Achdus – Eretz Yisroel

Last spring when this series of shiurim was first projected I anticipated that since the first shiur would coincide with the beginning of Elul that the first thing we would talk about were Inyanei Chodesh Elul, Teshuvah, and then as we moved closer to Rosh Hashanah, Inyanei Malchiyos. And I hope that אם ירצה השם בלי נדר we will yet come to all of those topics. In the interim, Klal Yisrael experienced an extremely painful summer. And there are certain thoughts which I feel a need to share and I think that there's a certain cheshbon hanefesh which we need to make. Over the summer we all go different ways, ze parash derachim, זה לכו וזה לכו. And then after the summer, so we meet up with friends whom we haven't seen over the course of the summer and invariably how was your summer? So I'm sure we've all been asked the question countless times, we've asked the question countless times, and we've heard many responses. And Baruch Hashem many of the responses are very enthusiastic. One hears how was your summer? Oh it was great I did X, Y, and Z. It was amazing, it was gevaldig, it was awesome. And not chas v'shalom l'kanter, not chas v'shalom l'katreg, but there's something very very wrong if we can respond to how our summer was without saying on one level absolutely terrible. Absolutely terrible. Acheinu Bnei Yisrael were being killed in Eretz Yisrael and in Lebanon. So how can it be that when someone asks me how my summer was my response is my summer was great, it was amazing, it was awesome? It was terrible. My summer was terrible. There were levayos daily in Eretz Yisrael. And yet when one answered okay so we can't posture our summer was amazing so I guess the issue is not in being honest. That's not where the problem lies. But how could we feel and react that the summer just unqualifiedly was just positive, wonderful? How could it be? How could it be? Now the Rambam writes and we're all familiar with it at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah, at the end of Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Teshuvah when the Rambam is listing those who have no חלק לעולם הבא, so the Rambam writes haporesh mi'darkei tzibbur, someone who separates himself from the tzibbur. אף על פי שלא עבר עבירות even though you can't indict him for he eats neveilah, he eats cheilev, he is mechallel Shabbos. You can't indict him for any of that. אלא נבדל מעדת ישראל, but he segregates himself from the rest of Klal Yisrael. אינו עושה מצות בכללן ולא נכנס בצרתן. He doesn't join and doesn't feel a part of that tzarah.

ולא מתענה בתעניתם אלא הולך בדרכו כאחד מגויי הארץ וכאילו אינו מהם אין לו חלק לעולם הבא.

So please don't misunderstand, I'm not Rachmana litzlan suggesting for a moment that our reaction was so far off the mark that this halacha is literally directly applicable. I'm not Rachmana litzlan suggesting that. I think we all, we all said Tehillim, we all felt some degree of pain. But the question is whether we were yotze this chiyuv of nichnas betzorasan bedieved bedieved or we were mekayem lachatchila. The impression again sort of created on again just these anecdotal interactions in terms of hearing descriptions of people's summers converged with other anecdotal but I'm afraid also somewhat representative impressions formed over the summer. One would have thought, one would have imagined that given what happened over the course of the summer that there would have been a tremendous hissorerus, tremendous hissorerus for teshuva. A collective sense of urgency of cheshbon hanefesh. One would have thought that certainly when you walked into the shul for davening there would have been an intensity. One would have thought that it would be inconceivable to see anyone talking during davening. One would have thought that it would be inconceivable to see anyone while the kapitlach Tehillim were being said doing anything other than saying the kapitlach Tehillim. That people should be wrapping their tefillin. And yet there was a certain disconnect. The emes is that there was a certain disconnect. And again I say it not chas v'shalom l'kanter, not chas v'shalom l'katreig. I say it by means of self-criticism and I say it for the purpose of that for two reasons: number one, on that gufa we need to make a cheshbon hanefesh on our response, on our reaction. And given this sense that the חשבון הנפש בשעת מעשה was incomplete, wasn't as thorough, as penetrating, as urgent as it should have been, that it's not inappropriate that we should continue to make that cheshbon hanefesh now. The Rambam again, you're all familiar with it in the beginning of Hilchos Taaniyos. The Rambam says that when there's an eis tzara there's a mitzvah d'oraisa to be mariyah bachatzotzeros, lizok and the Rambam says ודבר זה מדרכי התשובה הוא. That this mitzvah, this reaction that when there is an eis tzara that we have to daven, we have to call out to Hakadosh Baruch Hu is midarkei hateshuva

שבזמן שתבוא צרה ויזעקו עליה ויריעו ידעו הכל שבבשביל מעשיהם הרעים הרע להן ככתוב עונותיכם הטו וזהו שיגרום להסיר הצרה מעליהם. אבל אם לא יזעקו ולא יריעו.

What happens if in response to a tzara we analyze it and we understand it in terms of geopolitics? And based on our understanding of geopolitics so we understand exactly why Hezbollah yimach shemam why they're shooting all the Katyushas. And we have it all, we have it all understood, we understand how Iran is pulling the strings and everything geopolitically we understand it all. Okay, so if it's geopolitics so then the response should be political.

אבל אם לא יזעקו ולא יריעו אלא יאמרו דבר זה ממנהג העולם אירע לנו. אבל אם לא יזעקו ולא יריעו אלא יאמרו דבר זה ממנהג העולם אירע לנו וצרה זו נקרה נקרית הרי זו דרך אכזריות וגורמת להם להדבק במעשיהם הרעים במעשיהם הרעים.

Says the Rambam, it's not only a theological, a very, very basic theological hashkafa error in hashkafa if a person thinks that a tzara is attributable to purely natural causes, be they geopolitical, be they otherwise, but it's achzariyus. And it's achzariyus, it's cruelty because if we don't recognize the true source of the eis tzarah, we can never address it. If a person, if a doctor is prescribing a medication because he misdiagnosed, so then the therapy that he recommends isn't going to succeed. If we think that the problem, that the source of the problem is on a natural level or is purely accidental, so then we're never going to correctly address the source of the problem. Says the Rambam, that's not only a terribly wrong hashkafa, but it's simply achzariyus. So let's perhaps learn a little bit this parsha, parshas yisurim, and at least some of the reactions which they're supposed to elicit. First of all, it's quite clear that at times Hakadosh Baruch Hu communicates with us through yisurim, but yisurim is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's way of sending us a message. Do we have any understanding of why that is? Why Hakadosh Baruch Hu Hatov Vehametiv has this arrow, has this as part of his arsenal? So I think we can understand it on at least two levels. First of all, imagine the following mashal. Let's say you have someone who's prone to sleepwalking. Okay, so he begins to sleepwalk, so it's a little bit dangerous. He may trip, he doesn't know what he's doing. So you begin by calling his name: Yankel, Yankel, wake up. But he's in such a state of sleep that he's in, so it doesn't penetrate. If it does, then fine, problem's been solved. Okay, but if he doesn't, okay, so you watch him, make sure as long as he's not doing anything dangerous, we don't have to be more aggressive in trying to wake him up. But then he continues, he's walking, he's beginning to go outdoors, or he's beginning to walk to some area where danger may result. So then you nudge him gently. Maybe that will wake him. But he's in the grip of such a heavy sleep while he's sleepwalking that even that nudge doesn't bring him out of the slumber. And then it just so happens that he collects firearms. He has a whole on the wall of his house, so he has a whole cabinet of rifles, all kinds of firearms. And he's walking, he's walking in his sleep, and he's taking the key, he's unlocking the cabinet in which the firearms are kept for safekeeping, and he's about to take one out. And one can only imagine what will result. So at this point, you have to do anything and everything possible to wake him up. You can't just call him gently. You can't just caress him. You can't just nudge him. At this point, if because of the deep sleep, he's about to engage in something which will have catastrophic consequences, so then belo breira, basically anything goes. Anything goes to wake him up. So the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva, the Rabbeinu Yona in Shaarei Teshuva, they both use, others as well, this imagery of sleepwalking. How we go through life sleepwalking. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu calls us: Yaakov, Yaakov. So too often we don't hear. Hakadosh Baruch Hu nudges us. Too often we don't hear. And then sometimes, sometimes rachmana litzlan we begin walking over to the to the cabinet where the firearms are. And we're still asleep after all the calling, after Hakadosh Baruch Hu calling bekolei kolos, after all the nudging, we're still asleep. So then beles breira draconian measures are necessary to try to wake us up from that slumber. That's certainly one perspective, one understanding of how it is that kavyachol we force Hakadosh Baruch Hu to have to communicate with us through yisurim when the self-induced sleep is just so heavy and otherwise, otherwise unresponsive to all other calls. Similarly in an eis tzara whether it's personal rachmana litzlan or collective rachmana litzlan a person is reminded of his vulnerability and his helplessness. A person who feels very much in control on top of things all of a sudden rachmana litzlan goes to the doctor, receives a devastating diagnosis and keheref ayin that sense of self-sufficiency, that sense of autonomy, that sense of arrogance is totally broken. There is a vort from the Kotzker Rebbe. The pasuk says אנוכי עומד בין השם וביניכם. So the Kotzker Rebbe says that the pshat is anochi, the ego, is what stands between a person and Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Anochi is עומד בין השם וביניכם. The ego. Chazal say it that they put in the they attribute the following words to Hakadosh Baruch Hu that kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu says that ein ani vehu referring to a ba'al gaiva יכולין לדור בכפיפה אחת. Hakadosh Baruch Hu says there isn't enough room for me and a ba'al gaiva to reside in the same place. A ba'al gaiva has no need for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. A ba'al gaiva has a sense of kochi veotzem yadi. Nothing is more effective or more successful in totally, totally exposing the delusion of gaiva than yisurim rachmana litzlan. And there too sometimes we kavyachol force Hakadosh Baruch Hu's hand that we need that delusion to be dispelled. So yisurim are one avenue, one medium of communication between Hakadosh Baruch Hu HaTov VeHameitiv and us. And as such they're mechayiv in cheshbon hanefesh. A summer such as the one that we just experienced and obviously the eis tzara in Eretz Yisrael is far from resolved is therefore mechayiv in cheshbon hanefesh just as when one experiences adversity in one's own personal life it's mechayiv in a personal cheshbon hanefesh. So how do you make a cheshbon hanefesh? We have we don't have Yirmiyahu HaNavi we don't have Yeshayahu HaNavi to come and tell us rocho bitcho haktana על מה אבדה הארץ. So how do we make a cheshbon hanefesh? Yefashpesh bema'asav, yemashmesh bema'asav but how do we know whether we get the right answer? Okay, so there are different ma'amarei Chazal for instance in the Gemara at the end of the second perek in Masechet Shabbos or whether it's in Pirkei Avos where Chazal correlate different tzoros, different forms of yisurim with different different Ma'amarei Chazal. Okay, so if it matches up with one of those Ma'amarei Chazal, so then we know Chazal tell us. But what if it doesn't match so neatly? What if we don't have an explicit ma'amar Chazal? So the answer is that as long as a person is of sound mental health, he may not know whether or not he identified the right answer, but he won't come up with any wrong answers. What does that mean? משל למה הדבר דומה. Let's say a person goes to the doctor for a check-up, for a physical. He has certain complaints, certain aches, pains, doesn't feel quite right. So the doctor gives him a thorough physical and sends him for a CAT scan, MRI, the works. And the doctor comes back and says, "Well, the CAT scan shows this, Rachmana litzlan, and the MRI shows this, and this is what we need to do to correct the problem." Now, does the doctor know for a fact that it's these, that these are what caused the original symptoms which brought the patient to the doctor? Lav davka. He may have hit the nail on the head. It could be that what the MRI shows is really the source of the patient's pain and what brought the patient to the doctor. But even if it wasn't, the doctor's not wrong. It's something which needs to be corrected and it's something which the patient will benefit from having taken care of. So the nimshal is that when a person makes a cheshbon hanefesh, again if a person Rachmana litzlan is not stable, is not stable, so then a cheshbon hanefesh can be something very dangerous. But as long as a person is stable, religiously, psychologically stable, so then a cheshbon hanefesh, much like the physical at the doctor's, it doesn't yield any wrong answers. Do we know whether it yielded the right answer? Perhaps not, but it doesn't yield any wrong answers. So one answer which in almost any such situation isn't a wrong answer, whether it's the right answer, I don't know, but one answer and another clue, and a clue in making a cheshbon hanefesh is that מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא is that when HaKadosh Baruch Hu sends yissurim upon a person, so part of the rachamim in din, part of the chesed in din of HaKadosh Baruch Hu is that yissurim which are sent to a person are geared not just Rachmana litzlan that זאל זיין פאר כפרת עבירות כפרת עונות, but specifically the yissurim elicit a reaction which will also be a tikun on whatever failing or whatever flaw necessitated those yissurim in the first place. So it's not just that individually or collectively a person is chotei, so mimeila at a certain point the middas hadin says he has to be punished. No, the middas hadin has rachamim in it, has chesed in it, that the middas hadin will be geared that if only the person will respond appropriately, if only the person will recognize it, so it will elicit a reaction which it itself gufeh, that reaction will be mesaken what's in need of tikun. Clearly, whenever there's a crisis in Eretz Yisrael, even with what we were talking about before, even with the fact that the hisorerus wasn't what it should be, even with the fact that there was somewhat of a disconnect, but all that notwithstanding, the sense of achdus within Klal Yisrael is never as strong as it is in an eis tzara. Of the divisions and all the divisiveness which otherwise exists in Klal Yisrael somehow or other fades and there's a sense of achdus which doesn't exist otherwise. It's certainly not a wrong answer to think that that's one of, one of the things which Hakadosh Baruch Hu is looking for is that that sense of achdus should exist. That that sense of achdus should exist. The eis tzarah elicits it. So if only it were there without the eis tzarah, who knows if the eis tzarah would be necessary. Achdus doesn't mean, doesn't mean not thinking that there's absolute right and wrong. Achdus means having a sense that no, that unfortunately ba'avonosinu harabim there's so much bilbul hamochaus that that many many Jews taka are absolutely wrong in what they think and what they do and what they believe. Achdus doesn't mean blurring that fact that there's absolute right and wrong which the Torah teaches us. But what it means is that ישראל אף על פי שחטא ישראל הוא and that there's still a sense of family, there's still a sense of love, there's still ahavas Yisrael. There's still a sense of oneness. Not only legitimate differences notwithstanding, but even illegitimate differences notwithstanding, there's still supposed to be a sense of concern, of love, of empathy of acheinu b'nei Yisrael. Now why why is this so, why is this such a crucial part of Torah? This sense of achdus, of ahavas Yisrael, of chesed. Why is that so crucial? A person says that that all he has is Torah, the Gemara in Avodah Zarah says, without chesed אפילו תורה אין לו. Hillel says מה דסני לך לחברך לא תעביד, that's kol haTorah kulah. The Ba'al HaTanya, the Gaon say not like Rashi says in Shabbos, no, he's taka referring to v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. So why is why is this so central and so pivotal? It should be there, but why is it so central, why is it so pivotal? So let's consider either two or three, I'm not sure exactly how to enumerate them, perspectives on why ahavas Yisrael is absolutely indispensable to one's avodas Hashem. And ahavas Yisrael lacking, one's avodas Hashem is just, if one says he has only Torah, אפילו תורה אין לו. The sefarim tell us that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world through a process of tzimtzum. Tzimtzum literally, right, letzamtzem means to constrict. So tzimtzum literally means constriction or contraction. Now certainly, certainly, it's kefirah to understand that in any literal sense. The pasuk in Malachi says אני ה' לא שניתי. Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't change from before bri'as ha'olam till after bri'as ha'olam. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't change. It's not to be understood rachmana litzlan in any literal sense. How is it to be understood on its deep ultimate level, I don't know. It's in the class of במופלא ממך אל תדרוש. But one little bit of understanding that we can glean from what it means is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's infinite. Basically, there shouldn't be room for anything else to exist alongside infinity. If I take up so much, so much space in the room. I take up so much space in the room. You want to come in the room? You want to join me in this room? Gesundheit. There's plenty of room. I take up this, this delimited area. If I'll be successful on a diet, so maybe I'll take up a little less space. There'll be even more room in the, more space in the room. But lemaiseh there's room for other people. There's space for other people. But Ein Sof, so whatever tzimtzum means, and again rachmana litzlan, it's not to be understood in any, any literal sense. אני ה' לא שניתי. אני ה' לא שניתי. But what it does mean is that kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu made room for the world. Kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu allowed us, allows us to share in His existence. Or, and this is the level on which we can understand it a little bit, basically what it means is that Brias Ha'olam was the ultimate act of chessed. It's the ultimate act of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Again, when a person makes room, when a person shares his daled amos, when he backs off to let someone else in, so that's the ultimate act of chessed. So again, it doesn't mean literally. Doesn't mean literally. But what it does mean, what it does mean on a level that we a little bit can understand it, what it means when we say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world through the tzimtzum, it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is letting us into His room. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's letting us share His existence. Brias Ha'olam is the ultimate act of chessed. Olam chessed yiboneh. One yesod in the sefarim. Another yesod in the sefarim is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself is beyond our understanding, is beyond human comprehension, beyond human intelligence. What we know and understand about Hakadosh Baruch Hu is through His interaction with us in this world. So comes out that the basis for our existence, the basis for our relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's chessed. And for that reason, an avodas Hashem where chessed, where ahavas Yisrael, and again, and the ultimate expression of the chessed and ahavas Yisrael is this sense of achdus, if that's not present, so then you can't have an avodas Hashem without that. Because chessed is the foundation of our existence, the foundation of how Hakadosh Baruch Hu interacts with the world is on a basis of chessed. The very briah is olam chessed yiboneh. Is Hakadosh Baruch Hu letting us share His space kavyachol. So when chessed is the very basis of our existence, of our relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so we in turn have to be rooted and grounded in chessed in order to relate to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, in order to be oved Hashem. And therefore you can't have avodas Hashem without chessed. And again, ahavas Yisrael, achdus. Moreover, avodas Hashem is unimaginable without chessed, without ahavas Yisrael, without a sense of achdus. When Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us the Torah, so the bris which Hakadosh Baruch Hu established was ואתם תהיו לי ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש. Hakadosh Baruch Hu did not say to six hundred thousand yechidim, I'm interested in making a bris directly with each and every one of you betoras yachid. Hakadosh Baruch Hu said the bris is... is going to be with Klal Yisroel. The bris is going to be with this ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש, and then mimaila every yachid as a member of that klal has his relationship with Hakadosh Boruch Hu. But one standing as a yachid is because he belongs to the klal. So one can't relate to Hakadosh Boruch Hu outside of the klal. If a person is nivdal from Adas Yisroel, so he can't relate to Hakadosh Boruch Hu in that way. And again, ultimately, what's the fullest and most real expression of belonging to the klal? Is v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. And finally, in terms of understanding the centrality of Ahavas Yisroel, of chesed within avodas Hashem, within one's relationship with Hakadosh Boruch Hu, there is a medrash in Bamidbar Rabbah. Medrash in Bamidbar Rabbah comments that there's a pattern which runs throughout the beriah. The pattern is that Hakadosh Boruch Hu creates multiplicity, Hakadosh Boruch Hu creates many, and then Hakadosh Boruch Hu singles out one. Hakadosh Boruch Hu created seven days of the week, and Hakadosh Boruch Hu singled out Shabbos. Hakadosh Boruch Hu created a cycle of seven years, Hakadosh Boruch Hu singled out Shmita. Hakadosh Boruch Hu created a cycle of seven seven years, and Hakadosh Boruch Hu singles out Yovel. Hakadosh Boruch Hu created seventy nations, and alongside those seventy nations, Hakadosh Boruch Hu singled out Klal Yisroel. Hakadosh Boruch Hu, Hakadosh Boruch Hu created יוד בית שבטי קה, and within the יוד בית שבטי קה, Hakadosh Boruch Hu singled out Shevet Levi. So the medrash comments on this pattern in the beriah. So what's the significance? Obviously, if the pattern is there, it's not a coincidence, and obviously the medrash wants us to understand what the significance of that pattern in the beriah is. Rashi quotes in Parshas Korach that when Moshe Rabbeinu tells the two hundred and fifty people that they should kchu ish machtaso, you'll do it and Aaron will do it. So Moshe Rabbeinu warns them and says, I want you to know full well what's at stake here. Only one of you is going to survive this test, because Torah is not like all the avodah zarah religions. All the avodah zarah religions, they have many deities, many deities, and corresponding to that, they can have many kohanim gedolim. But we אין לנו אלא ה' אחד and therefore אין לנו אלא כהן גדול אחד. So only one of you is going to emerge from this nisayon. So there's a gevaldige yesod here. Gevaldige yesod. Almost אלמלא מקרא כתוב אי אפשר לאומרו. All the ones in the beriah, the reason Hakadosh Boruch Hu has a one amongst the umos ha'olam, the reason Hakadosh Boruch Hu has a one amongst the days of the week, the reason Hakadosh Boruch Hu has a one amongst the shnas shmita is because all those ones are intended to give eidus to the fact that Hashem echad. And that's the significance of this pattern in the beriah. Why is it? Why does there have to be an am nivchar? Why kach gozar chochmoso? Because Hakadosh Boruch Hu gozar chochmoso that the ones in the beriah should be ma'id on Hashem echad. And that's what Moshe Rabbeinu was telling Korach, we can't have more than one kohen gadol, because all the ones in Torah are intended, all the ones in the beriah are intended to be ma'id on Hashem echad. Now that being the, basically, that's the pshat in the Gemara in Berachos about Hakadosh Baruch Hu being maniach tefillin, that in our tefillin it says שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד and in Hakadosh Baruch Hu's tefillin it says ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ. And be'etzem, it's the pshat in what we say Shabbos to Mincha. Shabbos to Mincha:

אתה אחד ושמך אחד ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ.

So how can you say that? One of the Rambam's yud gimmel ikkarim is that אין יחידות כמוהו בשום פנים. Is that not only Hashem echad, but Hashem echad in an absolutely unique sense. Nothing else is echad the way Hashem is echad. A person is echad, yeah he's echad, but there are many other people. He's echad, but he's got many limbs, he's got many evarim, many gidim. There's no... there's nothing which is absolutely one in the sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's absolutely one. So how can we dare to say that אתה אחד ושמך אחד and then ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ? How can you say that? The only explanation is if the ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ is intended as an eidus on אתה אחד ושמך אחד. So if that's what we mean, so then one can say it. But otherwise it can't be said. So the ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ is an eidus on Hashem echad. Now what that suggests is, but what happens, so on a certain level, no matter how we behave, ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ. Klal Yisrael is one regardless of how we behave on a certain level, on a metaphysical level. But on a practical level, the eidus is broadcast more clearly when we manifest that achdus. Not only when it's true on a deep and ultimate metaphysical level, but when anyone looking at us can see ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ. And certainly, certainly part of the expression of ומי כעמך ישראל גוי אחד בארץ is ve'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha, is the ahavas Yisrael, is the sense of achdus. So for all these reasons, ahavas Yisrael, achdus, is so pivotal and so central to our avodas Hashem. An eis tzarah such as the one that we experienced over the summer, one of the reactions it elicits is this sense of achdus. And it behooves us, it behooves us to think whether that's one of the answers. Not to presume to say what the right answer is by any, any stretch of the imagination, but it's one of the answers which isn't wrong in terms of the cheshbon hanefesh. It's too late now to continue, but obviously the follow-up to this is: so how do we, how does one implement that halacha l'maaseh? How does one instill within himself a greater sense of ahavas Yisrael? And if in fact this is one of the not wrong answers which the cheshbon hanefesh identifies, so what do we do with that? So bli neder, maybe next week, maybe we'll talk a little bit about this before we move on to inyanei Elul.