Part of the series: Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Transcript
AI-generated transcript. May contain errors.
כיצד ירגיל אדם עצמו בדעות אלו עד שיקבעו בו? יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעשה על פי הדעות הממוצעות ויחזור בהם תמיד עד שיהיו מעשיהם קלים עליו ולא יהיה בהם טורח ויקבעו הדעות בנפשו. ולפי שהשמות האלו שנקרא בהן היוצר הן הדרך הבינונית שאנו חייבים ללכת בה נקראת דרך זו דרך השם והיא שלמדה אברהם אבינו לבניו שנאמר כי ידעתיו למען אשר יצוה את בניו ואת ביתו אחריו ושמרו דרך השם לעשות צדקה ומשפט וההולך בדרך זו מביא טובה וברכה לעצמו שנאמר למען הביא השם על אברהם את אשר דיבר עליו.
So there's something very pivotal. There's been an assumption throughout in the Rambam's whole presentation, the Rambam's whole identification of the Mitzvah of Vehalachta Bidrachav with the Middah Habeinonit, that the דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא are the Derachim Habeinoniyim. But how do you know that? The whole identification of the Mitzvah of Vehalachta Bidrachav with the Derech Habeinoni, the Middah Habeinonit... I don't know, maybe דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא are something else. But I think this He'ara, I think Rav Aviner says it has in his Sefer, that the Rambam is addressing that question here when he says that the Derech Habeinonit is Darchei Hashem. That you see from the Pasuk by Avraham Avinu. That the way the Rambam is learning Pshat in the ושמרו דרך השם לעשות צדקה ומשפט is Tzedakah Umishpat, like the Gemara says in Sanhedrin, the Sugia of Pshara, are usually at odds with each other.
במקום שיש משפט אין צדקה במקום שיש צדקה אין משפט.
And somehow or other, the Pasuk is presenting that as one unified Derech Hashem. And the Rambam is learning Pshat that it's striking that balance, it's the Middah Habeinonit Hamemutza'at which blends the Tzedakah Umishpat, so that's being identified as, that's being described as Derech Hashem. So that's the Raya that the Darchei Hashem are the Derachim Habeinoniyim. Okay. You have here again what we commented on last week, that the Rambam says the Mitzvah of Vehalachta Bidrachav is not only that a person's actions should be consistent with the Middah Habeinonit, but it should be something which a person internalizes. How does a person internalize it? So the Rambam says that it's through the constant repetition and the constant reinforcement. If a person gives Tzedakah Kefi hamiddah habeinonit, and a person, again, it could be that initially that's going to require a very concerted effort to do that. It's not going to be his natural instinct, it's not going to be his natural reaction, but he's going to give Tzedakah Kefi hamiddah habeinonit. And it could be that initially that a person measuring his words, not to talk too little, not to talk too much, is not going to be something which he does just naturally, instinctively, but it's going to be a very deliberate, concerted effort. But eventually, יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעשה, then a person internalizes these Middot, these De'ot. Basically it's the same yesod as is as is very often and very famously quoted from the Chinuch, אחרי הפעולות נמשכות הלבבות is basically what the Rambam is saying here as well, that a person's inner inner life will be shaped, will be molded eventually by by his actions. It's very important to understand that that that famous Chinuch, he mentions it by Sefiras HaOmer, by Korban Pesach, he has it other places as well, should be juxtaposed with the following from the Chinuch. The Chinuch in Parshas Va'eschanan in commenting on the mitzvah of lo tichaneim. So one of the three drashos Chazal have on lo tichaneim is לא תתן להם חן, not to not to compliment, not to hold up an oveid avodah zarah as some kind of some kind of role model. So misheorshei hamitzvah writes the Chinuch,
לפי שתחילת כל מעשה בני אדם היא קביעת המחשבה במעשים והעלאות הדברים על שפת לשון ואחר המחשבה והדיבור באת עשיית המלאכה ועל כן בהימנענו במחשבה ובדיבור מלמצוא בעובדי עבודה זרה תועלת וחן הננו נמנעים בכך מהתחבר עמהם ומלרדוף אחר אהבתם ומללמוד דבר מכל מעשיהם הרעים.
So here the Chinuch is going in the opposite direction, right? Here the Chinuch is saying that ma'asim don't come in a vacuum. The ma'asim are going to result from machshavah, from dibbur. And if a person will exercise control over his machshavah, so he'll preempt ma'asim ra'im. If a person will exercise control over his machshavah, so he'll be mekayeim לא תתן להם חן, he won't think it, and if he won't think it, he won't say it. So then he won't come to להתחבר עמהם ולרדוף אחר אהבתם. So that's the opposite direction. So it's not it's not a question, it's not a stirah. The Ramchal already writes, he talks about this sort of reciprocity between ma'asim and machshavos, between ma'asim and de'os. He writes that the same way he says zerizus results from a hislahatus nafshis that a person has. A person has a certain burn inside of him, so that results in, that generates zerizus. On the other hand, Ramchal says even if a person doesn't have that burn, if a person will push himself, again, not not that it comes naturally, but he'll push himself, making a concerted effort to act with zerizus, so that will generate that hispailus hanefesh, that hislahatus, it will generate that burn. So it goes in both in both directions, that through through behavior so then we we internalize middos, but again, through what we think and through what we have inside of us, that generates ma'aseh also and in terms of in terms of tikkun hamiddos, so so both approaches are correct. A person is mesakein middosav the way the Rambam says, a person's also mesakein middosav by reflecting on certain machshavos which will then also influence his his behavior. So at the end of Hilchos De'os in Perek Zayin, Halacha Zayin, the Rambam says as follows:
הנוקם את חברו עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תקום. ואף על פי שאינו לוקה, דעה רעה היא עד מאוד. אלא ראוי לאדם להיות מעביר על כל דברי העולם שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי ואינם כדאי לנקום עליהם.
And he is, the Rambam clearly here is saying, if only a person would have this correct machshava, this correct hashkafa that divrei haolam is אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי, so then a person wouldn't be nokem venoter. So this is the other direction, right? Here is if only a person would have this machshava internalized, so then it would lead him to compliance with לא תקום ולא תטור. Here in Perek Aleph, he is describing it in the opposite direction. That even if a person isn't charitable necessarily by nature, or if a person is overly charitable by nature, either way, he can internalize the correct balance through his ma'aseh. So both are true, and we have to work on both fronts. כך למדו בפירוש מצוה זו, this is what Chazal tell us and explain the mitzvah:
והלכת בדרכיו מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש ועל דרך זו קראו הנביאים לא-ל בכל אותן הכינויין ארך אפים ורב חסד צדיק וישר תמים גיבור וחזק וכיוצא בהן להודיע שאלו הדרכים טובים וישרים הם וחייב אדם להנהיג עצמו בהן ולהידמות כפי כוחו.
So let's focus on the last sentence. חייב אדם להנהיג עצמו בהן ולהידמות כפי כוחו. What does kefi kocho mean? חייב אדם להנהיג עצמו בהן ולהידמות. You could have said, Vinir'eh li leva'er says the Or Sameiach, not talking about our Rambam, in a different context in the beginning of Hilchos Talmud Torah.
ונראה לי לבאר דבאמת כל המצוות הן השווים לפחות שבפחותים ולמשה רבינו עליו השלום תורה אחת יהיה לכם כתיב וחיוב המצווה גבול יש לה כמו נטילת אתרוג בנענוע בעלמא יצא ורק המדקדקים נושאים אותו כל היום וכיוצא בזה ולכך לא כתבה התורה מדות רק ברמז דלמשל מדת הנקמה כל תלמיד חכם שאינו נוקם ונוטר ומלך שמחל ולכך אין זה חוק בפרט שווה לכל הישראלים רק כל אחד לפי ערכו ורק נקימה דממון זה שווה לכולם וכן לגאווה וכיוצא וכן לפנים משורת הדין בכולם מקורה והדברים ארוכים בספרי המחקר.
So the Or Sameiach says as follows. He says what you find in the Torah is the least common denominator. Any mitzvas haTorah is the least common denominator to every Jew who ever was, who ever will be. By definition, there is no such thing as saying I can't be mkayem a mitzvas haTorah, because the mitzvos haTorah are geared, are calibrated, that they should correspond, that they should be appropriate to the least common denominator amongst all Jews. שווים לפחות שבפחותים ולמשה רבינו עליו השלום. He says, and that's why, then he says a gevaldigue chidush: ולכך לא כתבה התורה מדות רק ברמז. The Torah doesn't deal in the same very defined direct way with middos the way it does with other mitzvos because when it comes to middos people's individuality is so crucial. And the example he gives is is quite remarkable. It's a little ironic for another reason, but the example he gives is is very, very remarkable. He says the Gemara in Yoma, it's the example of the Toras Kohanim as well, when it talks about netira, so it gives an example of davka shemammon, right? השילני קרדומך לא איני משאילך כדרך שלא השאלתני. So why does it give an example of nekima v'netira d'mammon, nekima d'mammon? Netira can play itself out in other ways as well. You don't say hello to me, I don't say hello to you. That's also may not be too devastating to you, but assuming that that sets the person off. So that's also that's also netira. So so what's eppes that the Chazal say that the lo sikom in in... So the Meshech Chochma is is clearly indicating here that he thinks the pshat is that that aspect of netira is שווה לפחות שבפחותים ולמשה רבנו עליו השלום. That degree of the mida of refraining from netira can be uniformly and universally expected, but beyond that is going to be כל אחד כפי ערכו. Everyone depending upon his his neshama, how much of a baal middos he's going to be is going to differ. That's what the Meshech Chochma says. And that's why the Torah doesn't have these again, quantifiable mitzvos and dinim about middos the way you have them by netilas lulav because over here the כל אחד כפי ערכו doesn't the כל אחד כפי ערכו preclude that. So לפי דרכו של המשך חכמה so one could one could think that that's what the Rambam means lehiddamos kefi kocho. That maybe that's what that's what it means over here that that people have different capacities in in cultivating middos the same way they have different capacities physically and they have different capacities intellectually, so people have different capacities in in lehiddamos as well and that's what you could have said that the kefi kocho means. But the irony of the example by netira is that the pshat is that the Rambam doesn't have that girsa in the Gemara in Yoma and you're talking that the Rambam has the isur netira even outside of davka shemammon. And again it's our girsa in the Gemara but it's not clear that it was the Rambam's girsa. Emes is it would seem more likely that what the Rambam yitachen means by lehiddamos kefi kocho though was something else, that it's not reflecting the Meshech Chochma's yesod but something else. At least one other place where you have that lashon kefi kocho in in the Rambam, he has it in the end of Hilchos Me'ila.
ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף ענינם כפי כחו.
This was one of the Rambams that the Beis Yosef was metzayen when we spoke the other day in terms of hakafas harosh, hashchasas zakan.
ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף ענינם כפי כחו.
So here too you could have said that the kefi kocho means the same way we said here על פי המשך חכמה. People have different kishronos in Talmud Torah. So the ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף ענינם is also going to be kefi kocho. So we're all misbonen be'mishpatei ha-Torah but not everyone comes up with what Reb Chaim and then the Rav came up with when they were misbonen be'mishpatei ha-Torah. So it's going to be kefi kocho. But what would seem to be more is that what the Rambam yitachen means in both these contexts is the following follows. vehalachta bedrachav, the emphasis on kefi kocho is not necessarily the individuality, not necessarily kefi kocho meaning one person relative to another person, but at the end of the day, even once we realize that the mitzvah of lehidamos, again we spoke about this last week, is lehidamos bedrachav, right? Vis-a-vis דרכי הקדוש ברוך הוא, not that the mitzvah presumes to say that there's any lehidamos to Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. But the lehidamos is bedrachav through his drachim, vis-a-vis his drachim, with respect to his drachim, that's what the lehidamos is, but even then, even then obviously it's ridiculous to think that a person in terms of rachmanus, in terms of chanina, in terms of kedusha is gonna be ממש דומה להקדוש ברוך הוא. The kefi kocho means that if you're dealing with dvarim elokiyim and you're telling a person that he should engage in that, so then that's what the kefi kocho is. The contrast of kefi kocho is not the difference of ability, of capacity of Reuven and Shimon, but the difference between when you talk about at the end of the day the mitzvah of vehalachta bedrachav, lehidamos bedrachav notwithstanding obviously אף חסד צדק ומשפט תמים גבור חזק when predicated of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is going to be predicated in an absolute sense of absolute perfection and a person is just gonna do it to the best of the ability of people. And that's what the kefi kocho means. And the same pshat would be here in Hilchos Meilah as well. The kefi kocho means, so let's say a person is מתבונן מטעמי הגזירות ולדעת סופן ועניינם. היעלה על הדעת that a person's gonna think that he exhausted everything, that every level, every dimension, the entire depth of the mishpatei hatorah? Of course not. By definition a person can't be יורד לסוף דעתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא. So that's what the kefi kocho means. The kefi kocho means again that when you're telling a person that he should think what Hakadosh Baruch Hu's thoughts were about this mitzvah, the same way you're saying that a person should be mizdameh bedrachav, so it's gonna be by definition kefi kocho, that by definition it's gonna be something which is incomplete, which is imperfect. Again in halacha vav, so the Rambam writes
כך למדו בפירוש מצוה זו מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש.
So there is a certain lack of symmetry here in the Rambam's lashon. Rambam should have said מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה תקרא חנון or alternatively he should have said מה הוא חנון אף אתה היה חנון. And the Rambam is medayek to say no,
מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום.
So ela mai, so the Rambam k'darko bakodesh in in that lack of symmetry, so he's reflecting something which he talks about as a tremendous, tremendous yesod that again whenever we talk about middos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, we're talking about middos which describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions. We're never talking about middos which describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is beyond definition, beyond description, beyond understanding. So we're not saying that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is channun. We're not saying Hakadosh Baruch Hu is rachum. So that's A, that would be defining and limiting, and what's more it would also to identify distinct middos would also encroach upon achdus Hashem on being Hashem echad in the most simple and absolute sense. There's no separate distinct middos. So for both of those reasons and more, so it's absolutely crucial to understand that whenever we describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu, whenever we're talking about middos, so what we're talking about are middos which describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions, which describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu's interaction with the world. We're not predicating middos chas veshalom of Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. And that's what the Rambam writes so, so meduyak: מה הוא נקרא חנון. It's not mah hu channun. It's מה הוא נקרא חנון. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is called channun. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is chanun. If a person would make that statement, so then a person would be predicating the middos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. The Rambam says that's the pshat in the gemara in Brachos. The, it's not Brachos, but the, in Omtek, it would be, it's the English would be Brachos, but the Hebrew is right here. Thank you. The Rambam says that's pshat in the gemara in Brachos here. Gemara tells a story. אהוא דנחית קמיה דרבי חנינא. Someone was serving as shliach tzibur before Rabbi Chanina.
אמר האל הגדול הגבור והנורא האדיר העזוז היראוי החזק והאמיץ הודאי והנכבד. המתין לו עד דסיים.
So he waited until he finished. Ki siyem, amar lei סיימתנהו לכולהו שבחי דמרך? למה לי כולי האי? Anan hani tlas of hagadol hagibor vehanora דאמרינהו משה רבינו באורייתא ואתו אנשי כנסת הגדולה v'tikninu bitfilah,
לא הוינן יכולין למימר להו. ואת אמרת כולי האי ואזלת?
So the shaileh is, so why is this more objectionable, האדיר העזוז היראוי החזק והאמיץ, than what we do in birkas krias shema:
פועל גבורות עושה חדשות בעל מלחמות זורע צדקות מצמיח ישועות,
also a whole long list of shvachin. So the answer is, and this is what the Rambam explains, is that זורע צדקות מצמיח ישועות בורא רפואות, so those are all the descriptions of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions. And over here we're using adjectives, so over here we're kavyachol describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu. In tfilah, the Rav talks about this in one of the Yahrtzeit shiurim, so in tfilah where that has no place because of again an implication as it were that we're predicating, it's almost implying that we're describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu rather than his middos. As long as it's clear that we're describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions and the middos that we're talking about are middos which describe his actions, his interactions with the world, not him, so that's fine. But the list of adjectives, so then already it's not as clear what we're presuming to do. And that's why we need the precedent of דאמרינהו משה רבינו באורייתא ואתו אנשי כנסת הגדולה v'tikninu bitfilah. It's a big problem. It's a big problem because on the one hand we're allowed and even supposed to describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions again with these descriptions of middos. And in so doing, so we, psukim do it, describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions as it were, you know, anthropomorphically, but it's very, very important not to take it literally, not to take it literally. That's what the Rambam writes earlier in Yesodei HaTorah.
הואיל והדבר כן כל הדברים הללו וכיוצא בהן שנאמרו בתורה ובדברי נביאים הכל משל ומליצה הן כמו שנאמר יושב בשמים ישחק.
Hashem's laughing. Ki isuni b'havleihem, that they angered me.
כאשר שש ה׳ וכיוצא בהן. על הכל אמרו חכמים דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם.
That's why למדין לנו לומר כביכול. When talking about Hakadosh Baruch Hu, a person has to understand and constantly remind himself and others that any time there's the slightest, again, anthropomorphism, any time we're predicating a midda or whatever, so we're describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu's actions. At Hakadosh Baruch Hu's action in such a way that a person would be laughing, a person would be angered, but we're never presuming to describe Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself, who's Hashem echad and who's above and beyond comprehension. One of the things which it is very, very difficult to understand here in the Rambam's presentation, we'll just leave off with this discussion. If you have a pshat, so please share. In Halacha Hei, so the Rambam says
מישהו מדקדק על עצמו ביותר ויסטה מן הדעה הבינונית מעט לצד זה או לצד זה נקרא חסיד.
If a person veers slightly away from the de'ah beinonit to one direction or the other, so he's a chasid, meaning he's not a chacham, which is what the Rambam said at the end of Halacha Dalet: דרך זו היא דרך החכמים, but he's a chasid.
כיצד מי שיתרחק מגובה הלב עד הקצה האחרון ויהיה שפל רוח ביותר נקרא חסיד וזו היא מידת חסידות ואם נתרחק עד האמצע בלבד ויהיה עניו נקרא חכם וזו היא מידת החכמה ועל דרך זו שאר כל הדעות וחסידים הראשונים היו מטים דעותיהם מדרך האמצעית כנגד שתי הקצוות יש דעה שמטים אותה כנגד הקצה האחרון ויש דעה שמטים אותה כנגד הקצה הראשון וזהו לפנים משורת הדין. ומצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.
So what needs to be understood here is the following: Lifnim mishurat hadin, so we generally understand the following: Ich veis. Lifnim mishurat hadin, it's enough to pick up the lulav and be menane'a. And Anshei Yerushalayim carried the lulav around all day. Okay. So they did exactly what the Torah required, exactly what Chazal required, and then more. And then more. Again, you have to know when the more is an enhanced kiyum and lifnim mishurat hadin and that it's not the bal tosif. That's a different story. But it's clear that the lifnim mishurat hadin means you're doing exactly what's required, but you're doing even more. Over here, the problem is that the way the Rambam seems to present it is that the mitzvah is derachim habeinoniyim, the mitzvah is to be in the middle. So how can it be a midat chasidut, how can it be a lifnim mishurat hadin to be slightly towards either extreme? That seems to be here in this context of lifnim mishurat hadin, doesn't seem to be doing extra, it doesn't seem to be going the extra mile; it seems to be doing differently. And heich tichen, how can that be? So that's a very, I don't know, that's a complicated question here in the Rambam. If you're interested in thinking or working about it, you should take a look, he talks about this in Shemonah Perakim as well, but that's tzarich iyun to give a good pshat.