Hilchos Deos Perek 1

So let's begin with Hilchos Deos. Hilchos Deos,

הלכות דעות יש בכללן שמונה מצוות חמש מצוות עשה ושש מצוות לא תעשה.

The first one is lehidamos bidrachav. In the minyan hamitzvos here at the beginning of Mishneh Torah as well, mitzvas asei ches, להדמות בדרכיו הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו. But you can't help but be struck by the fact that the Rambam is changing from the lashon hapasuk. Right? The lashon hapasuk the Rambam quotes is vehalachta bidrachav. So you would have thought that the natural way for the Rambam to formulate the mitzvah would be laleches bidrachav. That's what the lashon hapasuk is, is vehalachta bidrachav, and the Rambam very conspicuously changes it to lehidamos bidrachav. That's one thing we need to understand. The other thing is b'chlal, what does it mean lehidamos? Again, Chazal talk about it, we'll see in a minute, b'neder, im yirtzeh Hashem. What does it mean? What kind of a... there doesn't seem to be a more absurd concept than that. So if you take a look here at the end of Halacha Hey then going over to Halacha Vav and Zayin:

מצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו. כך למדו בפירוש מצוה זו: מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון, מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום, מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש. הלכה ז: וכיצד ירגיל אדם עצמו בדעות אלו עד שיקבעו בו? יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעשה על פי הדעות הממוצעות ויחזור בהן תמיד עד שיהיו מעשיהן קלים עליו ולא יהיה בהן טורח ויקבעו הדעות בנפשו.

So it's clear from the Rambam and the Rambam is clearly telling us where he gets it from Chazal, that maybe you would have thought just I don't know, being magbis sedra quickly without the Sifrei, just being magbis sedra, so you would have said vehalachta bidrachav. Okay. So the Rambam defines darkei Hashem as the derachim habeinonim. So it means that a person's ma'asim, a person's pe'ulos have to be consistent, have to accord with the derech habeinonis. So how much tzedakah should a person give? A person should be giving tzedakah, ich veis, between ma'aser, chomesh, that it's what the Torah would define as the middah beinonis. And how much of a ta'avah should a person have to eat? צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו. How much should a person eat? צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו. It's clear from the Rambam that that's not what the mitzvah is. It's clear from the Rambam that the mitzvah is not אף אתה התנהג באופן של חנינות. Again, the Rambam is just quoting Chazal here. It's not

אף אתה התנהג בחנינות, אף אתה התנהג ברחמנות, אף אתה התנהג בקדושה,

but it's

אף אתה היה חנון, אף אתה היה רחום, אף אתה היה קדוש.

And that's what the Rambam in Halacha Zayin follows up and says that what a person is supposed to be attempting to do in the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is ad sheyikave'u vo. And it's clear from the Rambam that the yikave'u vo is not simply go out because otherwise eventually he'll mess up on the practical level. No, that's gufa hamitzvah. The mitzvah is, again, ata... the Sifrei on the pasuk, ata heyei, or the אף אתה היה חנון, אף אתה היה רחום, so it has to be yikave'u vo. That's why since Chazal learned p'shat hamitzvah that way, that's what the Rambam is expressing when he changes it from vehalachta to lehidamos. That as long as you just have vehalachta without the Torah shebe'al peh, without the va'ani vehu, מה הוא אף אני, without... so you would have thought that vehalachta just means a person it's all on the level of ma'asim of pe'ulos. Kamasma lan no, it's lehidammos that a person has to acquire these character traits, a person has to cultivate these dispositions. What does it mean? What does it at the end of the day, what does it mean lehidammos? So it's clear that the translation here of lehidammos bedrachav lichora should be translated to be like Hashem with respect to darkei Hashem, to be like Hashem in his ways, meaning not to be like Hashem. If you would translate lehidammos bedrachav to be like Hakadosh Baruch Hu through his ways, so then it would sound like there's some kind of dimyon, a resemblance, there's some kind of resemblance. What does the pasuk say in Yeshayahu? אל מי תדמיוני ואשוה. So there's no dimyon to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Lehidammos bedrachav means to be like with respect to his drachim, in his drachim to be like Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So the דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא again, so that a person can aspire to lehidammos. So it's not lehidammos la-Hashem through his drachav, but it's lehidammos with respect to his drachav, in his drachav. We're more commonly comfortable and use the word midos where the Rambam uses the word deos. I think we would describe most of the examples as what the Rambam gives in Halacha Aleph.

דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו משונה מזו ורחוקה ממנה ביותר יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל ואם כעס יכעס כעס מעט בכמה שנים ויש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר ויש שהוא שפל רוח עד מאד ויש שהוא בעל תאוה לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאותו ויש שהוא טהור גוף ביותר לא יתאוה אפילו לדברים מעטים שהגוף צריך להם,

etcetera. The Rambam calls all of these deos. Okay, so it could just be that we don't really know what the word deos means. That's why it strikes us as being different and there certainly is some truth to that. But lichora this is also a little bit of at least this is part of the omek to it. If you go back after the minyan hamitzvos that you have in the beginning here, you go back to where the Rambam then talks about the yud dalet sefarim here in the Yad HaChazaka. It's Sefer Rishon, Sefer HaMada, after the minyan hamitzvos at the beginning here, so then the Rambam says וראיתי לחלק חיבור זה לארבעה עשר ספרים then you have Sefer Rishon.

אכלול בו כל המצוות שהן עיקר דת משה רבינו וצריך אדם לידע אותם תחילה הכל כגון ייחוד שמו ברוך הוא ואיסור עבודה זרה וקראתי שם זה ספר המדע.

So first of all, the mitzvos that you have in Sefer HaMada are

עיקר דת משה רבינו. וצריך אדם לידע אותם תחילה הכל.

So what does the phrase וצריך אדם לידע אותם תחילה הכל mean? So maybe it just means a person has to know what these mitzvos are so he'll be mkayem them. So like mitzvas sukkah, a person has to know mitzvas sukkah so he can be mkayem it. He has to know mitzvas lulav so he can be mkayem it. Or maybe it means more than that. וצריך אדם לידע אותם תחילה הכל meaning the ikar of the mitzvah is through yediyah. It's not just a person has to know the mitzvah to be mkayem it, but the kiyum is maybe on a different level. The kiyum of sukkah is not through yediyah. The kiyum of sukkah is through yeshivah, B'sukkos tishvu. The kiyum of lulav is not through yediyah. You have to know the mitzvah but then the kiyum is through u'lekachtem lachem. Yitachen that the Rambam over here means not only a person has to know what the mitzvos are so he'll mkayem them because the kiyum is עיקר דת משה רבינו. Yitachen that the Rambam also means, and again, the fact that the entire sefer is called Sefer HaMada is that the mitzvos are be'ikar mitzvos which are anchored in yediyah. So that's pashut that that's true for Anochi Hashem Elokecha and Shema Yisrael and lo yihiyeh lecha and issur avodah zarah. But yitachen that that's also true for v'halachta b'drachav. De'hainu that the yesod of the mitzvah of v'halachta b'drachav is yedias darchei Hashem. And it's against that background that the Rambam refers to what we call middos as de'os because really a person's middos, what we call a person's middos, should reflect his de'os, his understanding of דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא. And that's yitachen part of the intention in, again, A: that these halachos are here in Sefer HaMada and B: that's part of what the lashon de'os encapsulates. Okay, so

דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו משונה מזו ורחוקה ממנה ביותר. יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל ואם כעס יכעס כעס מעט בכמה שנים. יש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר ויש שהוא שפל רוח עד מאוד. יש שהוא בעל תאוה לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאותו ויש שהוא טהור גוף ביותר ולא יתאוה אפילו לדברים מעטים שהגוף צריך להן. יש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון העולם כענין שנאמר אוהב כסף לא ישבע כסף. ויש מקצר שדיו אפילו דבר מעט שלא יספיק לו ולא ירדוף להשיג כל צרכו. יש שהוא מסגף עצמו ברעב וקובץ על ידו ואינו אוכל פרוטה משלו אלא בצער גדול. ויש שהוא מאבד כל ממונו בידו לדעתו ועל דרכים אלו שאר כל הדעות כגון מהולל ואונן וכילי ושוע ואכזרי ורחמן ורך לבב ואמיץ לב וכיוצא בהן.

Let's read together a little bit of the overall picture.

ויש בין כל דעה ודעה הרחוקה ממנה בקצה האחר דעה בינונית רחוקה מזו ומזו וכל הדעות יש מהן דעות שהן לאדם מתחלת ברייתו לפי טבע גופו

and

ויש מהן דעות שטבע של אדם זה מכוון ומוכן לקבל אותם במהרה יותר משאר הדעות ויש מהן שאינן לאדם מתחלת ברייתו אלא למד אותן מאחרים או שנפנה להן מעצמו לפי מחשבה שעלה בלבו או ששמע שזו דעה טובה לו ובה ראוי לילך והנהיג עצמו בה עד שנקבעה.

The Rambam then says in Halacha Dalet that the correct de'ah is

הדרך הישרה היא מדה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה מכל דעות שיש לו לאדם והיא הדעה שהיא רחוקה משני הקצוות ריחוק שווה ואינה קרובה לא לזו ולא לזו לפיכך צוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותן ומכוון אותן בדרך האמצעית כדי שיהא שלם.

A person should always be assessing his de'os, always appraising his de'os, and

כיצד לא יהיה בעל חמה נוח לכעוס ולא כמת שאינו מרגיש אלא בינוני לא יכעוס אלא על דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו כדי שלא יעשה כיוצא בו פעם אחרת.

So here there is a famous kasha, a famous stirah that the Lechem Mishneh and others point out, that the Rambam here in Perek Alef mentions ka'as together with other de'os and illustrates the mida habeinonis, the derech habeinonis with regard to ka'as. He does the same thing more or less with regard to shiflus and govah lev. And yet in Perek Beis Halacha Gimmel, the Rambam says that there are two exceptions to the mida habeinonis.

ויש דעות שאסור לו לאדם לנהוג בהן בבינונית אלא יתרחק עד הקצה האחר והוא גובה לב

and then three lines later

וכן הכעס דעה רעה היא עד מאד וראוי לאדם שיתרחק ממנה עד הקצה האחר.

So what's pshat that the Rambam here, the very first example he gives in Hilchos De'os is regarding ka'as, and he follows up on that in Halacha Dalet by illustrating what the din of halachta bedrachav is with regard to ka'as, and then all of a sudden in Perek Beis Halacha Gimmel, the Rambam says no, a person shouldn't be noheig the mida habeinonis with regard to ka'as. Again, in a different sense you have the same problem, it's actually even more difficult to deal with with regard to govah lev and shiflus, you have a similar problem. But with regard to ka'as, itochen as follows. The Rambam here in Perek Beis Halacha Gimmel, the lashon haRambam is also noteworthy in another respect. The Rambam says

ילמד עצמו שלא יכעוס ואפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו.

A person should train himself not to get angry even on something which it's fitting to get angry for. So lichora that's mamash a stira minei ubei. No, if a person should never get angry, so what that really means is that there's nothing to get angry about. There may be things that a person has to respond to, there may be things that a person has to speak out about against vechulu vechulu, but if a person should never get angry and even as the Rambam continues

ואם רצה להטיל אימה על בני ביתו או על הצבור אם היה פרנס ורצה לכעוס עליהם כדי שיחזרו למוטב יראה עצמו בפניהם שהוא כועס ותהיה דעתו מיושבת.

So if that's the case, there's nothing which is which is rauy lichos alav because a person is never supposed to get angry. So there is nothing which is rauy lichos alav. So ela mai? itachen that the peshat is like this. Let's just read a little bit more in Halacha Gimmel in Perek Bais:

אמרו חכמים הראשונים כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה ואמרו שכל הכועס אם חכם הוא חכמתו מסתלקת ממנו ואם נביא הוא נבואתו מסתלקת ממנו.

So what then? Is it rauy lichos or not? So lichora the peshat is as follows: אם חכם הוא חכמתו מסתלקת ממנו, so Rashi quotes this right with regard to Moshe Rabbeinu, he says that whenever we see Moshe Rabbeinu getting angry, we see Moshe Rabbeinu making a mistake. By Moshe Rabbeinu gets angry, shimu na hamorim, and then he makes a mistake that he hits the rock instead of speaking to the rock. Moshe Rabbeinu ויקצוף משה על פקודי החיל in Parshas Matos, and as a result, nisalma mimenu halacha and it has to be Vayomer Elazar Hakohen has to teach the dinim of libun and hagala. Or in other words as follows: the emes is that really me'ikar hadin, as it were, ka'as is no different than all the other emotions, character traits, dispositions etc. And be'emes the din is that a person should go by the mida habeinonis and be'emes there are things in life which should get a person angry. There are things which are sufficiently outrageous, there are things which are sufficiently objectionable that the correct emotional response, the pathos that a person should feel, it takeh should be what we would call an expression of anger, an expression of anger. But ela mai? Chazal tell us that anger even when justified—Moshe Rabbeinu didn't get angry when it was unjustified, Moshe Rabbeinu on those two occasions was entirely justified in his anger. Moshe Rabbeinu—the emotion of ka'as is so volatile that a person can't modulate it. That's what the peshat is. That it's not that the mida kishalatzma, it's not that there's never an occasion that warrants ka'as. No, דברים שראוי לכעוס עליהם. There are occasions that warrant ka'as. There are occasions where the correct response in theory should be ka'as. Ela mai?

כל הכועס אם חכם הוא חכמתו מסתלקת ממנו אם נביא הוא נבואתו מסתלקת ממנו,

even if it's a דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו, because it's such a volatile, it's such a volatile emotion. So mimaila, in theory, me'ikar hadin, ka'as really belongs to all other deios, that the correct route is the derech habeinonis and that a person should only be כועס על דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו. Halacha lemaiseh—could be the Rambam means miderabbanan, I think that's what the Avodas Hamelech says. Halacha lemaiseh a person should never be ko'es because it's virtually impossible to modulate ka'as, because it's so volatile, unlike everything else, unlike all the other examples in terms of being a nadvan, not being too much of a pazran, but not being too much of a kamtzan, so there a person can modulate, a person can takeh go on the derech habeinonis. Over here it's next to impossible, it's virtually impossible. מי גדל לנו ממשה רבינו and even Moshe Rabbeinu couldn't modulate the ka'as. So mimeila, that's what the pshat is and that's what the Rambam is telling us in

וילמד עצמו שלא יכעס אפילו על דבר שראוי לכעוס עליו

that me'ikar hadin there are things really where ka'as is warranted and ka'as is justified, but since it's so volatile, so a person is supposed to, supposed to abstain. That perhaps is a mahalach. Again, lichora you need that there's something along the lines of the avodas hamelech that there is that this is a din derabbanan, that even though it's ra'ui lichos alav because of the volatility that a person shouldn't. Okay, there's one kasha here that remains outstanding, bli neder we'll come back to that. The Gemara in Sotah, it's in Sotah, it's in Moed Katan that the Rambam's quoting here in Halacha Daled of

לפיכך ציוו חכמים הראשונים שיהיה אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותן ומכוון אותן בדרך האמצעי כדי שיהיה שלם.

So the Gemara says

ושם דרך אראנו בישע אלהים. אל תקרי ושם אלא ושם.

That's the Gemara the Rambam's quoting. Rashi for instance, if we look in Rashi, so Rashi understands the Gemara totally differently. Rashi says again ושם is lashon shuma, to make an appraisal. So Rashi says what it means is that a person should be mitchashev שכר מצוה כנגד הפסדה, a person should be mitchashev הפסד עבירה כנגד שכרה. Rashi also says no, that's the lashon shuma. It doesn't mean according to the Rambam was mechadesh that the lashon shuma means this, this balance, that a person should be appraising in the sense of trying to balance his midos along the derech hamimutza. Rashi says no, that it just means that a person should, so the Rambam's chidush here that this Gemara is expressing the, the, and dealing with the derech hayisharah. So lichora, so what exactly, given the Rambam's understanding in this Gemara, that again, that the shuma, that the appraisal is, is constantly assessing and, and calibrating: am I bederech hamimutza or am I נוטה לאחת מהקצוות? So what exactly is the din derabbanan as distinct from the din de'oraissa? Right, the Rambam's going to tell us at the end of Halacha Heh that

מצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינונים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו

that the darkei Hashem equal derachim beinoniyim and mimeila the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים. Right, there is an equation that the Rambam will explain later, how he knows it, there is an equation that darkei Hashem equal the derachim habeinoniyim. So mimeila the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav is ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים. So what's, what is it that Chazal added as distinct from just the din de'oraissa? It's already a din de'oraissa ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים. So apparently, part of it is, ein hachi nami, the din that a person should not only go but be bederech habeinoniyim, that's a din de'oraissa. There's no, there's nothing derabbanan-dik about that. At least part of what the tzivu chachamim... So apparently part of it is the din that a person should not only go but be bederech habeinos, that's a din de'oraisa. There's nothing drabbonandike geven about that. At least part of what the tzivu hachachamim harishonim according to the Rambam's understanding is that in order to do that, there has to be a constant preoccupation, שיהיה אדם שם דעותיו תמיד. En hachi nami the din is taka din de'oraisa of vehalachta bidrachav. But says the Rambam, it's not unlike other mitzvos, okay, a person doesn't have to be constantly preoccupied with mitzvas matzah. Okay, at some point before Pesach, you have to make arrangements to buy a kezayis of matzah according to the Rambam, more than a kezayis, but you have to you have to you have to get your matzah. To have your matzah shmurah for Pesach. Doesn't require a constant preoccupation. לפיכך צוו חכמים הראשונים that if a person's going to be mekayem, it requires a constant preoccupation, שיהיה אדם שם דעותיו תמיד. It's not something that's going to happen me'eilav. It's got to require, again, a very concerted and deliberate effort. It's not the Rambam's vocabulary and and obviously, obviously it would be wrong to to blur the differences. Rambam doesn't doesn't... the lashon cheshbon hanefesh is not is not the Rambam's phrase. But lema'aseh שיהיה אדם שם דעותיו תמיד that a person should constantly be making a shuma, should constantly be appraising and assessing his deios certainly encapsulates a lot of what we associate with with cheshbon hanefesh. I just want one other little he'arah here that the Rambam here in in halacha daled when he's illustrating the dei'ah habeinos, the derech habeinos,

וכן לא יתאוה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתם כעניין שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו.

So in terms of taiva, that's the that's the derech habeinos. different context, maybe in Hilchos Teshuva I think we had occasion to mention this. So the Rambam quotes the pasuk of צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו. So our knee-jerk reaction is, so what's a raya over there? So that's a mida of tzadikim. But the emes is the lashon tzadek just means that a person does what he's mechuyav to do. We colloquially use, oh he's a he's a tzadik, he's one of the lamed-vavniks as though there's something lifnim mishuras hadin about the—no, but what the lashon tzadek really means is a person has zechuyos, he doesn't have aveiros. So that's kulo tzadik, meaning he's just doing what he's supposed to be doing. So צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו means that that's nothing lifnim mishuras hadin about the term, the label tzadik. It's basically something that we're all mechuyav to—again, not lifnim mishuras hadin, mei'ikar hadin, we're all mechuyav to be worthy of being referred to as a tzadik. So mimeila, the pasuk of צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו is something which is a makor for describing what the mida habeynunos is for everyone. It's also interesting, question is what the inference is to be drawn here. That even in achila u'shiya, so here too the definition that the v'halachta bidrachav, that a person is not just supposed to be practically on an even keel, but it's supposed to be something that he cultivates in terms of internalizing the mida, so it applies even here in physical matters. You could have thought that no, maybe the ideal is that a person shouldn't have any taiva to eat k'ilu zeh, but he should make a point of eating enough shehaguf tzarich lahem. Rambam clearly doesn't say that, right? The Rambam says no, a person has a taiva, he has a taiva to eat breakfast, and he has a taiva to eat dinner, but the taiva is דברים שהגוף צריך להם. So you can explain that in either of two ways. Again, either because that's af ata heyei, again, the it's always to internalize the mida habeynunos. So if that's the case, so even over here it's to internalize the mida habeynunos. That and or maybe the Rambam thinks here practically it's not going to happen. If a person mamash has no taiva to eat, maybe practically the Rambam doesn't think it's going to happen. Ayin alav, but either way l'maiseh the way the Rambam depicts the mida habeynunos is even with regard again to the inyanim chomriim, so it's the person cultivates the mida, it's not just that he practically is on that even keel.