Onelus, V’zos Haberacha. Ramban, Breishis.

Good morning Erev Rosh Hashanah Shalom Aleichem, I hope everyone's well. Maybe before we begin with a couple of Ramban's bli neder im yirtzeh Hashem on Parshas Bereishis, maybe we'll just take a moment to look at one Onkelos from Parshas Vezos Haberacha. At the beginning of Parshas Vezos Haberacha, תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב. So we all know, or maybe think we know, the translation here. So Moshe Rabbeinu commanded the Torah to us, an inheritance, a legacy, whatever the correct translation of morasha kehilat Yaakov. But when we look in Onkelos, there's something quite remarkable. Onkelos says אורייתא יהב לנא משה. Right, yehav means gave, as though the lashon hapassuk were תורה נתן לנו משה. Now, that Onkelos doesn't translate everything literally, that Onkelos didn't set out to provide a verbatim literal translation, is something we know. Rashi, the Ramban will comment from time to time that אונקלוס תירגם לפי העניין. That when you look at the word in Onkelos, so Onkelos is not telling you what the literal meaning of the words in the Torah are, but he's telling you what the content, what the gist, what's being expressed. So it doesn't raise any flags when Onkelos gives a non-literal rendition. But over here, what's the pshat? Isn't the literal meaning, isn't the literal sense of the word, the intended meaning of the word as well? תורה צוה לנו משה. Why does Onkelos render that as yehav, as Oraisa yehav, he gave? So here in the Me'at Tzori, which is a remarkable, remarkable, it's both anthology with independent comments as well, remarkable perush, super-commentary on Onkelos. So he records here a very interesting diyuk. That generally we find when one is the recipient or the intended audience for tzivuy, so the idiom in Chumash is צו את בני ישראל. Right, Moshe Rabbeinu is never told tzav le-Bnei Yisrael, it's always צו את בני ישראל. And here the lashon hapassuk is not תורה צוה אותנו משה, but תורה צוה לנו משה. So ad kan devarav in terms of the indication from the pshuto shel mikra, that there's something more to the meaning of this passuk than Moshe Rabbeinu commanded the Torah to us. But what does it mean? So itachen as follows: In Vaera, the last passuk before sheini,

וידבר ה' אל משה ואל אהרן ויצום אל בני ישראל ואל פרעה מלך מצרים להוציא את בני ישראל מארץ מצרים.

So Rashi clearly understands Vayetzav to mean he commanded, but then the the tochen hatzivui, the content of the command, seems to be missing from the pasuk. So Rashi's filling it in. Vayetzavem, he commanded them. He commanded them what? To to to lead Bnei Yisrael benachas and to have patience with them. And he commanded them to Paroh. What? What was the the content of the tzivui to Moshe and Aharon regarding Paroh? That that even though he was a big rasha, there's still a din of kavod hamalchus. But if you take a look in the Sforno, so the Sforno says that that sometimes Vayetzavem doesn't mean to command. Sometimes Vayetzavem minna osam. He appointed them lesarim as as officers, as ministers. Kemo, and he gives two other examples of of that usage of tzav, tzav being used in that sense. Kemo ויסמוך את ידיו עליו ויצוהו when the Torah in Parshas Pinchas describing Moshe Rabbeinu's interaction with Yehoshua bin Nun, ויסמוך את ידיו עליו ויצוהו. Vayetzavehu means that he appointed him. Right? He he appointed Yehoshua bin Nun as his successor. And similarly Vetzivcha lenagid. I think Shmuel says to Shaul that Hakadosh Baruch Hu appointed you as king over Bnei Yisrael. So Vetzivcha lenagid. The translation is not he commanded you, he appointed you. The Sforno has the same comment there on that if you look up that pasuk in in Parshas Pinchas, so the Sforno follows up and and has the same comment there as well. Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells Moshe Rabbeinu, קח לך את יהושע בן נון, here in Chaf-Zayin Yud-Ches. Chaf-Zayin Yud-Ches in Bamidbar.

קח לך את יהושע בן נון איש אשר רוח בו וסמכת את ידך עליו והעמדת אותו לפני אלעזר הכהן לפני כל העדה וצויתה אותו לעיניהם.

Says the Sforno,

תמנה אותו לנגיד עליהם כדי שיקבלוהו וישמעו בקולו כי יאמר צווי על המינוי.

We find that the lashon tzivui is used to connote minui. Clearly it's it's closely related to the sense of command because when you appoint someone, so it means he's being given, he's being charged with a mission, right? Every appointment is not the point of the appointment is not kavod. The point of the is not is not is not perks and prerogatives. The point of any appointment in in in the Torah from the Torah's vantage point is that it comes with that the person is being charged with certain responsibilities, he's being charged with a certain mission. That's why hence tzav that in its usual its usual most common use means to command, but it also means to to appoint. כי יאמר צווי על המינוי. I think the Ramban in one of these places has a similar has a similar comment. רב זכריה זכרונו לברכה calls attention to the fact that that the Rambam learns pshat like that as well. The Rambam in the hakdama to Mishneh Torah. And to Yehoshua, this is towards the very beginning of the hakdama to the Yad Hachazaka.

וליהושע שהוא תלמידו של משה רבנו מסר תורה שבעל פה וציווהו עליה.

What does v'tzivahu aleha mean? So the Rambam says it means that Yehoshua bin Nun was appointed as guardian of Torah shebe'al peh. Okay. So nimtzeynu l'maydim that the lashon tzivuy sometimes carries this sense of being appointed, being entrusted with a certain mission. So yitachen that what Onkelos is telling us here, again prompted by the tziva-lanu as opposed to tziva-osanu, is telling us something profound. It's certainly true that our relationship to Torah is one of being metzuveh, is that we are on the receiving end of command, commandments. That's certainly true. But the emes is the relationship runs much deeper than that. What Matan Torah represents and what our relationship is with Torah is that Torah was entrusted to us. The world can't exist without Torah. Right, Rashi in this week's sedra, yom hashishi

תנאי התנה הקדוש ברוך הוא עם מעשה בראשית אם ישראל מקבלים את התורה בשישה בסיון מוטב ואם לאו ואחזיר את העולם לתהו ובהו. אם לא בריתי יומם ולילה חקות שמים וארץ לא שמתי

the Gemara in Nedarim says. Torah, the world can't exist without Torah. Right, the Gemara where is it? in Sanhedrin says that there are 26 ki l'olam chasdos lines in Hallel Hagadol, ki l'olam chasdo, corresponding to the kaf-vav doros where Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustained the world before Matan Torah. For the world to exist, there needs to be Torah. Our relationship with Torah is not only that we're metzuvim by mitzvos haTorah, but Torah is entrusted to us to preserve and transmit. Now clearly, the way we preserve and transmit is A: lilmod u'lilamaid, B: lishmor v'la'asos. But the relationship, to describe our relationship to Torah only in terms of tzivuy is to truncate, is to understate what our relationship is. Our relationship is תורה צוה לנו משה means that Moshe Rabbeinu entrusted Torah. We were appointed, we were entrusted with Torah. It's a different, again it's bekhlal masa emuna, it obviously in no way detracts from the notion of being metzuveh, if anything it deepens it and intensifies it. But it's a different mindset and it's something which is very, very basic. Okay, maybe let's take a look at a couple of Rambans here in Parshas Bereishit. Ramban has at the beginning, just this is not really Ramban, it's more the Ramban just quoting an Ibn Ezra. the fascinating etymology on on the Posuk Hey, the end of the Posuk

ויהי ערב ויהי בוקר יום אחד. ויקרא תחלה הלילה ערב

says the Ramban. What's the etymology? How does the word erev mean—again for the Ramban it doesn't mean all night, it means the beginning of the evening. ויקרא תחלה הלילה ערב בעבור שיתערבו בו הצורות. The beginning of night is a time when we confuse things. The dwindling light confuses our perception and things get mixed up. So erev as in le'arev, right, is to mix up. Ta'aruvos is a mixture. So hence, hence the semantics of erev referring to techilas halaila. And corresponding to that, u-techilas hayom boker. Right, bikur means to scrutinize. The Korban Pesach, Pesach Mitzrayim was טעון ביקור ארבעת ימים to make sure that there was no mum. So levaker means to scrutinize, to check very carefully. U-techilas hayom boker and then the opposite is in the beginning of the morning when we have the benefit of the emerging daylight, so that allows a person שיבקר אדם בין הצורות. Okay, a fascinating etymology. Jumping ahead here if you take a look in Perek Gimmel, Posuk Yud-Gimmel, Rabbosai. Gimmel, Yud-Gimmel. So the Ramban here is being, well maybe we'll first of all read a little bit. Ma zos asis, right? ויאמר ה' אלהים לאשה מה זאת עשית, what did you do?

ותאמר האשה הנחש השיאני ואוכל. וטעם מה זאת עשית לעבור על מצותי כי האשה בכלל אזהרת אדם כי היתה עצם מעצמיו ובשר מבשרו וכן היא בכלל העונש שלו.

So first of all the Ramban is addressing a question: why is the isha being held accountable if the tzivui was addressed to Adam? So the Ramban says no, at that point they were one. They were one and the same. So the fact that subsequently, again whether originally they were du-partzufim, whatever the initial relationship was, but since she was bichlal Adam, she was bichlal azharas Adam as well. ולא אמר באשה ותאכלי מן העץ. Right, in contrast Posuk Yud-Aleph where when Hakadosh Baruch Hu confronts Adam he says המן העץ אשר צויתיך לבלתי אכל ממנו אכלת, the posuk specifies achila. Here the Torah just says more generally ma zos asis. Says the Ramban, the pshat is,

כי היא נענשת על אכילתה ועל עצתה כאשר נענש הנחש.

That Chava had a double liability. She had a liability for eating, but she also had a liability for inducing Adam to eat. Hence the more general ma zos asis as opposed to vatochel. ועל כן אמרה הנחש השיאני ואוכל, but if that's the case, isn't Chavah's defense inadequate? Because Chavah's only defending herself against the charge of eating. So then

ואם תאמר אין הכי נמי ועל כן אמרה הנחש השיאני ואוכל כי העונש הגדול על האכילה.

The the greater, the more the serious charge, the charge which was going to carry the greater punishment, was that of achila. So Chavah was defending herself against that. I don't know, maybe she also didn't have any defense for the for the other one, I don't know. But al kol panim, והנה מכאן נוכל ללמוד עונש למחטיאי אדם בדבר. From the fact that Chavah, that ma zos asis, that Chavah's being held accountable not only for her eating, but also for ותתן גם לאישה עמה ויאכל. So we learn, says the Ramban, that that a person is accountable and Rachmana litzlan punished for causing someone else to sin, כאשר למדונו רבותינו בפסוק ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול, as in fact Chazal tell us,

מנין למושיט אבר מן החי לבן נח או כוס יין לנזיר ולפני עור לא תתן מכשול.

So here, I'm not sure what what if the Ramban means to imply the following, but just to sort of provide a little bit of broader context. If you take a look in Tosafos in Avodah Zarah, דף ט"ו עמוד ב', דבור המתחיל עובד כוכבים. So Tosafos has a what what seems to be a stira in Gemara and they quote an earlier Gemara in Avodah Zarah on י"א עמוד א'. The earlier Gemara in י"א עמוד א' says that that there were certain items that you're not allowed to sell to ovdei avodah zarah because the the there's too much of a likelihood that they're going to use them in their avodah zarah ritual. So therefore it's an issur of lifnei iver. If it's clear, let's say, by the quantity that you're selling, that this person is just the I don't know, he's buying wholesale and then mistama he's going to sell retail, but he's buying more than for his personal use, so then there's no issur to sell because al lifne mafkidinan אליפני דליפני לא מפקדינן. There's an issur of lifnei iver. I can't provide an oved avodah zarah with again, what he'll use in his avodah zarah ritual. But the fact that I sell it to oved avodah zarah A, who in turn will sell it or give it to oved avodah zarah B, that's lifne d'lifne, and there's no issur of lifne d'lifne. Tosafos thinks that the Gemara here on tes-vav amud beis maybe seems to be against it, so that's why Tosafos is talking about it. So Tosafos answers with regard to that Gemara in yud-aleph that that this is the part of the Tosafos that's nogei'a to us presently:

ויש לומר דהתם מיירי בעובד כוכבים שאינו מוזהר לפני עור לפיכך אין אנו חוששים אם העובד כוכבים ימכור לחבירו.

Tosafos says lifne d'lifne is a hetter that's relevant only if the middleman is an oved kochavim. Because if the middleman is an oved kochavim, who himself is not muzhar on lifnei, so then I'm not muzhar because for me oved kochavim B is lifne d'lifne. Oved kochavim A is not muzhar on lifnei iver, so I'm not doing anything wrong. But what will be if the let's say if the middleman, what if the person who's going to sell it to the to the nochri to be oved avodah zarah is is a Jew, Rachmana litzlan? So then I'd be over lifnei iver on lifnei iver. The same way lifnei iver is I can't be machshil a nazir in his issur nezirus and I can't be machshil a ben Noach in his eiver min hachai, I can't be machshil a Jew in lifnei iver. It's lifnei iver to be machshil a Jew in lifnei iver. The same way it's lifnei iver to be machshil a Jew in issur nazir, in ma'achalos asuros, it would be lifnei iver to be machshil a Jew in lifnei iver. But if the middle man is a nochri who's not muzar on lifnei iver, so then I don't have a lifnei iver on him because he's not going to be oveir lifnei iver and the person to whom he gives it is too far removed from me. That's a lifnei de-lifnei. But okay, what's relevant to us in the Tosafos is that Tosafos says is a davar pashut because it does seem to be a davar pashut that there is no issur of lifnei iver by a ben Noach. It's not one of the שבע מצוות בני נח. And the Tosafos doesn't seem to be anything especially remarkable about that Tosafos. That would seem to be pretty straightforward. Question is what does the Ramban say here? How rigorous does the Ramban intend this when he says והנה מכאן נוכל ללמוד עונש למחטיא אדם בדבר? Chava wasn't Jewish, right? No shem musag at that point. So Chava was punished, was held accountable and was punished for being machti Adam, not only for her own achila but for being machti Adam as well, ka'asher limdunu raboseinu, the same way Chazal explain what the parameters of lifnei iver are. So halacha l'ma'aseh does the Ramban think that there is an issur for all practical purposes of lifnei iver by bnei Noach? Is that what the takeaway from this Ramban is? And if in fact it is, so what's the makor for it? I mean it certainly is not listed among, right, it certainly isn't listed amongst the sheva mitzvos. But maybe the Ramban doesn't really, maybe the Ramban is not really equating this with lifnei iver anyway. Let's say the din of lifnei iver is that it has to be trei evra denahara like the Gemara says. Trei evra denahara literally means two sides of the river, but the halacha that that represents is that the person who's oveir the aveira needs assistance. Right, so imagine that the nazir is on one side of the river and the kos yayin is on the other side of the river. The ben Noach is on one side of the river, the eiver min hachai is on the other side of the river and the width of the river is such that he can't reach across and I don't know, he doesn't know how to swim. But if he'll extend his hand as far as he can and the Yisrael who's on the other side will extend his hand as far as he can, so then he'll be able to access it. So here there's no, clearly the Etz HaDa'at wasn't trei evra denahara. I mean the same way Chava could help herself, so Adam could help himself also. So michlal, what does the Ramban mean with the, with the comparison anyway? That if not for her eitzah, if she hadn't pushed him in that direction, so he never would have eaten. Meaning, when Adam says

האשה אשר נתתה עמדי היא נתנה לי מן העץ ואוכל,

I mean, factually, that is correct. It's not a defense. It's not, it doesn't, Hakadosh Baruch Hu obviously doesn't accept that as a defense. But not because it's factually incorrect, but because it's morally and spiritually and halachically inadequate, but not because it's factually incorrect. And maybe that's what the Ramban means. The Ramban means that it was the equivalent of a trei ibra de-nahara in the sense that Adam never ever would have eaten were it not for Chava luring him to sin. The question is, is it possible that the Ramban thinks the following? I don't know, this is speculative, I must say, I don't know whether this is correct. In the beginning of Gemara Brachos, the Hakdama of Rav Nissim Gaon to Shas is printed, and Rav Nissim Gaon there says the following yesod. He says anything which is teluyah be-ovnanta de-liba, any mitzvah which is clearly indicated, dictated by svaras ha-leiv, by havanas ha-leiv, is binding on all of humanity. Mitzvos ha-Torah that are limited to Klal Yisrael are those mitzvos which required the chiddush of Matan Torah that we should be aware of the mitzvah. But any mitzvah which it's clear in svara, so that's binding on kol ba'ei olam. That's what Rav Nissim Gaon says. So according to Rav Nissim Gaon, so maybe the pshat is v'retzon Hashem let's say in the context that we're talking about, v'retzon Hashem has been unequivocally communicated that Hakadosh Baruch Hu does not want Adam to eat from the tree. So zol zein that it's not one of שבע מצוות בני נח, that it hasn't, that Lifnei Iver has not been included in שבע מצוות בני נח. Isn't it a svara that if the Ribbono Shel Olam says something "this should not happen" that a person can't be a co-conspirator in making it happen? That a person can't aid and abet such that it does happen and that it does result? I see, you'll say but maybe the pircha is b'tzido. So if it's a svara, so what does the Ramban have to learn it from this parsha for? Mah nafshach? If it's not a svara, so what's the mokur that it's assur? And if it is a svara, what does the Ramban have to learn? I don't know, but notice the Ramban's lashon is interesting. הנה מכאן נוכל ללמוד עונש למחטיא אדם בדבר. I don't know. Ramban says you see again not only is there a svara that it should be assur, but you see Hakadosh Baruch Hu punishes for it as well. Hakadosh Baruch Hu punishes for it as well. So ayin alav, is that the, again this is speculative, I don't know, but is that the sense of the Ramban that Lifnei Iver, to be machtie and thereby contravene Retzon Hashem is assur for everyone? And maybe the mokur would be that the Ramban agrees with that yesod of the Rav Nissim Gaon. Ayin alav. Okay, so maybe we'll stop here. Okay, gut Shabbos rabosai. Rebbi, can I ask a question? Please. Was Rav Nissim Gaon talking about only aveiros that are svara, like eating from the Eitz HaDaas that was only assur because of the tzivuy? Right, but the issur that we're talking about is not the issur of eating from the Eitz HaDaas, the issur that we're talking about is the issur of causing someone to go against Retzon Hashem. Rebbi. Yes. Isn't it possible that there's still an issur d'rabbanan of chad evra d'nahara? So I think the Rishonim say that there is an issur of chad evra d'nahara m'd'rabbanan. That's correct, but that's only for Yisrael vis-a-vis Yisrael. But let's say Yisrael vis-a-vis a Ben Noach would not have, wouldn't even have an issur d'rabbanan of chad evra d'nahara. Let's say if the Ben Noach and the eiver min hachai are on the same side of the river and the Ben Noach is just too lazy to bend down for whatever reason, you know, it's at the other end of the table and asks the Jew to pass it to him and the Jew passes it to him, so that's not assur. It would be assur m'd'rabbanan by a Yisrael. Yeah, Yehuda. Is it, I seem to remember that there's a machlokes if Lifnei Iver is part of each mitzvah or it's something that's like a general issur. Whatever, there's discussion about that. I mean, if it were to be part of each mitzvah, would it make sense that even B'nei Noach would be chayav? It isn't, it isn't. It isn't, it isn't. But you're right, there is such discussion, but I don't think it is. Rebbi, did what Rav Nissim Gaon also answer why the Nachash was punished? Yeah. So why doesn't the Ramban... Well why doesn't the Ramban? So maybe maybe I guess you can also turn your your comment into a question. So why not have the inference there? I don't know because maybe over there I mean agav that the Gemara does derive that אין מהפכין בזכותו של מסית from nachash. There's a Gemara in Sanhedrin like that right? Because the nachash could have tried to defend himself also with דברי הרב דברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעים but you can't be mahpech bizchuso אין פותחין בזכותו של מסית. So if you can have that limud from the nachash why doesn't the Ramban have this limud already? I don't know but I don't know maybe the question is how I don't know you have to see in what sense the Gemara in Sanhedrin really does or doesn't mean it and and maybe just for the Ramban it's it's it's more compelling to draw the inference from Chavah than it is from the nachash.