Nefesh Hachaim #10: Shaar 1, Perek 6, part 6

We've been in the I think towards the end or at the end of the second of the long haggahs here in Perek Vav. The tzad hashaveh between the Nefesh HaChaim's explanation of teshuva at least for the Nefesh HaChaim in the context of zedonot na'asot k'zechuyot perhaps all of teshuva is predicated upon this and what the Rav presents in Ish HaHalacha is that there's something enduring in the present about the past. The way the Nefesh HaChaim says it, it's because basically everything a person does becomes embodied. Everything is analogous to again what we gave the example of if a person was hired to sew a blue sweater and for whatever reason makes a mistake and makes the sweater gray, so then he can rectify that mistake. There's something here in the present which allows him to rectify that mistake. The Nefesh HaChaim identifies what's in the present as what's created, the fallout that every action a person does, every action a person does reverberates, creates and mimmela the teshuva is mityacheses to that and the Rav says in an even more fundamental way that it's not only the effect, the fallout, the embodiment of the act, but even one should view the timeline as one as we experience space as well. The fact that we're no longer in that room doesn't mean that the room isn't there and because of the past enduring into the present that's what allows for teshuva. So maybe just if you have the Rav Reuven edition, it's on the bottom of daf chaf beis, it's towards the end of that the second of the long haggahs.

ובזה יובן מאמרהם זל בפרק יום הכפורים דגדולה תשובה שזדונות נעשות להם כזכויות.

How great is the koach, the potency of teshuva, that the zedonot become sources of zechus.

שנאמר בשוב רשע מרשעתו ועשה משפט וצדקה עליהם הוא יחיה ולכאורה אינה ראיה מוכחת.

Meaning the Gemara is clearly saying that the aleihem refers to all the ma'asei harisha. And the Nefesh HaChaim says

ולכאורה ברווח טפי יש לפרש דעליהם הוא יחיה קאי אל משפט וצדקה שעשה אחרי תשובה.

So what's the raya that Chazal see in the pasuk.

ולפי מה שכתבתי ראייתו נכונה. דלישנא דקרא דייק הכי דאי קאי עליהם הוא יחיה על המשפט וצדקה

if it's referring to the mitzvos that he's doing presently, currently, הוה ליה למימר בהם הוא יחיה. So there, as the Nefesh HaChaim explained to us, that a person lives in he's enveloped by the idiom is v'chai bahem because again the kedusha that the person generates that again magnetic field of kedusha that the person generates through his ma'asim, the correct idiom is bahem.

הוה ליה למימר בהם הוא יחיה כמו שכתוב וחי בהם וכמו שנתבאר.

Umideka'amar aleihem, from the fact that the pasuk uses the not the preposition of bahem, but aleihem, ודאי דקאי על רשעתו ועוונותיו הקודמים. And that the sense of the pasuk then is שעל ידי תשובתו ועזיבת מעשיו הראשונים ועשייתו. so they overwhelm and transform the ma'asim harishonim

המה יתגברו על מעשיו הראשונים להפוך גם אותם לזכויות לחיי עולם.

Yeah maybe let's perhaps try to spend a moment b'ezras Hashem. So the teshuva needs to encompass not only azivas ma'aseh harishonim and clearly that's just shorthand for the charata, for the nichamti u'voshti, for לעולם איני חוזר לדבר זה but the teshuva also has to include mishpat u'tzedaka. So why is that? For a person to certainly do the optimal teshuva, the maximal teshuva he has to be marbeh b'mishpat u'tzedaka. So maybe let's try to get a perspective, one perspective on that. Let's begin with mishpat. Let's משל למה הדבר דומה. There's something intuitive let's say a person, a policeman pulls someone over for speeding. There's something intuitive that if there's a genuine sense of remorse not just the sense of frustration at having to pay a 150 dollar fine, but if there's a genuine sense of remorse, so there's something intuitive about the fact that mikan u'lehaba, so not only is the person going to be makpid not to speed, he's going to be makpid not to talk on the phone while he's driving, he's going to be makpid ich weis not to park in illegal parking spaces. And even more broadly, any cheit, mitzvos haTorah represent the way things are supposed to be. Any cheit represents again not only a particular of that specific cheit, but a zilzul in the overall system of mishpat and the same way again in the mashal, it's not only that the person is speeding, but he's sort of flaunting, he's being mezalzel in the rules of the road and more broadly in the laws of society, in the dina d'malchusa. So memaila there's something intuitive about the fact that the optimal teshuva isn't narrowly focused exclusively on this specific infraction. infraction but that it has to show a renewed commitment to mishpat in general. Chet means zilzul in din, in mishpat. And mimaila there has to be a concerted effort, commitment, and expression thereof to not only be maamid mishpat in that in the area of one's infraction but in a much broader sense as well. What about tzedakah? So yitachen a perspective on that is as follows, rabosai. Maybe to give a mashal from certain contexts in halacha. And an avel, rachmana litzlan, is assur b'talmud torah. Let's say the avel is a very very big talmid chacham, a moreh hora'ah, upon whom many people depend for time-sensitive hora'os as well. So then there's a notion in halacha of rabbim tzerichim lo. And then the issur talmud torah notwithstanding, it would be mutar for the moreh hora'ah to render those piskei halacha which can't wait. So what happened to the issur talmud torah? So the pshat lichora is with a little bit of omek, the pshat lichora is the issur talmud torah relates to the avel as a yachid, as an isolated individual. The very minute he's not merely a yachid but rabbim tzerichim lo, he's not merely a yachid but he's a klalisdika person, that rabbim tzerichim lo, so that limitation doesn't apply. That's a little bit of the omek of the pshat. Now the famous yerushalmi in makkos that the seforim quote about hanefesh hachoteis what should be its din. So how does it go? They sha'alu lachochma and hachochma says tamus until ultimately they come to hakadosh baruch hu and hakadosh baruch hu says ya'aseh teshuvah veyichyeh. But on a certain level again everything that we said notwithstanding on a certain level... A yachid is chotei. If you have a lease on your apartment and you're in a building with a rule, no pets allowed. It says that in everyone's lease, no pets allowed. And there's a tenant who keeps a pet. So lema'aseh, the landlord has a right to evict the tenant. It's a condition of his tenancy that he has to comply with this. You're not allowed to have your own washing machine in the apartment. You have to go down to the laundry room. If he installs a washing machine, so he violated the contractual terms of the lease. And as such, so he really has forfeited the lease, and it's within the landlord's prerogative to evict him. And on a certain level, that's really how chet should be viewed. It's violating the contractual stipulations. But what happens if in addition to the teshuva of azivas ma'aseh ve-rishonim, a person is marbe be-ma'asei tzedakah? So that's the analog to rabbim tzrichim lo. A person isn't just living for himself. A person's engaging in ma'asei tzedakah, so it becomes a bechina as it were of rabbim tzrichim lo. And we don't, again, as in the analogy in its pure halachic context, so we're not misyaches to him only as an isolated individual and decide ma dino as an isolated individual. No, but you have to look at him as in terms of what he contributes, what his role is within the klal, what the need of the klal is for him. That's why the avodah of teshuva has to be complemented by ma'asei tzedakah. In so doing, by in some microcosmic sense, everyone can attain that bechina of rabbim tzrichim lo. So then mimela the hisyachsus to him is no longer as an individual. And maybe as an individual, so maybe he did takeh violate the terms of the lease. You know, keivan de-asa le-yadan, there is a very, very beautiful and very, very important Maharsha at the end of Maseches Megillah. Last lines in Maseches Megillah, as you know, that Moshe Rabbeinu

תיקן להם לישראל שיהיו שואלין ודורשין בעניינו של יום ביום הלכות חג בחג הלכות עצרת בעצרת הלכות פסח בפסח.

So the Maharsha comments that Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur are not mentioned. It only mentions the shalosh regalim. Why doesn't it mention Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur? So he says, because then we would have possibly misunderstood it as follows: We would have our immediate association with the yamim noraim would have been teshuva. So then we would have thought, the same way hilchos chametz u-matzah are takeh, leaving aside menachos in the Beis Hamikdash, that hilchos chametz u-matzah is takeh limited to chag ha-matzos. And hilchos sukkah and hilchos daled minim are takeh limited to Sukkos, so we would have thought that hilchos teshuva is takeh nogeia only on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. And the Maharsha says, but that would be a terrible, terrible error because no, it's something which is nogeia every day of the year, every day of the year. Yitachen. The Natziv comments at the end of Parshas Bo, he has a he is commenting on the hemshech hapsukim:

והגדת לבנך ביום ההוא לאמר בעבור זה עשה ד' לי בצאתי ממצרים והיה לך לאות על ידך ולזכרון בין עיניך למען תהיה תורת ד' בפיך כי ביד חזקה הוציאך ד' ממצרים.

So the Natziv writes as follows. My father zecher tzaddik livracha, he used to like to quote this Natziv. V'hayah lecha,

גם זה אינו מספיק עדיין כל הצורך על כן יהיה לך לאות ולזכרון בכל יום.

V'harei zeh, the Natziv gives the following mashal:

כמו שהאדם מספר לבנו ענין גדול לצורך מוסר ואחר כך בכל יום מזכירו בקיצור וברמז תכונת הסיפור עד שוב מועד השנה ואז מספר עוד הפעם באריכות.

So let's say a father wants to inculcate within his son, ich veis, the middas zerizus. So he sits the son down and has a long shmooze with him about the importance of, about what zerizus means, what zerizus reflects, how to practice zerizus, how to cultivate zerizus, a long shmooze. Then with one sentence, right, you can talk for an hour and after you talk for an hour you can summarize that in a sentence. If you were just say one sentence initially, the sentence wouldn't be meaningful, it wouldn't even be intelligible, but when the sentence triggers the memory of the longer, more elaborate discussion and presentation, so then you can reinforce it very much bekitzur.

כמו שהאדם מספר לבנו ענין גדול לצורך מוסר ואחר כך בכל יום מזכירו בקיצור וברמז תכונת הסיפור עד שוב מועד השנה,

but at a certain point even with that daily short reminder it can wear off. So in a year's time, so again, ואז מספר עוד הפעם באריכות. So the father sits the son down and again they have a long shmooze, not just sort of his daily text, not just doesn't just sign up with Zmanim for his daily text reminder, no, but he sits him down again for a long shmooze. Kach tziva, says the Natziv, שהיה אחר הסיפור שהיה בפסח באורך. So on Pessach and obviously specifically bayom hahu, so then it's v'higadta l'vincha, so the sippur yetzias mitzrayim is ba'arichus, and then the rest of the year all the mitzvos of whether it's zechiras yetzias mitzrayim on a daily basis, whether it's mitzvah of tefillin which is most immediately what the Natziv is commenting on, so basically all those are nourished by the mitzvas sippur of Pessach. So yitachen me'od, so my father zecher tzaddik livracha used to takeh talk about that this is a paradigm which is true not only for the relationship between mitzvas sippur and those mitzvos which are zecher l'yetzias mitzrayim, but it has broader applications as well. The Maharsha obviously, that Maharsha in Megillah obviously doesn't mean to blur the difference between Aseres Yemei Teshuvah and the rest of the year in terms of, he's not saying that a person's daily schedule all year long is supposed to mimic his schedule during Aseres Yemei Teshuvah. Presumably he's not even saying that, certainly he's not even saying that a person's schedule all year long should be an Elul, but lemaiseh the point is the same way a person doesn't finish Sipur Yetzias Mitzrayim and then sort of not think about Yetzias Mitzrayim again until Tes-Vav Nissan rolls around. And aderaba the ability, as it were, to sort of be involved with Yetzias Mitzrayim on a part-time basis is facilitated by that immersion on Pesach. So not exactly the same way, but ke-ein zeh is the relationship between again in Aseres Yemei Teshuva to the fullest, but in Elul as well so then there's mamash an immersion in teshuva. It's not part of the day, it is the focus of the day. But then that's supposed to allow a person to be ossek betshuva a whole year long. It's difficult to overstate the importance of this ma'mar. Let's continue here in the Nefesh Hachayim. So we're in the paragraph that begins after the haggah:

וכאשר קיים כל המצוות בשלימות ובכל פרטיהם ודקדוקיהם בעיקר המעשה ונוסף עליהם הצטרף עוצם טהרת קדושת המחשבה הרי תיקן כל העולמות והסתרים העליונים ונעשו כולו בכל כוחותיו ואיבריו מרכבה להם ומתקדש מקדושתם העליונה וכבוד השם חופף עליו תמיד.

Because Hakadosh Baruch Hu created us in such a way, again, that all the kochos of all the olamos are compressed within and present within the person. So in perfecting himself through mitzvos, he thereby perfects the olamos as well. But what does it mean though, again just rereading the opening phrase: וכאשר קיים כל המצוות בשלימות. I mean, there is no such thing, right? No one is מקיים כל המצוות בשלימות. No one is a Kohen and a Levi and a Yisrael and is מקיים המצוות המוטלות על הכהן and מצוות המוטלות על הלוי and the mitzvos of a Yisrael about v'kidashto how to relate to the Kohen. So what does it mean וכאשר קיים כל המצוות בשלימות? And yet he clearly, the Nefesh Hachayim clearly is speaking about a yachid, about yechidim. He's not just talking about sort of Klal Yisrael cooperatively being מקיים כל המצוות בשלימות. So it says in sefarim that the way this tikkun happens is whatever mitzvos are nitanos lanu to actually literally be מקיים בפועל בגוף. So then it means peshuto kemashmao. And otherwise it means through the talmud torah of that mitzvah. It thereby reveals an added dimension to the aspiration if, if to the best of one's ability. Everything is to the best of one's ability, not more obviously. Of ושיננתם שיהיו דברי תורה מחודדים בפיך. So it's not only מצד מצוות תלמוד תורה that that's the goal, that that has to be the aspiration, but even mitzad the shleimus ha-adam. In terms of mitzvos, so that has to be the mevukash. That has to be the again, to the best of a person's ability, obviously not beyond it, to the best of a person's ability. Ayin Zohar Teruma, כל הנקרא בשמי ולכבודי בראתיו. Skipping to the bracket, to the translation:

ולכבודי בראתיו הוא בדווקא וסוד זה למנדע דהאי כבוד כולה אסתכם לעילא מגו תיקונין דבני עלמא.

So why does the Nefesh HaChaim here quoting from the Zohar HaKodesh? What does it mean ולכבודי בראתיו הוא בדווקא? So itochen that as the Ramban and others tell us that bria means yesh me'ayin. Bria as it were means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi brings into existence the raw material. But the bria still needs to be followed up with an asiya, with a tikun. So itochen that what the Zohar HaKodesh is saying and this is what the Nefesh HaChaim is quoting to support and document his previous idea is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu said, I only engaged kaveyachol in the stage and act of bria lichvodi. In terms of the kevod Hashem which can be present in the world, Hakadosh Baruch Hu says, I engage in the bria, but I left the asiya for people to do. And lichora that seems to read in the Zohar:

ולכבודי בראתיו הוא בדווקא למנדע דהאי כבוד וכולו אסתכם לעילא מגו תיקונין דבני עלמא.

Meaning that Hakadosh Baruch Hu left it unfinished. That lichora that's how some say u'mistama the Zohar HaKodesh already understands that way in אשר ברא אלקים לעשות. So what does it mean אשר ברא אלקים לעשות? So I think the Rav somewhere quotes that Rav Chaim Heller told him that ibn Janach says that sometimes you find bilashon hakodesh that the lamed doesn't always indicate an infinitive, but if it comes after another verb it's like ve. So אשר ברא אלקים ועשה. That's what ibn Janach says. So that's one havana in the pasuk. But lichora it's clear others say and lichora that seems to be what the Zohar HaKodesh is implying about the pasuk, that אשר ברא אלקים תקי לעשות that Hakadosh Baruch Hu engaged in the bria, but to a certain extent, to a certain degree, He left it. The point of the bria was la'asos that there should be a subsequent asiya that He didn't finish in sheishes yimei bereshis. And that seems to be what that's what the Nefesh HaChaim he said in the previous paragraph is that through the kiyum hamitzvos bishleimus, so what happens? So the olamos הרי תיקן כל העולמות and kevod Hashem is chofef alav. And he says that's what the Zohar says, that it's lichvodi berosiv. Hakadosh Baruch Hu says no, I can only take credit for the bria, but the tikun, the perfecting that raw material, so that is left to you.

וזהו שאמרו רבותינו זכרונם לברכה האבות הן הן המרכבה. וכן להיפך חס ושלום זה לעומת זה עשה אלקים.

This koach that a person has to perfect the olamos because whatever he does, since he's composed, comprised, constituted of all the kochos, so the same way what he does potentially impacts letova, so

וכן להיפך חס ושלום בפגם אחד מכוחותיו ואיבריו על ידי חטאיו או שחטא

gam kein

הפגם מגיע לפי שורשו לאותו העליון לאותו העולם והכוח העליון המכוון נגדו בסדרי השיעור קומה כביכול. להורסו ולהחריבו חס ושלום או להורידו או לפגמו או להחשיך ולהקטין צחצוח אורו,

depending upon how close or how distant that world is from us in Olam Hazeh, that determines the effect that the person's actions have on it. The closer it is to us, so the more dramatic and the more pronounced the hashpa'ah is. That's why he's going in in descending order from

להורסו ולהחריבו חס ושלום או להורידו או לפגמו או להחשיך ולהקטין צחצוח אורו ולהתיש ולהחליש ולמעט כוח טהרת קדושתו חס ושלום. הכל כפי ערך החטא ואופן עשייתו וכפי

what we just said ערך ועניין אותו העולם וגובה מדרגתו. He spells this out a bit more now כי לא כל עולם שווה בשיעורו בעניין הפגם והקלקול. Shebatachton, meaning the world's closest to us, is הריסה וחורבן רחמנא לצלן. ולמעלה ממנו עשייה זו. Uv'elyon yoser mimenu, not meniat or entirely, גורם אך כסמתות שפע אורו או הקטנתו. Uvyoser gavoah venaaleh

גורם אך כסמתות בגודל צחצוח אורו וטהרת קדושתו הנפלאה. וכהנה רבות בחינות שונות.

So the emes is this perek in general. It's true of the whole sefer and it's intended to be. It's not an unintended effect. On one level there's something very scary about about what the Nefesh HaChaim reveals to us, what he teaches us. And to a degree that's good. There's a mitzvah of Yiras Hashem, of Yiras Onesh, of את ה' אלהיך תירא. We don't think that fear is a bad thing. But obviously a fear that becomes Rachmana Litzlan overwhelming or paralyzing is a very very bad thing. משל למה הדבר דומה. I assume it's still the same way when many many many years ago when I took driver's ed to to learn how to drive, so it was quite clear that there were in in Massachusetts you could get a license at age at age sixteen. It was quite clear that that you had as part of as part of driver's ed, you had to watch a film. So it was quite clear that that the film was intended to try to impress upon people the consequences of driving, and that you shouldn't have these mindless teenagers joyriding and driving recklessly and ending up as another statistic Rachmana Litzlan. I remember that they showed they showed faces and ages. of people who had been, of teenagers who had been killed in just car crashes due to driving too fast, due to being distracted while driving, and was, I think, very powerful. But the message wasn't that this is so scary that it's something impossible. The message was that this is something serious. It's not a game. It's not a joyride. It's something serious. It's something which has consequences. And because of that, you have to go about it with a sense of koved rosh. And that's a message that a person can, in a very healthy way, assimilate. That's a fear which can and should be instilled in a person that translates into it's not a joyride, and that a person has to live with koved rosh, with a cheshbon. And ultimately, that's what we're supposed to internalize from what the Nefesh HaChaim is telling us.