Rambam Perek Chelek 5

The first of the yesodos is the existence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu והוא שיש שם מצוי בשלמות אופני המציאות. I think Rav Kapach comments a couple of times in his notes. I think the Avodat HaMelech comments in his peirush in on Sefer Mada as well that it's an Arabic idiom, certainly in Judeo-Arabic, I guess in Arabic in general. I mean in Hebrew, the word sham doesn't really add anything. sheyeish matzui that there is and the idiom in Arabic which the Rambam uses is sheyeish sham and in Yesodei HaTorah the Rambam sort of borrows that and transposes that into Loshon Hakodesh as well. יסודי היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. Kesef Mishneh says,

מילת שם שכתב כאן רבינו אינו מורה על מקום שהוא יתעלה אין לו מקום אבל מילת שם פה,

he says from Belashon Yishmael. It's just the emes is, in terms of Loshon Hakodesh, it has the same connotation in terms of existing, but there's no spatial sense to it. And the Rambam uses it. Kesef Mishneh gives another example in פרק ג הלכות תשובה where the Rambam uses that idiom as well. והוא שיש שם מצוי בשלמות אופני המציאות that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is perfect והוא עילת מציאות כל הנמצאים he's the cause of the existence of all other things that exist ובו קיום מציאותם וממנו נמשך להם הקיום and it is through Hakadosh Baruch Hu or maybe even more precisely translated and it's in Hakadosh Baruch Hu that we exist and that we draw our existence from him. In a minute we're going to come back to try to understand a little bit what that means. ואילו נתאר סילוק מציאותו, if one were to imagine rachmana litzlan Hakadosh Baruch Hu not existing

כי אז בטלה מציאות כל נמצא ולא יישאר מקיים המציאות,

everything else would also be null and void. On the other hand, ואילו נתאר סילוק כל הנמצאים זולתו, if we were to imagine that everything other than Hakadosh Baruch Hu did not exist כי אז לא תבוטל מציאותו יתעלה, it wouldn't undermine his existence veloh techsar כי הוא יתעלה בלתי זקוק במציאותו לזולתו because Hakadosh Baruch Hu is self-sufficient, he's absolutely self-sufficient. On the other hand, vechol mah shezulato, everything other than Hakadosh Baruch Hu, min hasechalim whether it's pure intellects כגון השכל המלאכים וגרמי הגלגלים ומה שלמטה מהם and lower forms, the human beings, who's a combination of intellect, of sechel and guf, ומה שלמטה מהם הכל זקוק במציאותו אליו, we're all dependent upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu.

וזה היסוד הראשון הוא אשר מורה עליו דיבור אנוכי ה' אלוקיך.

The Rambam says this yesod is contained in the posuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. I think one way to approach and try to just understand on the most elementary level, exactly how is this contained in the posuk? The posuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha just seems to say, "Remember Yetzias Mitzrayim and all those nissim veniflaos? I'm the one who performed those nissim veniflaos." And yet the Rambam has a whole theology here, the Rambam says that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists absolutely and that we only exist relatively, we exist. the because Hakadosh Baruch Hu shares that existence with us, so how is all that in the pasuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha? How is that encapsulated in the pasuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha? So the answer is that the Rambam explains, the Malbim talks about this in his peirush in Chumash also, that the shem Havayah יוד קא ואו קא, so again the shoresh is haya hoveh v'yiyeh, that's the shoresh also, means existence, right, means existence, that the name of יוד קא ואו קא, the name, the name Havayah means, means again the word in Lashon Hakodesh for the present, the only thing that exists in terms of our experience at least seems to be the present, right? So we call that hoveh. So Anochi Hashem Elokecha means that when Hakadosh Baruch Hu is identifying himself, he says Anochi Hashem, meaning that that I am existence in the sense of that I exist absolutely, it's part of my essence that I exist, and the notion, this is a little bit, a little bit difficult to understand, we need to think about it a little bit, the notion of being mechuyav hametzius, the notion of existing absolutely also implies exclusivity. That's what the Rambam explains elsewhere, right? Again, that the notion of being mechuyav hametzius, of existing absolutely, that that implies exclusivity, because by definition to be absolute, to be absolute, right, if you say someone is the the absolute best, so it means that he's better than than anyone else in in what he does, right? So absoluteness carries with it a sense of exclusivity. To say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists absolutely means, means that he alone exists absolutely and therefore anything else that exists only exists through Hakadosh Baruch Hu, only exists through through him. And and that's what when the Ribbono Shel Olam tells us that Anochi Hashem Elokecha, it means I, I am Hashem. So what, what does that mean? So I am Hashem means again, I am mechuyav hametzius, which is the source of all, all existence as we know it is from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's that's what the pasuk of Anochi Hashem Elokecha says. The Rambam also explains that when Moshe Rabbeinu says to Ribbono Shel Olam ואמרו לי מה שמו, right, so Moshe Rabbeinu says I'm gonna come and they're gonna ask me what what what's the name of the person who sent you. So the Rambam says, what's going on here? He says if Klal Yisrael are testing Moshe Rabbeinu to see whether he's a navi emes or a navi sheker, because they have a tradition of what name Hakadosh Baruch Hu will use, so how, what kind of test is that? The same way they knew of the tradition, so he knew the tradition also. So so what's what's the point, what's his name? So the Rambam says that mah shemo, mah shemo, that really what they're asking is explain to us who, who the Ribbono Shel Olam who sent you, who he is, and and explain to us how we should know to believe in him, how should we, how we should know to believe in him. So the Rambam says that okay, so, so what does Ribbono Shel Olam answer, what does Ribbono Shel Olam answer?

ויאמר משה אל האלוקים הנה אנכי בא אל בני ישראל ואמרתי להם אלוקי אבותיכם שלחני אליכם ואמרו לי מה שמו מה אומר אליהם ויאמר אלוקים אל משה אהיה אשר אהיה ויאמר כה תאמר לבני ישראל אהיה שלחני אליכם.

So how did the Ribbono Shel Olam answer? So the Rambam says basically, so the English translation here is "I shall be as I shall be," right? So the Rambam says that the subject and the predicate of the same, right? Right, right, I am who I am, I will be who I will be, correct? It's the same thing. Ordinarily, if you want to tell us something about someone, so you say oh he is, right, he is tall, he is... he has a dark complexion, he has a light complexion, right? You say something, you say something, the predicate is something different than the subject, something different. And here the Ribbono Shel Olam tells Moshe no, right? I am who I am, or again literally, I shall be as I shall be. So what's the idea? So the Rambam explains that what it means is this: that by identifying, by identifying the subject and the predicate, so what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is telling Moshe Rabbeinu again is that who I am, what I am, again I exist absolutely, meaning it's not something which is something which is sort of just an attribute, something which is which is external to me, but that's that's who I am. And the reason it's in the future is to to indicate that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is is eternal. So that's the idea again that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, Anochi Hashem Elokecha, I am Havayah. I exist absolutely. And as such, as such, if the Ribbono Shel Olam exists absolutely, so then that implies again exclusivity so that we only exist as the Rambam says בו קיום מציאותם וממנו נמשך להם הקיום. Now, the Rav discusses this also in in in the essays here in Worship on the Heart, referring to to the Rambam. And then he clarifies a a crucial distinction that I just want to read you a few a few sentences and then try to elaborate a little bit on it. In this passage, the Rambam formulates the idea of existing in God. Since He is the absolute being, no other existence is possible without sharing His being. Right? That's what we just explained, that that to be absolute implies exclusivity. Every existence is a relative one and as such must be related to the absolute one. Otherwise, the relative would become absolute. This relatedness is not that of effect to cause, however permanent it is, but of all-inclusiveness. Right? Since Hashem is the only being, and since this excludes all other things from having a reality of their own, it follows that only in God, only in Hashem may one find the completeness of being. To be means to participate in the divine being. It means to be in Him, right? And that's be'emes what the Rambam says here: Bo kiyum metziutam. Now, so what does that mean? Does that... so this begins to sound rachmana litzlan like pantheism, right? Begins to sound like pantheism. So the Rav explains as follows: However, this doctrine is a far cry from pantheism. Pantheism is... right, 'pan' means means 'all', right? A panacea is something which is a cure for for everything. So pantheism and theism and theism means to do with with with Hashem. 'Theos' means means 'God', theology. So pantheism means it says that everything is God, meaning that you can't sort of separate God from the world. The world is God, God is the world. What certain... the Rav refers to certain schools of philosophy who who believed in in in that that creed. That's what pantheism means, again, that everything is God. So is is that is that what we just said now? So that's what the Rav is clarifying. Please, if there are any questions, please don't don't hesitate to ask. However, this doctrine is a far cry from pantheism. They decreed the oneness of God and world as substance. Judaism by contrast, and in a minute I'm I'm going to I'll try to explain this, always decreed the incommensurability of God and world as substances. Seen from this perspective, Hashem is at an infinite distance from His creation. The latter is not enclosed by God but finds itself outside of Him. Yet shifting the categorical approach from substantia to existentia. From matter and content to ontic modality, the whole perspective changes. The world suddenly makes the great leap and discovers itself within Him, enveloped by the infinite. So let’s explain the following. Take the following moshal. My guess is that the less you know about physics, the better the moshal is. I’m not sure. But take the following moshal. Let’s say you have all kinds of electric appliances. Ultimately, let’s refer to their ability to function as their existence. Their ability to function as an air conditioner, as a light bulb, whatever the electrical appliance is, it depends upon the generator. And they have no existence again as functioning electrical appliances without a generator. So on the one hand, clearly we would say that they exist because they’re through the flow of electricity, so they exist within the electrical current, the electrical power of the generator. And you can’t imagine them existing without it. If there’s some kind of short and you lose that current, so then there’s a blackout, the lights go out, and all the appliances shut down. But on the other hand, you wouldn’t say that tangibly, you wouldn’t say that the air conditioner and the generator are one and the same. So on one level, the whole existence of the electrical appliance is only within the existence of the electricity and the generator and its current, but on the other hand, you certainly wouldn’t say that haynu hach. You wouldn’t say that they’re one and the same. You wouldn’t say that tangibly that this appliance is the generator. So you can on the one hand, in terms of the existence of something, you can say that it exists only through something else, but me'idech gisa, it is something separate. So that’s what the Rav is explaining, that’s what the Rambam means. Pantheism doesn’t have this distinction, just says that the pan is Hashem. So that we consider absolute kefirah. But me'idech gisa, we do maintain that the relationship of Hakadosh Baruch Hu to the world is not just simply cause and effect. It’s not just that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the cause of our existence, but then we’re imbued with our own existence. No, but the existence, that’s what it means when the Torah says, I think the Rambam quotes, when the Torah says Ein Od Milvado. What does it mean Ein Od Milvado? There’s lots of things milvado. There’s this table, there’s the chairs. So what does it mean Ein Od Milvado? So again, what it means is Ein Od Milvado is that there’s no... yes, there’s all kinds of, that’s what the Rav calls in terms of substance, that there are all kinds of bodies which are not Hashem. But again, think of the electrical current, think of the relationship between the appliance and the generator, but there’s nothing whose existence doesn’t draw from Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. That’s what it means. The bodies are not Hashem. We’re not Hashem. We’re absolutely not. But me'idech gisa, our existence draws from His existence. Our existence is only through His existence. Is that clear, rabbosai? And be'emes, that’s what we say in Aleinu also when we introduce the posuk of וידעת היום והשבות אל לבבך and we say אמת מלכנו אפס זולתו. That’s what it means. When we say effes zuloso, so it means again that there is no, that even Hakadosh Baruch Hu hasn’t created. any kind of independent existence. That the existence again is like, it's not cheres. Again, the mashal is of something which doesn't have its own battery, but something which always has to be connected to the, to the current, to the, to the generator. That it exists within it by drawing its, its existence from Hashem. And, and that's what the Rambam is saying here in this line: u'vo kiyum metziusam. It's, it's through Hashem that we exist. In Hashem, through Hashem that we exist even though, again, what we are is something different, but the existence is through Hashem, is, is in Hashem. And that's what the pesukim in the Torah, the pesukim in the Torah of ein od milvado or Hashem hu HaElokim. Again, the pasuk that we're introducing in Aleinu: בשמים ממעל ועל הארץ מתחת אין עוד. That's what these pesukim are saying as well. But that's also why, this is something which the Rav also used to underscore. I don't think he has it here in this same chapter, but, but he talks about it elsewhere that when the Rambam in Yesodei HaTorah is presenting this yesod, so the Rambam writes:

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא.

That the Rambam uses the lashon hoveh, right? Not והוא המציא כל נמצא. Not that the Ribono shel Olam created everything, because that's, that would suggest, well, again, 5,764 years ago, Hakadosh Baruch Hu created it and gave us our own existence. And that's what the Rambam says, no, it's והוא ממציא כל נמצא. It's at every moment Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi kol nimtza. The uniqueness, the singularity of 5,764 years ago is that that's when Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave the, the form to, to that which exists. But in terms of its ongoing existence, its ongoing existence is, is in the present of והוא ממציא כל נמצא. The Ba'al Shem Tov says that's what the pasuk means when it says לעולם דברך ה' נצב בשמים. That that your word is always in shamayim. So the Ba'al Shem Tov says it means the same idea. It means, again, we know that בעשרה מאמרות נברא העולם. That the world was created, as it were, בדיבורו של הקדוש ברוך הוא. So what does it mean that that dibbur is l'olam? Meaning that that dibbur is, it wasn't a one-time event in the sense that, well, Hakadosh Baruch Hu brought us into existence and now we have our own, our own existence, but in terms of its לעולם ה' דברך נצב בשמים. That that, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, again, every moment lets us continue, again, to exist through him, in him. To say that we have an independent form outside of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, isn't that limiting Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so to speak? It's, it's not limiting him because it, if you would, if you say, if, if you're talking about physical bodies, right? So if I'm, if I'm sitting on a bench and I tell you, come, there's room for you, so that means that I'm, I'm limiting myself to, to this space, so there's room for you alongside me on the bench, right? So in physical terms, to say that there's something, that there's something alongside me means that that I'm, I'm limited to, to a certain space, right? Mah she'ein kein, right? Let's, let's say, we, we don't see of any, so you can't have two people in the same, in the same place, right? Can't have two physical bodies in the same place. But on the other hand, our minds can conceive of a physical being and a spiritual being being in the same place, right? You can imagine something which is purely spiritual being. Being in the same spot as this as this table. Because they're sort of there on on different levels, right? One's there on the physical level, one's there on the spiritual level. So having something physical in the same spot something spiritual is is not an absolute impossibility. Having two things which are physical in the same spot is an impossibility. So if something is so if there's room beside me, so then I'm not there, right? So that that implies being finite. But but if you're talking about something spiritual, not something physical, so it doesn't have that you don't have that problem. That implies that there's a physical realm outside of His existence. No, it doesn't. Again, because that's only if if a person is thinking of the Ribbono Shel Olam in physical terms. If if a person again we can't we can't understand Hashem, but one thing we do understand is that is that we, which is again one of the Ikarim to come soon, is that He's not He's not physical, right? So so think of it, even though just a little bit, just to have some, for the purposes of this conversation. So the same way we all have a conception of a neshama. Neshama is again something purely spiritual, something purely spiritual. The fact that the neshama is in in the guf, so we don't necessarily think of the neshama being in a cavity in the body necessarily. It doesn't have to be in a hollow area because there's no there's no it's on it's on different levels. It's on different levels. So the same thing is true therefore in in terms of the the Ribbono Shel Olam also. Again, the fact that the physical is not Him isn't limiting Him because again two physical objects have to make room for each other. If they're distinct objects, so then then there's something outside of one object. The second object is outside of one one object. But in terms of spiritual and physical, the guf and neshama are in the same spot, even though the guf and neshama are are in the same spot because one's physical, one's spiritual. Is that clear? Now let's maybe let's read the Yesod Hasheni and then then we have to come back and and discuss something which really relates equally to these two yesodos. The Yesod Hasheni the Rambam says is achduso yisaleh. Hakadosh Boruch Hu's unity or oneness. Vehu, what does that mean? Shezeh ilas hakol, meaning the Ribbono Shel Olam, of whom we spoke in the Yesod Harishon is echad.

לא כאחדות המין ולא כאחדות הסוג ולא כדבר האחד המורכב שהוא נחלק ואחדים רבים ולא אחד כגוף הפשוט שהוא אחד במספר אבל מקבל החלוקה והפיצול עד בלי סוף אלא הוא יתעלה אחד אחדות שאין אחדות כמוה בשום פנים.

Rambam says that ordinarily when we use one, so let's say if you you bring a lunch and you have your lunch in a lunchbox. So someone asks you what what do you have to eat? So you say you have one apple. Right, you have one apple. So we use one in in that sense. But it means that there is a whole genus of of fruits of apples of which you happen to have one. Of which you happen to have one. So the one doesn't so that's we use one in that sense. Or maybe you could use one even in a more specific sense of that you have one one yellow apple. One yellow apple. Again, that doesn't imply again an absolute uniqueness, an absolute oneness. Or we think of our body as as one one whole. But it's really one composite whole, right? The remach evarim and shessa gidim. It's not one in in the simplest absolute sense of the term. When we speak of Hakadosh Boruch Hu as being echad, again, it doesn't mean echad amongst others. It doesn't mean echad in any kind of composite. it doesn't mean echad in any kind of sense but it's still divisible. It means in the simplest, most absolute, indivisible, unique sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is echad. That's what the Rambam is saying here, שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד. Now when the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos, the first two mitzvos quotes these two mitzvos of Anochi and Shema Yisrael, so then the Rambam there's a remark so Mitzvah Aleph is

הוא שצונו בהאמנת האלוהות והוא שנאמין שיש שם עילה וסיבה הוא פועל לכל הנמצאים והוא אמרו אנכי ה' אלהיך.

Mitzvah Beis

היא הציווי שצונו בהאמנת היחוד שנאמין שפועל המציאות וסיבתו הראשון אחד והוא אמרו שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד.

Fine, those are the that they correspond to these first two ikkarim. Then the Rambam says an amazing thing.

ויקראו גם כן זאת המצוה מלכות שמים כי הם אומרים כדי לקבל עליו מלכות שמים ברצונם לומר האמנה ביחוד והאמנתו.

So the Rambam says that Chazal also referred to these to this these twin beliefs of Anochi and Shema Yisrael as קבלת עול מלכות שמים, right? And that's that's when we're מקבל עול מלכות שמים every day in krias shema, it's these these beliefs which we are affirming. That's what we're affirming when we say שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד. So what's so noteworthy about that is that Chazal in the Mishnah at the beginning of the second perek of Berachos talk not only about malchus shamayim but ol malchus shamayim, right? Ol malchus shamayim, veyokev malchus shamayim. Ol malchus shamayim, so what's our understanding? When you talk about an ol, so when does an animal an animal has an ol on it when you harness it to do work, right? That's when you put the yoke on the animal when you want it to pull the plow, when you want it to do work. And that's why we're talking about ol malchus shamayim, ol mitzvos in the sense of our being meshubad to be oved Hashem, to ratzon Hashem. That's certainly the sense that ol has, correct? So how do we identify these basic beliefs, right? Lichora, isn't the Rambam here mixing two different things? One thing is what are what are what's the truth? What are the fundamental beliefs that we have? So the most basic truth Anochi Hashem Elokecha, שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד. That's sort of what we believe. Okay. Then a second question is you know what responsibilities what obligations do we have? And the Rambam seems to be identifying those two things. When the Rambam says that ויקראו גם כן זאת המצוה מלכות שמים, the mitzvah of שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד to be מקבל עול מלכות שמים, but I thought that's just to have a certain belief, to sort of to. To then let's say be to translate that into practice into action that lichora is something separate. The answer is that if a person let's say you believe that the world is heliocentric. Okay so that belief doesn't really heliocentric that the sun is in the center of the solar system and that we go around the sun. That belief or that knowledge it doesn't imply anything. It's not mechayev anything. Okay it's an interesting fact of astronomy right? That in and of itself it doesn't mechayev anything. It doesn't mechayev anything. The fact that a person has that piece of knowledge that in and of itself isn't mechayev anything. You couldn't speak of an ol which is associated with that piece of knowledge. What the Rambam says here is that the knowledge of Anochi Hashem Elokecha the knowledge of שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד is something which is mechayev us. That it isn't something which is purely knowledge purely belief that it belongs purely in the cognitive realm just in a realm of thought what a person believes what a person thinks. No but this knowledge is mechayev. And that's what the Rambam says that's the significance of this comment ויקבעו גם כן זאת המצווה מלכות שמים. Ol Malchut Shamayim means that this piece of knowledge is mechayev. This piece of knowledge is mechayev. Whether the Earth goes around the sun or whether the sun goes around the Earth religiously morally is not mechayev. It's not mechayev a person. The knowledge the belief that Anochi Hashem Elokecha that שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד is mechayev is mechayev that a person has to be an eved Hashem. And therefore there's no distinction there can't be any distinction between I believe but I don't practice. Now that's a stira minei u-vei. That's a stira minei u-vei. Ha-yesod ha-shelishi shlilat ha-gashmiyut mimeno denying any physical properties how do Anochi and Shema imply practice? On the most basic level if an employer he pays the employee for his time right? So he pays him so many dollars an hour. So the employee right obviously cannot turn around and tell the employer who are you to tell me what to do? So the answer is that the employer says to him: I paid for the time right? I'm paying you for this time. And as a result so you're meshubad to me you're meshubad to me to respond to my requests my demands of what you do with that time. So when you're on your own time when you're not getting paid so then it's your own business what you want to do with the time. But when you're when you're on my time and I'm paying you so then then you're meshubad to me right? I think that we understand that the Ribbono shel Olam gave us an innate sense to understand that that's the case. So if the reality is that our very existence is relative because it's בו קיום מציאותם וממנו נמשך להם הקיום. So then we owe our allegiance to the Ribbono Shel Olam, right? So right away, right away, knowledge of Hakadosh Baruch Hu as Hashem Elokecha implies allegiance to Hashem Elokecha. And once we identify that Hashem Elokecha is ה' אלהינו ה' אחד, so that becomes our sole allegiance. But if the perspective is purely an employer-employee sort of relationship where he says, take it and work for me, in the perspective he can turn down the job. So doesn't that, doesn't that take us to a place where, so you're absolutely right. And as I was saying it, you're absolutely right, the analogy doesn't go so far. And the reason the analogy doesn't go so far is because it breaks down at that point because the employee who exists independently of the employer can say, I'm not interested in the job and I'll turn down the salary and I want to be free to do with my time what I choose to do. If the employee has no existence independently, A, and B, even the existence is not really his own because אין נפשו של אדם קניינו אלא להקדוש ברוך הוא, even his existence is not his own, so then you don't have the counterpart to an employee who can turn down the job. Right? That's where the analogy doesn't go so far. So it's more like if you, I guess the better analogy to this element would be let's say granted the notion of avdus. Granted the notion of avdus, so that would be the difference. If the employee can decline the job, but the eved who again given the rules of avdus is born into avdus, so he can't decline the job. And this would be more analogous to... so it's so intuitive to assume the principle of avdus? No, no, you're not assuming. You don't need to assume the principle of avdus. Again, if we're looking for an analogy, that would be the analogy. The point is, let me think of a better way to put it. It consists of the following two points. It's not intuitive to think of avdus because thinking of this relationship between people is not at all intuitive. Ein hachi nami, it certainly isn't intuitive. But the קבלת עול מלכות שמים follows again the practical mandate follows from the belief and the knowledge for the combination of these two reasons. A, the recognition, maybe it's really one and the same but we're just sort of spelling it out with two phrases. There's the recognition that our existence, right, that our existence is a relative one, and that implies because it's a relative one that it's not ours either. See, when the Rambam has that lashon, right, this is the Rambam in Hilchos Sanhedrin, right, the Rambam's comment on the din of אין אדם משים עצמו רשע that if a person walks into beis din and confesses I was mechalel shabbos, I killed someone, so beis din doesn't give him misa. So you don't apply הודאת בעל דין כמאה עדים. So the Rambam says why not? So the Rambam says because because maybe he's from the morei nefesh, maybe he's sick and he's looking to... And what the Rambam means is, so maybe he has the right to do that. So the Radbaz says no because

אין נפשו של אדם קנינו אלא קנין הקדוש ברוך הוא.

But basically that follows directly from the sort of moral statement follows directly from the philosophical ideas that we're talking about now because if our existence is through Hakadosh Baruch Hu, in Hakadosh Baruch Hu, relative to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, then that also implies that it's not our own existence. So if it's not our own existence, if it's relative to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it's not our own, so then clearly a person can't have his own agenda. Is that clear? What if that isn't one's own personal moral intuition? If that isn't one's own personal moral intuition doesn't hold on that, then does one have to first look to the Torah for moral intuition and then come back to this issue in order to make the intuitive jump? Or is this part of pre-Torah morality? No, I don't think it's a pre-Torah morality. When you talk about intuition, some intuition is so basic and so elementary, so we all have it, it's pretty universal. Just about almost all civilized people have an intuition that murder is wrong, intuition that murder is wrong. Some people are so corrupt that they've even lost that, they've even lost that. But other things become intuitive as a person learns and understands, more and more becomes intuitive. Ultimately, Rav Chaim would tell you that everything in his Sefer is intuitive. But you and I don't intuit it. So the answer is that one's capacity for intuition grows as one learns more and knows more, so one's capacity and intuitive sense increases. So no, I don't think this idea is intuitive in the sense that we speak of Mishpatim as being intuitive. But as a person learns more, thinks more, and the more he learns, the more he thinks, the more he internalizes that knowledge, so then this does become intuitive. Okay, we'll continue in the Nefesh Hachaim.