Ramban Yisro

הדבור הזה מצות עשה. So the Ramban agrees with the Rambam against the Behag that anochi should be included in the official minyan taryag. The Behag doesn't, obviously not because the Behag thinks there's anything optional, anything less than absolute about the obligation to recognize and acknowledge anochi Hashem elokecha, but rather because the Behag says that this chiyuv is a chiyuv which logically precedes the chiyuv of taryag. First comes the obligation to recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Once you recognize Hakadosh Baruch Hu, once you recognize that there is a metzaveh, then you can have six hundred and thirteen discrete mitzvos. The Behag is another, I think we spoke about it in different contexts, is another illustration from different angles and on different levels how for some of the monei hamitzvos is the minyan taryag intended to be a catch-all, be-all of a person's obligations. So the Behag and then later the position is adopted by Rabbi Chasdai Crescas as well that you can't have in minyan hamitzvos you can't have a chiyuv misinai of anochi Hashem elokecha because that would be circular. It has to be that of its own accord a person can and therefore is obligated to recognize and then the taryag comes afterwards. The common denominator to lechora to all the answers to this taana, again of Rav Chasdai Crescas defending the Behag, is that there's more contained in the mitzvah of anochi than is logically necessary to have mitzvos. That there's more in anochi than just recognition of Hakadosh Baruch Hu who is metzaveh. One of the contours of the mitzvah according to the Ramban, so יאמינו שיש השם והוא אלקים להם. Klomar, meaning klomar, everything the Ramban is about to say is all condensed within, expressed within the two words of Hashem elokecha, right? The chiyuv is anochi Hashem elokecha which means יש השם והוא אלקים להם, elokecha. Klomar, what does the Shem Havaya represent? So the Shem Havaya represents... represents that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is hoveh kadmon. Again, we discussed a little bit last week in conjunction with the pasuk of השם ימלוך לעולם ועד, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is matzui kayam above, above time. The Shem Havaya also expresses that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the source, that not only does Hakadosh Baruch Hu just exist me'elav above and beyond everything, but that he's the source of everything else that he brought into existence. Me'ito haya hakol, right? Me'ito haya hakol, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the source of all existence. Becheifetz veyacholas, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world not out of any necessity, not because anything about his essence inexorably demanded that there be a world, but he willed to do so. Becheifetz veyacholas. Vehu Elokim lahem, Elokim representing sovereign, sovereignty. Elokim is a lashon sar veshofet, v'nesaticha Elokim le'Pharaoh, it means sovereign, sar veshofet. Vehu Elokim lahem shehayav u'mevamotam. Ramban here is also, without formulating it as a question, is also answering the famous question that the Ibn Ezra quotes from Yehuda HaLevi. Yehuda HaLevi asked the Ibn Ezra why, why Hakadosh Baruch Hu's calling card, kavyachol, says אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים rather than אשר בראתי שמים וארץ. So the Ramban is clearly addressing that question. And right away the Ramban indicates when he says, hadibur hazeh, just re-reading for a moment, הדיבור הזה מצות עשה, אמר אנכי השם יורה ויצוה. So we know what yitzaveh means. What does yoreh mean? So l'horos is to teach. So the pasuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha is both a mitzvah as well as instruction, instruction in the sense of, of teaching, right? An instructor, a teacher. Yoreh veyitzaveh osam, meaning Anochi Hashem Elokecha. And, and if you're looking to, to know how one can come to that belief, how one can substantiate that, that belief, so that's provided by the אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. And that's clearly the Ramban's answer to, to Yehuda HaLevi's question. That were it to have said אשר בראתי שמים וארץ, so then the pasuk would have been mitzvah. The Torah is telling us not only what the fundamental beliefs we're supposed to have klapei Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but also how to, how to anchor those beliefs, also how to substantiate and, and sustain those beliefs. Yoreh veyitzaveh. And that's what the Ramban comes and in the second half here he elaborates that. ואמר אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים, meaning the אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים, this is no longer the tzivui part of the pasuk, this is the hora'ah part of the pasuk.

כי הוצאתם משם תורה, תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ. כי בידיעה ובהשגחה ממנו יצאו. גם תורה על החידוש. כי אם קדמות העולם לא ישתנה דבר מטבעי.

V'toreh al hayacholas,

והיכולת תורה על היחוד, כמו שאמר בעבור תדע. גם טובה על החידוש, כי אם קדמות העולם לא השתנה דבר מטבעו, וטובה על היכולת, והיכולת טובה על היחוד, כמו שאמר בעבור תדע כי אין כמוני בכל הארץ.

If the world had existed eternally so then that would mean that the world existed out of logical necessity. If the world existed out of necessity then then everything about it would be inexorable. Nothing about it could be overridden miraculously. When Hakadosh Baruch Hu performs a miracle, so then that proves Briyas Ha'olam. Why? כי אם קדמות העולם לא ישתנה דבר מטבעו. Because had the world existed eternally so then it would just mean that that it exists out of necessity, that that it would have meant that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence implies the existence of the world. So if that's the case then everything about it would have to be absolute and and immutable. The fact that you can have a miracle, the fact that the natural law can be suspended, so all that shows that there's nothing inexorable, there's nothing necessary about about the world and about its functioning. Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, He created the world mitoch retzono. Birtzono that the world should function one way, it's birtzono that that at other moments in history the world should function differently. The targeting of of the Mitzrim for punishment, the singling out of of Bnei Yisrael for protection, for Yeshua, both demonstrate the twin principles of Yediah and Hashgacha.

וזה טעם אשר הוצאתיך כי הם היודעים ועדים בכל אלה.

And and it's it's the same approach that the Ramban has already presented at the end of Parshat Bo when when we we looked at that together. ועתה אומר לך כלל גדול במצוות. Why there are so many Mitzvos which are Zecher Liyetzias Mitzrayim because Yetzias Mitzrayim serves as the the basis, as the foundation for correct belief. In in this respect in terms of the reading of the Pasuk, so basically for the Ramban the the Pasuk should be broken down that the Tzivui Shebo is limited to the first three words. That's the that's the Tzivah and the balance of the Pasuk Asher Hotzeisicha is the Hora'ah Shebo, is the instruction how a person can arrive at such correct belief. And and when you look in the Rambam, it's clear that that he also reads the Pasuk that way, that it's only the first three words that that are the Mitzvah Shebo.

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמתת המצאו. לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת המצאו

vechulu וידיעת דבר זה מצוות עשה שנאמר Anochi Hashem Elokecha. And not Anochi Hashem Elokecha vechulu, no, like the Rambam, Anochi Hashem Elokecha. That's the part of the pasuk which is the mitzvah shebo. Other of the Rishonim amongst the Monei Mitzvos, take a look in the Sefer Hachinuch for instance. You'll find the same thing as in the Smag, I think, that the Sefer Hachinuch says that the mitzvah of Anochi is to know and believe that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, who took us out of Mitzrayim, is the one who gave us the Torah. So some of the other Rishonim read the entire pasuk as mitzvah. That the mitzvah is as it were de'u veha'aminu that Anochi, I, who am I Hashem Elokecha, who am now giving you the Torah, I am the one אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. And again, the contrast of how the Rambam and Ramban punctuate the pasuk is clear. The pshat in the Ramban's iyov veyatzav is also in addition to addressing the Yehuda Halevi's question, is also addressing another question that it's highly unusual, no not the only instance of it, but it's certainly highly unusual. רובא דרובא דרובא מצוות, so the Torah formulates them belashon tzivuy with an imperative. Okay, the future, and lo davka that has to do with what's tzivuy, the future can also have that sense of imperative in Lashon Hakodesh. That what we call the future has the sense of that's what you're supposed to do, that's what you're obligated to do. I think like that the Lashon Torah is like that, the Lashon Chazal also, I think someone once gave an example, I think in the first mishnah in Bava Metzia, shnayim ochazin betallis,

זה אומר כולה שלי וזה אומר כולה שלי זה נשבע שיש לו בה וזה נשבע שיש לו בה,

yachloku. So what happened there? Yachloku? It's going to be a day sometime it's going to be shnayim ochazin betallis, he says I can see that they're going to yachloku? No, he's not saying a nevuah about what will be, he's saying what has to be, what should be, what the din is. Yachloku, this is what you have to do. What we call the osid has that connotation in Lashon Hakodesh as well. So sometimes it's not necessarily what we recognize as tzivuy. It doesn't say achlu matzos, it says baerev tochlu matzos. And that also has connotation of tzivuy. Mashe'ein kein by Anochi, so you don't... don't have that you don't have any any such word. So the Ramban lichora is also implicitly addressing that question in in saying that that would sort of confuse or or maybe even totally offset the point that the pasuk isn't only mitzva. The pasuk is mitzva v'hava, the pasuk is mitzva and instruction. If it would be introduced beloshon mitzvos, so then the Ramban lichora would tell us, we would then be prone to misreading the entire pasuk as as mitzva. So that's why it's not introduced beloshon mitzva. In terms of those two questions, so the Ibn Ezra famously answers the the Yehuda HaLevi's question by saying that ein lechora mi, those who have the the capacity, intellectual capacity, vechulu, and preparedness to be able to understand and recognize Anochi Hashem Elokecha from the briah, so the takeh should. But the Ibn Ezra says, rubo d'rubo of the population are not necessarily philosophically in inclined or intellectually equipped to arrive at the yedi'ah and emunah through that route. So the Torah gives a route that shova l'chol nefesh. In terms of the question of why Anochi, the other question the Ramban is implicitly addressing, why Anochi doesn't have a loshon tzivuy, so the Maharal writes, he says, because Anochi is is unique amongst the mitzvos in the following sense. Let's say the mitzva d'achilas matza. So what happens if Rachmana litzlan a person doesn't eat matza? He didn't eat matza, ein hachi nami, he should have eaten matza, he should have consumed matza, but Rachmana litzlan, b'dieved, yasa, he didn't eat matza. What happens if a person doesn't acknowledge that Anochi Hashem Elokecha? What happens Rachmana litzlan if a person doesn't doesn't believe, doesn't acknowledge Anochi Hashem Elokecha? The fact remains the fact, it's not it's not that this mitzva doesn't the reality of the mitzva doesn't hinge upon one's compliance. The reality of achilas matza hinges upon one's compliance. If a person doesn't comply, then the takeh won't be an אכילת מצה ליל ליל חמישה עשר. If a person if a person doesn't take the lulav, so then ein hachi nami, there won't have been a a lekichas lulav. And if Rachmana litzlan a person doesn't acknowledge Anochi Hashem Elokecha, it doesn't make a difference, the reality of Anochi Hashem Elokecha remains the remains the same. That's what the Maharal says, that's why the Torah doesn't doesn't introduce it beloshon tzivuy, that one shouldn't think if a person doesn't acknowledge, okay, so it's if a person wants to enter into that relationship, a person wants to sign the contract, he can do so, if he doesn't want to, no, you should know that the reality is going to be a reality regardless. Anochi Hashem Elokecha is a fact, it's the only thing that's the only choice we have is is whether to acknowledge the fact or not acknowledge the fact, to acknowledge the reality or Rachmana litzlan not, but it's not as if that reality or that relationship of Anochi Hashem Elokecha depends upon compliance with the tzivuy. In general, whatever chelek of Torah we're learning, a person has an achrayus to להבין דבר מתוך דבר, person has an achrayus to promote the theories and spin spin up spin ideas in every every chelek of Torah every sif of Torah. A person has a chiyuv to approach it b'kovod rosh to correctly discern and accurately represent amito shel Torah that it shouldn't chas v'shalom be anything less than that. Im kol zeh that that chiyuv is magnified kefel kiflayim you can't put a number on it when learning ikarei hadas. Whatever the whatever the boundaries of chiddush should or should not be for any given yachid and obviously they're not going to be the same for each one in in other chelkei haTorah, b'ikarei hadas a person's not looking to be mechadesh. A person's looking to just understand what Chazal, what the Rishonim, what the chachmei hamesorah have transmitted to us. Let's take a look a little bit of the Ramban on Shabbos.

זכור את יום השבת לקדשו. אחר שצוה להאמין בשם המיוחד יתברך שהוא הנמצא הוא הבורא הוא המבין והיכול ושנייחד האמונה בכל אלו והכבוד לו לבדו

this is the Ramban's reformulation of what we just saw in the mitzvah of anochi.

וציווה שנכבד זכר לשמו. ציווה שנעשה בזה סימן וזיכרון תמיד להודיע שהוא ברא הכל והיא מצוות השבת שהיא זכר למעשה בראשית.

You know we back on daf beis a little bit we discussed the the famous Bach about ma'ayan yedi'as dasecha and tishmoru va'asisem ותהיה תורת ה' בפיך. Here it's just clear from the peshuto shel mikra. Shabbos is intended, Shabbos is designed, whatever whatever else it it can and and does accomplish, whatever else additionally it's intended to accomplish, but first and foremost to mechazek our emunah. It's it's a time to reinforce our emunah in sheishes yimei bereishis as elementary as that sounds, almost to the point of seeming simplistic. It's a question worth asking ourselves whether or not our shmiras shabbos reflects that emuna. Is how we spend our 24 plus hours of shabbos, is my emuna reinforced? All the implications of what that emuna should be in terms of lifestyle and priority, are they clarified? The Ramban skips a little bit here in this posuk. If you see where it says ובמדרשו של רבי נחוניא בן הקנה. He says a lot of things. Skipping a little bit.

ובמדרשו של רבי נחוניא בן הקנה הזכיר עוד סוד גדול בזכור ושמור ועל הכלל תהיה הזכירה ביום והשמירה בלילה וזהו מאמר החכמים שאומרים בערב שבת בואי כלה בואי כלה בוא ונצא לקראת שבת מלכתא כלה ויקרא לברכת היום קידושא רבא שהוא הקידוש הגדול ותבין זה. ואמת הוא גם כן כי מדת זכור רמזו במצות עשה והוא היוצא ממדת האהבה והוא למדת הרחמים כי העושה מצות אדוניו אוהב בו ואדוניו מרחם עליו מדת שמור במצות לא תעשה והוא למדת הדין ויוצא ממדת היראה כי הנשמר מעשות דבר הרע בעיני אדוניו ירא אותו ולכן מצות עשה גדולה ממצות לא תעשה כמו שהאהבה גדולה מהיראה כי המקיים ועושה בגופו ובממונו רצון אדוניו הוא גדול מהנשמר מעשות הרע בעיניו ולכך אמרו דאתי עשה ודחי לא תעשה.

The Ramban says that there are obviously two basic components to mitzvas shabbos. מצות לא תעשה שבו, primarily to be nizaher mimelacha, and the mitzvas asei shebo, the mitzva of kiddush and everything that that entails. Obviously, normatively and practically, so a person has to be nizaher mimelacha the entire shabbos and the mitzvas asei is noheges the entire shabbos as well. Nevertheless, the aspect of yira is more accentuated by the zman of layla, of yira, of the lo ta'aseh, and the element of asei, of zachor, of ahava, is more pronounced and more prominent in the day. Again, the Ramban says it al pi kabbalah. That's what's nirmaz in the fact that the Ran in maseches pesachim already deals with the fact, why do we call kiddush in the day kiddusha raba? So he says, no, it's a euphemism because if you compare the kiddush in the day to the kiddush Friday night, the kiddush Friday night is a whole lot of arichus. We have the borei pri hagafen and the whole אשר קדשנו במצותיו ורצה בנו. And in the day, it's just this solitary borei pri hagafen. So this kiddusha raba is a euphemism, like a suma, rachmana litzlan, is referred to as a sagi nahor. And the Ramban says, now that's what the Ran says is the correct nigladike pshat. He says but al pi nistar, no. that the element of zochar, of esh, of ahava is more pronounced in the Kiddushas Hayom of the day, and that's what's reflected in that phrase Kiddusha Rabba. He says it al pi Kabbalah, but it's at least reflected al pi halacha as well in the din of כבוד יום וכבוד לילה כבוד יום עדיף. Again, even though obviously halacha l'maaseh in terms of Kiddushas Hayom being nisur melacha, so in that sense obviously the kedusha is uniform, but you do see this indication that the fact that all the halachos are נוהג בין ביום בין בלילה. You see in the din of כבוד יום וכבוד לילה כבוד יום עדיף a reflection of this idea that Ramban is telling us that if you have a special dessert for Shabbos and you only have enough for one meal, you should eat it in the day rather than at night. This is also why I think... no, not going to make this yet... right when Erev Pesach falls out on Shabbos, so you have the whole diyun of how you have shalosh seudos because in the afternoon, so obviously you can't eat chametz. On the other hand, the Yerushalmi's din you can't eat matzah either. And if you hold that the shalosh seudos are supposed to be... you don't want to have two in the morning, so then what do you do? Okay, so a whole eisek. So how come... so some say okay, you eat two in the morning. So you get up, you daven very early and before sof daled shaos you wash twice. So why didn't anyone come up with a much simpler solution, which is have two meals at night? It's a lot easier to pack two meals in at night and then just have one meal within the first daled shaos in the morning than to have to pack two meals in without getting involved with bracha she'eina tzricha in the morning. The teretz is no, here too, since כבוד יום וכבוד לילה כבוד יום עדיף, you can't have two of the three meals at night. It has to be because kvod yom adif from kvod laila, so two of the three meals have to be in the day. You can't plan things to have two meals at night and one meal in the day. The Sfas Emes says a vort which is very much in keeping with the Ramban's explanation here of shamor and zochor, midas hayira and midas ha'ahava. Ramban earlier quoted the Gemorah's hekesh of כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה. Chazal tell us that זכור ושמור בדיבור אחד נאמרו. So what's the halachic significance of that? Al pi din, what's the significance of that miracle?

מה שאין הפה יכול לדבר ומה שאין האוזן יכולה לשמוע.

Hakadosh Baruch Hu said as it were zochor v'shamor simultaneously. So what's the significance of that? So one of the מידות שהתורה נדרשת בהן is that when you have two mitzvos which the Torah combines within the same posuk, so that implies a hekesh. If you have a posuk over here with a mitzvah and a posuk over there with a mitzvah, so there's no hekesh. This is a mitzvah, that's a mitzvah. Each one has its own rules, each one has its own halachos. Lav davka that there's any equation between the two. But when the Torah says

לא תאכל עליו חמץ שבעת ימים תאכל עליו מצות לחם עני,

so the Torah is telling you there's some equation between matzah and chametz.

דברים שאדם יוצא בהן דברים הבא לידי חימוץ אדם יוצא בהן חובתו משום מצה.

There's some kind of hekesh. So the significance al pi din of the fact that זכור ושמור בדיבור אחד נאמרו means agam that in the Chumash, so one's written in Yisro and the other's written in Va'eschanan. No, but it's really al pi din it's one posuk. Hakadosh Baruch Hu said them together, so there is a hekesh. And that's the hekesh of כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה, which is... is the basis of saying that the rule מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא doesn't apply and Nashim Chayavos in Kiddush m'de'oraisa. Okay. And the Sfas Emes says and it's very much sort of building off of, picking up where the Ramban explicitly leaves off, so the Sfas Emes says very, very beautifully, he says, what’s the pshat? He says כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה means that if a person wants to genuinely experience the zochor of Yom HaShabbos, the asei of Yom HaShabbos, the experience of Shabbos, the romemus hanefesh of Shabbos, that's only possible in the context of shomor. It's only sheyeshno bishmira. If a person who has the discipline of לא תעשה כל מלאכה, the dikduk of לא תעשה כל מלאכה, such a person sheyeshno bishmira, such a person is yeshno bizchira. But the niggun for Lecha Dodi can be gevaldig, can be gevaldig, but if it's not rooted, if it's not anchored in kol sheyeshno bishmira, it's not going to lead a person to yeshno bizchira. That's the on a nefesh level, that's what the hekesh of, it's not כל שישנו בזכירה ישנו בשמירה, but it's כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה. The pashtus is, from Rav Shlomo Alkabetz, who wrote Lecha Dodi, so he's also referring to this שמור וזכור בדיבור אחד נאמרו. It's not that his name happened to be Shlomo Alkabetz, so he would have written זכור ושמור בדיבור אחד נאמרו. Oh, it's davka it's shomor v'zochor, it's כל שישנו בשמירה ישנו בזכירה. Hagam that in the Chumash, again, it's written Va'eschanan and Yisro, but both al pi din, in terms of how the hekesh functions l'halacha, as well as this other idea of the Ramban and the Sfas Emes, conceptually, the zochor has to build off of the shomor. And that's also the whole structure of the Braysa of Pinchas ben Yair, that the Ramchal explains to us also reflects this yesod, right? Zehirous and zrizous. The twin middos and inyanim. So the Ramchal explains it's the same thing. One's legabi lo sa'aseh, legabi issur, the other's legabi asei. Which comes first? Again, zehirous and then zrizous. It doesn't mean halacha l'ma'aseh, obviously, that I'm not sure if I'm sufficiently zahir, so I'm not going to eat matzah this erev Pesach. That's obviously not what this means, but it's the same idea, that the zochor is built on the shomor, the zrizous is built on the zehirous.