Part of the series: Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Transcript
AI-generated transcript. May contain errors.
It doesn't Chazal would dayek, it doesn't emphasize those nissim v'niflaos which were primarily demonstrating Yad Hashem in punishing the Mitzriyim. But rather it was the nissim v'niflaos which were earned and which were evoked by Moshe v'Yisrael amo. So Chazal say you want to know what those were? So that was Milchemes Amalek and Keriyas Yam Suf. That's the remez to what Chazal are saying as well את כל אשר עשה אלהים למשה ולישראל עמו. That's what the Rambam writes in Hilchos Teshuva in Perek Gimmel, Halacha Yud Aleph that
הפורש מדרכי ציבור אף על פי שלא עבר עבירות אלא נבדל מעדת ישראל ואינו עושה מצוות בכללן ולא נכנס בצרתן ולא מתענה בתעניתן אלא הולך בדרכו כאחד מגויי הארץ וכאילו אינו מהם אין לו חלק לעולם הבא.
Even though you can't pin any specific aveira on the person, but it's just that he separates himself from Klal Yisrael and he doesn't have any empathy, לא נכנס בצרתן ולא מתענה בתעניתן. He has no empathy, אלא הולך בדרכו כאחד מגויי הארץ. A person who has that kind of detachment, a Jew who has that detachment, that sense of remoteness from acheinu Bnei Yisrael, so that the din is that such a person is אין לו חלק לעולם הבא. And that's the pshat by Yisro, that Yisro wanted to know, not only to be convinced of who the Ribbono Shel Olam is, but he also wanted to know that he wanted to integrate himself into the Klal Yisrael. As we normally do on Thursday, I'm going to discuss a very difficult topic. I don't claim to understand it too thoroughly. Not sure if I understand it well enough to be talking about it, but we dealt this week with the question of gezel akum. Is it assur min hatorah? If so, is it only betoras issur gezeila or is it an issur of chillul Hashem? Everyone agrees that hafka'as halva'aso and avedaso are mutaros if not for the problem of chillul Hashem or because a kiddush Hashem will be created in foregoing that. But otherwise avedaso is muteres and hafka'as halva'aso is also muteres. So there are two, be'aniyoseinu, so there are two problems which I think many people, probably most of us included, encounter in this halacha. Number one, just the distinction or less euphemistically what seems to be discrimination, why should it be that gezel Yisrael is simply assur but gezel akum is a sugya? That's a sugya. That's one question, I think most people are aware of. There's another very interesting question, and that is you find in a few places in halacha, and this is a very strange thing, let's take the opinion that gezel akum is mutar min hatorah, the shitas of the Amoraim in Bava Metzia that gezel akum is mutar min hatorah. However, if there's chillul Hashem, so then chillul Hashem does assur. Now for all practical purposes once you say that, it doesn't really make a difference whether gezel akum is mutar min hatorah or whether gezel akum is assur min hatorah. The fact that במקום שיש חילול השם במקום שיש חילול השם that it's assur means that there's almost practically there's almost no difference between whether it's mutar or assur mitzad din gezeilah because of the overriding and overwhelming consideration of Chillul Hashem. Just parenthetically, there's no question, there's no question in our day in America, there's no question that the consideration of Chillul Hashem has to loom very, very large. I think most if not all of us are aware of investigations which are now pending, I'm told they've been reported in the New York Times and elsewhere where the objects of the investigation are frum Jews, from organizations, and there's no question whether there was any impropriety or not, there's absolutely no question that if a frum Jew does something, whatever frum Jews do is going to be scrutinized with a magnifying glass. Whether there was impropriety or not, I certainly wouldn't begin to know and chas v'shalom would never, ever prejudge, but one thing is clear that there must be more important items on the agenda of federal authorities other than the kind of relatively minor infractions which these frum organizations are being investigated for. Ella mai, the answer clearly is, just as our esteemed mayor did when he was in the prosecutor's office, frum Jews are targeted. Frum Jews are targeted. Ella mai, so we're not in a position to change that policy, but we certainly can't allow a pischon peh. And therefore the notion, people claim, there's a whole shayla whether or not paying your taxes is that considered hafka'as halva'aso, so therefore maybe there's a heter not to pay your taxes or no, hafka'as halva'aso is only with a private Gentile but when it comes to paying the government which is dina d'malchusa dina, so then there's no heter of hafka'as halva'aso. Okay, so that's a whole shayla. I think in the very first RJJ journal, I think Rav Schachter wrote about dina d'malchusa dina, I think he touched on this as well. And even if you claim that it should be hafka'as halva'aso, it's not clear what the heter is for lying on your tax return. If you have to sign your tax return, okay, hafka'as halva'aso is hafka'as halva'aso, but what's the heter for lying on the tax return is also מקום הניחו לו להתחדש what the basis for that is. But one thing is clear, one thing is clear that you can be certain that if there's the slightest, slightest hint of any impropriety in the tax return of a frum Jew that it's going to be scrutinized under a magnifying glass and they're going to do their best to find it. And that's quite clear, that's quite clear. So the Chillul Hashem, a person has to be aware that the Chillul Hashem, you can't very glibly say, well no one's ever going to find out so there's no Chillul Hashem. But we know full well that there's a double standard, the same way Medinat Yisrael is held to a different standard than the rest of the world, so too Jews all over are held to a different standard. And there's no question that therefore the authorities are going to be quick to look to try to find the slightest impropriety and we have to be so, so careful about Chillul Hashem. So therefore there's nothing to talk about, hafka'as halva'aso and gezel akum, there's nothing to talk about, there's nothing whatsoever to talk about because the consideration of Chillul Hashem closes all doors. Whatever loopholes a person thinks he can find with hafka'as halva'aso or anything else, all doors are shut in our faces by Chillul Hashem. And what's going on currently, the investigations which are pending are just a very vivid reminder. And again, I hope the truth is that nothing was done and the whole thing will blow over. But even if something was done, the fact that the prosecutor may be motivated by antisemitism doesn't excuse us for giving him an opening. Avada it's true, I can't believe that they don't have more important things to do. do than to be investigating the relatively minor issues which they are. I don't know, a few drug traffickers they'd probably their time would be better spent if the federal agents would be investigating them. Ella mai, but that's no answer. That's no answer for, you know, if you get caught for going 10 miles above the speed limit, it's no answer that the other guy was going 20 miles above the speed limit. It's no answer. So the consideration of Chillul Hashem is one which we have to be very, very sensitive to. Very, very sensitive to. And whenever the papers like the New York Times don't leave anything to the imagination. If the person who was found guilty of something is an Orthodox Jew, so they don't leave it to you to figure it out based on what his last name is or by putting just by putting a picture and making sure that his yarmulke is evident, but they write Orthodox Jew. They write Orthodox Jew. So the concern with Chillul Hashem should be very, very great and a person should not think, should not think that even if he thinks there's some kind of technical justification, a person has to be very wary of it. Coming back to the on a more theoretical plane. So one question is why according to some views does this distinction exist between gezel akum gezel yisrael? And the second one is, it's very strange that the Torah, right, it's the same system of halacha. כולם ניתנו מרועה אחד that on the one hand you have a din let's say according to some Tanna, we don't paskin this way, but according to some Tanna'im that gezel akum is muttar and yet that very din is basically neutralized by another halacha. It's a strange thing. So okay, so occasionally you have an aseh and lo sa'aseh and they clash and but here again I don't know it's hard to imagine that there are too many circumstances when it's not a Chillul Hashem. When it's not a Chillul Hashem to cheat. So there aren't too many circumstances. So basically you have a halacha which says that something is muttar mitam gezel and then you have another halacha which assurs it mitam Chillul Hashem. It's a strange I'm not asking so much al pi din. I'm asking more in bederech agaddah it's a strange thing that you have a din which is totally neutralized. Drush lekabel sechar? It's a strange thing. So kim'omani these two questions perhaps and there are other examples of this also, other examples of this also. Let's say the whole notion of mishum eivah by pikuach nefesh of akum also to a large, large extent totally erases a halacha in dinei pikuach nefesh. And here too it's a strange thing, again, without getting into the first question of why the distinction exists in the first place, it's strange that you basically you have a distinction which then for all practical purposes is neutralized. It's a strange again bederech agaddah the question. It's a strange thing. But I think the two questions converge and the answer is the same. Some halachos in the Torah reflect a very ideal world. Try to express this as loosely as possible. And sometimes when those halachos would be applied, implemented in our less than ideal society, not in the Ribbono shel Olam's not the chisaron is not in the Ribbono shel Olam's bria, it's in our human sort of suspends that ideal halakhah. The ideal halakhah is on, is there for us to know and for us to understand perhaps what the ideal is. And yet the Torah says since this assumes a certain ideal metziyus, you're not ready to implement it. And what that means is as follows: there's no question the entire world בראשית ברא אלקים בשביל ישראל שנקראו ראשית. The entire world is created for Klal Yisrael and for Klal Yisrael in turn to be oved Hashem. That's the tachlis of everything and everything is supposed to be channeled towards that ultimate goal. There's no question, there's no question that Chassidim v'anshei maaseh could put a lot of the wealth of this world to better use than their current owners put it to. There's no question about that. And in terms of the ultimate goal of the briya, so certainly it would be better served, it would be better served were those, the same way we find lemashal that a melech is poretz l'geder. And the needs which the melech stand for override the personal needs of any individual Jew. Right? So therefore the melech has a, he's poretz l'geder and he has all kinds of, all kinds of prerogatives. So what's the pshat? Simply that there's a hierarchy. There's a hierarchy and the melech is higher in that hierarchy than I am. And as a result, as a result, so the melech has a right to channel not only his own assets but my assets also to that higher goal which he's pursuing. The Torah authorizes him to do that. In an ideal world, the din of gezel Akum, if you hold it's mutter, would be no different than something like kofin al hatzedakah. It would be a question of just of where the money and the assets and the nechasim were being channeled for something more important, for something sacred, rather than for something secular. And that's something we would know. We would know the same way we understand kofin al hatzedakah and I don't think that's really, it's not a moral dilemma for us. And the fact that the, that what the melech represents and what the melech has to accomplish overrides my individual liberties, we understand that also. That's also not a moral dilemma. In an ideal world
ואתם תהיו לי סגלה מכל העמים ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש,
where that was so nikkar, where that was so nikkar and it was nikkar that there was no trace of chamsanut, there was no trace of looking to just accumulate or amass wealth, but it's rather a question of channeling that wealth to what its real goal, to its real destination. So that's what the din of gezel Akum would be if gezel Akum is mutter. Ella mai, the world is society, people, each of us is less than ideal. To have this din, and in an ideal world it wouldn't be a chillul Hashem. The same way kofin al hatzedakah is not a chillul Hashem, gezel Akum wouldn't be a chillul Hashem either if the difference would be so clear between day and night, between the ממלכת כהנים וגוי קדוש. and between this akum, and it would be clear that the Jew has no interest in money, that he's a soneh betza, and that the gezel akum is no different than kofin al hatzedakah, it wouldn't be a chillul Hashem, it wouldn't be a chillul Hashem. However, the reason the Torah has, and again, this chas v'shalom not that we in our own do this, but the Torah has built in itself kol zman that that distinction is not so clear, kol zman that we're less than perfect, so then already the analogy to kofin al hatzedakah or the analogy to melech isn't something which people perceive. And not only isn't it something they perceive, but maybe it's not even totally accurate. So the Torah has built in, the Torah says bimkom chillul Hashem, this is not intended, but the Torah's telling us that this halacha is intended for an ideal world. In an ideal world there's really nothing morally unsettling about that halacha. In a less than ideal world there is something unsettling about that halacha, there is something unsettling about that halacha. And that's why mimela the Torah has built in, again we said, isn't it curious that the Torah has a din, but then toch k'dei dibbur, b'neshima achas, the Torah basically overrides its own halacha, it overrides its own halacha. So the pshat is because the Torah's telling us that you should know, this is important to know. It's important to know that this is an ideal. Again, according to that opinion, according to that opinion that this is an ideal. However, however you should know that whenever things are less than ideal, so then it's going to involve chillul Hashem, because then when the Jew is caught stealing, so no one sees this as kofin al hatzedakah, they see it as simple cheating, which is what it usually is, which is what it usually is. And that's not what the halacha represented, that's not what the halacha ever stood for. I think that's the pshat, and I think it's a very, very, I think it's an important yesod and it's worth reflecting on. And so briefly, a few minutes for our Thursday shiur, I have to ask mechila ahead of time for what we're going to talk about. What we're going to talk about is very elementary in every sense of the word. And yeah, there's something that we all, we all need chizuk on. Well, I take that back, it's an inyan which we have to be mechazek on, not chas v'shalom, but everyone needs chizuk in it. Well, one of the major problems, and this crosses all ideological lines, it crosses all ideological lines. You can go to any neighborhood, and you can go to, doesn't matter what the ideological stripe of the shul is, there's a major, major problem, which is simply, if you think about it, if you look in as a detached observer and you try to uproot the fact that we take this phenomenon for granted, there's something which is absolutely mafli al hara'ayon, and that is the lack of decorum in all our shuls. And again, it's not something which any, it doesn't make a difference whether a person identifies himself as this Orthodox, that Orthodox, or whatever the adjectives are, wherever you go, it's mafli al hara'ayon, mafli al hara'ayon. Talking during davening, talking during... And you ask yourself sometimes, what would happen if an irreligious, assimilated Jew was having hirhurei teshuva. A nitzotz within him is beginning to burn brightly, and he decides to visit a shul on Shabbos. And this experience is going to go a long way towards determining whether or not he thinks that a life of Torah will satisfy his spiritual yearnings and will respond to his spiritual awakenings or not. And then he walks into one of our shuls, wherever we davven, wherever we davven, fill in the blank. So how is this person going to decide to live his life? And when you think about it, it's absolutely terrifying. You ask that simple question and the answer is obvious. The answer is obvious. And the answer is absolutely terrifying. Not just because this can actually happen and does happen, that again prospective and perspective ba'alei teshuva are often in our midst in shul, but it reflects so negatively on our appreciation of tefilla. Sometimes the one time you hear quiet, maybe there are two times you hear quiet in shul. So people are very makpid for whatever reason, for whatever reason, in krias hatorah we're not so makpid, on chazaras hashatz we're not so makpid, but the rabbi's sermon, that we're very makpid on. And then very often you have someone standing at the door and there's no traffic allowed in or out. So that we're very makpid on, and we should be very makpid, it's derech eretz. But the question is, why do people relate to that more than they relate to not talking during krias hatorah? So the answer is because we know that you have to be courteous, we know you have to be polite, and therefore that's meaningful to us. And we know that it's a bizayon that if the rav of the shul is standing up there and darshaning that it's absolutely unacceptable conduct that we should be talking. So we understand that and mimeila, mimeila, for then you have quiet, then you have quiet. Another point during davvening where you often have quiet in, I think probably in most of the shuls, the shuls where most of us davven, the tefilla for the shlom hamedina is said, and then too you have quiet, then too you have quiet. So here already it's harder to distinguish, right? This is tefilla and that's tefilla, so מאי ומאי האי האי? The answer is again people relate to that because the Zionism is important to them, so they relate to this tefilla, but apparently they don't relate to krias hatorah and they don't relate to the rest of davvening. And that's the, I think the inescapable conclusion that if I'm talking during krias hatorah, that it's not stam a yetzer hara to talk, that yetzer hara to talk has to be combined with a total lack of understanding or appreciation for Torah, for devar Hashem, for devar Hashem, for davvening, for being omed lifnei Hashem. And we talk from time to time how during our years in yeshiva, it's very important that we prepare ourselves for when we enter a different environment, a different milieu, and we have to prepare ourselves now. So even though now certain preparations seem totally unnecessary because things come naturally, but nevertheless there are certain commitments and convictions which a person has to reflect upon and he has to make sure that he doesn't do it by habit when he's in yeshiva, but it's something which is really internalized and it's something which is really a profound commitment. And one of those has to be, so now I don't know, maybe you stay often for Shabbos, maybe you don't stay off for Shabbos, but at least all week you davven in yeshiva where baruch Hashem the phenomenon of talking is not what it is in shuls. But when you go home for Shabbos or when you'll be out of yeshiva and that's where you'll always be davvening, so we all have to prepare ourselves now that not to be nichshal on that. We'll have the Gemara later in Kiddushin in a couple of blat,
דאמר רב הונא כיון שעבר אדם עבירה ושנה בה הותרה לו הותרה לו סלקא דעתך אלא נעשית לו כהיתר.
So we all know Rav Yisrael Salanter's famous vort. So what happens the third time you do it? So after the second time you do it, it's na'asait lo keheter. What happens after the third time? So Rav Salanter says, after the third time, it's na'asait lo kemitzvah. Think it's a mitzvah. And it's in addition to everything else, in addition to all his other gadlus, so Rav Yisrael Salanter was a great psychologist. In addition to all his other gadlus, he was also a great psychologist. And it's very true that it becomes so ingrained and so habitual. And it happens very quickly, once, twice. So the first time you only do it because I don't know, it's quasi tzorkei tzibur you think. And then but once you've talked during chazaras hashatz okay so I spoke during chazaras hashatz and I wasn't hit by lightning. So the next time it's not so much tzorkei tzibur but it's not stam devarim beteilim. Not stam devarim beteilim. And then and you look around then it's simply staggering to see what happens כי ביתי בית תפלה יקרא לכל העמים just to see the lack of simple, I mean in elementary school they don't allow the lack of decorum which takes place in our shuls. And it's simply mavel al haraayon. And this is something we all know and I don't think for a moment that anyone here participates in it, but it's something which you have to be mechazek yourself on. Because the more neglected a mitzvah is by others so then the more careful a person has to be for himself and the more a person has to be mechazek himself on that mitzvah. And it's quite clear that the mitzvah of of proper conduct and of so so they have the signs of that it's assur beshas tefillah and beshas krias hatorah. So right under the signs people stand and shmooze. It's under the signs are up on the wall right under the signs people are standing and shmoozing. And it's very very important that we be mechazek ourselves on it. Kimdumani I'm not I don't pasken shailos, you have to ask someone who does, but kimdumani that it says in Shulchan Aruch where the Rabbeinu Yonah is medayek from the Gemara in Berachos that talking during krias hatorah is בין גברא לגברא אסור. Not only during krias hatorah but even bein gavra legavra is also assur. Except for divrei Torah. Except for divrei Torah he paskens. There's one view that even divrei Torah not, but except for divrei Torah. So I think a person when you get an aliyah so you get your misheberach then you have the optional then you have the optional second misheberach and you can make a misheberach for your long lost third cousin and you can make a misheberach for you know for his cat who's having difficult labor you know you can make all kinds of misheberachs but I think part of the cheshbon here has to be that people are going to be talking. People are going to be talking while you're showering your third cousin whom you haven't seen in the past 20 years anyway because you're not in talking terms. So while you're showering him with a misheberach people are simply being nichshal on the issur of talking bein gavra legavra. I don't pasken shailos but kimdumani it's worth asking whether given that metzius whether when a person has an aliyah whether he should make a misheberach. Whether he should make a misheberach. It's not clear to me that that one should and in all likelihood yatza secharo behefseido but it's very important it's very very important as simple and as elementary as it is it's very important that we be mechazek ourselves on it. And in addition something else and it's not easy to do not easy to do it's very hard to do. But sometimes some people are makpid not to talk but if someone's talking to them so they'll listen during Kaddish or they'll listen they won't answer verbally they'll answer with sign language. But lechoira what you should it's not easy to do it's not easy to do but if you do it consistently people respect it. As with all things it's not only that we shouldn't talk but we shouldn't be we shouldn't be listening either. And if someone's coming and talking and a Kaddish is about to begin so ask him you know let's wait a minute. You say it nicely so you can do it even without hurting on anyone's feelings without being pogeya in anyone. And in addition it would also help contribute that our shul should be the way it should be.