Q&A: Inyanei Emuna, Part 2

So we'll begin with the question about what is and what is the definition of Emunah? And the question can and perhaps does mean different things. But maybe let's talk a little bit in this context about the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. It has become unfortunately in rather recently there's been some confusion has arisen and some sincere people have sort of been enveloped by that confusion, as though the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is as the shitas haRambam and the same way in halacha, yeah, the Rambam says this and the Ra'avad says this and the Ramban says this, the Rashba says this and you know the same is fundamentally true in inyonei Emunah and after all there's no psak halacha in these matters and just make sure that the food has an OU or a Star-K and you're a good Jew. So fundamentally that's a major, major error. Just historically it's a mistake, conceptually it's a mistake, it's a major error. The Rambam's what the Rambam tells us עיקרי אמונה בהקדוש ברוך הוא, Metzius Hashem, Yichud Hashem, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eino guf, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's eternity is all normative and is accepted as such. It's accepted as such by those Chachamim, the Chachmei HaMasorah who engaged in and wrote philosophical works. It's accepted by those Chachmei HaMasorah who studied and who wrote חכמת הנסתר על פי קבלה. They don't disagree. Were there people once upon a time who believed it? Yeah, the Rambam tells us that he met such people. He met such people who had a corporeal Rachmana l'tzlan conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. No one's saying that the view never existed and maybe it still exists, I don't know, maybe there are people who still think so. Unfortunately, hopefully they don't really mean what they say, hopefully they don't really understand what they say, but there are people who say so nowadays when they say that someone was that the Atzmius of Ein Sof geshtalt in a body. So hopefully they don't understand what they're saying and hopefully they don't mean what they're saying because that would very much be holding and advocating a view which is against Yud Gimmel Ikkarim and which has always been considered kefirah, but presumably they don't mean what they're saying, hopefully they don't mean what they're saying and they don't know what they're saying, those few people who do say such things. Second question is the Ravad says gedolim vetovim, I mean not about atzmuso and so forth, but in terms of believing Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself has a guf. There were Gedolei Rishonim who believed that Hakadosh Baruch Hu could be misgashem in a guf. And that one, I mean of the ikarim, that one's... that's the only one that only has philosophical rayos, that Chazal never expressed that one. The Ravad says gedolim vetovim who believed... But the Rambam says Chazal never expressed it because it's a meforash passuk in the Chumash that says מאימתי קא משתעי תנא הכא דקתני מאימתי קורין. Gedolim vetovim mimenu, so gedolim vetovim mimenu, I think the Chazon Ish already says אלה שגדולים וטובים ממנו. Again, it's certainly the two things. Two things. Two things. A, the hassagos HaRavad certainly does reflect the fact, again, as the Rambam himself writes, that there were people who had a corporeal conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The hassagos HaRavad does reflect that fact. The hassagos HaRavad, the Ravad does not say that that view isn't apikorsus. The Ravad does not question that that view is apikorsus. The Ravad does not question that that's kefirah. The Ravad says if people innocently were misled into adopting such a view, even though that view is minus, why did the Rambam call them minim? The Ravad never says that if you look at the Ravad, the Ravad says why did he call them minim? The Ravad didn't say this is a legitimate view. The Ravad didn't say it's not minus. Avadah it's minus. The Ravad suggests that maybe there's a distinction, that maybe if a person is misled by either peshutei mikraos or aggados when not properly interpreted, which can be meshabesh es hade'os, so the Ravad says you could have a person who's misled into minus who perhaps innocently תם לבבו ונקיון כפיו is misled into minus, and the Ravad says avadah it's minus, avadah it's kefirah, but he's not a min, he's not a kofer. He does say that. He could be saying that. It doesn't say definitely it is minus. It's quite clear that the hassagos... If the Rambam writes, see, on these inyanim, in general I think it's very good to... I don't really... In general in massa umattan on halacha, so even if someone asks a question and doesn't accept an answer, okay fine, you don't have to push. On ikarei emunah, I apologize, I can't be polite. So on ikarei emunah I have to tell you, no, you're wrong. What you're saying is wrong. And but some even say that baalei Tosafos believed that, gedolei Rishonim and so forth believed... Hat oznecha ushma. The Rambam says if someone believes that, he's a min. Now, what that means is that the view is minus and a person who accepts it is a min. Now, if the Ravad only says by way of disagreeing, why does he call them minim and then explains how they clearly implies that it is a shibush hade'os and the only thing he says is why does he call them minim, so it's quite clear, the simple, correct, emesdiker p'shat is that what the Ravad is saying is, what the Ravad is saying is, it is minus, it is kefirah, but ella mai, the Ravad thinks that the classification of min with all of its halachic and metaphysical implications, the Ravad thinks with regard to this one understanding, if a person is innocently mistaken, even though it's minus, he only questions the classification of min. That's clearly the p'shat in the Ravad. Were there opinions, were there people who had corporeal conceptions? Yes, the hassagos HaRavad does reflect that. The fact that you can find a... the fact that that one can find a... And isolated views in in any area in halacha which which have been and and are considered outside the the mainstream of what's accepted and what's believed doesn't doesn't make it into a doesn't make it into a machlokes. You can, they were Gedolim vetovim, they were Gedolei Rishonim. They weren't just, I agree that it's not a shita you find it, it's that okay fine, but the people who believed it, the Ramban quotes the Baalei Tosafos believed it. The Baalei Tosafos, they weren't stam, you know, the Ramban is not lying, the Ramban is ne'eman that the Baalei Tosafos believed it. If Baalei Tosafos believed it, it's a shita. That, that, yeah. On this ikkar there is clearly a machlokes, the Rambam, there is no makor Chazal for it, it keeps, yeah. The fact that a person can find, the fact that a person can find that an opinion was held and that an opinion was held by a Rishon doesn't, it's important to listen, it's important to hear, that's the only way a person learns. Otherwise a person doesn't learn. And it's one thing to, it's one thing to dig in your heels about whether to say Tachanun on Pesach Sheni or not to say Tachanun on Pesach Sheni. No hanhaga should be taken lightly, but it's not the end of the world. But in some things, you have to hear, you have to hear. It's not, this is not my Torah to be mochel, this is not my havana to be mochel, it's and it's not something that, it's something that, that requires koved rosh and not, one's. One can document, again, not only, not only when talking about Ikkarei Emuna, when talking about shailos in halacha also. One can document shittos as shittos dchuyos and and nowadays, another one of the bilbulim is that people go, they find shittos dchuyos, sometimes people know it because they actually know it, and some times people go looking for it because they want to, they're looking, they have a conclusion that they've already decided they want and they're looking to to try to provide a basis for their conclusion. There are things which have been shittos which let's say even in terms of halachic shailos which have always been in the halachic mainstream and always part of the halachic discourse, and then there are shittos which were said by great and holy people, by Gedolim vetovim, which were relegated outside of the mainstream to go back several hundred years and to dig it up is to distort what the consensus of of the masora is. Your other question. The Chasam Sofer, it was the Amora, the Chasam Sofer talks about your other question. Was the Amora Hillel and and an apikores? So the Chasam Sofer says, no he wasn't. He says sometimes there may be issues which until a certain point the chachmei hamasora didn't didn't clarify for us. Not at, you don't learn kol hatorah kulah your first day in the beis medrash. You don't learn kol hatorah kulah your first day in a shiur. It may be, it may be a while until the Rebbe gets around to being miva'er something. Some things, he said once the chachmei hamasora were miva'er that, once, once Abaye says and that's the haskamas hagemara, that שרי ליה מריה להלל for having made such a mistake, the Ribono Shel Olam should forgive him. So says the Chasam Sofer, if rachmana litzlan anyone after that gets up and says the same thing, that there's going to be a tkufas hamashiach but not a melech hamashiach, so then that is kefira. And the same thing is true here. Yes, one can document, but so what? That that a person has to have a sense and an understanding that there are things which yes, which can be documented with and yes, one can give mareh mekomos, and yes, one can even at at times at times it's not done at times at times the person's status is greatly magnified just to to try to make a point and in other times there's no need to do it, but not everything that every great person once said is normative is because of that normative. Part of what Masorah is, Masorah says what opinions, it's true in Halacha, and it's also true in terms of Emunos V'deos. What things are in the mainstream and what things, even though they were said at one point, the consensus of the Chachmei HaMasorah is that this is not in the mainstream, that this is not an acceptable opinion. So does that mean that the person who said it before that consensus had emerged is an Apikores? No, but does that mean that one should be misled by one's own yedios into thinking that this remains a machlokes, that this remains an open question, that this remains a viable opinion, chas v'shalom, Rachmana Litzlan? You know, they tell a story, and the story it seems like a chochma but it's not a chochma, it's profound, it's profound. They tell the story that Reb Velvel, this actually relates to another one of the questions here on the list, in terms of believing that Moshiach can come today. So they once asked Reb Velvel about again the 12th of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, what does it mean, what does it imply? So this was whatever, maybe we'll talk about that בלי נדר אם ירצה השם כשלעצמה at a different time. So Reb Velvel answered

ווי עס שטייט אין סידור, אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא,

which the way he was translating, that I'm waiting every day that he should come today. So then they asked Reb Velvel and said, 'No, but if you look in the Gemara in Sanhedrin and other places, there are simanim for what's gonna be when Moshiach comes, or there's the Moshiach is gonna come in a certain year in the shmita cycle. So whatever, you're not holding this, so what do you mean

אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא ווי עס שטייט אין סידור?'

So Reb Velvel, again, it seems like a chochma, it's much much more than a chochma. So Reb Velvel answered, 'When Moshiach comes, we'll ask him the kashe.' So what did he mean? What did he mean? He meant that in dealing with Ikkarei Emuna, there's a different derech halimud than elsewhere. A person can't proceed the same way. Again, there's a koved rosh to say anything, to say a line in the Gemara anywhere, to say a line in Hamapkid means something. You're talking about dvar Hashem, Toras Hashem, there's always a tremendous koved rosh. אף על פי כן, okay, דרכו של תורה הוא מפרק הוא מוסיף, you draw conclusions from kashes. Ikkarei Emuna, a person has to operate differently. And that's what he meant, it wasn't stam a chochma. Ikkarei Emuna, a person has to operate differently with an even different level of koved rosh and an even in a different approach. It's not so pashut as, 'Oops, I have what seems to me be a raya, I conclude.' We'll ask Moshiach. We'll ask Moshiach if the kabbalah is this, we'll ask Moshiach, we'll ask Moshiach. Of the first five Ikkarim where the Rambam talks about Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the one that ostensibly would seem to be shonay b'machlokes is the one that says that davening should always be directed, directed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Kamayaduah, we have the tfillos of Machnissei Rachamim, Malachei Rachamim, M'shorshei Elyon, which don't do that, which don't do that. So inachanamy some people take it don't say them, but most people do say them. The Rashash in Sanhedrin thinks there's a siyuah from Rashi in Sanhedrin it's the minhag to say them. So on the surface and on one level, on a practical level, it is Shalom bemachlokes. It is Shalom bemachlokes. Ela mai? Ela mai? When you look into it, then the Nekudas hamachlokes is not what it seems to be. Not at all what it seems to be.

היסוד החמישי שהוא יתעלה הוא אשר ראוי לעבדו ולרוממו ולפרסם גדולתו ומשמעתו ואין עושים כן למה שלמטה ממנו במציאות מן המלאכים והכוכבים והגלגלים והיסודות וכל מה שהורכב מהם לפי שכולם מוטבעים בפעולותיהם אין להם שלטון ולא בחירה אלא רצונו יתעלה ואין עושים אותם אמצעים להגיע בהם אליו אלא כלפיו יתעלה יכוונו המחשבות ויניחו כל מה שזולתו.

So yeah, so Yesod hachamishi that again Avodah, service, again Davening is obviously that, is to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. He says not to anything beneath Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Malachim, Kochavim, etc. But then the Rambam seemingly, it seems to be a digression, the Rambam tells us something about what the nature of Malachim and Kochavim and Galgalim are. He tells us that Malachim, Kochavim, and Galgalim are all Mutba'im befeulasam. They're all programmed. They're not Ba'alei bechirah. Unlike people, they're not Ba'alei bechirah. They are Ba'alei da'as. They are intellects who are aware in the Rambam's understanding, but they're not Ba'alei bechirah. But just why is that relevant here? Whatever you think, whatever you think Malachim are, why is it relevant to the Yesod hachamishi? The Yesod hachamishi is that there should not be intermediaries between a person, there are no intermediaries in terms of a person's Avodah. A person's Avodah is supposed to be direct. Tefillah is a form of Avodah. Tefillah should be direct. Why is it relevant that Malachim, Kochavim, Galgalim, and the Yesodos are Mutba'im befeulasam? So it's quite clear that in the Rambam as follows: Lu yehei that a Malach were a Ba'al bechirah, Lu yehei that a Malach were a Ba'al bechirah, so then either it wouldn't be so fundamentally different or even if it would be different, it wouldn't be a question of Kfira to address oneself to a Malach. I can ask you to Daven for me. No one says that that, no one says that that violates the Yesod hachamishi. That's one person can Daven for another. השב אשת האיש כי נביא הוא ויתפלל בעדך וחיה. There's no, that doesn't, Rachmana litzlan, encroach upon the Yesod hachamishi. So why is it so different to ask a Malach? So I can ask a friend, I ask a Rebbe, I ask a Malach. Why is it so different? So the Teretz is if you ask a Ba'al bechirah, okay, I ask a Ba'al bechirah, do me a favor, say Tehillim. Say Tehillim for me, say Tehillim for this Choleh I'm aware of. So who says that that's not, that doesn't violate the Yesod hachamishi? I'm not making him an intermediary between myself and Hakadosh Baruch Hu. A separate Parsha of what the Pshat of one person Davening for another person is, but Avada, Avada, Avada that's something which, which we certainly accept. Says the Rambam, I consider it a violation of the Yesod hachamishi to address oneself to Malachim because I don't understand, you ask... The wall cannot act, cannot voluntarily react to what you're saying, it can't choose what to do. The implication, the insinuation of addressing yourself to something which is mutba bif'ulosav is that somehow or rather I cannot, I'm not allowed, I cannot address Hakadosh Baruch Hu directly. That it has to be indirect. If one addresses a malach, but with a different understanding of malachim than the Rambam has, so ultimately the point of dispute there is not about the yesod hachamishi. Ultimately, again, is it a point of dispute avada, avada. The Rambam would not look favorably on on saying machnisei rachamim. He he would not. And and a few of the other selichos, he certainly would not. But lemaise, those who are saying it, the nekudas hamachlokes between them and the Rambam is in the conception of malach. And that's not one of the ikarei emuna. The Rambam himself writes, the Rambam himself writes in I think it's in Igeres Techiyas Hameisim. He says people have a very hard time, he says, with incorporeal conceptions. They're very m'gusham'dik. We like tangible and visible things. We have difficulty conceiving of of things that that are that are purely spiritual, that are incorporeal. And the Rambam says, and you know, so people believe that the malachim have bodies. The Rambam says, nu nu. He says, people, he says avada that's wrong. He says people want to believe it, he says you don't have to, you don't have to spend your life trying to trying to correct that mistake. People want to go through life thinking that the malachim have bodies? Okay, he says they're wrong, but they can go through life thinking malachim have bodies. It's only when when rachmana litzlan people want to transpose that upon the Ribbono Shel Olam, so then you have to. A person has a mistake and a mistaken understanding according to the Rambam of a malach, it's a mistake, it's a mistake, it's a mistaken understanding. Not every mistake, not every mistake is is kfira. Lemaise, the dispute here isn't about, the dispute is really about what the conception of of malachim is. The Maharal has, the Maharal has in in in the Nesiv Ha'avoda talks about that. Maharal says as follows. Again, the Gemara talks about on a taanis going out to the beis hakevaros. And and preferably it should be a Jewish beis hakevaros. If it's a non-Jewish beis hakevaros, then it serves the purpose of החי יתן אל לבו. It's something which is sobering, something which gives a person perspective, and that's avada of course a tremendous to'eles. But but there's an added to'eles if a person goes to a a a Jewish beis hakevaros. So he says what happens? So he says of course we're not davening to tzadikim. He says, again, obviously this gets into realms that we don't understand, but but the words in the Maharal say like this: that that when a person goes out to the place where where where a tzadik is buried, so there's some kind of chibur which is affected. And he says unlike the malachim, he says the tzadikim even after their petira from olam hazeh remain ohavei Yisrael ninhu. And then through that chibur, they davven on our behalf. is to create that chibur. Then he says אפילו אם תמצא לומר that someone can daven for someone else, again, so then we're asking them to daven for us, but we're not davening to them. Inochunami, a person has to be very careful not to think that the Jewish practice of going out there, Kalev Ben Yefuneh did it, it's a heilege, it's a holy thing to do. No one thinks there's a question about that, but it taki has to be with the right understanding. It's not like there's a goyishe notion about that after death they become saints, this whole business that they took over from, I don't know where they got from, the Greeks or wherever they got, that avoda zara-dikke thing. And taki there, it's yitachen me'od that that understanding taki is a violation of the issur chamishi. What we're supposed to be doing, again, is that the tzadikim should daven on our behalf and that that is something which is acceptable after their petira the same way it's acceptable when they're alive. The same way a person's not supposed to think that when he goes to an Adam Gadol for a bracha or to daven, it doesn't mean that he's making that person an intermediary between himself and Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It means he's asking that person to daven. The Maharal even has one de'ah and says that lemaise you can't daven for someone else. What do you mean you can't daven for someone else? So the Maharal says and the Chasam Sofer explains what the Maharal means, he says according to one de'ah in the Maharal if I ask you to daven on my behalf you can't unless there's such a degree of empathy that you feel the pain. That's what the Maharal has two de'os whether or not without that degree of empathy he's not even sure you can daven in someone else's behalf. He says according to one tzad in the Maharal, so there's no such thing as davening for someone else. What it means is, like Rav Aryeh Levin, our knee hurts, that's what it really has to be al pi din in order to daven for someone else. That's one tzad the Maharal has. Then he says, even אפילו אם תמצא לומר that you can daven in someone's behalf, again, what it means is that, okay, so maybe I don't have the empathy that I feel your pain, but lemaise, I'm not acting as an intermediary, but I'm the same way if you were moving and you needed help shopping stuff, so I would lend a hand, so here too, so I'm also davening and contributing an extra tefilla, an extra zechus tefilla. But inochunami, we're not davening to them the way there's a notion of saints and all that business. Are we davening to Hashem there and the ma'ala being a chibur or are we saying... There's such an inyan also, there's such an inyan of being there. Rav Sacks told a story once that the Chofetz Chaim la'eis ziknuso. So the Chofetz Chaim only had the mesorah of chrein for maror. He didn't have I don't know whether he even had access to it, even if he would have had the tradition, but not for romaine. And la'eis ziknuso, the Chofetz Chaim lived to be quite an old man. So la'eis ziknuso it was dangerous, the doctors told him that it would be dangerous for him to eat chrein. So the Chofetz Chaim was very pained by this. He was very pained by the fact that he wouldn't be able to eat maror. So he sent a shliach to go to the Gr"a's kever to be mispallel that bizchus that he the Chofetz Chaim had published the Toras Kohanim with the Hagahos HaGr"a, that in that zechus he should have a refuah and be able to eat maror. So there is such an inyan, right, there's such an inyan also that maybe going there is a way of invoking that zechus. But we're saying to Hashem bizchus HaGr"a, we're not saying Avrohom daven. Correct, correct, that's different. But in the Maharal could you say that it is okay to say Avrohom daven for us, not as an intermediary, but as a zeide? The same way you can go to your zeide and ask him that he should daven that you should be matzliach in learning, you should be matzliach in everything else, so you can ask your zeide Avrohom Avinu to daven for you also. But not as an intermediary, as a zeide who's davening on your behalf, as a zeide... Who's concerned for you, who loves you, who for somehow or rather and on a level that we don't begin to understand, somehow or rather there is some chibbur and and because of that, yeah, yeah, that's what the Maharal says. Again, whether lemayseh to davven for someone else, do I have to feel his pain or even if I honestly don't feel the pain but I'm aware of it and because of that I want to davven, so the Maharal has two leshonos on it. Okay. That's it. Maybe we'll continue next week.