1) Our Attitude Towards Chochma. 2) Taking Things for Granted

Rabbeinu Bachya, so it won’t take a lot of time for me to read it all inside, but just to summarize briefly before we comment. Rabbeinu Bachya says that the chiyuv of the bechinah which we’ve seen, the chiyuv of approaching the world of bechinah with discernment to recognize the Yad Hashem, Chachmas Hashem, Chasdei Hashem. So Rabbeinu Bachya says sometimes that Chachmas Hashem is more obvious, sometimes it's more subtle, and depending upon to what degree it's obvious, to that degree it's exoteric and everyone can easily appreciate it. And other dimensions and other facets of the Briya, the Chachmas Hashem is much more subtle. He goes on to say, if you have this edition, it’s on page kof-beis, if you don’t have this edition, it’s towards the, I don’t know, approaching the halfway mark of the perek. He says, HaPikeach HeNavon, the astute person, יסיק מן העולם ידיעת רוחניותו ודברים העדינים שבו, spiritual matters, ויעשם סולם ללמוד מהם על בורא הכל יתעלה, about the existence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. ובכך מטיל על עצמו משמעתו, the obligation to surrender to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and va-avodaso, to serve Hakadosh Baruch Hu, כפי רוממותו וגדלותו בלבו, according to the degree that a person has apprehended the greatness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. וכן יזקק מגשמיות העולם, he will purify from the material of the world, מה שיש בו תועלת גופו, what he needs for sustenance,

ויציבת מצבו בעולם כפי הצורך והסיפוק בלבד. ויעזוב שאר מותרות העולם,

he will abandon other excesses, המטרידים את הלבבות, which distract and deflect the hearts from Hashem yisbarach v'yis'romem. וישתדל במעשיו למען אחריתו, for his ultimate destiny, ולמה שיגיע אליו אחר מותו, and for the fate that awaits him after his death. V'yikba b'daato,

כי העולם הזה וכל אשר בו מעבר לעולם העתיד עולם הבא ולאחריתו,

it's a transition to the future world, olam ha-ba, and for the end. לפיכך לא יקח ממנו, consequently a person takes from this world,

מה שיועיל לו כאשר יעזוב אותו לבד. והסכל בעניני העולם הזה ובעיקרי החכמה שבו,

the one who is foolish in his encounter with this world and even in his encounter with the Chachmas Hashem in this world, oseh osah naveihu, he makes this world into his abode, v'olam nitzcho, and into his eternal world, ומשתדל למענו בכל יכולתו, and he exerts himself for it with all his strength. entirely oriented and geared towards olam hazeh ואינו מעלה על לבו and it doesn't occur to him ki yegio and his toil ve-odef ve-huchusho and his accumulation of properties עובר לזולתו בחייו ואחר מותו is transient, he doesn't retain it, ונעלם ממנו צרכי אחריתו לגמרי and he totally ignores his ultimate needs. And then he goes on to give to draw an analogy to two brothers to illustrate this point. First, it's just interesting to notice Rabbeinu Bachya says that even the person who looks for the chochmah in olam hazeh can do so in a misguided fashion, can do so in a misguided fashion. It's very much comparable, I think, to rephrase what he says in modern terms, someone who approaches the world, who studies science, and the driving force is the technological advance which science can facilitate, or even the questions which science can answer, which preoccupy contemporary science, how old the world is, how was the world created. And at no point in their study of science, in their study of the world, do they stop to look for or recognize the Yad Hashem, the hand of Hashem in the world, the chochmas Hashem. And this analogy of the person who even the traces of chochmah in this world, he's totally geared and oriented towards olam hazeh in his pursuit of the chochmah is very much paralleled nowadays, its contemporary counterpart is on, again, the emphasis on technology and history of the world to the exclusion of seeing Yad Hashem reflected in the world. There's also another theme here which Rabbeinu Bachya is assuming. Rabbeinu Bachya clearly considers it a mitzvah to study science and to study the world. That's quite clear. The entire Sha'ar is Sha'ar HaBechinah, that there's a chiyuv to be discerning about the world, to understand the world. At the beginning of this perek he says that the way you go about understanding the world is to understand the various yesodos, the building blocks of the world, what the world is composed of, and how and how it functions, and how it's purposeful. So he clearly considers it a mitzvah to study science. There's no there's no two ways about that. And yet, it's quite clear that the person who studies science without the proper goal and without the proper motive doesn't just seem to be in a lower class, doesn't just seem to be doing the mitzvah shelo lishmah, doesn't seem to be doing a mitzvah at all. In his mashal, in his analogy to the two brothers, so it's quite clear from the analogy that the foolish brother, the brother who lives for the day and doesn't engage in long-term planning, the nimshal being whether one lives for olam hazeh or whether one lives for olam haba, it's quite clear that this foolish brother is being indicted and condemned, and there's no there's no saving grace to what he's doing. There's no there's no silver lining to the cloud. So why is that? If it's a mitzvah to study to study science, to study the chochmas Hashem in the world. So let's say a person does it purely for purposes of technology and not for the purpose of encountering Hashem. So let be shelo lishmah, let it be על מנת להיות עשיר, al menas that shelo lishmah it should be, it should be a mitzvah shelo lishmah. Ella mai. Ella mai, Berachma means as follows. You find the Rishonim say even le-man de-omar מצוות אינן צריכות כוונה, even le-man de-omar מצוות אינן צריכות כוונה, and if you eat matzah on the night of Tes-Vov Nissan, so you yotzei the mitzvah even without kavanah, you have to know it's the night of Pesach. You have to know it's the night of Pesach. You have to know it's matzah. You don't necessarily have to have a Harei'ni muchan u-mezuman to be mkayem mitzvas matzah. You can do it because you're hungry. You can do it because you're hungry. That can be the impulse, but you have to know that it's the night of Pesach and you have to know it's matzah you're eating. Otherwise, even le-man de-omar מצוות אינן צריכות כוונה, you're not yotzei. Why is that? What's the pshat? The pshat is as follows. The machlokes mitzvos tzerichos kavanah, einan tzerichos kavanah, whether or not kavanah la-tzeis is indispensable for the mitzvah. But everyone agrees that if you would be a misasek, not knowing what you were doing, everyone would agree—let's say the Gemara says explicitly in Rosh Hashanah that if a person is sometimes lucid and sometimes he's not lucid, maybe he's an epileptic, whatever the diagnosis is. So if he eats matzah at the time when he's not lucid, so he's not yotzei the mitzvah. Ai, מצוות אינן צריכות כוונה? But you still have to be a bar da'as, you still can't be a misasek. Kavanah is dispensable, but you have to know what you're doing. If you don't know it's the night of Pesach, so the matzah isn't really a cheftza shel matzah. It's indistinguishable from chametz, from ice cream, from any food. So in order for this just to be a cheftza shel mitzvah, in order for you not to be a misasek, even without kavanah, you have to know that it's the night of Pesach and you have to know that it's matzah. You have to know that it's matzah. Ke-yotzei ba-zeh, if a person approaches the world, a person takes their course in chemistry, biology, physics, astronomy, whatever it is, takes a course, and the subject matter of the course is defined as, again, the basic concepts of chemistry, basic laws and concepts and mathematical equations of chemistry. So that's one course, that's one cheftza. Or a person can take a course in chemistry, but the course description can be Chachmas Hashem as reflected in the branch of science known as chemistry, which will include a discussion of the basic laws and concepts and mathematical equations of chemistry. So the subject matter and most of the lectures and most of what's said in the lectures will be the same, but yet the cheftza has been identified very differently. A difference which parallels whether a person eats matzah knowing that tonight is Pesach, or whether a person eats matzah unaware that tonight is Pesach. When a person eats matzah unaware that tonight is Pesach, so it bichlal doesn't have the chashivus of matzah for him. He's not just lacking kavanah la-tzeis, he's not just lacking that intangible of kavanah la-tzeis, but it's not even—it doesn't even have the chashivus of matzah for him. Because מצה בשאר ימות השנה is insignificant, it has no special status. So too, the reason Rabbeinu Bachya dismisses in very strong terms someone who studies and someone who sees chochmas ha-olam, but doesn't see chochmas ha-olam as a סולם ללמוד ממנה על הבורא. Doesn't see it as a ladder leading you to yedi'as Hashem, so he doesn't know he's eating matzah. It's not just that he's not doing it lishmah, it's not just that he's doing it shelo lishmah, it's not just that he's doing without kavanah, he doesn't know this is matzah. He doesn't know it's the night of Pesach. If a person studies science because this isn't just the world, but it's עולמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא שברא הקדוש ברוך הוא and he studies science with that, with that intention and in that context. So that's one pursuit. And it's entirely a different pursuit. It's not just that the motive is different, but the cheftza, the subject matter of his study, is totally different. If he's studying the world, he's studying the world, not עולמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא. With this in mind, keep this distinction in mind, I think you'll see a diyuk nifla in the lashon of Rambam. In the famous Rambam, the beginning of Perek Beis of Yesodei HaTorah, Halacha Beis, Rambam writes היכי הדרך לאהבתו ויראתו? In Halacha Aleph, so the Rambam quotes the passuk of ואהבת את ה׳ אלוהיך, את ה׳ אלוהיך תירא, there's a mitzvah of ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem. היכי הדרך לאהבתו ויראתו? Where does a person get the impulse for ahavas Hashem and yiras Hashem? So the Rambam writes בשעה שיתבונן האדם במעשיו וברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים when a person will reflect upon the actions and creations, the wondrous actions and creations of Hakadosh Baruch Hu ויראה מהם חכמתו שאין לה ערך ולא קץ and he will discern the wisdom of Hakadosh Baruch Hu that's infinite and you can't even evaluate it, מיד הוא אוהב ומשבח. So immediately a person will be overcome with a sense of ahava. So if you'll notice, the Rambam is very careful, Rambam is medayek to write b'sha'ah sheyisbonen ha'adam. He should have said or could have said בשעה שיתבונן האדם בברואים הנפלאים הגדולים, right? In the briyah. But the Rambam writes בשעה שיתבונן האדם במעשיו וברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים. The possessive with a capital H, right? His actions, His creations. So what, why not just בשעה שיתבונן האדם בעולם? And we know who created the world. We know we already like the famous joke with the apikoros and the Briskaya. It's a mefurash Rambam. We know who created the world. We already know that from Perek Aleph of Yesodei HaTorah. דאס ווייסט מען שוין. So you don't have to tell to us again in Perek Beis of Yesodei HaTorah. So what's the emphasis in this context of b'ma'asav uvru'av haniflaim? אלא הן הן הדברים. That's the same notion which underlies this perek in Rabbeinu Bachya. The Rambam says no, don't think that if you involve in astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, whatever it may be, so don't think that that's going to impel you towards ahavas v'yiras Hashem. What I am promising you is that if you will identify your subject matter not as bruim haniflaim, not as the briyah, but as bruav haniflaim, the creations of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, if that will be the context in which you study, if that will be how you identify your pursuit and your quest for knowledge about the world because it's not the world, it's not briyah hanifla, but it's bruav haniflaim, so then the Rambam tells you it will be an immediate instinctive response of miyad hu ohev. A person will be inspired to ahavas Hashem to yiras Hashem. But this is emes tzufa, as any truth of Torah is eternal. And yet it's probably even more true in the world we live in than it was in the Rambam's day. It was true then, but it's probably even more true now. It's even more true today that unless a person approaches again his study of the world as a whole as במעשיו וברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים, that there won't be any mitzvah component and it is highly, highly unlikely that he will gain in terms of his yiras shamayim from that pursuit. The reason for that is that the scientific establishment today by and large, and I'm not talking about the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists now, I'm talking about the others, by and large. You don't find it in science textbooks. You can check. You don't find the the word God doesn't make it into the textbooks. Doesn't make it into the textbooks. And the reason is that the way the self-perception which the scientific establishment has of itself is that their success in understanding chukei hateva, in understanding the laws which govern the natural world, so they mistakenly think that the degree to which you can give natural explanations, so to that degree you don't have to speak about hakadosh baruch hu who's being supernatural. And that's why the entire the entire endeavor of science today and has been for a while in the modern era is totally permeated with basically with an atheistic approach. Now again, if the same natural if the same chukei hateva would be studied and discovered as evidence of and as reflecting hakadosh baruch hu, so then it remains a very valuable endeavor. But certainly today where not only would the pursuit be neutral, but on the contrary, the unwritten and unstated bias is antithetical, so certainly today to undertake any study of science without this a priori understanding that what you're studying is ma'asav u'bru'av hanifla'im, so certainly any such endeavor would would not yield positive results. This is consistent with the theme which we developed a few weeks ago the time we gave the mashal of sometimes you have a you could have a certain picture and you have a design which is embedded in the picture. So if you're sensitive to the design and you're looking for it, so then you'll detect it. But if you're not sensitive to it and you're not looking for it, so then it will remain undetected. And so it is with our avodas Hashem and this is just another instance and illustration of that that in avodas Hashem you have to be looking for hakadosh baruch hu. We can't just go through the motions and wait for hakadosh baruch hu to overtake and find us, but you have to be looking for hakadosh baruch hu. You can't just go through the motions of being bochen the world as Rabbeinu Bachaye would say, of being discerning about the world and seeing chukei hateva. No. So then you'll miss the geometric design. You'll miss the presence of hakadosh baruch hu who stands behind the world. You have to be looking for him at all times. Perek daled, Rabbeinu Bachaye goes on and he categorizes that the seven different areas in which chochmas Hashem can be discerned in the briah. And he lists the the seven categories. For the most part straightforward. Just wanted to comment briefly. The sixth of the seven groups, so Rabbeinu Bachaye says היסוד השישי עקבות החכמה הגלוים במדעים ובמלאכות ובמעשים. Again, this is a little bit halfway through the perek. Hayisod hashishi ikvos, the traces of chochma hagluim which are revealed bamada'im uvem'lachos uvema'asim

אשר נתן השם יתרומם שמו בלב האדם להשלמת צרכיו והשגת כלכלתו ושאר תועליותיו הכלליות והפרטיות ועליהם רמז הכתוב באמרו מי נתן בטוחות חכמה.

The capacity which man has to manufacture for all kinds of applied technology to satisfy his needs, so that human capacity itself, so where does that capacity come from? It also comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That too is a reflection of the Chochmas Hashem that he gave us this capacity to develop technology which will address our needs. It's interesting that the Rabbeinu Bachya here is being very limited. He's not saying that any expression of human ingenuity is a reflection of Chochmas Hashem. He doesn't say that

היסוד השישי עיקר החכמה הגלויה בכל מעשה ובכל ספרי האדם על כל אופניו.

He doesn't say that. He very carefully limits it to when we take advantage of the abilities and capacities and potential Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us for purposeful knowledge. Or in other words, it is on occasion erroneously suggested that any branch of human endeavor just by virtue of the fact that a person is Betzelem Elokim, so that automatically validates and gives importance to any cultural pursuit and validates any endeavor, and that this should then be included in the definition of Chochma, which then it becomes an appropriate subject of study. Rabbeinu Bachya is very careful not to say that. When Rabbeinu Bachya says that there are seven areas in which we can see Chochmas Hashem, so he doesn't say the entire gamut of human endeavor. He says those Chochmos, those Madayim, sciences, Melachos, processes, אשר נתן השם בלב האדם להשלמת צרכיו. Or in other words, the point here is as follows. Very often in the discussion of what other disciplines are meaningful, so there's a distinct lack of rigor in those discussions. So everyone knows the Midrash in Eicha Rabbah which is quoted all the time, that bagoyim ein Torah, so תורה בגוים אל תאמין חכמה בגוים תאמין. So Chochma can be found, is found, even amongst the Chachmei Umos Haolam. There's a bracha for Chachmei Umos Haolam. So apparently there's such a thing as being a Chacham in Chachmei Umos Haolam. And that's undeniably true. Those are meforshei halachos. However, what the follow-up that needs to be done, and very often this follow-up is not done rigorously enough, is to understand what Chazal had in mind by Chochma. The fact that Chazal clearly indicate that there is such a thing as Chochmah bagoyim, that there is such a thing as a Chacham in Chachmei Umos Haolam, the sight of whom would be mechayiv you in a bracha, the sight of... That doesn't necessarily mean that the definition of chochmah is what is everything that the goyim will tell you is chochmah. Doesn't necessarily mean that whatever secular definition of chochmah or culture is current in the times we live, that doesn't necessarily mean that that's what Chazal had in mind by chochmah ba'goyim. And this is very clear in Rabbeinu Bachya. He doesn't tell you, he doesn't just say, well, any human endeavor is chochmah. No, he says in terms of the seven areas, so one of the seven areas in which you see chochmah shel Hashem is, but not any area of human endeavor automatically. So it's very, it's very important to follow up after quoting chochmah ba'goyim ta'amin ve'chulu and similar such marei mekomos. It's very important that that be followed up by trying to find how in Chazal and in their wake, in the Rishonim, how this chochmah was defined. So Rabbeinu Bachya talks about it in his hakdama to Chovos HaLevavos. He talks about different disciplines within chochmah. So there are some things that are there, and lots of things that are not there, lots of things that are not there. You have to begin with, of course, with the Mishnayos, Gemara, Tekufos, Gematriyaos, Parparos to chochmah, Chishuv Tekufos u'Mazalos. But the assumption automatically that because there is such a thing as chochmah, that chochmah is then going to be defined by whatever the contemporary culture defines, is a very wrong and misleading assumption. At the end here of this perek, so Rabbeinu Bachya says, in the very, the last ten lines or so here, Perek Vav, Rabbeinu Bachya writes ואמרו כי דרגת הטבע ביחס לתורה that the level of teva, of nature, be'yachas la'Torah in relation to Torah, היא כדרגת העבד ביחס לאדונו is similar, is analogous to the relationship of a slave to his master.

שאין כוחות הטבע נוהגים בניהול העולם אלא לפי מה שתאות להם התורה

ke'ein ma'amar ha'kasuv

ועבדתם את ה' אלקיכם וברך את לחמך ואת מימך והסירותי מחלה מקרבך ואמר והיה אם שמוע תשמעו לקול ה' אלקיך והישר בעיניו תעשה והאזנת למצוותיו ושמרת כל חוקיו כל המחלה אשר שמתי במצרים לא אשים עליך כי אני ה' רופאך.

This is a very, very fundamental understanding. What's the relationship between chukkei ha'teva, nature, and between hashgacha pratis, between divine providence? So the Rishon, Rabbeinu Bachya is not the only one who discusses it, but Rabbeinu Bachya says is very fundamental and I think by and large the accepted approach. Mitzad echad, so we clearly don't deny that there is such a thing as teva. We clearly don't deny that there is such a thing as teva. Even the famous Ramban at the end of Parshas Bo, which is often cited, even the Ramban elsewhere speaks of teva. So even the Ramban has to have to figure out what the kasuv ha'shelishi is. Even in the famous Ramban at the end of Parshas Bo where he talks about everything being nissim nistarim, but yet me'idach gisa, the Ramban in Bechukosai when talking about refuah says that if you trust doctors, so takeh teva does rule. In Bereishis on Ki Yedativ, the Ramban also speaks clearly of teva. So we don't deny teva. You see we don't deny teva. We have a din of אין סומכין על הנס. We have a din of rapoh yerape. So we clearly don't deny that there is such a thing as teva, that there are natural processes in the world. So we had, we had in Tosafot that even shluchei mitzvah who have a havtacha that einan nizokin, so bemakom deshchiach hezeika. So what does shechiach hezeika mean? By natural, according to natural laws, right? According to the natural probability, possibilities. Shechiach hezeika, probability. So even a shliach mitzvah has to be choshesh for whatever. The mitzvah of ma'akeh, as the Sefer Hachinuch explains:

ועשית מעקה לגגך ולא תשים דמים בביתך כי יפול הנופל ממנו.

So what do you mean? It's from Hashem? If he's supposed to fall, then he's supposed to fall. So apparently, the Rabbeinu Bachya says ve'acharei kichlos hakol, we do recognize there is something as teva. There is something as teva. Ve'idach gisa, so how do you say Hatzur tamim po'olo, everything is just, we assume that everything that happens to us is just. Hakol bidei shamayim. So how do you reconcile these two? So what Rabbeinu Bachya says is very important. What Rabbeinu Bachya says is as follows: we do deny teva in the following sense. Here we'll quote the Rambam again, not so much the Rambam in these inyanim is a separate discussion, so we're just taking one halacha in the Rambam for our purposes here, not discussing his overall shita. The Rav underscored time and time again, the very first halacha here: יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות. So last week you remember we spoke about the significance of chochmos here.

לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת הימצאו.

So the Rav emphasized the present tense in the Rambam, that הוא ממציא כל נמצא. Rambam doesn't say himtzi. Rambam doesn't speak of bri'as ha'olam as a historical event, but mamtzi kol nimtza. He brings into being, he brings into existence all that exists. Belashon hoveh, in the present tense. And I think they say from the Baal Shem Tov, Baal Shem Tov says לעולם השם דברך ניצב בשמים. So what does it mean, לעולם השם דברך ניצב בשמים? So it means that, the Baal Shem says it means בעשרה מאמרות נברא העולם. The world was created through ma'amaros of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So לעולם השם דברך ניצב בשמים? It's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu simply, he says something, and so it's gone, right? Whatever soundwaves emanate from your mouth when you speak, so they dissipate and finish, finished. You spoke, but my words aren't still, my words of a second ago are not still hanging in the air. So what does it mean, what does the pasuk have in mind when it portrays the words of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, לעולם השם דברך ניצב בשמים? So the Baal Shem Tov says that's what it means. It means that the ma'amarim of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, which brought the world into existence, so those ma'amarim are still there because it's a constant process. It wasn't a one-time historical event that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu constantly and continuously wills the world to exist in the present tense, the same emphasis as the Rav saw in the present tense in the Rambam of mamtzi kol nimtza. So in that sense, we do deny teva. In that sense we deny teva. There has always been a philosophical position which compared bri'as ha'olam to a watchmaker who makes a watch, right? Kayadu'a. But they give that analogy, that the same way the watchmaker was instrumental and without him the watch wouldn't exist, but once he set the watch in motion, so then the watchmaker is totally removed from the functioning of the watch. So in that sense, in the sense that teva is something automatic, in the sense that teva is something immutable, in the sense that teva... something blind in that, well, the laws of nature say that if you're drunk you won't be able to drive straight and you might plow into someone else's car, in the sense of Chukei HaTeva being blind and immutable and absolute, so in that sense we deny Chukei HaTeva. In that sense we deny Chukei HaTeva. To the degree that Chukei HaTeva would impinge upon the justness of and justice within the world, within Hakadosh Baruch Hu's world, so we say no, it's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu instilled these Chukei HaTeva and Rachmana Litzlan retired. No, chas veshalom, that's not the case. It's לעולם ה׳ דברך נצב בשמים. Mamtzai kol nimtza. And as such, those Chukei HaTeva don't reign, again, blindly and absolutely. They're not immutable, but rather, to the extent, to the extent that there is no clash between the Chukei HaTeva and Torah, so to that extent we recognize teva. We don't deny teva. And to that extent we say that אין סומכין על הנס and to that extent, so we're not Christian Scientists and we go to doctors when we get sick because אין סומכין על הנס, so we, we work through natural channels and we have a mitzvas ma'akeh and you put on a seatbelt when you're driving the car because Chukei HaTeva do exist. To the extent that Chukei HaTeva can blindly impose a fate upon a person, a fate which would be unjust, so to that extent we deny teva. To that extent we say that yeah, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu can manipulate teva, but whether or not this drunk driver hits the car head-on or doesn't hit the car head-on, or some other variable, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu manipulates teva that albeit in a fashion of nes nistar, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu manipulates teva that teva shouldn't impinge upon the הצור תמים פעלו כי כל דרכיו משפט. Okay. Perek Hey in Sha'ar HaBechina, Rabbeinu Bachya continues and says of the seven areas which if we were to explore, we would find traces and we would see chochmas Hashem reflected, the one which is closest to us, which is most immediate, is studying the microcosm of man. Ikvos hachochma hagluyim, the traces of chochma which are evident b'min ha'adam, in the species of man, shehu ha'olam hakatan, he's a microcosm. לפיכך חייבים אנו להתבונן, the very first paragraph here in Perek Hey, לפיכך חייבים אנו להתבונן בראשית האדם וגידולו, so therefore we are obligated to reflect upon the entire lifespan from conception on, which is what Rabbeinu Bachya proceeds to do here in Perek Hey. So I just want one general he'arah and then perhaps to give one example. We're not going to read the entire perek because it's rather lengthy, and I hope you will, if you haven't yet read it, we're not going to read the whole thing together. One general he'arah about the entire perek and then we'll choose just a few lines to illustrate this with. Rabbeinu Bachya's lesson: simple but profound, perhaps profound but simple, is that there's so much to be learned and inferred just by not taking things for granted. That's the entire theme of Sha'ar HaBechina, but particularly here, particularly here. He describes the miraculous nature of development from Conception through adulthood. And when you stop and think about it, it's fucking mind-boggling. It's fucking mind-boggling. Nothing comparable. Nothing comparable. There's so much in terms of niflaos haborei that you don't need scientific discoveries, even without the Hubble telescope. That's good, but even without that, even without seeing what's going on one hundred million light years away in the outer recesses of the universe, there's so much just in our everyday experience, in our everyday experience, if only we wouldn't take things for granted. There's so much of נפלאות הקדוש ברוך הוא if we wouldn't take it for granted we'd be simply inundated with reminders of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's presence. And that's perhaps the most important of everything he says throughout this entire sha'ar, is not to take things for granted, to stop and reflect upon things. And then without discoveries, without discovering new planets, without discovering new theories, without discovering—that adds and that enhances. But there's so much, there's so much just if we would stop taking things for granted. So we take things for granted because what's familiar we take for granted. We know ein navi be'iro, ein navi be'iro. Whatever... ein navi be'iro, ein navi be'iro, otherwise known as the grass is always greener on the other side of the mountain. So that's a tendency we have, and it's a tendency which robs us of so much chizuk in emuna and so much inspiration which is so readily available in the world. Further on in this perek in describing the infancy of a person, so he describes the miracle of nursing, how a child is never deprived of food, how the flow of milk is regulated to exactly what the child is capable of handling. Then he says אחר כך יחזק גופו, he grows, he strengthens a little bit, ואז יראה הצורות וישמע הקולות, he becomes aware of the world around him, ויתן השם חמלה ורחמים בלב הוריו, Hakadosh Baruch Hu instills compassion and mercy in the heart of his parents כדי להקל עליהם גידולו, to make his upbringing, his raising easier for them, ויעדיפוהו על עצמם במאכל ומשתה, they give him precedence to them—over themselves. They put the child before themselves. First they feed the child and only then will they themselves eat. ויקל עליהם טרחה וקושי גידולו, and again he lightened the load of raising him, כגון רחיצתו וניקויו והטיפול בו על כרחו של התינוק. That the love which parents have is what energizes them to do what otherwise would be too burdensome in terms of childcare. This is another example of what—again, of the general theme of the perek, of not taking things for granted. And here Rabbeinu Bachya is saying something very profound. I once, some of you might remember a couple of years ago I once spoke about this. Why is it given that the world around us abounds with niflaos Hashem, chochmas Hashem, chasdei Hashem, why are we so blind to so many of them? So we saw... That's another one also, and that is: it has been commented correctly, we know that our language is a vehicle for expression. That you communicate through language. If I'm thinking to myself, "Could you please lend me a pen?" so if I don't have the words to express myself, I can't communicate that to you. I can't communicate that to you. So if we share a common language, we can communicate. I can tell you what I'm thinking, "Could you please lend me a pen?" and you can tell me what you're thinking, "Baruch Hashem," and so we communicated. So it's a good thing we have language, we were able to, we successfully communicated. But there is another and sometimes more subtle dimension to language, and that is that language is not just the vehicle of expression of our thoughts, but the language we're taught influences our thinking. It influences our thinking. The categories of thought which are embodied in a language then influence our thinking. Case in point. Case in point. Everyone is familiar with the phrase "maternal instinct". Everyone knows "maternal instinct". What does "maternal instinct" mean? So instinct, I don't know why I didn't bring my Oxford World Dictionary, I always do, but so instinct means something natural, a given. So maternal instinct means that mothers as a given, so mothers react and have compassion for children. That's what maternal instinct means. But because of that association of instinct that we have, so instinct, we know there's a survival instinct, we know there's a maternal instinct, we're familiar with various kinds of instincts. But right away when you hear the word instinct, so that tells you right away don't ask me any more questions because once you say it's instinctual, that means we've analyzed it and we've identified it as an instinct, there's nothing more to be understood, there's nothing more to be gained by probing any further because that's what an instinct means. An instinct is just like in geometry, it all comes down to what your axioms are. So once you say something is axiomatic, so you can't ask, well, why is it? Axiomatic means, well no, those are the axioms which you establish, which you're assuming. So instinct has that same connotation for us. It's something axiomatic, it's a given. So when we hear instinct, so we don't think about it, we don't reflect, we don't, we stop thinking. We stop thinking because that's what instinct means. That's what the word instinct means. So this is an excellent, excellent case in point of where language and where phrases that we're taught don't just facilitate expression, but actually influence thought. Really, the correct description is it's not a maternal instinct, but it's a God-given, almost superhuman, supernatural capacity for compassion and for concern. And it's this Rabbeinu Bachya which underlines the maamar chazal. We're all familiar with the Gemara in Kiddushin that השוה הכתוב כיבוד אב ואם וכבוד המקום, and השוה הכתוב מורא אב ואם ומורא המקום. So אלמלא מאמר חז"ל נאמר, iy efshar le'omro. That Chazal hadn't said it, you couldn't say it. How can you say that the Torah equates anything with kvod hamakom? How can anything, good, so kibbud av va'eim is very important and filial responsibility is very important and very central u'khulu u'khulu, but how can you say that the Torah equates anything with kvod hamakom? לא מטעם האי אמרה לכאורה. Chazal said. The famous Gemara with Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemara says in Kiddushin כי שמע קול כרעי דאימיה when he heard his mother's footsteps said eikum mikamei Shechinah. Let me get up for the Shechinah. Again, if it hadn't been a Gemara, you couldn't have said it. But אם גמרא היא נקבל. So what does it takeh mean? What does it mean? What does it mean? What does it mean that Rabbi Yochanan heard the pitter-patter of his mother's footsteps and says he has to jump up for the Shechinah? Where's the Shechinah? So the teretz is, that capacity which Rabbi Yochanan's mother had of v'tadad shenatah me'eineha, of at any hour, day or night, to be at the call and beckon of this little infant isn't a human capacity, human passion. It doesn't make any sense because bederech hateva everyone is self-centered, everyone is self-centered. bishvili nivra ha'olam doesn't require, a person doesn't have to, I know the Steipler Gaon used to pace up and down all night saying minalo tazua, minalo tazua, minalo tazua. You don't have to pace up and down all night and say bishvili nivra ha'olam. No need for gadlus bichlal, you don't have to chazer too much. Comes right naturally. bishvili nivra ha'olam is very, we have an instinct for that, for bishvili nivra ha'olam. People are self-centered. People are self-centered. And yes, this self-centeredness notwithstanding, there's a tremendous longing for children, and once you have children, the capacity for self-sacrifice which people have for children is unparalleled anywhere, and even within their own lives is unparalleled. Even within their own lives is unparalleled. So what's p'shat then? So Rabbi Yochanan knew p'shat then. Rabbi Yochanan knew that that paternal instinct, that parental instinct, that maternal instinct is really, is really a God-given capacity and that his mother was the shluach derachmana to bestow chasadim upon him. It wasn't, it wasn't a natural instinct that again somehow or other it's axiomatic, it's a given. No, that's mechasedei Hashem. That's mechasedei Hashem, and that's an expression of the rachmei Hashem. The irrational compassion which and concern which parents have for children, and lemaiseh it's totally irrational, totally irrational. The irrational compassion and concern which parents have for children is a me'ein of the rachmei Hashem for people. That's what Rabbi Yochanan recognized. So Rabbi Yochanan said, oh, his mother's coming, so his mother's representing the Shechinah. That maternal love which she has wasn't her own, it wasn't the human she realized the capacity, she carried out the shlichus, but that capacity was a God-given capacity. And in that sense, so she represented the Shechinah for him. She represented the Shechinah for him. And in that sense, so השוה הכתוב כיבוד אב ואם לכבוד המקום because really who are you respecting? You're really respecting Hakadosh Baruch Hu because you recognize that the parents are emissaries in terms of that, that overflow of ahava which parents have for children, so they're merely agents of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. But we miss it all with one phrase. We call it a maternal instinct and finish. We call it instinct and finish. And we miss everything. So besides taking things for granted, also have to be acutely aware of biases which our language and the surrounding culture imposes upon us. That's what the Rabbeinu Bachya says it here and then he repeats it again later that this parental capacity is ויתן השם חמלה ורחמים בלב ההורים. And that's how a person is supposed to view it, as a pale reflection of the rachmei shamayim for us. And if, and if this is the rachmanus which human parents who acharei k'chol Even with this parental capacity are limited, parents also lose their patience with kids. Even with the parental capacity are limited, so על אחת כמה וכמה the rachamim which Hakadosh Baruch Hu has for people. So something like this is a very powerful illustration and case in point of how if we don't take things for granted, how if we're not distracted by by the phraseology, how we can have constant reminders and constant inspiration from the presence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu all around us. Okay, so then next Tuesday we'll continue.