Chacham vs. Chassid

Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Chacham vs. Chassid
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1) Deos 1:4-5: definition of chacham/tzaddik vs chassid. Lifnim mishuras hadin doesn’t contradict middah beinonis given the correct definition thereof, i.e. being sholet on both middos and mixing them as dictated by ratzon Hashem.
2) Chiyuv derabbanan of shom deosav mi’sevara

Transcript

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And this would be, we've noted that the Rambam refers to the midat beinonit as tov veyashar, as a double description of the midat beinonit, tov veyashar. The makor for that is that Rashi in Parshat Va'etchanan quotes Chazal on the pasuk ve'asita hayashar vehatov is... actually one second I'm sorry, maybe we'll build up on this. Let's actually hold off on that, I might have it backwards. The Rambam writes

הדרך הישרה היא מדה בינונית שבכל דעה ודעה מכל הדעות שיש לו לאדם והיא הדעה שהיא רחוקה משני הקצוות ריחוק שווה ואינה קרובה לא לזו ולא לזו. ולפיכך ציוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותם ומכוון אותם בדרך האמצעית כדי שיהא שלם. כיצד? לא יהא בעל חמה נוח לכעוס ולא כמת שאינו מרגיש אלא בינוני. לא יכעוס אלא על דבר גדול שראוי לכעוס עליו כדי שלא יעשה כיוצא בו פעם אחרת. וכן לא יתאווה אלא לדברים שהגוף צריך להם ואי אפשר לחיות בזולתם כעניין שנאמר צדיק אוכל לשובע נפשו. וכן לא יהיה עמל בעסקו אלא להשיג דבר שצריך לו לחיי שעה כעניין שנאמר טוב מעט לצדיק.

And typically we use the term tzaddik to describe something which is, or someone whom we are depicting as being le'eyla le'eyla. It's quite clear from the Rambam's usage of these psukim, the Rambam is quoting these psukim as proofs to something which is incumbent upon all of us. Not, the Rambam is not describing what's incumbent only upon yechidei segula. And the reason for that is simple. That the definition of a tzaddik is that he's mekayem mitzvot and he abstains from aveirot. And the definition of a rasha is the opposite. And in that sense everyone's obligated to be a tzaddik. Tzaddik is not something which is, means he's one of the lamed-vavniks. It means he's in some exalted realm which is inaccessible to us. No, it means he does what it says in Shulchan Aruch and he abstains from what it says in Shulchan Aruch that one shouldn't do. And then he shouldn't be stingy.

ולא יקפוץ ידו ביותר ולא יפזר כל ממונו אלא נותן צדקה כפי מסת ידו.

To give tzedaka according to his means

ומלווה לכל ראוי למי שצריך ולא יהיה מהולל ושוחק ולא עצב ואונן אלא שמח כל ימיו בנחת ובסבר פנים יפות.

And then similarly regarding de'os, so that too is the way of the chacham.

כל אדם שדעותיו כולן דעות בינוניות ממוצעות נקרא חכם. ומי שהוא מדקדק על עצמו ביותר ויתרחק מדעה בינונית מעט לצד זה או לצד זה נקרא חסיד.

Keitzad.

מי שיתרחק מגובה הלב עד הקצה האחרון ויהיה שפל רוח ביותר נקרא חסיד. וזו היא מדת חסידות. ואם נתרחק עד האמצע בלבד ויהיה עניו נקרא חכם. וזו היא מדת חכמה. ועל דרך זו שאר כל הדעות. והחסידים הראשונים היו מטין דעות שלהם מדרך האמצעית כנגד שתי הקצוות. יש דעה שמטין אותה כנגד הקצה האחרון ויש דעה שמטין אותה כנגד הקצה הראשון וזהו לפנים משורת הדין.

So look, this halakha is very, very difficult to understand. The Rambam says that there are two tracks. There's the track of the chacham who basically follows the middah beinonis. And then there's the track of the chasid. Chasid always implies lifnim mishuras hadin because of what the word chessed etymologically means. It is more, without the negative connotation necessarily of excess. So chessed means something which is al derech haflagah, that there's more of it. That's what the Ibn Ezra explains that the teshuvah shemikra from the Torah in Parshas Kedoshim describes the ervah of ach veachous as chessed hu. So he says that what it means is, it's something which is, which is extreme in its depravity. It's something which is, which is extraordinarily corrupt. So chessed means something which is al derech haflagah. It can be, it can be in a negative context as that pasuk, it can be in a positive context like in Sefer Yonah. So Yonah says משמרים הבלי שוא חסדם יעזבו. So there's a machlokes in the meforshim what that pasuk means. But according to some meforshim what it means is as follows: mishamrim havlei shav, the people on the boat who previously had been ovdei avoda zara, they are mishamrim havlei shav. Now, chasdam ya'azovu, because of their experience on the boat, so they're going to abandon their avoda zara. So chessed referred to avoda zara. Same pshat as what the Ibn Ezra himself gives this pasuk, same pshat that the Ibn Ezra learns in chessed hu as describing the ervah of ach veachous. So chessed means something which is al derech haflagah, more. Again, extreme, but not necessarily with a negative connotation, with a neutral connotation. So that's why chessed, midas chasidus means what's lifnim mishuras hadin. So look, but the what's simply tough to understand here is the following: Midas chasidus has to mean that the halakha only requires so much, and the person does more. So for instance in Hilchos Gezeila va-Aveida in perek 11, halacha 7. So the Rambam talks about if you find an aveida בעיר שהוא רובו עכו"ם. So you can assume that the aveida belongs to an akum and therefore the aveida is muttar. And even if it belongs to a Yisrael, the Yisrael knows that since it's rubo akum, so he would have been misyayesh and therefore it belongs to the motzei aveida. Says the Rambam,

אף על פי שהיא שלו הרוצה לילך בדרך הטוב והישר ועושה לפנים משורת הדין מחזיר את האבידה לישראל כשיתן את סימניה.

So lifnim mishuras hadin, even where the motzei aveida is entitled to keep the aveida, if the previous owner proves his prior ownership, lifnim mishuras hadin to return the aveida. So there we understand. Halacha requires so much. The halacha says the motzei aveida is only muchyav in hashavas aveida to this degree, and lifnim mishuras hadin is if a person goes beyond that. But over here in Hilchos Deios, the Rambam seems to be describing a lifnim mishuras hadin that contradicts the din. The din is that a person's supposed to go on the derech hamimtzo'os. And lifnim mishuras hadin is that a person doesn't go on the derech hamimtzo'os. He veers slightly from the derech hamimtzo'os in the direction of either of the two extremes. He veers slightly further away from the of the two extremes, the one to which people are generally more susceptible. Most of us are more susceptible to being too interested in amassing money than being under-interested in amassing money. Most of us are more susceptible to being נמשך אחר תאוות אכילה etc. than we are being nimshach to being under-interested, under-nimshach in ta'avas achila. So the chasidim veer further away from the extreme to which people generally are more susceptible. But if the pshat in halacha in Hilchos Deios is that a person's meshubad to the middah hamemtzo'os, so how can it be a lifnim mishuras hadin to do what conflicts with the ora with the etzem halacha? But ella mai, in light of the pshat, as follows. We explained the other day that the pshat of the middah hamemtzo'os is not that a person is supposed to be a five. Pshat of the mehus of the person is a five. Really the pshat in the middah hamemtzo'os is that he has both within him. He has the zero and the ten. Practically, in most situations, in 99 percent of situations, the way this will express itself is a five. Because he has the zero and the ten within him, which means that he's not meshubad to the zero, he's not meshubad to the ten. If he were meshubad to either he couldn't have both. But rather he's sholeh on both. So practically it expresses itself as a five. Lichora in light of that, so then we can understand the middas chassidus. The middas chassidus let it be that the pshat of the middah hamemtzo'os is that there's a middah of zero, there's a middah of ten, and the pshat of the middah hamemtzo'os is a five. So then the middah of the chassid, the middas chassidus contradicts. Because instead of going on a five, he's going on a four, he's going on a 4.5. ve-hashtah de-asinu lehachi that the pshat of the middah hamemtzo'os is no, the person is sholeh on both, both of those extreme middos. He has within him both the zero and the ten. So then there are two mahalachim as to how to practically express that control. A person can express that control over the zero and the ten by acting as a five, or a person can go lifnim mishuras hadin and he can express that control over the zero and the ten as a 4.5. But in light of the understanding we have, so we recognize that that's what allows for this middas chassidus.

ובכל זאת אנו הולכים בדרך הבינונים והן הדרך הטובה והישרה שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.

So here is this, could be what we've discussed already, but there is something extraordinary in the seder hadvorim here in the Rambam. So the Rambam is first here at the end of halacha hey telling us that there's a mitzvah d'oraisa of veholachta bidrachov. Until now he's been telling us, he's sort of been defining terms. He's been defining what the ketzavos are, what the midah beinonis is, and only now having given us all that background, so the Rambam comes and tells us it's d'oraisa. So all that is fine and good, but the peleh is that we just learned, we just read a few minutes ago in halacha daled that the Rambam said

שצוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותם ומכוון אותם בדרך האמצע כדי שיהא שלם.

That Chazal say that a person is not going to just sort of be-hesach hadaas end up being mkayem veholachta bidrachov. Chazal say that in order for a person to successfully fulfill veholachta bidrachov he has to constantly be appraising his deos, his midos. He has to constantly, again, be conscious of directing them along the derech hamemtzuas. So how can the Rambam tell us the din derabbanan which is coming to tell us how to become d'oraisa? In mitzvos kiddush, the Rambam wouldn't tell us it's a derabbanan of kiddush al hayayin and kiddush bimkom seudah before he tells us it's a d'oraisa of kiddush. So first the Rambam says it's a d'oraisa kiddush and then says that m'derabbanan it should be al hayayin and m'derabbanan it should be bimkom seudah. You can't tell me the din derabbanan before you tell me the din d'oraisa, and yet here the Rambam has the din derabbanan of שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד, and again that din derabbanan is linked to the kiyum of veholachta bidrachov, right? That's the whole thrust and the whole context of the din derabbanan here. So lefi, it's part of the answer is clear. In halacha gimel, the Rambam writes

ששתי קצוות הרחוקות זו מזו שבכל דעה ודעה אינן דרך טובה ואין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדן לעצמו.

So there are several places in the Rambam where it's clear that what the lashon rov means, whether it's ein rov, but what the lashon rov means is something that we know mikoach hasvara. Even without having a pasuk in Chumash, even without having a Sifrei on the Torah, a davar who is damya l'sevara. And there are things that we can understand and know and recognize mikoach hasvara and that's also a mechayev. That's also a mechayev. Ad k'dei kach that the Rambam says that even if you didn't have the pasuk of v'halachta bidrachav, you you would have had the context, you would have had the anchor for the d'rabonon. The d'rabonon, even even in Hilchos De'os where we don't yet know the the pasuk of v'halachta bidrachav, but we can understand what the what the basis is and what the context is of the d'rabonon of שיהא אדם שם באותן תמידין, it's this chiuv mikoach hasvara. Mikoach hasvara a person is mechuyav to to go bederech ha'emtza'is. The question is, does a nafka mina here in Hilchos De'os or no? Or it's just an important yesod the Rambam wants us to know in this and other contexts? The fact that it's not only v'halachta bidrachav, a pasuk in Chumash, but something that that we could and and should have understood mikoach hasvara. Or no, maybe the yesod is so important that the Rambam is presenting it here and in other contexts? Or or is there have any applications here in Hilchos De'os which you wouldn't know from the pasuk but that you do know mikoach hasvara? I don't know, so maybe let's check back, let's check back to that example. Okay, so we'll stop there for now and we'll move on to the next segment.