Part of the series: TorahWeb Yemei Iyun
Transcript
AI-generated transcript. May contain errors.
Sholom aleichem rabosai. The models and mores of society are pervasive and it seems as if their influence is omnipresent, but certainly one of the areas, one of the spheres in which societal influence is felt is in the workplace. Society's models permeate the workplace and shape its culture. And accordingly, as modern society hurtles in freefall, excuse me, as modern society hurtles in freefall further and further away from Torah morality, the challenges that we encounter in the workplace proliferate and intensify. One particular challenge which I was asked to address this evening, at times particularly painful and sensitive, is that of homosexuality, LGBT lobby and culture. We'll try to address some representative questions and scenarios, and in so doing, go back and forth מן הכלל אל הפרט, מן הפרט אל הכלל, in an attempt to discover guidelines that apply to these specific questions and scenarios that we'll mention shortly בעזרת השם בלי נדר, but then also can be applied to other situations of which there is just so many, so many varieties. What should one's attitude be towards a colleague at work who is a homosexual? Is it appropriate to have a collegial relationship? Is it appropriate to allow a friendship to develop and flourish, or should one remain within the boundaries of common courtesy and common decency but not go further than that, not go beyond that? What happens if such a colleague would extend an invitation to his or her homosexual wedding or that of a child? In the name of collegiality or friendship, is it appropriate to attend or not? What happens if in the company where one works, employees have been encouraged to place table tents on their desk which announce that the person who features this, it says that person is an LGBTQ ally? It's not technically required to do so, but the vibes are unmistakable that one is strongly encouraged to do so and that not doing so would in all likelihood limit and stunt career growth and advancement. So how how do we navigate such situations? And again, we'll we need specific situations to try to concretize what we're talking about but these are in in the vein of יצא מן הכלל ללמד על הכלל כולו. So the first very basic fact and distinction which we need to review in this context is that the question only arises with regard to the coworker, the colleague, who is a practicing homosexual. The Torah categorically bans homosexual behavior,
ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה תועבה היא, כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה לא תעשו.
The Torah is silent regarding homosexual orientation. If an individual feels that he or she has such an orientation, the Torah is silent about that. It doesn't constitute any violation and as such it doesn't pose any questions. So throughout the shiur, throughout our discussion, the questions are spawned and revolve around relating to homosexual behavior. With that in mind, so let's turn to the first question. What what kind of relationship is possible with with a coworker who clearly, openly is a a practicing homosexual? So there are actually three piskei halacha of the Rambam which are relevant, which are potentially relevant to this question. One is in Hilchos De'os, when the Rambam writes in perek vav Hilchos De'os halacha gimel,
מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו.
There's a mitzvah to love every fellow Jew k'gufo. Elsewhere, the Rambam even elsewhere in this sugya, the Rambam has a modifier of achicha b'torah u'mitzvos. He speaks of a a level of religious observance and here, very significantly, he doesn't. There's no within Hilchos De'os, there's no condition of what the level of religious observance of that fellow Jew is.
מצוה על כל אדם לאהוב את כל אחד ואחד מישראל.
One Rambam. A second Rambam, after in the Rambam's hakdama to Perek Chelek where he lists the thirteen principles which define Jewish faith. The Rambam says that if a person denies any of these principles, so then one of the consequences of that heretical denial is that the מצוות בין אדם לחברו which which govern interpersonal, interfamilial... the Jewish people are one large family... which govern the interfamilial relations don't don't apply to such individual. And it's clear, it's clear, it's quite explicit in in the Rambam that the v'ahavta l'rei'acha k'mocha wouldn't apply when when not only when we're speaking not just of lack of observance, excuse me, but what we're speaking of is is is heretical denial of principles of faith. But there is a third Rambam. Again, each of these are are well-known. None of them are discoveries. The Rambam writes in Hilchos Mamrim when speaking about Tzedukim and Baitusim or in their medieval nomenclature Karayim who deny the תורה שבעל פה and as such certainly that clashes with one of the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim and certainly is a heretical denial. The Rambam says that b'nai—that the harsh line which one should adopt vis-à-vis heretics doesn't apply to בני אותם התועים ובני בניהם. Doesn't apply to the second generation and certainly not to the third generation because these individuals sadly, tragically, נולדו במינות וגדלו אותם עליו. They were born into that religious theological confusion. They were raised with that religious and theological confusion and they're no different than a tinok shenishba than an individual rachmana litzlan who was taken captive as an infant and didn't receive proper chinuch. Ra'ui—I'm skipping a few lines—lephichach because of this extenuating factor, ראוי להחזירן בתשובה ולמשוך אותן בדרכי שלום. One should be preoccupied with, one should be involved in kiruv. One should be looking to share the beauty and truth of the Torah with them and rather than rejecting them, one should be looking to draw them close bedarkei shalom so that they'll have the opportunity so that they're given the invitation עד שיחזרו לאיתן התורה. So three different halachos in the Rambam. Returning to our question as to what type of relationship can, should exist when the for purposes of tonight's shiur, so we're focusing on a Jewish co-worker with a little bit of extra analysis and supplementary sources. A very similar scheme and approach would emerge for a non-Jewish co-worker but it's beyond the scope of tonight's shiur. So what type of relationship is possible? So one would need to assess which of these halachos is the operative halacha at hand given the particulars of that situation given the individual. Clearly often it's either going to be the Rambam in Hilchos De'os of מצווה לאהוב כל אחד ואחד מישראל or the confusion in this area has reigned long enough that the Rambam in Hilchos Mamrim is also going to often be applicable and clearly often either of these two Rambams will be the operative one. Is it possible, are there times when the Rambam in the Peirush HaMishnayos will be the operative one? Absolutely. There are such situations and they if and when rachmana litzlan they present themselves they should be recognized for what they are and then the Rambam in the Peirush HaMishnayos which says that there's a complete suspension of the mitzvah of ahavas yisrael and all interfamilial mitzvos and on the contrary when that's relevant, if that's relevant. and flourish. It would mean that one would be guided by basic, basic courtesy and decency, but it wouldn't really allow for a relationship beyond that. Let's continue. So what happens hypothetically, interestingly, maybe I'll just mention, you know, this distinction that the Rambam draws that in Hilchos De'os he speaks of regardless of level of religious observance of mitzvah ahavas yisrael, unless the caveat that he adds in the Perush HaMishnayos is interesting, you have something really parallel to that in what is perhaps one of the most classic expressions and formulations of the mitzvah ahavas yisrael which is found in the Tanya. So the Tanya says as follows: Mi she'eino chaveiro and in context based on what he writes two-three lines earlier, he means מי שאינו חברו בתורה v'eino mekurav etzlo. There's a religious gap. There's a very real distance and gap religiously.
מי שאינו חברו ואינו מקורב אצלו הנה על זה אמר הלל הזקן הוי מתלמידיו של אהרן.
Be from the disciples of Aharon HaKohen. Oheiv shalom vechulu, אוהב את הבריות ומקרבן לתורה. Love, and in that love, through that love, bring them closer to Torah. לומר שאף הרחוקים מתורת השם ועבודתו, even those who unfortunately presently are still distant from Toras Hashem and His service, ולכן נקראים בשם בריות בעלמא, tzarich limshachan, a person has to draw them close b'chevlei avosos ha'ahava vechulu hai, ואולי יוכל לקרבן לתורה ועבודת השם. Maybe success isn't guaranteed, but maybe the person will succeed in kiruv. And if not, but he did his mitzvah. לא הפסיד שכר מצות אהבת רעים. And then he adds at the end of this perek: ולא אמר דוד המלך עליו השלום tachlis sina sinaisim, Dovid HaMelech only renounced ahavas yisrael אלא על המינים והאפיקורסים, only with regard to heretics. Paralleling the two Rambams in Hilchos De'os and in the Perush HaMishnayos. Okay. So again, halacha lema'aseh one needs to assess the situation at hand as we just discussed. Now, what happens, let's say either the Rambam in Hilchos De'os was relevant, maybe the Rambam in Hilchos Mamrim was relevant and as a result a close relationship has developed and again for purposes of tonight's shiur we're focusing on a Jewish coworker but again with the same caveat mentioned before. And then given that relationship, so one day one receives an invitation, either that coworker is extending an invitation to his or her own homosexual wedding or that of a child. Does the mitzvah le'ehov, does it spill over even in this situation or not? So here, it's very, very important that we understand that the mitzvah which transcends difference in degrees in religious observance can and does. but only relates to the person. It does not, cannot, ever spill over in such a way that it validates the behavior. The mitzvah of לב כל אחד ואחד מישראל of limshoch in the Baal HaTanya's phrase bechevlei avotot ahava relates to the individual. It does not give license to in any way validate, legitimate and על אחת כמה וכמה to celebrate behavior which the Torah categorically prohibits. There is a Gemara in Megilla, a frightening Gemara in Megilla. The Gemara in Megilla asks, why is it that in the time of Achashverosh, in the time of Mordechai and Esther, why is it that we came so close to the precipice, rachmana litzlan, of destruction?
שאלו תלמידיו את רבי שמעון בן יוחאי מפני מה נתחייבו שונאיהן של ישראל שבאותו הדור כליה אמר להם אמרו אתם אמרו לו מפני שנהנו מסעודתו של אותו רשע
because they attended Achashverosh's party and they enjoyed. Why was that so egregious that it brought us to the precipice of unmitigated disaster? So earlier on the previous amud, the Gemara tells us that Achashverosh timed his mishteh, timed his party for when he thought, obviously erroneously, that the nevuah of Yirmiyahu that we would be redeemed after 70 years, when he thought that 70 years had come and gone and that nevuah had not materialized, so then he sponsored, he threw this lavish party to celebrate the fact that the churban habayis was going to be, in his twisted mind, was going to be permanent. It's one thing, it's bad enough if a Jew doesn't mourn the Beis HaMikdash, but to celebrate? To celebrate? One can attend a wedding happily, one can attend a wedding out of a sense of obligation, but whatever the impetus to attend a wedding is, attending a wedding means participating in a celebration. In a celebration of the wedding. That's what it is by definition. That's what one's presence at a wedding means and can't honestly be interpreted in any other way. It means being a part of the celebration for that wedding. To celebrate something that defies devar Hashem is a chillul Hashem. To celebrate something that defies devar Hashem is a chillul Hashem. What if I've grown so close and appropriately to this coworker? He feels like a brother to me and I'm like a brother to him. We feel more like family than we do coworkers. It's the same chillul Hashem. A person can't celebrate behavior which contradicts and defies ratzon Hashem, dvar Hashem. Regardless of what my relationship with my co-worker with that individual is. What we're discussing is absolutely compelling. You know, there are some questions which are given to debate, given to difference of opinion, and some questions the answer is simple and absolute and compelling, and this is such an example. And yet, and as such, it should be something instinctive. Our instinctive visceral reaction should be: I can't. How can I celebrate defiance of dvar Hashem? And yet, that often is not our instinctive visceral reaction. Often we're confused, conflicted. Out of that confusion and conflict emerge thoughts, words, and even actions that are just so wrong and so off. But how is that? How can it be that something which is so straightforward and so absolutely compelling, how can it be that we collectively, communally, some of us find ourselves confused and conflicted? Let's, as engaging in a collective cheshbon hanefesh, let's perhaps mention a few factors. By no means is this comprehensive, it's not intended to be comprehensive, but let's mention a few factors. We mentioned earlier the pasuk. We just read it, פרשת אחרי מות קדושים, we just read the pasuk:
כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה לא תעשו וכמעשה ארץ כנען אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה לא תעשו ובחוקותיהם לא תלכו.
So the Torah identifies Eretz Mitzrayim for us. K'maaseh Eretz Mitzrayim, like the behavior of the inhabitants of Eretz Mitzrayim asher yashavtem bah, where you resided. Remember that? Remember where you lived for 210 years? Some people are blessed with wonderful memories. Some people like me don't enjoy that blessing. But I don't know, maybe if you live somewhere for a week, so maybe it doesn't make such an impression on one individually or on the national psyche. But to be enslaved somewhere for 210 years, we know what Eretz Mitzrayim is. The Torah doesn't need to identify Eretz Mitzrayim. And similarly, we know where we're headed, k'maaseh Eretz Canaan, we know where we're headed. So why does the Torah find it necessary to identify
כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה וכמעשה ארץ כנען אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה?
Eretz Mitzrayim where you resided, Eretz Canaan where you're headed. I know, I know what Eretz Mitzrayim is, I know what Eretz Canaan is. Answer: The Torah says lest, this is what the Torah addresses us and tells us, lest you think that the behavior in Mitzrayim and Canaan was so repulsive and so repugnant that I don't have to really be concerned with ever engaging in such behavior. I'm not susceptible to it. So okay, it's it's it's in the Minyan HaMitzvos, but I can sort of check off that box. It's not going to require any effort. It's not going to require any particular mindfulness on my part because it's just so far beyond where I am, where my sensibilities are. Comes the Torah and says ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה. You live somewhere, the Torah tells us, you're susceptible to influence. It doesn't matter initially how far removed you feel from the surrounding society. A person lives somewhere long enough, so sensibilities and sensitivities become dulled and clarity gives way to confusion. And hence the Torah says because Eretz Mitzrayim is asher yeshavtem bah and Eretz Canaan is אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה, you're going to live there for hundreds of years, you need to be exceedingly careful not to be influenced, to push back and make a concerted effort because the default setting given human nature is that if it's asher yeshavtem bah we are influenced. One one perspective perhaps on our current sense of confusion and conflictedness. Another one, again in the vein of making a cheshbon hanefesh, a cheshbon hanefesh needs to be completely honest even when honesty includes pain. Let's take משל למה הדבר דומה. Now let's say certain types of jokes, certain types of humor are off-color. And let's say someone would never tell such a joke, but when he hears such a joke he enjoys it. He'll he'll get a good laugh, he'll get a good laugh out of it. So how do we sort of how how do we make sense of that? He recognizes that there's something very inappropriate about it. He recognizes that it's off-color, sufficiently so that that he wouldn't initiate. And yet if if he hears, he enjoys. So the answer is that his sense of principle is superficial. If it's superficial, it can prevent me from initiating but it it won't shape and determine and mold my reaction. There's one level of commitment which is which suffices in terms of what action I embark upon, but it's an altogether different and deeper level of commitment and conviction which will determine my reactions. It's it's it's something for us to think about, rabbosai. The third perspective I wanted to suggest, I'd like to introduce with a story that that I heard from the baal hamaiseh, the person involved with the story. I'm not using his real name, I'm I'll use the name, say, Goldberg. That wasn't his name. He he was a rov in the fifties when there was a tide which at the time was a very powerful tide sweeping through Orthodox communities where many shuls succumbed to pressure and they... But they they removed the mechitza because Conservative Judaism was on the ascendancy and they felt that the only way they could hold on to their membership was to was to compete by also, we'll also remove our mechitza. So this Rav was getting intense pressure from his ba'alei batim. And finally the pressure became so great that he relented and said, okay, I'm going to call Rav Soloveitchik and I'll follow what he says. So he agreed to pose the question. So he calls up and he's making the case, he's making the case, we're losing the youth, they're all going to the Conservative Temple, this is the only way we can hold on to the youth, it's the only way we can save souls. And the Rav says to him, Goldberg he says, don't bring me Moshiach. Your job is to uphold Torah, to teach Torah, don't bring me Moshiach. And if the pressure is too intense, so then leave the rabbanus, come back to a stronger Jewish community, don't bring me Moshiach. Sometimes, and and I think it comes from a good place in our hearts, we're looking to bring Moshiach in the sense that we feel that we have to be able to cater to every individual on his terms. So no matter what set of self-contradictory, impossible terms that individual or that group of individuals dictates, so the bring me Moshiach in us says how, we have to be able to accommodate them because otherwise aren't we leaving them behind and isn't that unthinkable. And that's what the Rav explained, don't bring me Moshiach. HaKadosh Baruch Hu charged us with the mandate of teaching as effectively, as sympathetically, as empathically as possible, genuine, authentic Torah. HaKadosh Baruch Hu didn't, didn't, didn't authorize us to make changes in order to accommodate a self-contradictory set of conditions which are being dictated. No matter how much love one has for one's fellow Jew, if one is challenged to square a circle, so the answer is I can't, I can't square a circle, there's no such thing as a square circle. If you're asking for a square circle, it's no reflection on my lack of ahavah, it's a reflection on the self-contradictory nature of your demand. There's no such thing, there's no such thing as recognizing the gay lifestyle as being consistent with Orthodox lifestyle. That's no more possible than a square circle. And and we need to remember and we need to internalize what the Rav said: don't bring me Moshiach. Because when a person thinks he's bringing Moshiach, he's holding back Moshiach. A person's holding... Moshiach is going to come, Moshiach is going to come when when we're devoted to Torah u'Mitzvos. That's the way a person brings Moshiach. And when we're dictated a self-contradictory set of terms and conditions, even though our every impulse always is that we want to help, we want to respond, we want to do, we can't square a circle. We cannot square a circle, there is no such thing as an Orthodox, as a gay Orthodox lifestyle. The teshuva that the rav wrote in the 50s about the issue of mechitza, again he was talking about the issue of mechitza, it's no less relevant, no less applicable to our issue today, arguably more so. In particular I wish to call the attention of the conference, I think an RCA conference, to the mechitza problem. I continually, the rav writes, receive reports from laymen from all parts of the country accusing many rabbis of displaying indecisiveness and even cowardice in this matter. No rabbi, I'm skipping, no rabbi however great in scholarship and moral integrity has the authority to endorse, legalize, or even apologetically explain this basic deviation. Any rabbi or scholar who attempts to sanction, again the rav is speaking of the desecrated synagogue, but one can substitute for our situation at hand, ipso facto, casts a doubt on his own moral right to function as a teacher or spiritual leader in the traditional sense of the word. No pretext, excuse, ad hoc formula, missionary complex, right, thinking of Moshiach, right, missionary complex or unfounded fear of losing our foothold in the Jewish community can justify the acceptance of, again the rav is speaking about removing the mechitza, the Christianized synagogue as a bona fide Jewish religious institution. With a slight emendation, it reads and addresses our situation at hand. I know beforehand, and these next words are so important rabosai, so so important. I know beforehand the reaction to my letter on the part of our apostles of religious "modernism" and "utilitarianism." They will certainly say that since a great majority of the recently constructed synagogues have abandoned separated seating, they'll certainly say since there are so many practicing homosexuals, we must not be out of step with the masses. This type of reasoning, says the rav, could well be employed with regard to other religious precepts such as the observance of Shabbos or the dietary laws. However, we must remember that an ethical or halachic principle decreed by God is not rendered void by the fact that people refuse to abide by it. Its cogency and veracity are perennial and independent of compliance on the part of the multitudes. If the ethical norm "thou shalt not kill" has not lost its validity during the days of extermination camps and gas chambers when millions of people were engaged in ruthless murder, but on the contrary has been impregnated with deeper meaning and significance, then every halachic maxim assumes greater import in times of widespread disregard and unconcern. The greater the difficulty, the more biting the ridicule and sarcasm, and the more numerous the opponent, then the holier is the principle and the more sacred is our duty to defend it. And we would add in our context, the more biting the accusations of being insensitive and unsympathetic, the more one is maligned by having one's principled reaction of saying that one cannot square a circle, that one cannot authorize what the Torah categorically prohibits, then the holier is the principle and the more sacred is our duty to defend it. In my opinion, the halachic dictum בשעת גזירת המלכות אפילו מצוה קלה כגון Briefly, the last of the three scenarios in terms of placing a tent on one's desk self-identifying as an LGBTQ+ ally, if what that represented was simply advocating for people with homosexual orientation that they should be treated like everyone else, that chas v'shalom that they should suffer any discrimination, they should be welcomed and embraced as everyone else, then we certainly could identify as an ally, we could and would and do. But since what that term actually represents is aggressively promoting a lifestyle, a homosexual lifestyle, an alternate morality, so once again without using the word, the term lightly or rachmana litzlan flippantly, it's a chillul Hashem to identify with that. And regardless of what consequences it has for one's career, one needs to remain principled. Certainly in looking for job opportunities, this is a major factor that should be considered. The corporate culture and what pressures are associated with the corporate culture is something that a person should look to discover and then assign it the appropriate weight in his decision as to where he accepts employment and as to where he looks to make his career. There's no question that what we've been talking about, the limits of our interpersonal relationships with colleagues, the limits that the crucial distinction between relating to the person, but without validating and certainly not celebrating the behavior, there's no question that it's something which is difficult, it's challenging for us. Jews are rachmanim, gomlei chasadim. Saying yes and accommodating is something which comes easily to us. Having to say no because we're being asked to square a circle because to say yes would involve a chillul Hashem, that's not the reaction that we want to have to implement. But maybe we can derive some strength and inspiration from a beautiful Meshech Chochma. Meshech Chochma comments on a passage that we quote in the Haggadah.
יכול מראש חודש תלמוד לומר ביום ההוא. אי ביום ההוא יכול מבעוד יום תלמוד לומר בעבור זה. בעבור זה לא אמרתי אלא בשעה שיש מצה ומרור מונחים לפניך.
The mitzvah of sippur yetziat Mitzrayim, to recount all the miracles of the Exodus, is when the matzah and maror, when there's a mitzvah to consume the matzah and maror, i.e., the night of the 15th. Says the Meshech Chochma, what, why do Chazal speak of matzah and maror? It should have been בשעה שיש פסח מצה ומרור מונחים לפניך. The pasuk says that the mitzvah of sippur yetziat Mitzrayim is, you'll tell your son ba-avur zeh. Hakadosh Baruch Hu took us out of Mitzrayim so that I would fulfill these mitzvos, for the sake, so that I would fulfill these mitzvos. So why mention only matzah and maror? Why not mention pesach matzah u-maror? So he answers with a mashal. He says a couple marry off their daughter and initially they're providing support for the young couple. The mother sees how well the couple is doing, how royally their son-in-law treats their daughter, and she's overjoyed at how successful the shidduch is. Her husband tells her that their judgment is premature. He says, right now, everything is easy. They have no worries, no responsibilities. We're providing for all their needs. Let's wait until they have to stand on their own two feet. Let's wait until the son-in-law assumes responsibility for supporting his family. And let's see then, given that challenge, given the difficulty which may be associated with it, given the possible adversity that may be associated with it, let's see then, כי ידאג לפרנסתו ובנפשו יביא לחמו. Then we'll be able to judge what kind of son-in-law he is, what kind of husband he is. Says the Meshech Chochma, what's the nimshal? What's the analog? He says Hakadosh Baruch Hu took us out of Mitzrayim ba-avur zeh that we should fulfill His mitzvos. But the ultimate test of our loyalty and faithfulness to the Ribono Shel Olam is not at that time of history when we have pesach matzah u-maror. Not when the Beis HaMikdash is standing, and in b'mei David u-Shlomo and everyone is איש תחת גפנו ואיש תחת תאנתו, when conditions are optimal, maybe even approaching utopian. No, that's not, that's not the test of loyalty, the test of faithfulness to the Ribono Shel Olam. The test, ba-avur zeh, Hakadosh Baruch Hu took us out of Mitzrayim ba-avur zeh to see whether we'll be loyal and faithful to His mitzvos at a time in history when there's no pesach, when there's churban ha-bayis, when the Beis HaMikdash is destroyed, and we're in galus, and we're suffering adversity. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants to see ba-avur zeh when there's only matzah and maror. That's when we really express our commitment and our devotion and our dedication and our principles. When we're confronted with a situation which is not easy, which is emotionally difficult, which is emotionally trying, בעבור זה עשה ה' לי בצאתי ממצרים. Thank you very much.