lech l’cha (hishtaldus), vayera; chayey sara

Sometimes in in studying Chumash, in eliciting Divrei Hashkafa ve-Hadracha from Torah, so one intends and is able to elicit answers, answers for for questions we have, and to establish clear guidelines in different areas. Sometimes what one accomplishes is to become sensitive to a question, and hopefully to, should it ever arise in one's personal life, in the life of the Klal, that one will recognize the question and try with the appropriate guidance to answer the question in that context. So the thought which I want to share with you very briefly belongs to that second category. So please don't expect to walk away with any any clarity in terms of answers, but hopefully some clarity at least in terms of a question. Ramban has his famous comment here criticizing Avram Avinu for going down to Mitzrayim because of the hunger, and although chata, גם כי כח לעשות ולהציל. So the Ramban indicts Avram Avinu that Avram Avinu didn't have the bitachon which he should have had. He shouldn't have asked Sarah Imeinu אחותי את למען ייטב לי בעבורך וחייתה נפשי בגללך, he shouldn't have put her in that compromising position, but rather should have had bitachon. So the question here is, we know that bitachon, having bitachon doesn't mean that a person is supposed to be passive. Doesn't mean that a person is not supposed to make every correct hishtadlus, be it begashmius, be it beruchnius. It doesn't mean a person sits back and says well, if it's bashert that I should have enough money to support my family, so eichshehu the Ribbono Shel Olam will find a way to send it to me, so I'll sit in my rocking chair and I'll wait for the UPS man to bring the delivery. So what was Avram Avinu's cheit? So be-emes the question itself lich'ora is is would seem to be unanswerable for us, because mistama whatever Avram Avinu's cheit was, it was so subtle and so dak-distik that it's probably something which we in our level aren't even sensitive to. However mi-idach gisa the Chiddushei HaRim says in Parshas Chukas when discussing the cheit of Moshe Rabbeinu, and he raises exactly this problem in that context. The Chiddushei HaRim says it's true that again obviously Moshe Rabbeinu's cheit was so so subtle, it was a cheit for Moshe Rabbeinu, and yet mi-idach gisa if the Torah tells us about it, so obviously there must be some reflection of this cheit which is something that we can relate to and learn from even our level. Because otherwise it wouldn't be in the Torah. Were it something Again, that didn't have some shadow or some reflection which were meaningful to us, it wouldn't be in the Torah. So what was Avraham Avinu's cheit? Again, bitachon doesn't mean to be passive. So one pshat is, could be that the Ramban is l'shitoso, another very famous Ramban in Parshas Bechukosai where the Ramban talks about, about doctors. And the Ramban says:

כי בהיות ישראל שלמים והם רבים לא יתנהג עניינם בטבע כלל לא בגופם ולא בארצם לא בכללם ולא ביחיד מהם כי יברך השם לחמם ומימם ויסיר מחלה מקרבם עד שלא יצטרכו לרופא ולא להשתמר בדרך מדרכי הרפואות כלל.

So כי בהיות ישראל שלמים והם רבים, so then they're lemala midarkei hateva and they don't have to worry about cholesterol, as the Ramban says:

כמו שאמר כי אני השם רופאך וכן היו הצדיקים עושים בזמן הנבואה גם כי יקרם עון שיחלו לא ידרשו ברופאים רק בנביאים כאשר היה עניין אסא וחזקיהו בחלותו.

So the Ramban says that for tzaddikim, or in a time when it was actually b'foal, not just potentially v'ameich kulam tzaddikim, that the hashgacha pratis which we enjoyed elevated, again, elevated us lemala midarkei hateva. In that time: כי בהיות ישראל שלמים והם רבים. Again, when the ameich kulam tzaddikim is b'foal. וכן היו הצדיקים עושים בזמן הנבואה. So it could be that the Ramban here is l'shitoso, that Avraham Avinu was certainly on such a madreiga, that Avraham Avinu was certainly on such a madreiga, and that that was Avraham Avinu's cheit is given who Avraham Avinu was, given zera Avraham ohavi. So for Avraham Avinu, there was no need to be making any hishtadlus, for Avraham Avinu, there was no need to be making any hishtadlus. And in fact, that's how some learn pshat, that that was the cheit of Yosef HaTzaddik also:

ולא זכר שר המשקים את יוסף כי אם שכרתני אתך ולא זכר שר המשקים את יוסף וישכחהו.

So that's a diyun what Yosef HaTzaddik's cheit was, the same problem we're discussing now, but some say again, because for Yosef HaTzaddik, there wasn't need for hishtadlus. But again, on that level, it again doesn't really relate to us, it really doesn't indicate anything for us. And be'emes the Ramban's second, the second thing which he blames Avraham Avinu for also would, would fit into this:

גם יציאתו מן הארץ שנצטווה עליה בתחילה מפני הרעב עון אשר חטא כי האלוקים ברעב יפדנו ממות.

But it could be that the Ramban has something else in mind as well. It could be there's another pshat in the Ramban. And again, here, here's where, again, it, it prompts questions rather than clear guidelines. And that is even if one assumes that in this situation, it's not that we're focusing on Avraham Avinu's uniqueness... in being lemala midarchei hateva. No, we're not necessarily, necessarily zeroing in on that. But there is a yesod. I think the story is told, now obviously, please, this is not meant to insinuate anything. It's a story about a different time and different place and it's not, it really isn't my kavana to insinuate anything. The story is told that when the Russian government decreed that they would forcefully close, shut down Volozhin unless they could dictate what the curriculum was, that they would have to introduce secular studies into Volozhin. So there was a meeting of Gedolei Yisrael, right? It wasn't just whoever was involved with Volozhin, there was a sense that Volozhin belonged to Klal Yisrael, wasn't, wasn't anyone's private property and there was a whole big diyun amongst the Gedolei Yisrael whether, since this was the only way to save the yeshiva, to accede to that demand or, no, whether to refuse that demand, knowing full well that the government would then, as it did, close down the yeshiva. So the Gedolei Yisrael were split, Gedolei Yisrael were split. Some said that they should give in to the demand. The Meir Simcha, the Ohr Somayach thought that they should give in to the demand. Others, the Beis Halevi amongst them, were very adamant not to, not to give in to that demand. So the question was posed, I think it was to the Beis Halevi, I think it was to the Beis Halevi, given that the alternative is clear, that the alternative is that the yeshiva is going to be shut down and that without it, we'll have nothing, so we have no alternative, so isn't it clear that beleis brera we have to accede to that demand? There is no alternative, there is no alternative. Or to paraphrase that, again to make its, its parallel but its relevance to what we're discussing more clear, isn't it clear that that's the hishtadlus which we have to do to sustain Torah, personally? So again, I think it was the Beis Halevi, maybe it was one of the other Gedolim who advocated the same position, I think it was the Beis Halevi who answered that the chiyuv to do what you can, that also has its limits. And there are certain points at which you have to say that we can't make certain compromises and even though there doesn't seem to be any alternative, there doesn't seem to be any brera, so we simply have to have bitachon that somehow or other the Ribbono Shel Olam will provide us with a solution. And ein hachi nami, there is no brera, the brera is that it's going to be shut down, but we can't do this. We're not authorized to do this, we're not authorized to do this. Could be that the Ramban here is saying a similar idea. That Avraham Avinu is not being faulted for the hishtadlus. It's not that the Ramban is saying that because of the obligation to have bitachon, so he should have been totally passive, but rather שהביא אשתו הצדקת במכשול עון. Ay, but there was no alternative. Avraham Avinu had no alternate plan. There was no other hishtadlus he could make, so that's what the Ramban is saying, but even when one recognizes a chiyuv hishtadlus, there at some point a person has to say, "But that I can't do. That the Ribbono Shel Olam doesn't want me to do, even if that's the only hishtadlus available, and therefore in this, in such a situation, היה לו לבטוח בשם שיציל אותו ואת אשתו." Now again, obviously, the crucial question, again which we're leaving, but hopefully sensitized to the fact that this is a question which does arise, is where do you draw the line? Right? How do you know when a situation you're dealing with, even though the hishtadlus involves bediavad, but a person is supposed to make the hishtadlus, which is certainly most cases, most cases, certainly. fall into that category into that classification in which cases but there are such cases again in the klal also not just in the person's private life but in the klal there are cases also where the argument of well there's no bereira there's no alternative so you see from this Ramban that that's not always a sound argument that's not always a compelling argument and sometimes the answer is well that's right we have no bereira there is no correct hishtadlus and

השלך על ה' יהבך וראוי לבטוח בה' שיציל אותה ואת אשתו

and it's a very very important again very very important question to be sensitive to Rashi

והגדול שבהם אמר וקראם כולם אדונים ולגדול אמר אל נא תעבור וכיון שלא יעבור הוא יעמדו חבריו עמו ובלשון זה הוא חול דבר אחר קודש הוא והיה אומר להקדוש ברוך הוא להמתין לו עד שירוץ ויכניס את האורחין ואף על פי שהכתוב שכתב אחר וירץ לקראתם האמירה קודם לכן היתה ודרך המקראות לדבר כן כמו שפירשתי אצל לא ידון רוחי באדם שנכתב אחר ויולד נח ואי אפשר לומר כן אלא הגזירה היתה מקודם ק' שנה ושני הלשונות בבראשית רבה

so could mean the two lishanos simply disagree whether or not it's chol or kodesh whether or not Avraham Avinu is addressing the gadol shebahem be-lashon adnus and it's chol whether or not he's addressing the Ribbono Shel Olam and it's kodesh they disagree ein hachi nami we can't say be-chol pashtus we can't say be-chol pashtus they disagree oh no but usually when Rashi quotes two lishanos usually Rashi is quoting two lishanos on two different levels that he's talking to them and he's also talking to the Ribbono Shel Olam simultaneously if that's so then it's very strange Meila that we understand throughout Chumash throughout Torah that Torah is intended to be understood on different levels פשט רמז דרש סוד and it means different things on different levels but these things are not mutually exclusive the fact that a posuk means different things on different levels is that's how Torah was given but lichora one would have thought that it would be impossible that the same word could refer both to the Ribbono Shel Olam and to a person that even the principle of of different levels of Torah different levels of interpretation of understanding but it can't be that the same posuk the same word is kodesh and chol that the same word is a Shem Hashem and that the same word is also a kinui for a person that would seem to be bordering on the blasphemous again the the notion of of different levels means that they're simultaneously true when the Rashbam says al pshat על דרך הפשט which is against the drashos Chazal seemingly against the drashos Chazal not because the Rashbam is disagreeing with that halacha Rachmana litzlan but he's saying that Chazal interpreted it on one level and obviously what they what they said was emes on that level but there's another level also which which I'm coming to tell you so the different interpretations on different levels are simultaneously true how can you say something is simultaneously kodesh and chol okay so maybe I don't know maybe here we have to understand that the two lishanos are not are not on different levels but they takeh disagree with each other but maybe not in addition perhaps perhaps this emerges according to all versions of what happens here but let's let's operate with the Rashbam for now Rashbam says

וירא אליו ה' היך שבאו אליו שלשה אנשים שהיו מלאכים

that vayeira eilav Hashem means that Hashem appeared to him in the dmus malachim who were in the dmus anashim so that's what it means right

וירא אליו ה' היך שבאו אליו שלשה אנשים שהיו מלאכים שבארבה מקומות כשנראה המלאך קוראו בלשון שכינה כדכתיב כי שמי בקרבו

shlucho kemoso שלוחו של אדם כמותו ve-chein So the Rashbam says what it means is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu appeared through the malach. So halo davar hu. The Torah says that Hakadosh Baruch Hu appeared through malachim who appeared through anashim that the גילוי שכינה לאברהם אבינו was that he perceived malachim bidmus anashim. What does that mean and what's the—what's to be derived from this? So what this parsha illustrates is a tremendously important, difficult to exaggerate its importance, tremendously important and fundamental principle in Avodas Hashem, in particular striving for Ahavas Hashem. There is a paradox in terms of Ahavas Hashem which seems not just to be a paradox but something insurmountable. And that is that mi'chad gisa, the Rav talks about this, the Rambam tells us at the end of Hilchos Teshuva that לפי הדעה תהיה האהבה. מעט מעט ומהרבה הרבה. So לפי הדעה תהיה האהבה. Mi'idach gisa, the Rambam writes in Moreh Nevuchim that ultimately Hashem is unknowable. That ultimately we can't really understand Hakadosh Baruch Hu, can't really know him, ad k'dei kach that the Rambam underscores it with the remarkable formulation that the goal of chochmah is to realize that we don't really understand. So what happens to Ahavas Hashem? So what's the kasuv hashlishi? What's the kasuv hashlishi if לפי הדעה תהיה האהבה but we can't really have—what does it mean to be infinite, what does it mean to be eternal, things that we can't grasp. So what does it mean ואהבת את השם אלוקיך? So the answer is that Vayera eilav Hashem בדמות מלאכים בדמות אנשים. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu does allow us to understand and perceive the midos through which he reveals himself to us, does let us understand the chochmah which is Torah. And that's the bridge, and that bridges what is otherwise an infinite gap and allows for לפי הדעה תהיה האהבה. And that's what's so typical about וירא אליו השם בדמות מלאכים בדמות אנשים. Again what does that mean for us? It means as follows. We can't directly understand Hakadosh Baruch Hu. We can't understand what ahavah olam means, what ahavah rabbah means. We can't jump to that, we can't leap to that. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, that he instilled within people a koach of ahavah for other people, a koach of mesiras nefesh for other people, again most notably, most significantly, of parents for children. And then Hakadosh Baruch Hu said that Beni vechori Yisrael, that if you see that mida again in the world, middas hachesed, middas ha'ahavah, one of the midos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and you see how a person, finite, limited, embodies that mida ahavah, and a child, when a child gets older and can appreciate the devotion and mesiras nefesh, the selfless love which a parent, if he or she carried out his or her mandate, will have showered upon the child. So it's bidmus anashim, right? It's bidmus anashim. Not seeing Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it's bidmus anashim. But you should know that that ahavah which you're seeing bidmus anashim, which you can understand because it's bidmus anashim, that's something. That's something which our sechel can relate to, that ahava which is bidmus anashim, you should know, it's malachim bidmus anashim, it's הקדוש ברוך הוא בדמות מלאכים שהם בדמות אנשים. But again, we're not saying it in any literal sense, Rachmana litzlan. But we're talking about the middah of hakadosh baruch hu, the middah of hakadosh baruch hu. That's what it means that a person comes to ahavas Hashem, not directly, but indirectly. הקדוש ברוך הוא מתגלה על ידי מלאכים, but even the malachim are מתגלה על ידי אנשים. Again, what's the nimshal? The nimshal, again, it's a mashal. And the nimshal, it's not literal, that we don't understand hakadosh baruch hu, but His middos we do understand. Middas hachesed, middas hagevurah, we do understand. But even that, we have to recognize that when we encounter those middos in the world, it's venasan lacha rachamim. That the rachmanus that we can show, that when you see someone who's a tremendous baal chesed, it's because of venasan lacha rachamim. That that's again, that's the middah of hakadosh baruch hu bidmus anashim. In a hesped for Rav Volve, so the Rav talks about this, how Gedolei Yisrael embody certain middos. And he talks about middas hachesed, middas hagevurah, hispashtus, tzimtzum, and that leads in to the hesped. That's the same idea, again, we're using it as a mashal. Al derech aggadah, that's the same idea of וירא אליו ה׳ בדמות מלאכים בדמות אנשים. But that means that that vayeira eilav Hashem can be totally squandered and can be totally lost if we don't make that connection. If we don't realize that that's a מידה של הקדוש ברוך הוא בדמות אנשים which hakadosh baruch hu endowed parents with that capacity for selfless love. So that gives us a little bit of a musag of that middah of ahava through which hakadosh baruch hu relates to the world, through which He reveals Himself to the world. And that allows us to aspire to a measure of ואהבת את ה׳ אלקיך, but we have to be conscious of this. We can't say, well, it's a blind instinct, it's a maternal instinct, it's a paternal, it's a parental instinct. There's no such thing as blind instincts. Instincts don't come from nowhere. It's because hakadosh baruch hu implanted it in the briyah. He implanted it in the briyah. Again, His middah, again, bidmus malachim bidmus anashim, and that's the bridge to ואהבת את ה׳ אלקיך. And of course the other bridge, again, besides seeing middos in people, a middah of ahava in parents, different middos in different people, bemiyuchad in Gedolei Yisrael. The main bridge of course is Torah. It's וירא אליו ה׳ על ידי תורה. When a person tries to learn beamalah and sees one little sugya of tofus hanoah, mamon eino mamon. Our meager understanding of a few lines in a Chiddushei Reb Chaim, the amkus. And whenever you have genuine, genuine amkus in Torah, it's always mesuka oso, also mesuka midvash. If it's not masok, if the svara is not mesuka, then it isn't, it isn't correctly amuka, it isn't emes. So a person just a little bit, so what, what do we understand in Torah? We understand superficially a little bit of a nigleh shebaTorah, and yet it's so masok, so amok. And again, what are we understanding superficially? A little bit. A krop, a little bit of a nigleh. So what the Rambam describes in Perek Beis of Yesodei HaTorah, when a person is overwhelmed by the chochma of the Ribbono Shel Olam, that's an experience which any time a person learns beamkus, he has it. And that too, again, both through the yedias HaTorah as well as the overwhelming experience of the depth and profundity of Torah, also again, both arouses a person to ahavas Hashem as well as bridges that gap. And that's again, all that is, again, al derech mashal, that's what it means vayeira eilav Hashem, but it's never direct. Because direct, there has to be a bridge. It's bidmus malachim, bidmus anashim, bidmus Torah. Rashi quotes from Chazal,

אמר רבי אבא יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות לפני המקום מתורתן של בנים שהרי פרשת של אליעזר כפולה בתורה והרבה גופי תורה לא ניתנו אלא ברמיזה.

That the story of Eliezer the Torah tells us twice, once as it happens, then as Eliezer recounts it to Rivka's family. Whereas הרבה גופי תורה לא ניתנו אלא ברמיזה. So יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות מתורתן של בנים. So what does that mean? יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות מתורתן של בנים. So Rabbi Elpert zichrono livracha said that what the Chazal means is as follows. It's not, it's not any kind of preferential treatment or ranking for the av de-avos as opposed to the, as opposed to the bonim. And who are the bonim? The bonim are Moshe Rabbeinu teaching hilchos Shabbos, teaching, teaching hataras nedarim. Who are the bonim? It's not, not, rachmana litzlan, some kind of disparaging statement about the bonim, but rather the contrast which Chazal are underscoring is reflecting what's being taught. That from the Parshat Eliezer, so we're learning parts of Torah which have to do with chesed, the test which Eliezer established for whoever would become Yitzchak's wife. Maybe there's also lessons to be derived in terms of bitachon, in terms of how Eliezer went about it. When that's the subject matter being taught, so then a person has to teach baharchava. A person has to teach expansively. When the subject matter is hataras nedarim, when the subject matter is hilchos Shabbos, then a person can teach beremez also. And then Rabbi Alpert went on to amplify as follows, that we know amongst Gedolei Yisrael that they had different styles, seemingly. In fact, that from the Baal Shem Tov, so we know there are lots of stories, right, baharchava. The Vilna Gaon, again this is a typology, obviously with exceptions on both sides. The Vilna Gaon on the other hand, so in the Biur HaGra, an Ayin, Amareh Makom, is a 20-page shitkel Torah condensed into an Ayin. So why is that? So he said because of the subject matter, subject matter. That the Vilna Gaon by and large was dealing with torasom shel bonim. So an Ayin is enough. There the subject matter can be taught beremez. The Baal Shem Tov, his subject matter was the same subject matter as the שיחתן של עבדי אבות, so that required a different style of pedagogy, hence the elaborateness of the stories we're given. Ad kan devarav. It's a very beautiful peshat in the Chazal. But there's a tremendously important yesod again, implicit in this, which it's worth reflecting on for a moment. When a person learns torasom shel bonim, so a person has to be omeil veyageia to understand. All the sugyas are so deep. A person has to work hard to understand. And then, again, the shichicha shouldn't be sholetes, rachmana litzlan. So of course a person has to review also, but as a precaution against shichicha. What the Torah is being meramez here, what the Torah is telling us by repeating the שיחתן של עבדי אבות, which is teaching us about chesed, is that when a person is learning yesodos about chesed, about bitachon, so it's not simply enough that a person learns, that a person understands, that a person reviews enough to guard against shichicha, but what a person has to accomplish is he has to go over and over and over again to reinforce it so much and so often that he internalizes it. And that's what it means, yafeh sichosom. not our question or our concern at the moment. But then there are other inyanim of Torah. When a person learns yesodos of chesed, so then the pshat is not simply that a person has to know and understand and remember, but he has to internalize it so that that molds his personality. And that's what the Torah is telling you. The story of Eliezer, you have to go over again and again. Yeah, you know it already and you remember it already. We just read the psukim. We just read the psukim. There's no need for chazara in terms of remembering, but יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות. It has to be reviewed and re-read for the sake not just of preventing shikcha, but for the sake of reinforcing and internalizing. And that too is included in what Chazal are saying in יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות that the Torah reviews the entire story more as telling us that again, this mentality that we have of if there's no chiddush and if I remember it and yavo Eliahu veyomar that I'm not going to forget it, so then there's no point. But the way a person internalizes is by going over again and again and again until gradually it's not just yeida, but yasim al libo as well. Now the reason for that is not simply because the Torah isn't content with our practicing chesed. The Torah wants us also to be ba'ale chesed. Of course that's true, but it goes deeper than that. Ultimately, what the Torah is teaching us יפה שיחתן של עבדי אבות מתורתן של בנים is that a person cannot adequately practice chesed unless he internalizes yesodos of chesed. But what does that mean in terms of concrete examples? Ultimately, to be a ba'al chesed and to therefore be able to practice chesed means a person has to refine or ensure that a certain instinct that we have is correctly placed and doesn't spill over. People have an instinct, we all have an instinct to be self-centered. We all have an instinct to be self-centered. Why did the Ribbono Shel Olam give us such an instinct? Because it's that instinct of being self-centered which is at the root of our instinct for survival. And we're supposed to want to live. Vachai bahem. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants us to desire to live, and therefore we have an instinct for it. We need to be motivated by shelo lishma. Shelo lishma again appeals basically to a selfish instinct. So we need such an instinct, and we certainly have it. But again, that instinct, like every instinct we have, has its time and its place, and it becomes corrupted if we allow it to dominate ourselves inappropriately. The ikar of chesed is to view other people, to view life, without this self-centered perspective, but from an altruistic perspective, not a self- The ikar of chessed, perspective of chessed, is that a person is not supposed to feel that in doing chessed he's burdened, it's encroaching upon his time, but rather that ki l'kach notzarnu, part of our avodas Hashem is that people are supposed to help each other. And if the Ribbono Shel Olam gives us opportunities to do so, so that's not encroaching upon our time, that's not burdening us, but that's, those are the opportunities the Ribbono Shel Olam gives us for our avodas Hashem in the tchum of bein adam l'chaveiro. There's no question that if a person views chessed again from the self-centered perspective, so then it translates into an attitude of well how much do I have to do, how much is required of me. If a person views chessed from the correct perspective, so then it's how much can I do. Even more broadly in terms of relationships bein adam l'chaveiro, if a person has the correct perspective, we can never be guilty of using another person. And yet the ma'aseh it happens all the time. It happens all the time in ways that we're insensitive to. It happens in little incidents, it happens in big incidents. Let's say a person has to, there's a, I don't know, a shiur going on, something going on. Let's say someone who's present needs to go out of the room. So whether or not the person lets the door slam behind him, again, it's a kleinekeit. It's not avodas Hashem. It's a kleinekeit, but the truth is that maybe the manifestation is small and certainly on the scale of things relatively unimportant. But when one stops and thinks, so then one realizes that the yesod here belongs to דברים העומדים ברומו של עולם. The yesod is whether or not the person is thinking about what he needs to do, whether he has a self-centered perspective, or whether or not the person is thinking about others, what his orientation is. Is the orientation for oneself or the orientation is not for oneself. If the orientation is for oneself, so unless from that vantage point there's something very blatant, so then we're not sensitive to what needs to be done, little things, big things bein adam l'chaveiro. Unless it's so blatant that it just hits you in the face, so then we're very insensitive to what needs to be done, little things, big things bein adam l'chaveiro. You know the famous story with the Beis Halevi with the woman who came to ask him about using milk for Arba Kosos? So the Beis Halevi went over to his money drawer and gave her a lot of money. So the Beis Halevi said, "A woman comes and she asks a shaila, so what are you giving her so much money?" So the Beis Halevi answered, "She may not have known whether you can use milk for Arba Kosos, but she certainly knew you can't drink milk after eating meat. So obviously she was considering using milk for Arba Kosos with meat, which means that she doesn't have the resources."