Taamei Mitzvos, part 4

We've been discussing a little bit the Mishpatim and Chukim in the Rambam, Ramban. Let's circle back a little bit for today to the Rambam. We had seen the last halakha in Hilchos Meila. Let's come back to that for a minute. V'haMishpatim, again it's פרק כ"ב הלכה ח, the last halakha in Hilchos Meila. V'haMishpatim, the Rambam says,

הן המצוות שטעמן גלוי וטובת עשייתן בעולם הזה ידועה כגון איסור גזל ושפיכות דמים וכיבוד אב ואם.

So what is the Rambam adding with that second phrase of טובת עשייתן בעולם הזה ידועה? It seems difficult because it seems to be just pragmatically, we appreciate that there's an issur gezel. No one really wants to get mugged and have their wallet taken away. But if that's what it means, it's difficult because lich'ora, isn't the p'shat by Mishpatim and Chukim not that Mishpatim are intuitive on a pragmatic level, they're intuitive on a moral level, on a religious level? It's intuitive to us that morally gezel ushvichas damim are ra. The fact that if you don't have an issur gezel, issur shvichas damim, that it's going to be the wild wild west, I mean that is obviously true, but is that what defines Mishpatim? Isn't Mishpatim that we understand, we have an intuition to appreciate the morality, not just the need, not just the practical need, but we have an intuition to understand the morality of the mitzvah. Mah she'kein hachukim, we don't have an intuition to understand the inherent compelling nature of the mitzvah. And we'll present it as a second question, but obviously it's not really a second question. But then when the Rambam gives us the definition of chukim, so it's not symmetrical. חוקים הן המצוות שאין טעמן ידוע. Okay, so that parallels משפטים הן המצוות שטעמן ידוע, but then there's no, the Rambam doesn't have a parallel to the phrase of טובת עשייתן בעולם הזה. So whatever it is that's added by Mishpatim, the Rambam doesn't need to negate by chukim. So it talks as follows. In one of the volumes of Nefesh HaRav, I don't remember which one, so there's a shiur that the Rav gave on Aseres HaDibros that's transcribed. And in that shiur it's apropos of the Mechilta that Rashi quotes at the beginning of Aseres HaDibros, וידבר אלקים את כל הדברים האלה לאמר, that the Torah here refers to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Vayidaber Elokim with a midas hadin, even though most mitzvot is וידבר ה' אל משה לאמר. So it's unusual that the Torah introduces the Aseres HaDibros with Vayidaber Elokim. And the Mechilta comments on it. So the Rav explains that what it means is like this. the omek of the definition of mishpatim is not only, again, that the reason for the inherent morality is intuitive to us, but the omek is that HaKadosh Baruch Hu created, essentially, certain tenets of morality are natural. What does that mean? So let's say moving into the physical universe, outside of the moral domain, into the physical universe. So HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the laws there as well. There are moral laws: Lo Tirtzach, Lo Tignov. There are also laws of physics. HaKadosh Baruch Hu created laws in the physical universe as well. So what would be if a person is going to be over, right, again, so a person Rachmana litzlan can be over on HaKadosh Baruch Hu's moral law? So what would be if you take the equivalent of that, the analog of that, in the physical universe? A person: "no one's gonna tell me what I can do and what I can't do. Don't tell me anything about gravity. If I want to step outside of this window, I'm gonna step outside of this window. No one's telling me what to do." So what happens if a person acts on that and he violates HaKadosh Baruch Hu's physical law? So is it that l'achar meah v'esrim he's gonna give din vecheshbon? Well, yes and no. The l'achar meah v'esrim is gonna be l'achar five seconds, it's not gonna be l'achar meah v'esrim. He will give din vecheshbon for that rebelliousness, but there's also going to be immediate consequences in olam hazeh. So the difference: HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the world with two types of divine law. Some divine law is natural. Natural means that it's part of the functioning of olam hazeh. And then there are other laws, other divine laws that HaKadosh Baruch Hu created, which are not natural. Not natural in the sense of that they're not embedded in the fabric of olam hazeh. Not natural in that sense, that's the only sense in which we're saying not natural. The omek of mishpatim is that mishpatim, like the physical laws of the universe, are embedded into the natural fabric of olam hazeh such that if you have a society which flagrantly violates issur gezel or shefichut damim, so it's not only that there's a din vecheshbon to give l'achar meah v'esrim, but one will see there will be consequences in olam hazeh as well. Puk chazi the world today. That's pshat in the world today. That's היכן הגענו למקום שהגענו is this yesod of the Rav is that when one violates HaKadosh Baruch Hu's moral law which He created as natural moral law, so it's in addition, again, to the aveira that a person or society answers for basof hayom, there are immediate consequences, there are consequences in olam hazeh as well. A society that rejects tradition and rejects wisdom of its elders, a society that rejects, destroys all values, a society that rejects—and this rejection began in the sixties—that rejects Lo Tinaf destroys the family, destroys the family which is the nuclear unit. A society that rejects lo sinaf champions the yetzer hara, and after the yetzer hara has conquered that front, that lo sinaf is no longer a barrier, is no longer a constraint. So then the yetzer hara knocks down other barriers and other constraints until one reaches not nightmarish conclusions; what exists today is beyond a nightmare. No one fifty-five years ago, no one, the most forward-looking person, the most perceptive insightful person, no one, no one could, did, or could have foreseen the the craziness and the hashchasa that that exists in in the world today. And and all that is is the pshat and all that is is what the rav explained. And that's the omek of mishpatim and the omek of mishpatim is not only that we understand that it's intuitive but that it's natural, again, natural in the sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu embedded it in the world. And the same way, again, a a flagrant violation of the law of gravity has consequences in olam hazeh because Hakadosh Baruch Hu embedded that law into the fabric of the world, so too issur gezel, issur shefichas damim, מצוות כיבוד אב ואם when those things are are rejected, Hakadosh Baruch Hu embedded that into the natural moral fabric of of the world and there are consequences, very, very real and very, very far-reaching consequences in olam hazeh. Yitachen, that's what the Rambam means. So ad kan, ad kan what the rav said. Mikan va'elach, maybe to apply it, maybe that's what that it means sheta'aman galui, that don't think only our partial understanding of what mishpatim mean, that we understand the reason. No, understand the טובת עשייתם בעולם הזה ידועה. The Rambam doesn't mean it in a pragmatic sense. He doesn't mean that, oh, we we appreciate the mishpatim on on a pragmatic level. No, that that's that that lowers the what the category of mishpatim is. No, the Rambam is saying, no, that that hand in hand with ta'aman galui is that it's natural morality, again, natural in in the sense that it's embedded in the in the workings of of olam hazeh. And that's what the Rambam is saying. Mimela, once you say that that chukim is ein ta'aman yadu'a, so then it's understood that that that that we don't have any appreciation for for what tovas asiyasam, for what tovas asiyasam is. If you don't have the first step of ta'aman yadu'a, you you obviously don't progress to the deeper level of that the significance of the deeper significance of ta'aman yadu'a, again, is that it's it's it's natural morality. The Rambam in Shmona Perakim has basically a halacha l'ma'aseh nafkamina to this distinction between mishpatim and chukim. The Rambam quotes in perek vav of Shmona Perakim... Initially he poses it as a clash. The Rambam says like this, that you find that the philosophers say that a person who does what's right because he's suppressing an urge to act differently, right, Kovesh Es Yisro is a lesser Madreiga than the person who has internalized the value and wants to do it. The person who wants to give Tzadaka and does so happily, willingly, is a higher level than a person who gives the same 50 dollars but has to be Kovesh Es Yisro in order to do that. And he says that Shlomo Hamelech says like this also, that נפש רשע אותה רע. The Tzadik not only doesn't do that, but he's not, he's not, he's not Misaveh, he doesn't desire it either. But Me'idach Gisa, you have the Maimrah of Rabban Gamliel of

לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לאכול בשר בחלב ואי אפשי ללבוש שעטנז ואי אפשי לבוא על הערוה אלא אפשי ומה אעשה שאבי שבשמים גזר עלי.

So how do you reconcile this? So the Rambam answers that it's a difference between Mishpatim and Chukim. When it comes to Mishpatim, so that's what the philosophers were talking about and they're right, and that's what Shlomo Hamelech said. When you're talking about Chukim, and the Rambam says notice the examples Rabban Gamliel gives, he doesn't say

לא יאמר אדם אי אפשי לגנוב או לשפוך דמים אלא אפשי ומה אעשה שאבי שבשמים גזר עלי.

He doesn't give any of that type of example. The example he gives is Davka Basar B'cholov, Davka Shaatnez, meaning he gives examples Davka of Chukim. So what's the Pshat? So the Pshat is that the Rambam is saying that this distinction between Mishpatim and Chukim is not only an important distinction on the philosophical level, but it has very practical implications as well. The fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us a natural, an intuition for Gezel, for Shfichus Damim, the fact that it's intuitive means that we're supposed to comply naturally. We're supposed to comply naturally and that's why if the person is supposed to cultivate the Middah, not only is he supposed to behaviorally comply, but he's supposed to cultivate the Middah. Again, he's supposed to happily give Tzadaka Ke'matnas Yado. He's supposed to very willingly and comply with the Issur Gezel, Shfichus Damim. He's supposed to very happily be מקיים כיבוד אב ואם. Again, the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created us with a natural intuition, with an intuition for it, means that the Mitzvah should be performed in that natural way. Okay, but how do you understand the other half of what Rabban Gamliel said? Rabban Gamliel says Meila that a person doesn't have to have an instinct on Basar B'cholov. But Rabban Gamliel Bedavka doesn't want him to. Right? Again, what Rabban Gamliel says is that Efshi, no, when you watch McDonald's, you have to think that the, I don't know if you have to think the cheeseburger would be healthy, what Davka, but you have to think that it's succulent. You have to think, "Nah, all things being equal, Avada I would, if there was no Mitzvas HaTorah, so Avada, of course I would, of course I would." A person shouldn't talk himself into that that oh when you combine the basar vecholov it it doesn't taste good and and who in the world would would want to eat it? A person, one you know their their breakfast davar acher and and eggs. A person doesn't suppose to, no, it's a very tasty breakfast. It is a very, but מה אעשה שאבי שבשמים גזר עלי. What's the pshat? Because the pshat is like this: היות שהקדוש ברוך הוא if the mitzvah isn't intuitive, so for a person to superimpose that detracts from the kiyum hamitzvah. Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us an intuition for kibud av va'eim, so mimaileh that a person happily is mikayeim kibud av va'eim as opposed to bein koveish yitzro, so that's the ideal form of the mitzvah. But היות שהקדוש ברוך הוא didn't give us an intuition for shatnez, if a person develops any any any force or factor other than the mitzvah, so then that detracts from the kiyum hamitzvah. It's almost as if the kiyum hamitzvah now becomes lishmah shelo lishmah. Yeah, it's taka a din haTorah בגד כלאים שעטנז לא יעלה עליך, but also shatnez is not not my style suit anyway, you know. So that that that detracts from the kiyum hamitzvah because once once once the mitzvah Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't create and didn't design the mitzvah as being intuitive, if if a person generates that, so that's that's migarei'a in terms of the kiyum hamitzvah. When Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants that that should be our that should be the character we have, so then that's part of the mitzvah. But when no, Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't give us an intuition for basar vecholov, didn't give us an intuition for levisha shatnez, so then for there to be such an artificial one is migarei'a from the from the kiyum hamitzvah. Okay, we'll continue on 125 b'ezrat Hashem.