Ramban – Parshas Toldos. Suffering, Tefillah, Eretz Yisroel.

At the beginning of the Parshas Toldos

ויתרוצצו הבנים בקרבה ותאמר אם כן למה זה אנכי ותלך לדרוש את ה'

the Ramban

ותאמר אם כן למה זה אנכי אם כן גודל צער העבור למה זה אנכי מתפללת ומתאוה על ההריון לשון רש"י

ve'einenu nachon and the Pneinei HaRamban suggests from the hemshech of the Ramban that what the Ramban takes issue with in terms of Rashi's pshat is that Rashi's pshat seems to impute to Rivka Imeinu that she thought that all the pain and the that she was having was normal for pregnancy, right? אם כן גודל צער העיבור that as though Rivka erroneously thought that the that what she was suffering was typical for for any pregnancy and you see from the hemshech both the what the Ramban now quotes from the Ibn Ezra as well as what he says that both of those pshatim take issue with that and assume that that Rivka recognizes that what she was enduring was was extraordinary in terms of in terms of heroyom. Ve'Rabbi Avraham amar כי שאלת הנשים אם אירע להם ככה ותאמרנה לו. This was Rivka's first pregnancy so she had no experience so to have some comparative frame of reference she asked she asked other women whether they had experienced something similar and when they told her no

ותאמר אם כן הדבר והמנהג למה זה אנכי בהריון משונה.

Why am I experiencing something so unusual and so so extraordinary? והנה הכתוב חסר ואיננו שלם בפירוש הזה. So again it's very meduyak that the Ramban has a different type of objection to the Ibn Ezra not that einenu nachon that in gantzen einenu nachon but rather that according to the Ibn Ezra there's something missing here dehynu the the basis for the im kein is missing from the Chumash, right? According to the according to the Ibn Ezra so for the pasuk to be complete the pasuk should have said ויתרוצצו הבנים בקרבה ותשאל את חברותיה and then vatomer im kein. But that it's a different type of objection to the Ibn Ezra than to Rashi.

והנכון בעיני כי אמרה אם כן יהיה לי למה זה אנכי בעולם

not למה זה אנכי בהריון משונה but if this is what I have to endure

למה זה אנכי בעולם הלואי אינני שאמות או שלא הייתי כטעם כאשר לא הייתי אהיה.

You see from the Ramban that there is such a thing rachmana litzlan as such intense yissurim that it elicits from a person a reaction of tov mosi meichayay. Even from Rivka Imenu it elicits that reaction. And it's accentuated in the sense that Rivka Imenu even if she anticipates that it's going to last for the balance of the pregnancy, but she certainly has no reason to think that it's going to continue beyond the pregnancy. And אף על פי כן, rachmana litzlan, there is such a thing as yissurim which are just so great and so overwhelming that it elicits such a reaction. The gemara says in Kesubos that אלמלא נגדוה לחנניה מישאל ועזריה פלחו לצלמא. If Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah instead of being threatened with death had been tortured, so they would have bowed down to the tzalmah. So what does that mean? So Tosafos says because really it wasn't me'ikar hadin that they had to be moseir nefesh. Because it wasn't really avoda zara, it wasn't avoda zara. The statue was there, a statue it was there lichvodo. It wasn't deification, it wasn't deifying him. It was there likavod. But lema'aseh it was, sort of borderline or coaching borderline, so there was a middas chasidus according to Tosafos to be moseir nefesh but it wasn't me'ikar hadin. And that's what it means that ulmalei nagduha so they would not have practiced the middas chasidus in the face of torture rachmana litzlan. But let's say according to the Rambam that there is no such thing as a middas chasidus to be moseir nefesh. That a person's not allowed to volunteer to be moseir nefesh. The hetter to be moseir nefesh is the chiyuv to be moseir nefesh. But otherwise it's not a person's choice to give up his life if Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't say to do so. So then lichora the gemara means kipshuto. It means that if they had been subjected to extreme, extreme torture, that even Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah who didn't break under the threat of death, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, the Rambam writes in perek heh of Yesodei Hatorah that ein ma'alah kema'alatan. Ein ma'alah kema'alatan. There is such a thing as such great and overwhelming yissurim rachmana litzlan. It doesn't give a person a hetter to do anything rachmana litzlan. A person can davven and others can davven. The Ran says in Nedarim, he quotes based on the gemara in Kesubos that there is such a thing that if a person is rachmana litzlan terminally ill and there's no way for the person to recover and the person is suffering terribly, terribly rachmana litzlan, so obviously a person cannot do anything, it's mamash retzicha to do anything to shorten the person's life, there's no such thing as euthanasia in halacha, no such thing as permissible euthanasia. But it is muttar to davven. It is muttar to davven. Hakadosh Baruch Hu says that it's not our prerogative to decide when to end a person's life. It's his prerogative, but there are times when it is appropriate to davven for that. If there's no opening to davven for a refuah and there's no way of even controlling the pain, if it's so horrible, so there is such a thing as davvening that the person should be relieved of the pain. ותלך לדרוש את ה'. Lashon Rashi,

להגיד מה יהיה בסופה ולא מצאתי דרישת ה' רק להתפלל כטעם דרשתי את ה' וענני דרשוני וחיו חי אני אם אדרש לכם.

So according to Rashi ותלך לדרוש את ה' she went to Shem and Ever. The obvious question on the Ramban is that vedarashta vechakarta heytev. Drisha means to inquire. And I guess Rashi is right. Drisha means to inquire and that's what Rashi says that ותלך לדרוש את ה׳ means that she had an inquiry. She had an inquiry, so you go to the navi. That the navi should is in a position to to respond to the inquiry. But what does it mean that לא מצאתי דרישת ה׳ רק להתפלל? So the meforshei Ramban point to the Ramban in Parshas Yisro. Vayomer Moshe lachasno. Right? Yisro asks Moshe Rabbeinu, what's this line around the block here that the everyone's standing online waiting to waiting to have an audience with you? What's that all about? So כי יבא אלי העם לדרוש אלוהים. Right? The same the same lashon as drishas elohim. So the Ramban here writes,

כי יבא אלי העם לדרוש אלוהים, השיב משה לחתנו צריכים הם שיעמדו עלי זמן גדול מן היום כי לדברים רבים באו לפני.

There's a lot of people and there's lots of lots of things which which which which move them to come. כי יבא אלי העם לדרוש אלוהים lehispalel al choleihem. So they come that I should daven. That I should daven for for family members who are who are ill. But but listen to what the Ramban adds here. כי יבא אלי העם לדרוש אלוהים lehispalel al choleihem, again, if you have if you have it, it's י״ח ט״ו here in Shemos, כי יבא אלי העם לדרוש אלוהים lehispalel al choleihem

ולהודיעם מה ידבר להם כי זה יקרא דרישת אלוהים וכן יעשו עם הנביאים כמו שאמר לפנים בישראל כה אמר האיש בלכתו לדרוש אלוהים לכו ונלכה עד הרואה וכן ודרשת את ה׳ מאותו לאמר האחיה מחולי זה שיתפלל אליו ויודיענו אם נשמעה תפילתו וכן ותלך לדרוש את ה׳

kemo shepirashti sham. The Ramban says something extraordinary. The the reason the idiom drishas elohim means tefillah is because the tefillah was accompanied the the tefillah elicited an answer. So it was an inquiry in the sense that the tefillah, again, is let's say for a chola is אל נא רפא נא לה, but that was also an inquiry because Hakadosh Baruch Hu then responded by, again, either either in the affirmative or or in the negative. So how does this fit with the Ramban in Devarim 13:15 where he says אחרי ה׳ אלוהיכם תלכו is to enumerate all the mitzvos lo sa'aseh, and he brings this pasuk? So there he seems to say like Rashi. Yes, I I think the Pnei Yerushalaim here quotes that. 13:5, that's where you are? Yeah, yeah, the Pnei Yerushalaim points it out. דרישת ה׳ היא שאלת העתידות. Quotes both of them. He also quotes the pasuk in Parshas Yisro, right? Quotes both of them. Yeah, it does sound like Rashi. Yeah, Inami, it does sound like Rashi. Lefnei Yerushalayim is meod kasha. You're right. It does sound like Rashi. So what you see from the Ramban and the Ramban in Parshat Yisro, something extraordinary, mamash extraordinary. The ideal, maybe the better word is the pristine form of Tefilah. What Tefilah really is and Tefilah really should be is that the Mispallel is speaking to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. If someone speaks to you, you answer. Someone says, "Can I please borrow your pen?" So you don't ignore them. You may say yes, you may say no, but even if for whatever reason the answer's going to be no, you do answer. You don't just ignore them and say, "Well, time will tell, wait and see. If my pen ends up in your hand, then the answer was yes, and if it doesn't, then no." You answer the person. So Tefilah doesn't simply mean, again, what it in pristine terms, Tefilah is that a person is engaging with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The only thing is, we're hard of hearing. The Nevi'im had very good hearing, they had acute hearing, and the Nevi'im heard the response. And we, even with hearing aids, remain too hard of hearing to hear that response. Lemayseh, you go back to Parshat Vayeira, so that's what happens when Avraham Avinu is davening on Sdom. Avraham Avinu davens and right away he hears the answer. Right away he hears the answer. The Rav zechrono livracha used to often say in drashas, I think this is also written in, well I'm not remembering where right now, but I think he wrote it also, that be'etzem Tefilah and nevuah are two sides of a coin. The difference being that in nevuah, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu initiates and speaks to man, and in Tefilah, so man initiates and speaks to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So this Ramban helps one relate to that comment, helps one have a little bit of a tfisa on that comment. It really is an audience with Hakadosh Baruch Hu to the extent that, to the degree that the real form of Tefilah is that a person is answered. Right, Chazal say that b'gimel mekomos, so kavyachol Moshe Rabbeinu תפס להקדוש ברוך הוא and said

אני איני מניחך עד שתודיעני אם תעשה בקשתי אם לאו.

Right, one of them is in Parshat Pinchas, יפקוד ה' אלהי הרוחות לכל בשר. Moshe Rabbeinu asks after Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells him in Parshat Chukat, Lachen lo saviu, that you're not going to cross the Yarden and Moshe Rabbeinu sees that he's not going to be accompanying Kel Yisroel, so he asks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should appoint a memaleh makom. How do Chazal know... How do Chazal know that Moshe Rabbeinu kavyachol made that demand of Hakadosh Baruch Hu to answer him? Because I think the lashon hapasuk there in Parshas Pinchas וידבר משה אל השם לאמר. So what does the word lemor mean? So Rashi in Parshas Va'eira says that lemor means to that Vayedaber Moshe, that when it says וידבר השם אל משה לאמר it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu spoke to Moshe that there should be a lemor, that there should be a follow-up amira, which means that Moshe Rabbeinu is then supposed to turn around and convey to Bnei Yisrael. So the Ramban there in Parshas Va'eira is massig on Rashi and he says there are pesukim where it clearly can't mean that and the Ramban says no, lemor means that it's an amira berura. It means that it wasn't something that was beremez, it wasn't something that Moshe Rabbeinu needed to decipher, but it was with total clarity, with complete behiros. But the emes is that it's klar in many many places that Chazal understood the word lemor like Rashi. You have to look at all the Ramban's kashyas and figure out what the answer is, but it's clear in many places from many drashos Chazal that Chazal understood the word lemor like Rashi. And this is one of them. Where did Chazal get that Moshe Rabbeinu kavyachol tafaso leHakadosh Baruch Hu and said איני מניחך עד שתודיעני? Because what's the lemor? Hani micha when it's וידבר השם אל משה לאמר, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's speaking to Moshe that Moshe should then there should be a follow-up amira, that Moshe Rabbeinu should turn around and talk to Bnei Yisrael. But when Moshe Rabbeinu is talking to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not supposed to repeat that to someone else, so what's the follow-up amira? Oh, that's what Chazal say. No, the follow-up amira is that Moshe Rabbeinu says no, I'm kavyachol I'm demanding a response. In Parshas Yisro

והגבלת את העם סביב לאמר השמרו לכם עלות בהר ונגוע בקצהו כל הנגע בהר מות יומת.

So Rashi quotes on lemor

והגבלת את העם סביב לאמר הגבול אומר להם השמרו מעלות מכאן ולהלן.

Right, the gvul itself, if someone was about to go beyond his station, so the gvul itself would warn him. Where did Chazal get that from? Where did they pull that out of thin air? No, they got it from lemor. What's the lemor? Lemor leachairim. והגבלת את העם סביב לאמר that the gvul itself is going to there are other drashos Chazal also. It's clear that Chazal understood the lemor as Rashi, that's where Rashi got it in Parshas Va'eira that it means lemor leachairim. Al kol panim lichora in light of this Ramban, our Ramban here in Parshas Toldos, the perspective on those gimmel mekomos is that Moshe Rabbeinu is saying that Ribbono Shel Olam tefilla really and it's not that in light of our Ramban, so it's not that Moshe Rabbeinu is asking for something which is so extraordinary, but it's really mi'din tefilla that the navi should be answered. And he's saying Ribbono Shel Olam so I'm cashing that in here. I want that the tefilla should takeh be ketzuraso. This this is a very very profound idea and insight of the Rav that if one really were to daven and experience tefillah to its fullest, it's the other side of the coin, it's not nevuah, it's not nevuah, but it's the other side of the coin. There's a Gemara in Brachos, I think it's ל"א ע"א. Yes, so Tanu Rabbanan: ein omdim l'hispallel lo mitoch atzvus lo mitoch atzlus etcetera אלא מתוך שמחה של מצוה. lo mitoch atzvus, lo mitoch atzlus, parenthetically, we think of atzlus as a physical trait, which it also is, but it's also a spiritual trait. Otherwise it has no shaychus to tefillah. אין עומדים להתפלל לא מתוך עצבות ולא מתוך עצלות skipping אלא מתוך שמחה של מצוה. Perek zayin of Yesodei HaTorah Halacha daled:

כל הנביאים אין מתנבאים בכל עת שירצו אלא מכוונים דעתם ויושבים שמחים וטובי לב ומתבודדים שאין הנבואה שורה לא מתוך עצבות ולא מתוך עצלות אלא מתוך שמחה.

Pelei pla'im. There's even echoes, traces, again, it's an echo, it's an echo, but it is an echo. The Rambam writes in

פרק ז הלכה א מיסודי הדת לידע שהקל מנבא את בני האדם.

Skipping a few lines אדם שהוא ממולא בכל המידות האלו שלם בגופו, skipping again a little bit

והוא מתקדש והולך ופורש מדרכי כלל העם ההולכים במחשכי הזמן והולך ומזרז עצמו ומלמד נפשו שלא תהיה לו מחשבה כלל באחד מדברים בטלים ולא מהבלי הזמן ותחבולותיו אלא דעתו תמיד פנויה למעלה קשורה תחת הכיסא.

So the prerequisite for nevuah is that a person's mind, the navi, the potential navi's mind, is cleared of all the clutter of transient reality. His mind's not cluttered with that. Melamed nafsho, he has to train himself. This is not the- it's not an innate capacity.

מלמד נפשו שלא תהיה לו מחשבה כלל באחד מדברים בטלים ולא מהבלי הזמן ותחבולותיו אלא דעתו תמיד פנויה למעלה.

Keitzad hi hakavanah is the Rambam in Perek Dalet Tefillah Halacha Tet-Zayin, שיפנה לבו מכל המחשבות. By nevuah, דעתו תמיד פנויה למעלה. Here in Hilchos Tefillah,

שיפנה לבו מכל המחשבות ויראה עצמו כאילו הוא עומד לפני השכינה.

There were echoes, and intentionally so, obviously. And that's bechada machta with our Ramban that the idiom of drishas Elokim connotes tefillah because you see that the pristine tefillah, a person gets the response, a person gets the response. So that's maybe touch briefly, the Ramban a little further on in the parsha. I think this is the first time in the Peirush Al HaTorah has his famous understanding about Torah and mitzvos in Eretz Yisrael. If you take a look on עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי. The last pasuk before Sheini,

עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי וישמור משמרתי מצוותיי חוקותיי ותורותיי.

Lashon Rashi: bekoli, kshenisisi oso. עקב אשר שמע אברהם בקולי, when I- when I tested him. Mishmarti: גזרות להרחקה כגון שניות לעריות שבות לשבת. Right, a mishmeres is something which is a safeguard. So the same way Chazal darshan ושמרתם את משמרתי ועשו משמרת למשמרתי, the Gemara in Yevamos says that that's a remez to shnios min haTorah. Shnios are the secondary arayos which are only miderabbanan. So it's a mishmeres. So Rashi understands mishmarti here the same way. Mitzvosai: מצוות שאילו לא נכתבו דין הוא שייכתבו. Those mitzvos which are intuitive to us, which Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us an intuition for, כגון גזל ושפיכות דמים. Chukosai: דברים שיצר הרע ואומות העולם משיבים עליהם. Those mitzvos for which we have no intuition,

כגון אכילת חזיר ולבישת שעטנז, שאין טעם בדבר אלא המלך גזר חוקו על עבדיו.

What why do- how does the word chok connote something for which which we don't understand the reason, where it's for which we have no intuition because chok is lashon chakika, what's engraved, meaning if it hadn't been engraved, if it hadn't been written down, if it hadn't been legislated, so then we never would have come up with such a mitzvah on its own as opposed to mishpat or in this context as opposed to a mitzvah where it's something which is intuitively a tzivui, even if it hadn't been nechukak, so we would also have recognized the tzivui. V'im kein, I skipped a little bit here, ואם כן יהיה כל זה בנוי, this pshat of Rashi from Chazal is built on the assumption, on the opinion

על דא שהיה אברהם מקיים ומשמר את התורה עד שלא ניתנה.

V'kach amru bapassuk

ויתן להם יוסף עגלות שפירש ממנו בפרשת עגלה ערופה שהיה עוסק בתורה

k'sheim shehaya avosav, and up until now lo nitna Torah, v'harei kasuv וישמור משמרתי מצותי חקותי ותורותי. v'shom amru Chazal שהיו משמר אפילו דקדוקי תורה והיה מלמד לבניו. V'yeish lishol, if that's the case that the avos קיימו תורה עד שלא ניתנה, im kein איך הקים יעקב מצבה v'nasa shtei achayos ukedas raboseinu arba, right, according to Chazal so Bilhah and Zilpah were also were also the daughters of Lavan, albeit half sisters, but there were four sisters, v'amram nasa dodoso uMoshe Rabbeinu

הקים שתים עשרה מצבה והיך אפשר שיהיו נוהגים היתר בתורה במה שאסר אברהם אבינו על עצמו וקבל לו השם שכר על הדבר והוא יצוה בניו ואת ביתו אחריו ללכת בדרכיו.

V'hanira elai, I'm skipping around ten lines,

והנראה אלי מדעת רבותינו שלמד אברהם אבינו את התורה כולה ברוח הקודש ועסק בו בטעמי מצותיו וסודותיה ושמה עשה כולה כמי שאינו מצווה ועושה ושמירתו אותה היה בארץ בלבד.

And the answer is that all these seeming violations of Torah happened in chutz la'aretz, because the avos only observed Torah in Eretz Yisrael. ויעקב בחוץ לארץ נשא האחיות וכן עמרם. And then here come the six words where the Ramban sort of compresses his whole shita about Eretz Yisrael here, כי המצות משפט אלוקי הארץ הן. Even though lemaiseh, obviously, halacha lemaiseh אף על פי שהוזהרנו בחובת הגוף בכל מקום, even though halacha lemaiseh obviously only

מצות התלויות בארץ תרומות מעשרות מתנות עניים מצות התלויות בארץ,

the Mishna in Kiddushin says are limited to Eretz Yisrael, but any chovas haguf, tefillin v'chulu, machalos asuros, Shabbos, any chovas haguf is even in chutz la'aretz, but lemaiseh כי המצות משפט אלוקי הארץ הן. v'ikar hamitzvos is in Eretz Yisrael, which is why for the avos for whom it wasn't metzuve, so they only observed Torah in Eretz Yisrael. What what what do the words mean כי המצות משפט אלוקי הארץ הן? Right? That's what it is. It means what it means. But maybe maybe a little bit it means like this.

פרשת עקב כי הארץ אשר אתה בא שמה לרשתה לא כארץ מצרים היא אשר יצאתם משם אשר תזרע את זרעך והשקית ברגלך כגן הירק.

You draw water from the from the Nile, and and that's the way you irrigate the fields, and and that's the way you ensure that the crops will grow.

והארץ אשר אתם עברים שמה לרשתה ארץ הרים ובקעות למטר השמים תשתה מים.

And Eretz Yisroel you're going to be dependent upon rainwater, upon rainfall, which means that in Eretz Mitzrayim, so basically you can do it with your hishtadlus. And in Eretz Yisroel, the hishtadlus isn't going to do it. It's going to have to be that Hakadosh Baruch Hu provides rainfall. And then the Torah concludes this section, Eretz, meaning the ארץ אשר אתם עברים שמה לרשתה, Eretz Yisroel,

אשר ה' אלקיך דרש אתה, תמיד עיני ה' אלקיך בה מרשית השנה ועד אחרית שנה.

Rashi quotes Sifrei, that the Ramban then sort of underscores. Rashi already quotes Sifrei, והלא כל הארצות דורש, Ella Kevayachol, skip a few words,

אלא כביכול אינו דורש אלא אותה, ועל ידי אותה דרישה שדורשה דורש את הארצות עמה.

So Hakadosh Baruch Hu inquires about Eretz Yisroel and somehow or other, agav that inquiry, on its coattails, so there's an overflow to the rest of the world. עיני ה' אלקיך בה is a melitza for hashgacha, right? עין ה' אל יראיו, it's a melitza for hashgacha. So the ikkar hashgacha in the world is on Eretz Yisroel. The Ramban again, he quotes the same Sifrei as Rashi says and then adds, okay, so a few of the words are kabbalah, we don't understand, but the last few words are, we can understand, ויש בו סוד עמוק כי הארץ הזאת נדרשת בכל, V'hi Hakol, and all the, okay, now comes the part that we can't understand a little bit, וכל הארצות מתפרנסות ממנה באמת. You see, whatever, again, whatever sort of the kabbalah underpinnings of this are, but you see this reflected in halacha as well, right? The Gemara in Brachos says that the din is that כל שלא אמר ארץ in the second beracha, Bircas Hamazon, לא יצא ידי חובתו. So I don't understand, a person is sitting in Washington Heights and he eats a sandwich. The wheat grew, I don't know, in Idaho, I don't know where the wheat grew. And so the wheat grew in Idaho, he's sitting in Washington Heights, he has himself a nice meal, and the din is if he doesn't mention Eretz Yisroel, he wasn't yatza yedei chovaso in Bircas Hamazon. According to this Sifrei, the way the Ramban explains, you understand that din. You understand that din. The ikkar hashgacha, the Ramban here also has, I think, the ikkar hashgacha of Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the world is in Eretz Yisroel. We generally, which is partially correct, think of hashgacha in terms of protection. And that is partially correct. But let's say משל למה הדבר דומה, let's say a parent doesn't provide the child with housing, doesn't provide the child with clothing to stay warm. Makes him sit outside for a long time when it's cold. So what would we say? We'd say that he's guilty of dereliction of duty, right? That he's abandoning, abandoning, abandoning the child. What happens if the parent provides all that, but he's not mechanech the child? Not mechanech the child, doesn't teach the child how to behave properly. So avada that's also an abandonment, a different type of abandonment, but avada that's also an abandonment. Mitzvos are a form of hashgacha. Hashem tells us what to do, how to live, is a form of hashgacha. He then doesn't leave us to our own inadequate resources to try to figure out how to live. I think of Saadia Gaon that writes in Emunos V'deos. He says it's intuitive that there's a Torah. It's inconceivable that Hakadosh Baruch Hu put us down in the world and as though the world is one big maze and said, okay, now the same way you're in a maze, you have to figure out where to go. Figure out what to do. Figure out for everything what's right, what's wrong and the way to live. Saadia Gaon says no, it's intuitive that there's a Torah min Hashamayim. But Torah, again, lashon hora'ah, lehoros haderech, is a form of hashgacha. Says the Ramban, but the ikkar hashgacha of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is in Eretz Yisrael. So maybe that's maybe that's a little bit of what the Ramban means, what our Ramban means, when he says כי המצוות משפט אלוקי הארץ הן. Halacha l'maaseh, Rav Nevenzahl has a, he says it bederech safek, bederech efshar. He's not sure, but a fascinating safek. It's very often nogeia l'dina. Let's say, let's say your flight lands in Eretz Yisrael in the afternoon. But it's before shkia. So you have to daven Shacharis on the plane, so you put on tefillin on the plane. So he says al pi this Ramban, itachen that such a qualitative difference between chutz la'aretz and Eretz Yisrael, but efshar that you're mechuyav to put on tefillin again and what you did in chutz la'aretz doesn't patur you once you come to Eretz Yisrael. So it's nogeia not only again whether one should put on tefillin again in that scenario, but it's also nogeia depending upon the timing. Sometimes it's you only have two minutes, in which case the first nafka mina would be true but the second not. Sometimes nogeia also whether you should bedavka hold off in terms of when you daven Mincha. Sometimes, you know, people want to be able to sort of zip through as quickly as possible, so even though you're going to land in time to daven Mincha on the ground, but they'll daven Mincha already on the plane. So whatever other problems there may be associated with that. But here too, again, so if you're going to land two minutes before shkia, okay, so then you're not going to time to daven. So what can you do? But let's say you're going to land an hour before shkia. So then al pi this safek of Rav Nevenzahl also, it's not kedai to daven Mincha at that point. Person should wait until he lands and then daven Mincha in on the ground in Eretz Yisrael.