Bechira Chofshis. Middah Beinonis.

Halacha 2.

ויש בין כל דעה ודעה הרחוקה ממנה בקצה האחר דעות בינוניות זו רחוקה מזו. וכל הדעות יש מהן דעות שהן לאדם מתחילת ברייתו לפי טבע גופו. ויש מהן דעות שטבעו של אדם זה מכוון ועתיד לקבל אותן במהירה יתר משאר הדעות. ויש מהן שאינן לאדם מתחילת ברייתו אלא למד אותן מאחרים או שנפנה להן מעצמו לפי מחשבה שעלתה בלבו או ששמע שזו הדעה טובה לו ובה ראוי לילך והנהיג עצמו בה עד שנקבעה.

So the Rambam says sometimes a person can have a character trait which was entirely innate, mitchilat briato. He was born with that middah. Again, the Rambam calls it a de'ah. Other times what's innate was not the de'ah itself but a predisposition to that de'ah, that a person is more susceptible to developing and cultivating a particular de'ah. And some of them are purely habituation. It's not because the middah itself is innate, not because the tendency, the predisposition to the middah is innate; it's just habitual. Why did the person cultivate it? I don't know. He was influenced by other people. He on his own decided that it was a good middah to cultivate. So it's this halacha in the Rambam in Hilchos De'os provides an important lens for what he says later in Hilchos Teshuvah. If you take a look in Perek Hey of Hilchos Teshuvah, Halacha Beis for a moment, rabosai. Perek Hey, Halacha Beis in Hilchos Teshuvah.

אל יעבור במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טפשי האומה ורוב גולמי בני ישראל.

Rambam in Perush Hamishnayos in Avos says that a golem is someone who has miktzas middos sichliyos. He has unfinished, underdeveloped intellectual qualities, the result being that he sort of ventures into areas of thought but is too unequipped, is inadequate, and because of that he ends up with all kinds of bilbulim. So the golem is someone who philosophizes, which is not a bad thing if a person is capable and has the capacity to do that. But if a person doesn't have the capacity to do that and he thinks about certain types of inyanim, he's going to get himself very messed up. Not of the golmei bnei yisroel, not bnei yisroel of the golmei bnei yisroel, so the rov of them get messed up.

שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחילת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע.

So a person shouldn't even entertain this as a fleeting thought, right? אל יעלה במחשבתך דבר זה, not even as a fleeting thought. ein hadavar kein. אלא כל אדם ראוי לו להיות צדיק כמשה רבנו, not necessarily a chochom k'Moshe Rabbeinu, not obviously not a navi k'Moshe Rabbeinu, a tzadik k'Moshe Rabbeinu, o rasha k'Yorovam,

או חכם או סכל, או רחמן או אכזרי, או כילי או שוע וכן שאר כל הדעות.

Now here's the phrase where the lens from Hilchos Deios is important not to overstate what the Rambam is saying.

ואין לו מי שיכפהו ולא גוזר עליו ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים אלא הוא מעצמו ומדעתו נוטה לאיזו דרך שירצה.

So the Rambam says A, no one coerces him, right? kofin oso. kfia is coercion. So there's no one coercing him. B, v'lo gozeir alav. It's not that in Shamayim there's some decree which is controlling him. ולא מי שמושכו לאחד משני הדרכים. Nor is there anyone who's pulling him in either of the two along either of the two paths of tzadik o rasha. So what this does not mean, again it's something lichora which should be intuitive even without Hilchos Deios, but Hilchos Deios just fully corroborates this. The Rambam's not denying that we have an what we in modern science would call genetic predispositions or genetic dispositions. The Rambam's not saying that we're born, you know that everyone's sort of a blank tablet. No, of course we have, some people are naturally, the Rambam's first example, some people are naturally hot-tempered and some people are naturally very, very laid back. vechulu. But what the Rambam is saying is that none of that represents fate. The fact that we all have certain deios which we have none of them thought about it, they still are innate doesn't mean that that represents fate, that a person that there's no genetic, there's no biological predetermination either. It's not only that there isn't religious predetermination from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, there's no biological predetermination either in terms of what a person does. And what the Rambam is saying is no one's coercing him. Again, coercion means when you twist his arm behind his back until he says uncle, you actually force-feed the person, even more than that. That's the better example. That's not happening. v'lo gozeir alav. And it's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu decreed and Hakadosh Baruch Hu is pulling strings as though we were puppets. And there's no external force. which is even pushing us in either direction. However, and ve'yitachen that, again, not only is this consistent with Hilchos Teshuva, ve'yitachen that the Rambam himself here is actually referring back. What do the two words me'atzmo u'mida'ato mean? Right? So the counterpoint is no, there's no coercion, there's no decree, there's no external force which is pushing any one of us in either of two directions. Ella, what's the truth? הוא מעצמו ומדעתו נוטל איזה דרך שירצה. What's the me'atzmo, what's the da'ato? So ve'yitachen that atzmo represents sort of let's say the non-cerebral part of the person, the non-intellectual part of the person. And on the contrary, each one and every one of us certainly does have some midos which are entirely innate or again were initially entirely innate, and of the midos where the susceptibility to developing that mida was innate. That's me'atzmo. Me'idach gisa, a person has da'ato, a person has his understanding. I mean, it could be that I, yes, I do have this innate mida or this innate tendency to this mida which is on the extreme, maybe the mida 100% or 80% of the mida, whatever it is. But me'idach gisa, I have my da'as to recognize that that mida is wrong, that that mida doesn't represent ve'halachta bidrachav. And what I do about that, you know, do I sort of just give in to, you know, take the path of least resistance, do I give in to atzmo, do I give in to teva haguf, I give in to keflanus briyasom? Or no, I push back, and איזהו גיבור הכובש את יצרו. I push back and say no, no, מטבע גופי אין הכי נמי, I would really react and do such and such and I would act in such and such a way and I would speak in such and such a way, but mida'ato I know that's not right. So how do I adjudicate that? That's what bechira lies. Right? That's where the bechira is. And aderaba, not only is this Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva not denying, not failing to recognize that of course we have innate midos and of course we have tendencies, it's affirming it, but it's saying they're not destiny, they're not fate, because it's me'atzmo u'mida'ato and it's the person has the bechira how to determine which should prevail. You know, does he just let himself be guided by the me'atzmo, or does the da'ato mold the atzmo? הוא שירמיהו אומר says the Rambam in Hilchos Teshuva מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. Right, for the Rambam, ra'os ve'tov don't refer to punishment and schar mi'hashamayim, that's the way Rashi understands it. But ra'os ve'tov refer to our actions. Meaning, when there's evil and good that happens in this world, it's not from Hashem. It's the evil and good that we do to each other. It's not that Hashem, it's not mi'pi elyon, that's not coming from Hashem. We're responsible for the evil and good that we do to each other. Klomer,

אין הבורא גוזר על האדם לא להיות טוב ולא להיות רע.

And that same combination that we were speculating, and again I'm not sure if the pshat is correct, but if you take a look towards the end of Halacha Daled here in Perek Hey I would say, כשם שחפץ היוצר להיות האש והרוח עולים למעלה. Again, we're in Perek Hey, Halacha Daled, I don't know, more than 50% through the, into, into the halacha.

כשם שחפץ היוצר להיות האש והרוח עולים למעלה והמים והארץ יורדים למטה והגלגל סובב בעיגול וכן שאר בריות העולם להיות כמנהגן שחפץ בהן כך חפץ להיות האדם רשותו בידו וכל מעשיו מסורים לו ולא יהיה לו לא כופה ולא מושך,

meaning that not only is Hakadosh Baruch Hu not gozer, but he doesn't allow any other force to be kofeh or moshech, אלא הוא מעצמו בדעתו—here it is, right, me'atzmo bedaito—that same combination that we saw earlier in Halacha Beis, שנתן לו האל עושה כל שאדם יכול לעשות. Okay, good. Halacha Gimmel, back to the Chasdei Hashem, Halacha Gimmel.

שני קצוות הרחוקות זו מזו בכל דעה ודעה אינן דרך טובה ואין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדם לעצמו.

By the way, the point that we made yesterday, not really agav, let's delete agav. Continuing the point that we made yesterday about how in Halacha Aleph, the Rambam describes a person who's kois tomid as opposed to a person that is daato meyushaves alav, eino kois klal, which means that דעתו מיושבת עליו תמיד. So we said because the Rambam is not describing people, he's not describing types of people, he's describing middos, right? There's a middah of ka'as, there's a middah of yishuv hadaas. A person, ein hachnami, in real life, so very few people are 100% embodiment of something. So in real life, there are people who are hot-tempered. Okay, so they'll get angry, not tomid, they'll get angry 80% of the time. And there are people yishuv hadaas and they'll be meyushav 90% of the time. But in terms of the middos, those are different middos, that's just sort of an imperfect representation of the middah, a watered-down version of the middah. But the middah, there's a middah of ka'as and there's a middah of yishuv hadaas. And that's why the Rambam only, only depicts the extremes. So that's why the emes is that on every spectrum, there's only really three middos. Right? When the Rambam said here on Halacha Beis that we just read before,

ויש בין כל דעה ודעה הרחוקה ממנו בקצה האחד דעה בינונית,

so it means that on every spectrum, so again, we think there's so many points on a spectrum. Now, that's true if you talk about real-life people, but if you're talking about the middos, and this is so—it's so important because it's actually machriya what we inferred from Halacha Daled. It's a very important conceptually. When you talk about middos, there's only three middos on the spectrum. There's, there's ka'as... The water is not even at no wave, nothing in the water, right? And because we said, when you have it l'mechtzah, ha-shlish, ha-revi'i, that's not a middah, right? That's not the middah. It's just a watered-down version. So what's pshat then in the middah beinonit? How does the middah beinonit exist? The middah beinonit exists when the person has both extremes together. That's also a middah. Meaning, no, he has that extreme of ka'as, he has that extreme of da'ato yeshuvah alav. He has that extreme of ich veis, ba'al ta'avah, he has that extreme of tehor guf beyoter. So that, the coexistence of those is also a middah. Is also a middah. And that's how there's three midos. And again, that's what's machriach that the pshat in the middah beinonit is not the middah beinonit as a five. Because the same way nine, eight, seven, six, four, three, and two are not midos, five wouldn't be a middah either unless it represented the combination as opposed to the compromise of the ten and the zero. I have to think about that rabbosai to process, but I think it's correct. Halakhah gimmel:

שני הקיצוות הרחוקות זו מזו שבכל דעה ודעה אינן דרך טובה ואין ראוי לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדן לעצמו ואם מצא טבעו נוטה לאחת מהן או מוכן לאחת מהן או שכבר למד אחת מהן ונהג בה,

right, so that's obviously parallel to halakhah bet's the three ways that we have deos, either totally innate, or there was a susceptibility, a tendency that was innate, or that it was just learned, it was acquired through habit. יחזיר עצמו למוטב וילך בדרך הטובים והיא הדרך הישרה. So for today, we're just going to leave off here with a question. So the Rambam here, this is I think the first time he's doing it, he identifies the middah ha-beinonit as being tovah and yesharah. Right? The extremes are not the derech ha-tovah. And if a person finds himself at the extreme, he should go be-derech ha-tovim, clearly which means the de'ah beinonit. So the de'ah beinonit on the one hand is described, defined as tovah, but then also ve-hi ha-derech ha-yesharah. And again, that's it's quite explicit at the end of halakhah hei:

ומצווין אנו ללכת בדרכים האלו הבינוניים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.

So the question is, why that double adjective, the double description that it's tovah and yesharah, that these are drachim which are tovim and yesharim. So bli neder, im yirtzeh hashem, we'll hopefully we'll come back to that, but we'll stop here for now.