Seeing HKBH in Nature

But not the regular Rabbeinu Bachya, this time it's the Ibn Tibbon translation, keep everyone on their toes. Min hachosov, Rabbeinu Bachya is again quoting the three rayas min hasechel according to reason, min hachosov Torah Shebi'ksav, min hamosov from Torah Sheba'al Peh that we are obligated to discern Hakadosh Baruch Hu's presence and His Chochmah in the Briya all around us. Min hachosov masheamar שאו מרום עיניכם וראו מי ברא אלה. V'amar כי אראה שמיך מעשה אצבעותיך ירח וכוכבים אשר כוננתה. V'amar

הלוא תדעו הלוא תשמעו הלוא הגד מראש לכם הלוא הבינותם מוסדות הארץ.

So havinosem mosdos ha'oretz, we're supposed to understand and contemplate who is responsible for mosdos ha'oretz. V'amar החרשים שמעו והעורים הביטו לראות. V'amar

טוב ללכת אל בית אבל מלכת אל בית משתה באשר הוא סוף כל האדם והחי יתן אל לבו.

So here already Rabbeinu Bachya, we'll see later when he quotes from Chazal also, is telling you that Bechina, to be discerning, to be reflective, doesn't just apply to studying science. It means that throughout life a person is supposed to be, again, very, always with this midah of Bechina, always discerning. He's not supposed to take anything for granted in life and he's not supposed to just go along with the tide in life. והחי יתן אל לבו, everything should be carefully thought out, everything should be reflected upon. Bichlal, within that, the Briya is included as well, but it's not limited to the Briya. V'amar החכם עיניו בראשו והכסיל בחשך הולך. V'amar

וארח צדיקים כאור נגה הולך ואור עד נכון היום דרך רשעים כאפלה לא ידעו במה יכשלו.

Min Hamikubal, meaning Torah Sheba'al Peh,

מה שאמרו זכרונם לברכה כל היודע לחשב בתקופות ומזלות ואינו מחשב עליו הכתוב אומר והיה כנור ונבל תף וחליל ויין משתיהם ואת פעל השם לא יביטו ומעשה ידיו לא ראו.

So the Gemara indicts someone who could study and appreciate and understand Poal Hashem, which refers here to the Briya, and doesn't do it is condemned by the posuk. V'amru מנין שחייב אדם לחשב בתקופות ומזלות shene'emar

ושמרתם ועשיתם כי היא חכמתכם ובינתכם לעיני העמים אשר ישמעון את כל החקים האלה. איזו היא חכמה ובינה שהיא לעיני העמים הוי אומר זה חשבון תקופות ומזלות.

V'amru

הוי מחשב הפסד מצוה כנגד שכרה ושכר עבירה כנגד הפסדה.

Again, same thing, now we're talking about Bechina not just as applied to the, to the Briya, not just in the sense of science, but in general.

הוי מחשב הפסד מצוה כנגד שכרה ושכר עבירה כנגד הפסדה.

A person's not supposed to live with hesech hadaas. A person is supposed to live, everything is supposed to be calculated, everything is supposed to be, everything he undertakes, everything he does is supposed to be with reflection. So the same way when he encounters the world, that's also supposed to be with reflection. He's not supposed to take it for granted but he's supposed to see the Chochmas Hashem in the Briya. V'amru אלמלא נתנה תורה לישראל למדנו צניעות מחתול. Even had the Torah not been given to Yisrael, we would have derived tzniyus me'chasul from a cat, arayos mi'yonah, derech eretz mi'tarnagol, and gezel mi'nemalah.

וכבר התבאר חיוב הבחינה בברואים והבאת הראיות מסימני החכמה ואתה דע לך.

Talk a little bit about this last raya. It's a Gemara which is often quoted and sometimes misunderstood. Again, what the Gemara says is that even if we wouldn't have the Torah, we would have inferred the principles of tzniyus, the principles of arayos, of derech eretz and gezel from the animal kingdom. We would have... to infer these principles. Again proving bechina. Proving that you're supposed to not just take things at face value but you're supposed to be discerning in how you encounter the world. So this Gemara is often quoted as a proof that Yahadus believes in what's called natural law. I.e. that outside of, independent, that there are certain independent absolute values, hence they're called natural law, meaning they don't come as a result of any commandment or any obligation, but they're natural law that's to be found in nature and as such are binding. So that's what the Gemara seems to be saying that even without a tzivui from Hashem in the Torah, so we would have recognized and Rabbeinu Bachya is clearly saying we not only would have recognized but we would have been obligated to learn from the tznius of the chasul, the arayus of the yonah, the derech eretz of the tarnegol, gezel min hanamala. So hence what people say as proof that Yahadus recognizes natural law. Again natural law in the sense that it's not supernatural, that it's not coming from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but it's natural, the same contrast that we intend between natural and supernatural, so too. But the emes is that that's a erroneous understanding of the Gemara and it's you see it very clearly here in Rabbeinu Bachya. Why is that? Throughout Chovos Halevavos, we've already seen it in this perek, Rabbeinu Bachya proves everything with hasechel, according to reason, according to Torah shebiksav, according to Torah sheba'al peh. Why does he justify everything according to reason as well? Sounds like the reason is also a source of truth. Torah shebiksav is a source of truth, Torah sheba'al peh is a source of truth and reason is also a source of truth. That's why everything he wants to prove, he wants to prove that there's an obligation to be discerning in how you encounter the world. So he proves it lephi hasechel, that's what we read last week, lephi hakasuv and lephi hamasur. Torah hasechel, Torah shebiksav, Torah sheba'al peh. Why do we attach so much importance to reason? So Rabbeinu Bachya himself says in the hakdoma to Chovos Halevavos, let me find it. Here. השערים שפתחם הבורא לדעת תורתו ודתו הם שלושה. The gateways to knowledge of Hashem and knowledge of his Torah are three. Three gateways, we would call three sources of truth. האחד מהם השכל הניצל מכל פגע. Pure reason as opposed to when one is influenced due to having a vested interest, but pure sechel. Hasheini Torah shebiksav, תורתו האמיתית הנתונה למשה נביא, והשלישי הקבלה שקיבלנו מקדמונינו. Right? So there's reason and there's Torah shebiksav and there's Torah sheba'al peh. So interestingly, let's re-read again the sentence here. The two—the translations don't differ on this crucial point. השערים שפתחם הבורא הם שלושה. The reason—the reason, sechel, reason is a source of knowledge only because what seems reasonable to us is also from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Let's say when we talk about mishpatim and chukim, right? So we know the Gemara says in Yoma that mishpatim are those that we recognize in our own as reasonable and chukim we don't, chukim we don't. So where did that come from? Why is it that we recognize gezel, shefichas damim? We recognize these. So it means that bateva our reason, so who created our reason? Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So when Rabbeinu Bachya says that we attach, that reason is a source of truth, that it's a gateway to knowledge, when he says that everything should be proved according to reason, not because reason has some independent standard, it's because Hakadosh Baruch Hu formed our reason, Hakadosh Baruch Hu created our reason. So anything which we—anything you speak of as an innate tendency, anything you speak of as intuitive, it's intuitive that gezeilah is wrong, it's intuitive that retzichah is wrong. So who created our intuition? Where did our intuition come from? So that also comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, also comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's why Hashearim for truth, Hashearim shepethacham haborei. That's why when a person's reason is not pure reason, but the very reason—the very moment he has some vested interest, the very moment he has some negiah badavar, so that's no longer the sechel hayashar which Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave him, so that's not a source of truth. It's a source of truth as long as that's the sechel which Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave him and as long as therefore the conclusions that he reaches are all based on that—on that sense of reason which Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted within us. So now when you come to this Gemara in Eruvin, so the Gemara in Eruvin is saying is interesting and important, but it's saying something very different than the way it's usually understood. The Gemara in Eruvin is not saying that without a tzivui from Hakadosh Baruch Hu we would have on our own deduced the principles of tzniyus, arayos, gezel. No, that's not what the Gemara says. The Gemara says without a tzivui in the Torah we would have found Hakadosh Baruch Hu's tzivui elsewhere. Doesn't mean that without a tzivui. That's not what it means. No, without a tzivui in the Torah, because Hakadosh Baruch Hu not only gave us the Torah but also gave us sechel and because Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the borei of our sechel and he's also the borei of the briyah, so then if we would have applied our sechel to the briyah, so even without the Torah we would have inferred the ציווי הקדוש ברוך הוא through the briyah from our sechel. But that's not—you can call it natural law if you want, but as long as you understand that it doesn't mean something which exists independent of the tzivui. No, not at all, because whenever Rabbeinu Bachya says that something would be obligatory because of sechel, it's because behind the sechel stands Hakadosh Baruch Hu, not because the sechel stands autonomously, independently, as something absolute. It's because the sechel is one of those Hashearim shepethacham haborei to know what the ratzon Hashem is. So when what this Gemara in Eruvin is saying is very important and is very fascinating, but what it's saying is that some of the tzivuyim which Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave are to be found not only in the Torah but are to be found in the world as well. The tzivui against gezel, against arayos, the imperative of tzniyus and derech eretz, so those imperatives are to be found not only in the Torah but Hakadosh Baruch Hu inscribed them in the world as well. משל למה הדבר דומה, you can read two ma'amarim by the same mechaber and you'll find oh he says the same thing in both places. So that's interesting, it's an interesting correlation, it's an important correlation, but it doesn't mean that. it just means that the same author said it twice in two different contexts, maybe in two different ways, maybe one will be a poem and maybe one will be prose and there maybe many differences but it's still הכל נתנו מרועה אחד. Be'emes you find the same thing. There is a famous two girsa'os in the Rambam in Hilchos Melachim. Rambam writes in Hilchos Melachim that when Bnei Noach observe שבע מצוות בני נח, so the Rambam writes that they have to observe it because Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave a tzivuy to Moshe Rabbeinu. It's not enough that Bnei Noach observe the שבע מצוות בני נח, they must explicitly do so because Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave such a tzivuy through Moshe Rabbeinu. Says the Rambam, a Ben Noach who observes the שבע מצוות בני נח, but he observes it because he thinks they're right, he observes it because of his moral sense, not because of a divine tzivuy על ידי משה רבינו, so the Rambam says he's not mechassidei umos ha'olam, he's not from mechassidei umos ha'olam, and then come two girsa'os: either ella mechachameihem—he's from the Chachmei Umos Ha'olam, though not from the mechassidei umos ha'olam—or velo mechachameihem. Right, over and over, whether it's he's not mechassidei umos ha'olam ella mechachameihem or velo mechachameihem. So that's a famous two girsa'os in the Rambam and here, the end of perek ches in Hilchos Melachim, the last halacha.

כל המקבל שבע מצוות ונזהר לעשותן הרי זה מחסידי אומות העולם ויש לו חלק לעולם הבא והוא שיקבל אותן ויעשה אותן מפני שציווה בהן הקדוש ברוך הוא בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבינו שבני נח מקודם נצטוו בהן אבל אם עשאן מפני הכרע הדעת,

his own moral sense, אין זה גר תושב ואינו מחסידי אומות העולם. Next question is velo mechachameihem or ella mechachameihem. So the Rav had a billion ha'aros in terms of being mevarer which of these girsa'os are correct. A line in the Rambam that everyone knows and no one stops to think about, very first line, very first line in Mishneh Torah. What's the very first line in Mishneh Torah? Everyone knows. You know the Rambam spells out יהוה, right? Everyone knows that. How does he spell out יהוה? Nu? יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. Amud hachochmos. What? לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. To know and believe in the existence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So how does the Rambam describe it? It's the yesod hayesodos, the pillar of all pillars, ve'amud, the basis of everything, ve'amud hachochmos. What do you mean, ve'amud hachochmos? What if a person just has a moral sense? A person has a moral sense. So the Rambam's saying, no, that's not true chochmah either, right? The Rambam's saying real chochmah, genuine, authentic chochmah cannot exist without knowing and believing in Hakadosh Baruch Hu שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא etc. So the Rav said clearly in light... I think this has been in one of the first messoros. ועמוד החכמות that clearly the correct girsa in Hilchos Melachim is velo mechachameihem. Velo mechachameihem, because that's what the Rambam tells you here, that there's no chochmah, there's no chochmah without recognizing Hakadosh Baruch Hu either. There's no chochmah without recognizing Hakadosh Baruch Hu either. So that's the same point. That's the same point as we're explaining in the Rabbeinu Bachya, that the importance and significance of reason is only when you recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu as the author of our reason and what seems reasonable to us. And therefore, what the Gemara in Eruvin is telling us, not that independently without a tzivuy of Hashem, without Hashem's input, we would have concluded and been obligated in tznius and arayos and derech eretz and gezel. No, it means that without a tzivuy in the Torah, we would have found the tzivuy elsewhere. That's what it means. The same emphasis in the Rambam of יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. So lemai nafkamina about this Gemorah in Eruvin, lemai nafkamina? It is in the Torah, so lemai nafkamina? Is there any nafkamina whether this im malei, right? Counter-positive. Even if it hadn't been in the Torah, so we would have inferred the tzivui elsewhere. So lemai nafkamina? lemai nafkamina? But the maiseh is it is in the Torah. So is it just of the theoretical, philosophical interest or is there some nafkamina? So lechora, lechora it's a gevaldig nafkamina ledina. gevaldig nafkamina ledina. What's nafkamina ledina? So we're all familiar, but lechora it should be put in this context, Rambam at Shemona Perakim, in the introduction to his Peirush on Pirkei Avos. So eight-chapter introduction, hence Shemona Perakim. So the Rambam writes, the Rambam quotes a stira between whether or not when you're supposed to do mitzvos, you're supposed to do mitzvos only because you're being kofeh es yitzro, because you're subordinating your yeitzer, what you would want to do to the tzivui of Hashem, but you're not supposed to internalize it necessarily to such an extent that you want to do it independently. Rambam quotes from Chazal that אל תאמר אי אפשי. Nu, a cheeseburger is very appetizing. There's nothing unappetizing about a cheeseburger, must taste gevaldig. So how come I don't eat the cheeseburger? I don't eat the cheeseburger not because of cholesterol either, no, get away with it once a week it'd be okay, besides the cholesterol. You don't eat it because מה אעשה שאבי שבשמים גזר עלי, right? Rashi on the Torah quotes that ma'amar Chazal also. Meidach, the Rambam says it seems to be emphasized that we're supposed to do things not just this is a tzivui of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but I takke also sense that this is right. So the Rambam answers by saying it's between mishpatim and chukim. In our observance of mishpatim, so a person is not supposed to abstain from gezel only because Hakadosh Baruch Hu commanded him. He's not just supposed to subordinate himself to the צווי הקדוש ברוך הוא. He's supposed to sense, he's supposed to internalize that it's wrong, that it's wrong. By chukim, no, a person is never, it's okay if a person, if a person thinks a cheeseburger is ma'os, that doesn't mean he's violating this ma'amar Chazal, it means it's because of the tzivui Hashem that he's doing it. But a person is never supposed to aspire to a madreiga, to a level where naturally, without thinking about the fact that it's a tzivui Hashem, that he's repulsed by shaatnez. No. No. So what's the teirutz? The teirutz is this: why, why should there be such a, where do, where does this distinction come from? Where does this distinction happen? The answer is you see that, you see Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the ratzon Hashem, sometimes Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us an intuition that it comes naturally to us. Mishpatim, that's what we call mishpatim. Other times Hakadosh Baruch Hu clearly left a gap between our intuitive sense and between what the chukkei HaTorah are. We have no intuitive sense about shaatnez, no, about basar becholov, no, no intuitive sense. So that's not bemikreh, it's not accidental. But apparently Hakadosh Baruch Hu is telling us these mitzvos, which I'm giving you an intuitive sense for, so I want you to observe them intuitively as well. The reason you have an intuitive sense is not accidental. It's not accidental, it's because that's supposed to be part of your mode of observance of the mitzvos. And those mitzvos which you have no intuitive sense, so that too is not accidental, but it's to tell you that that's supposed to be your mode of observance for those mitzvos. So again, kitzur amaiseh, the fact that our reason dictates mishpatim as well, the fact that without a tzivui in the Torah the Gemorah in Eruvin tells us we would conclude arayos. No, that's what the Rambam. How can it be? How can it be anything independent of Hakadosh Baruch Hu? There would be nothing. There would be total ayin, total nothingness. So how can there be any values either? Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the source of all existence, of all morality, of everything, of everything. That's what it means. What the Gemara tells you is that we would have seen the Ratzon Hashem elsewhere, because part of the Ratzon Hashem is intuitive to us, part of it is not intuitive. Lemai nafka mina? Lemai nafka mina is the Rambam in Shemonah Perakim, that even le'achar shenitna Torah, the fact that part of Torah is intuitive doesn't just become of theoretical, hypothetical, or philosophical interest, no, but it's very relevant and pertinent halacha lemaise. The fact that part of Torah, even without the Torah, is intuitive, the fact that part of Torah is paralleled in the natural world, the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wrote, as it were, some things twice, in the Torah and in the world, and some things wrote only once, so all that is halacha lemaise in terms of how you observe them. And that's the pshat in what the Rambam means in Shemonah Perakim. Okay. I think Sunday was officially designated a day of chazara in light of the upcoming kuntres.