Q&A: Inyanei Emuna

So we'll begin be'ezras Hashem we'll start with some of the questions in Emunah. One of the questions: should we try to find proofs for Hashem and what should be avoided? There is a very, very fundamental machlokes in the Rishonim between the Rambam and the Ramban. Rambam writes in Yesodei HaTorah in the very opening halachos. He says that יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. Right, the foundation of everything, the pillar of everything is to know that Hashem exists, that he's the source of all existence. And the Rambam says that ידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה שנאמר אנכי ה' אלהיך. It's clear from reading through the halachos that the yediyah of which the Rambam is talking about is a logical proof type yediyah. It's clear from the previous halacha, halacha hey, where the Rambam says that hamatzui hazeh, that this eternal Hashem who exists, who

אלוה העולם אדון כל הארץ הוא המנהיג הגלגל בכח שאין לו קץ ותכלית ובכח שאין לו הפסק שהגלגל סובב תמיד ואי אפשר שיסוב בלא מסבב והוא ברוך הוא המסבב אותו בלא יד ולא גוף.

So it's clear that the yediyah that the Rambam is talking about again is a type of logical, logical proof type yediyah. And kiyadua, he is very ma'arich about this elsewhere to present what he presents here berashei perakim. So elsewhere he is very ma'arich. He elaborates at great length. Le-umaso, the Ramban, who agrees with the Rambam that Anochi Hashem Elokecha is in the minyan taryag as a mitzvah of yediyas Hashem. So listen very carefully here. Even though the Ramban in Sefer Hamitzvos defends the Behag who doesn't count it, so the Ramban even there the truth is says that he doesn't really agree with the Behag, he's just defending the Behag. So in the Peirush Al HaTorah in Aseres Hadibros, the Ramban writes as follows:

אנכי ה' אלהיך הדיבור הזה מצות עשה אמר אנכי ה' יורה ויצווה אותם שידעו ויאמינו כי יש ה' והוא אלוהים להם כלומר הווה קדמון מאיתו היה הכל בחפץ ויכולת והוא אלוהים להם שחייבים לעבדו ואמר אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים כי הוצאתם משם תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ.

Again,

אנכי ה' אלהיך הדיבור הזה מצות עשה אמר אנכי ה' יורה ויצווה אותם שידעו ויאמינו.

So the Ramban here implicitly, implicitly, again the Ramban wrote bekitzur. The Ramban is not a quick, light, light reading. He wrote very, very בחינת מועט המחזיק את המרובה in the words of the Ramban. Ramban here implicitly is addressing a question that among others the Maharal asks, which is, right, the overwhelming majority of mitzvos are formulated belashon tzivuy, they're formulated as an imperative. So why is it here by the pasuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, why doesn't it say de'u or veyadata? It's presented as a statement of fact. So the Ramban doesn't ask the question. But he's clearly responding to the question. And that's what the Ramban means yoreh veyitzaveh. That the pasuk is not only a mitzvas asei, the pasuk is also instruction, as it's not only a tzivuy, it's also a hora'ah. If the pasuk would have been written beloshon tzivuy, so then I would have thought that אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים, then the limud is again believe or know that this Hashem who took you out of Eretz Mitzrayim. That's how I would have understood the pasuk. The pasuk bedafke is written factually, as a statement rather than as an imperative, so that we'll recognize that it's yoreh veyitzaveh. Again, yoreh means to instruct, right? Lehoros is to instruct. So yoreh veyitzaveh osam that we should know and believe in Hashem. And then what should the source, where from where are we supposed to derive and draw that belief? כי הוצאתם משם תורה, again torah lashon hora'ah again, right, the same root as yoreh, כי הוצאתם משם תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ because Yetzias Mitzrayim proved all the yesodos ha'emunah. Again, so that's a very fundamental dispute that for the Rambam, the Rambam doesn't dispute, I mean the psukim in Va'eira and Bo say it. The Rambam doesn't dispute that the eser makkos were designed to instill emunah. And he doesn't question that he himself writes it when he talks about ta'amei mitzvos, and that's why we're supposed to remember nisei Mitzrayim. So the Rambam doesn't deny that history is a source of emunah, but what the Rambam says is that the mitzvah of yediyah is to go beyond that. That's for the Rambam. And the Ramban says no, the mitzvah of yediya doesn't require one to go beyond that. That's the Torah is more than happy with a knowledge, again, which is rooted, which derives from an awareness of the miracles of Yetzias Mitzrayim and presumably subsequently as well, which demonstrate the yesodos ha'emunah. So that's a very, very fundamental machlokes. Is one supposed to be looking for logical proofs of the world has to have a creator vechulu or just no, we look into, we look into history. The Ramban says that the yoreh veyitzaveh is that the hora'ah is Hashem says how to be mekayeim the mitzvah. That hotze'osam misham torah, that the Yetzias Mitzrayim itself indicates, reflects about Hashem and how Hashem acts voluntarily and the yedias Hashem, hashgachas Hashem. Earlier he mentioned nevuah as well because the makkos were foretold by Moshe Rabbeinu. Okay. Obviously you can't really talk about how we pasken. There's no seif in Shulchan Aruch about this. You can't say how we pasken. Very famous that Reb Elchonon writes that he thinks that bezman hazeh there isn't anyone who has a sufficient yiras Hashem to be oseik be'inyanei chakira as the shittas haRambam would require. I don't know if everyone agrees with Reb Elchonon necessarily, but that is what Reb Elchonon writes. Either way, it is very important to emphasize that it's quite clear the Rambam goes out of his way on more than one occasion to point out how people, even very bright people, people with very keen intellects, when they try to figure things out on their own without any kind of tradition, can and almost inevitably do make wrong turns. And one wrong turn obviously can take a person very, very far astray rachmana litzlan. Not, not everyone is a potential Avraham Avinu who who through seichel can successfully figure things out on on his own. So should we look for proofs? So the Ramban would say, no, not proofs of of that logical variety but just אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים. The Rambam would say that we should be doing it. Lemaiseh what should we do? I don't know, הכל לפי מה שהוא אדם. It probably depends on the person. Certainly if a person is bothered if a person has questions he he should seek guidance to to have those questions answered m'idach gissah if a person knows himself and his temperament that that sort of the implicit act of asking questions which might be involved in the Rambam's path is something that that rattles him then he certainly should stay very very very far away from it and I don't know הכל לפי מה שהוא אדם. First of all I just want to understand what's the Rambam's pshat? Anyway in terms of Torah min hashamayim you have to rely on history at some point anyway so like what what why would there be a what what's the Rambam's pshat with God logically? Why why is that a better idea? If if if the whole point is that like this is a starting idea from a historical olam right? But doesn't the same chisaron apply to Torah min hashamayim let's say and everything that we don't have a proof of from a priori reason? If it's good enough for Torah min hashamayim it should be good enough for God overall. What's the pshat? So the Rambam the Rambam would answer you that אין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר. Meaning that the Rambam the Rambam's understanding is that the the highest level of yediya is is when something is is logically muchrach, logically compelling. The Ramban obviously disagrees with that and and therefore the Ramban says that that when the the yediya in question when the proposition in question lends itself to that type of yediya so that's the that's the highest form of yediya. He wasn't the only one who thought so. Chovos Halevavos thought so also because Chovos Halevavos has this famous moshal the you know what what he says that a person who believes without the type of yediya that Chovos Halevavos was before the Rambam without the type of yediya that the Rambam talks about the difference between a blind person who's being led along a path and a person with sight who walks along the path. That's exactly our argument for Torah min hashamayim though. And sorry what? You really think the argument? No again אין דנין אפשר משאי אפשר. The Rambam the Rambam's view is again that when it lends itself to that so then that's the highest form of yediya. Why isn't why don't we have yediya? I thought you said earlier the highest level of yediya is that is logical proof that means we don't have we don't have that form of yediya. No no no no no because it depends on what the truth is Dehainu if something is a historical truth there's nothing lacking if your yediya of it is purely historical. If something is more than a logical if something is more than a historical truth so then the Rambam would tell you the Ramban would disagree very sharply as he does and again this there's no advocacy here just trying to to clarify in response to the question the Rambam would tell you again Torah min hashamayim is a historical truth. It's a historical event that Hakadosh Baruch Hu at Har Sinai gave us the Torah and then mimaileh there's nothing missing if your yediya of that is based on לא יסור מלבבך והודעתם לבניך ולבני בניך. It's a historical event so your yediya of it is complete and and perfect as a historical yediya. When when when there's a truth which is more than just so let's say two plus two I'll give you a moshal like this when you study let's say study geometry. So you can try to remember all the theorems about when you have two lines here and then you have a line that bisects them. Which angles are going to be congruent? Which angles are not congruent? You can remember them as gezeiras hakasuv. You can take it on faith from your math teacher, and then chances are you'll get a 42 on the test if that's the extent of how you understand it. Or you can, no, you can takeh, you can takeh understand, you know, once you have the postulates, once you have the axioms, then you can takeh see how it's really, really compelling. So if something is, you can say, look, look, they built this building based on this theorem, so it must be true, or you can understand. Again, there are always postulates. You can understand how it's compelling. So the Rambam would tell you, when the truth is a historical truth, so then chas veshalom it's nothing missing, there's nothing lacking, that your yediya is historical. But when the truth is more than a historical truth, so then the Rambam thinks that one's yediya should be on that level as well. Why can't you just, in the question, why do we assume a chiluk between Torah min hashamayim and anochi Hashem? Why can't you just say klapei being a ma'amin, Torah min hashamayim it's emuna gemura, there's nothing missing, but the Rambam holds there's a specific mitzvah of yedias Hashem that has to be? No, because, no, the question is correct. The implication of the mitzvah is, wherever something is nitpas in yediya, the Rambam thinks there's a mitzvah of yediya. No, the question is correct, the question is correct. And that's the answer, that's the answer of the Rambam. Again, if a person is not sure, so a person should follow what Rav Elchonon says. Zicher follow what Rav Elchonon says. Again, if a person, if there are questions that bother a person, sometimes, sometimes there's never anything wrong with having a question. If a person has an honest question, a person should seek guidance and help in finding the answer. Sometimes people think, people think that their understanding is the measure of everything. They have questions and they sit themselves and they mispalsef and they can't figure out the answers to the questions and they tie themselves up in knots and then they come to quote conclusions. People have questions, so that's totally fine and totally normal and totally healthy and religiously and on all levels. But you have to, if you have a pain in your knee and you don't know what it's from, or even if you think you know what it's from, so you go to a doctor, you go to an orthopedist and the orthopedist helps diagnose and helps guide the person. The same thing should be true when people have questions in emuna. Is Rav Elchonon saying this because we don't have an hachra'ah between the Ramban and the Rambam? Or because within the Rambam, lichora, he wouldn't tell you there's a מצוות עשה מן התורה, but if we're nervous that you have a problem, you shouldn't be? Is he saying that we should follow the other Rishonim? Chovos HaLevavos, you mean? Chovos HaLevavos makes an exception for hashmata. So lichora he agrees it could be a kein mitzvah bedieved? Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. Right. So bechlal, it's very important to understand, you know, whether it's when you mention, when we mention this Rav Elchonon or other things, we're not afraid of truth. משה אמת ותורתו אמת. There's nothing true which challenges anything in Torah. משה אמת ותורתו אמת. We're not... But ela mai, ela mai... A person has to be qualified to deal with, to understand what he's dealing with. And sometimes this can be true in in philosophy, in dealing with certain questions. It can be true in ich vais when when people tell you certain things about about Tanach and tkufas hamikra. It can be true there as well. Sometimes sometimes people are told things that are just not true, that are just sheker. That's a different story. But sometimes a person can be told something which is true, but but you have to know how to deal with it. So we're not afraid, we're not afraid of anything that's true. But elah mai, one should be afraid of people who are not equipped to to deal with and to understand what their perspective is, that we are concerned with with their being exposed to to certain things. It's not a it's not that that Torah is rachmana litzlan can be challenged. It could be that that my personal understanding of Torah isn't adequate for me to be exposed to to certain things. משל למה הדבר דומה, a person a person goes swimming. Okay, so he may be a good enough swimmer to to swim in in in a swimming pool, but that doesn't mean that if he goes out to the ocean where there's a very strong tide, that he's going to be a good enough swimmer for that. And a person has to know what his own abilities are, what his own capacities are. And and a person shouldn't, certainly not unguided and maybe even guided at times it it shouldn't be done. A person shouldn't expose himself to what he can't handle, not because not because Torah is afraid. Torah is not Torah is not afraid of anything. But sometimes people people expose other people to things they can't deal with. And again, they may be true. Sometimes they're not true. But sometimes they can be true. But you're not allowed to expose people to things they can't deal with unless you explain to them how it's supposed to be dealt with. They like to point out that that sometimes you can find in some ancient code certain certain laws which seem to antedate Maamad Har Sinai and then you find the same thing in Chumash. And and again, whether whether that fact is true or not, I don't know. Zol zein that it's true. And then and this is and then מה יעשה הילד ולא יתבלבל when such a quote yediyah is given to him? What's the again, assuming that that it's true, what's the correct perspective or what's one of the correct perspectives is that since the avos kiyemu hatorah, there were many dinim of the Torah that were known and through their influence which became accepted in in society before Maamad Har Sinai. So it's not a kasha. It doesn't rachmana litzlan intimate anything heretical. Adaraba, adaraba, you find the Torah itself alludes to, we see that there were certain practices from the Torah which were already accepted beforehand due to the due to the the influence of the avos. Just an example of that again when Rav Elchanan says that a person should stay away, it's not that we think Torah can't handle. No, we think that maybe we can't handle everything, and a person has to know what what he's capable of handling and shouldn't shouldn't expose himself to to what he can't handle. You know, Rachmana litzlan, you know one hears on occasion of of the people who get confused and and go off the derech. Rachmana litzlan. Whatever natural curiosity or or concern or combination thereof, you know, maybe motivating a person, it's not necessarily a good idea to try to get that person to explain why he went off the derech because again sometimes people just go off the derech just because of very very plain down-to-earth yetzer haras. But sometimes they go off the derech because they get confused about inyanei hashkafa, inyanei emuna, and they end up again swimming in waters that they're not capable of swimming in. But lav davka that their friend who wants to again maybe it's out of curiosity, maybe out of concern, maybe wherever it's coming from, lav davka that that he's enough of an advanced swimmer to to be swimming there with them as well. So it's very important that אל יצא איש ממקומו, that we all have to know what our place is, what we can handle, what we can't handle, and and what we should therefore expose ourselves to, what we should not expose ourselves to, and and im tirtzeh lomar that when a person does have questions, it's very important to realize that that that we're not supposed to try to just figure things out on on our own. One one summer I once got a ride from from Moshav Beit Meir into Yerushalayim with Rabbi Wolofsky who's a famous famous speaker. So he was telling me in the car how how a kid once came to him and and said he doesn't believe, doesn't believe, doesn't believe. So he begins asking him have you studied this? Have you studied this? Have you studied this? And you know did you you you ever hear of Moreh Nevuchim? You ever hear of Emunos V'Deyos? You ever hear of this? You ever hear of that? And maybe he mentioned some other other other authors as well. The answer was no, no, no. So he says to him you're not a kofer, you're an idiot, he says. You don't what do you mean you don't believe? You don't know anything. How what do you what do you mean you don't believe? So a person so people people who don't people who don't know or don't know enough and and get in over their heads, it's not a it's not a formula for life, not a formula for life in in in any area and here as well and again so הכל לפי מה שהוא אדם with great great care and caution that that we shouldn't be getting involved in things that we don't know enough, that we don't have the the depth to to deal with. I'm not again I'm not saying there aren't other perspectives, and I'm not saying there aren't other perspectives. No, that's fine but that's not the point. I'm not I'm not saying there aren't other perspectives. Again it all depends on on the specific instance. I'm not so much interested in that that question sort of I was more interested in sort of illustrating this and maybe we could bli neder talk about that k'she'le'atzmo. I was more interested in illustrating the principle. Yeah. So another... Why does Hashem hide behind teva? One can't necessarily expect to answer, you know, a question that begins with why. In this case I think we are we are given a perspective, but in general one can't. The question is what does this mitzvah teach us? What is it the what question rather than the why question? Okay, sometimes we can respond even if the question is asked in the why. The assumption of Hashem hiding behind teva is correct in sifrei Chassidus you'll find the Chiddushei HaRim says it, the Meor Einayim says it, presumably others must say it as well, that very beautiful etymology that the word for world in Lashon HaKodesh, Olam, comes from the same shoresh as to be hidden: im haleim yaalimu. And the reason for that being because HaKadosh Baruch Hu is hidden in the world. Very beautiful etymology. Why is that? So again, or what's our perspective on that? The simple pshat is as follows. I think the Maharal in one place says along the following lines that ויתייצבו בתחתית ההר מלמד שכפה עליהם הר כגיגית. So the Maharal says, I think Maharal says this, that what it means is as follows: it doesn't necessarily mean that Chazal don't mean literally that HaKadosh Baruch Hu picked up the mountain but what it means is that there was a coercion in being in Kabbalas HaTorah in the following sense: that having witnessed the Eser Makos, having witnessed Krias Yam Suf, having experienced Hakol b'kol m'kol, everything was just so obvious and so overwhelming and

ראתה שפחה על הים מה שלא ראה יחזקאל בן בוזי

that it was no nisayon, it's almost as if that there was no element of bechirah in emunah. And מכאן מודעא רבה לאורייתא because HaKadosh Baruch Hu doesn't have the world run that way all the time. And that's why the הדר קבלוה בימי אחשורוש, and Maharal says that, but that's why the הדר קבלוה בימי אחשורוש. What do you mean b'yimei Achashverosh? Since when do we sort of assign the periods of Jewish history by this is the period of Achashverosh and this is the period of Nevuchadnezzar? No, this is the period of Bayis Rishon and this is the period of Churban Rishon and this is Bayis Sheini. Vos epes b'yimei Achashverosh? No, the whole point is הדר קבלוה בימי אחשורוש, adaraba, to emphasize when things were nistar, when Achashverosh was riding high, to emphasize that the as it were the complementary Kabbalas HaTorah was when HaKadosh Baruch Hu's presence was more hidden. Because when HaKadosh Baruch Hu's presence is not hidden in the world, it's so overwhelming that it almost or entirely eliminates bechirah. And HaKadosh Baruch Hu's plan for the world is that we should, at least at this stage of our existence and the world's existence, that we should have to exercise bechirah. It's an important thing to realize that despite the conviction, despite the Rambam's telling us again about metzius Hashem being nitpas in a yedia, again, hegyonus, sichlus, v'chulu, that doesn't preclude that a person that there's bechirah in belief. Sometimes when people have questions in emunah, what they're looking for is that they want you to tell them something that's so compelling that it takes their bechirah away. I remember years and years ago a talmid came. Okay, different questions in emunah. Fine, we talked about them. And then his response was I hear everything that was said and it responds to everything I asked and it's very compelling. But maybe there's a weakness, maybe... A person can always, always come up with the Ribono Shel Olam created the world that there's bechira and bechira if you want to be stubborn enough is you can say that two plus two isn't four. That the Ribono Shel Olam wanted, on the one hand, there's objective absolute truth in the world. On the other hand, there's bechira and Hakadosh Baruch Hu created that a person can, if he wants to, perversely exercise his bechira and look objective absolute truth in the face and deny it. And that's p'shat with the seifer from Reb Itzele Salanter, how can it be, even if you say that ich veis, that let's say like the Ramban says, that that view in Chazal, that Paroh has his bechira chofshis for the first five makkos and only then loses it. So you didn't have to be a tzaddik, it's just self-preservation. You didn't have to be a lamed-vavnik to give in. If someone's twisting your arm off and says say uncle and he's clearly bigger than you and stronger than you and you don't have a chance, so you say uncle and you don't have to be a very pious individual with a netiyah towards midos chasidus. He tells you to say uncle, you say uncle. So how is it possible? So Reb Itzele Salanter said if a person doesn't want to believe, he doesn't want to believe. So the fact that there's objective absolute truth will never, ever mean that a person doesn't exercise his bechira in recognizing that. And that idea, again, just how powerful the capacity and the faculty of bechira chofshis is, that's also what underlies the fact that we have such a capacity for self-deception, that we have such a capacity to live with denial and to deceive ourselves, because again, without that, without that, the most irrational, absurd feeling or attitude in the world is gaivah. Most irrational, absurd. A person can't even guarantee that he can take his next breath. A person can't guarantee that he's going to be able to move. A person goes to sleep at night, he has no way of knowing if he's going to wake up in the morning. So how can it be that we're ba'alei gaivah? How can it be? We have a capacity to ignore things, we have a capacity to forget things, we have a capacity to, all of that is because Hakadosh Baruch Hu's plan is that we should be ba'alei bechira. And it's part of that master plan that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is hidden and the world is olam because when the gilui Shechina is overwhelming enough, so the more obvious it is, so then the less and less bechira, the less and less bechira there is. Okay, so now to continue.