Chessed and Hisbatlus to HKB”H

In the previous shmooze on the Ibn Ezra's explanation of the word chesed, the Ibn Ezra says that the fundamental semantic semantics of chesed are really neutral and that chesed means something which is an extreme. And in theory, it can denote an extreme in a negative sense as well as in a positive sense. The regular usage is more associated with a positive sense and that's how the Ibn Ezra explains al derech hapeshat when the Torah refers to the incestuous relationship of ach ve’achot is chesed hu. But it means it's an extreme, in that sense an extreme of what's repugnant, of what's anathema. And that the meforshim, some meforshim suggest that that's also the usage of the word chesed in Sefer Yonah in the pasuk of משמרים הבלי שוא חסדם יעזובו. The Rambam follows in the footsteps of the Ibn Ezra. The Rambam says כבר ביארנו בפירוש אבות reading from Rav Kapach's translation כי חסד עניינו ההפלגה באיזה דבר שהופלג בו. That again, that chesed, the sense, the meaning of chesed again is extra, extreme. ושימושו בהפלגה במעשה הטוב יותר. And the general usage of the word again is in a positive sense. The Rambam elaborates a little bit. וידוע כי ההטבה כוללת שני עניינים. To be a benefactor, to bestow a benefaction is in one of two situations, one of two contexts. האחד להטיב למי שאין לו זכות עליך כלל. Again, to bestow a benefaction on someone who has no claim whatsoever, someone who's not deserving at all.

והשני להטיב למי שיש לו זכות עליך ביותר מן המגיע לו.

The sheni is to again to bestow tov, benefaction on someone who has some degree of deserving but to exceed that in what you give the person, to exceed that in what you bestow upon the person.

ורוב שימוש ספרי הנבואה במילת חסד הוא בהטבה למי שאין לו זכות עליך כלל.

And most of the time we find the word chesed used in Tanach, it refers to the first of the two cases where the person has no claim whatsoever. לפיכך כל טובה הבאה מאיתו יתעלה נקראת חסד. And that's why we refer to any good that Hakadosh Baruch Hu bestows as chesed.

אמר חסדי ה' אזכיר. ולפיכך כל המציאות הזו כלומר המצאתו יתעלה אותו הוא חסד אמר עולם חסד יבנה.

And that's why the very again fact of existence is referred to as chesed, is described as chesed, as in the pasuk of olam chesed yibaneh. See, the question arises, so that's the Rambam again following in the footsteps of the Ibn Ezra. Now chesed, of course, is enumerated amongst the... vechanun erech apayim, so by chessed the Torah refers to HaKadosh Baruch Hu as Rav Chessed, which the meforshim take to mean not only that Rav Chessed, since chessed is the noun which means kindness, so you have to say that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is the master of kindness, so it's not just that Rav Chessed is the equivalent of saying Rachum vechanun. No, if that's all the Torah wanted to express, the Torah mistam could have said chassid. The Torah didn't have to say Rav Chessed. So you take a look in the Ibn Ezra, the Sforno on the pasuk, so they both clearly understand that the phrase Rav Chessed magnifies again the haflaga, the extreme of chessed is compounded, is magnified by the fact that the middah is not just chessed, but the middah is Rav Chessed. The Sforno says, excuse me, the Sforno says that this is an allusion to what the Gemara in Rosh Hashanah tells us that we refer to in the Selichos of Maavir Rishon Rishon. That that's an expression not only of chessed but Rav Chessed. So the question is, on the other hand, the Rambam tells us that the middos of HaKadosh Baruch Hu represent middos beinoniyos. That the Derech Hashem, any middah which the Torah uses to describe HaKadosh Baruch Hu's interaction with the world is by definition a middah beinonis. So what's the kasuv hashlishi there, right? So the kasuv harishon is that the semantics of chessed are extreme, haflaga. And if that's not enough, the middah isn't only chessed, the middah is Rav Chessed. That's hakasuv echad. Hakasuv hasheni is that the דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא, Kel Rachum vechanun is the דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא, the Rambam says, is always the derech habeinoni, the middah hamimutza'as. But here the very definition of the middah seems to contradict that. So how do we understand it? So there is lichora a very simple but also very important kasuv hashlishi that I just briefly want to discuss. Now let's take a mashal. Let's say you'll give a copy of the biography of the Vilna Gaon to a secular person and it will have a description of the Vilna Gaon's seder hayom. So what's the reaction going to be? What adjectives are going to be used? Fanatic, mistam. Extreme and kayeitzei bo zeh. What's our description? HaGaon HeChassid. Take a chassid, HaGaon HeChassid. So how do we have so totally different reactions? So the answer is obvious. The answer is it depends upon what your frame of reference is. If your frame of reference, right, Rachmana litzlan, is a secular one, so such intensity and such devotion and such dedication is fanatical. If your frame of reference is a Torahdike one, so that's the closest thing to shleimus that we can imagine. So lichora the pshat when the Ibn Ezra and the Rambam tell us that chessed means haflaga, means extreme, that's what the word means. But it's only an extreme in within the Torah's frame... The kashya shlishis is, yeah, takeh it connotes extreme in the sense that you're doing for someone something that the person doesn't deserve. You're doing them a chesed, the person's never done you a chesed, yitachen the person never will do you a chesed, you're busy, you don't really have the time for it. It's extreme if the frame of reference bein adam lachaveiro is a frame of reference of what does he deserve? What do I deserve? If that's the frame of reference, so then chesed is takeh something extreme. The Torah's frame of reference is that that's not the frame of reference for bein adam lachaveiro. For our interpersonal relationships, so the frame of reference, the operative question isn't "Does he deserve it? What did he ever do for me?" The rav zichrono livracha often gave the following example when he would contrast the Western sense of morality, lehavdil, lehavdil, lehavdil with the Torah's sense of morality. And he would say that in the Western world, so tzedaka, to give tzedaka, to give charity is by definition an act of lifnim mishuras hadin. There's no such thing as being obligated to give tzedaka, that's a contradiction in terms. No such thing. And avadeh, avadeh in the Torah's moral code, there's such a thing as a chiyuv to give tzedaka. Such a thing as a chiyuv to give tzedaka. So lichora the kashya shlishis is that chesed is by definition an extreme within a frame of reference that what should govern bein adam lachaveiro is deserving. Is what does he deserve? What do I owe him? What has he earned? What payback do I have to give? So in such a frame of reference, chesed is an extreme. And that's why the term is used. But within the Torah's frame of reference, it's a derech habeinonus. So what emerges then is something very, very important Rabosai. If I do a chesed for someone and I feel that I'm going to an extreme, I feel that that represents an extreme, so then that highlights a chisaron in me. Because that means that while, and not to minimize the importance of this or the significance of the attainment, while it means that I'm doing chesed, I'm gomel chesed, but a baal chesed I'm not. Because to be a baal chesed means that one has the Torah's orientation that the governing principle bein adam lachaveiro isn't "Is it magiah lo, is it not magiah lo?" But adaraba, but that's the natural state of affairs. That what in a different frame of reference is chesed extreme, within the Torah's frame of reference is a derech habeinonus. The mitzvah the Rambam says of vehalachta bidrachav is not only that a person should act in a way that's consistent with the middos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but that a person should... sheyikavu b'nafsho, that these de'os, that these middos should be internalized, that they should become a part of his fiber, of his character. So nimtzanu l'meidem that if we want to engage in self-monitoring, if we want to test where we are in terms of the pursuit, the attempt to cultivate middas hachesed, kol zman, kol zman that we feel that we're extending ourselves, kol zman that we feel that we're takeh going to the extreme, ah, this is chesed, I'm going to the extreme, so the truth is that what that indicates is that we're still far from the goal of becoming a genuine ba'al chesed. There is a very, l'chora, simple, simultaneously profound, overarching hashkafos olam which accounts for this difference as to whether or not the operative principle ben adam l'chaveiro is what do I owe him, what has he earned, as opposed to the toras chesed frame of reference. And l'chora is the following. The reason the Western world doesn't have a concept, can't have a concept of there being a chiyuv to give tzedakah is because the mindset of the Western world is that a person's life is his own. If my life is my own, my money is my own, my time is my own. I'm not beholden to anyone or to anything. And by definition, if I choose to share my money with you, my time with you, so by definition, that's an act of lifnim mishuras hadin. It's mine, I'm giving it to you. If a person's larger, broader hashkafos olam is

אין נפשו של אדם קניינו אלא קניין הקדוש ברוך הוא,

if a person's larger, broader frame of reference לי הכסף ולי הזהב, so a pikadon v'gabay tzedakah, but לי הכסף ולי הזהב says Hakadosh Baruch Hu. If a person's larger and broader frame of reference is that agira yoma anan, what po'alim, a po'el's time, the Rambam says al pi din, is meshubad to the ba'al habayis. po'el's time is meshubad, it's not his own time. A po'el's time, if I'm getting paid to work from me'alos hashachar, meihaneitz, whenever, ad shkia, ad tzeis hakochavim, so my time is not my own, my time is not my own. If my life is not my own, but קניין הקדוש ברוך הוא, if my money is לי הכסף ולי הזהב, is a pikadon from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, if my time is היום קצר והמלאכה מרובה ובעל הבית דוחק, my time is meshubad to the ba'al habayis, so then the frame of reference for ben adam l'chaveiro is not going to be what does he deserve, what do I owe him, what do I have to do, but then the frame of reference becomes a chesed frame of reference. The most, not the most, but a very, very powerful reflection and articulation of that is the yeish omrim in Pirkei Avos. That if a person says שלי שלי שלך שלך is a middas Sdom. Is a middas Sdom. What emerges if I feel encumbered, if I feel imposed upon, if I feel resentful when the chesed comes my way that I should be attending to? So the emes is, it's not—it would be bad enough if it were a self-contained chisaron, a self-contained flaw in in in the midah of chesed in in that realm of bein adam l'chaveiro. But lichora in light of what we're talking about, so that's supposed to be rooted again in in that broader hashkafas olam. To whom does my time belong? To whom does my money belong? To whom to whom does does does my life belong? And itachen that this is and and just to conclude with this that this is one aspect, Reb Itzele writes in in the hakdama to Nefesh HaChaim, he talks about his his father's anavah and he says that it's מדרכו של ענוה אמיתית להיות את דכא ושפל רוח. Not only to engage in chesed but especially again the the unfortunate, the downtrodden. And he describes in a few again just very powerful words his father's devotion to the dako u'shfal ruach. So there is here a a causal connection, more than that, between anavah and and the expression of chesed. Those two—anavah has to manifest itself, Reb Itzele says, through again interpreting the dako u'shfal ruach as as the the most urgent and and pressing need and occasion for chesed. One one perspective on that, not the only one, but one perspective on that is the following. That what characterizes the anav is that awareness. What makes a person an anav? Why isn't he boastful of who he is, what he is, his position be it social, be it professional, be it financial in life? Why why doesn't that fill him with a with a sense of of pride and arrogance? The answer is because he knows that the need for hard work and all the yegia v'amal notwithstanding, his very life is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's, to say nothing his very existence, to say nothing of whatever abilities, opportunities, resources he has. That's what an anav knows and feels. One aspect, there's more to it Reb Itzele is saying than what we're discussing now, but but one aspect of it could be so that sense of anavah again is is what creates, what generates that chesed orientation. The person knows, the person feels in in his blood it's not my life. It's not my money, it's not my time. It's Ribono Shel Olam's life, it's Ribono Shel Olam's money, it's Ribono Shel Olam's time. That again generates, again, the broader hashkafas olam with the framework for bein adam l'chavero is not what do I owe him? What is he entitled to from me? But the framework is rather a framework of chesed.