Hilchos teshuva 12

Take a look here in Perek Dalet. עשרים וארבעה דברים מעכבין את התשובה. The Rambam was asked why, what's the significance of listing Esrim v'arba devarim, we could have added them up ourselves. Since the Rambam answers that he was afraid lest a sofer make a mistake in copying the manuscript and inadvertently omit something, he wanted at least that we should be aware of that fact. It's such a powerful illustration to, a person always has to know when there's a kasha, when there's a simple teretz. When there's a simple teretz, it's a, it's a safeguard against, against that we should at least be aware of scribal error were it to occur. ארבעה מהן עון גדול. So what does m'akvin et hateshuva mean? So if you fast forward to the end of the perek, Halacha Vav, the Rambam says

כל אלו הדברים וכיוצא בהן אף על פי שמעכבין את התשובה אינן מונעין את התשובה.

So clearly m'akeiv here means they impede, they interfere, but they don't, they don't prevent.

אלא אם עשה אדם תשובה מהן הרי זה בעל תשובה. עשרים וארבעה דברים מעכבין את התשובה. ארבעה מהן עון גדול.

So the way they're m'akeiv et hateshuva and what even m'akeiv et hateshuva means depends upon the subcategories of the 24. The first category,

ארבעה מהן עון גדול, והעושה אחד מארבעתן אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מספיק בידו לעשות תשובה לפי גודל חטאו.

Because the magnitude of cheit is so great in the following four instances, אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מספיק בידו לעשות תשובה. So what is it that ordinarily a person is given and here Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't provide it to the person, אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מספיק בידו לעשות תשובה. So there are different pshatim that might occur to one but in terms of ringing true within the Rambam itself, it's not so pashut. If you go ahead to Perek Vav Halacha Heh,

ומהו זה שאמר דוד טוב וישר ה' על כן יורה חטאים בדרך. ומהו זה שאמר דוד טוב וישר ה' על כן יורה חטאים בדרך. וידרך ענוים במשפט וילמד ענוים דרכו. זה ששלח להם נביאים מודיעים להם דרכי השם ומחזירים אותם בתשובה.

What does it mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu... What does it mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu guides sinners along the path? So one pshat is that in the time of the times of nevuah, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu sent nevi'im. And the nevi'im in the tochachah provided us with a roadmap for teshuvah. But od at all times, even when one lives at a time when there's no nevuah, שנתן בהם כח ללמוד ולהבין. Hakadosh Baruch Hu implanted within human nature the capacity lilmod u'lehavin to understand, to learn, to be discerning. שמידה זו בכל אדם. The following quality, the following trait is true of everyone:

שכל זמן שהוא נמשך בדרכי החכמה והצדק נתאוה להם ורודף אותם.

If a person will only take the first steps to be drawn in the ways of chochmah and righteousness, justice, so it will resonate with him. Nitavah lahem. He naturally responds and desires more. V'rodeif otam and pursues them. והוא שאמרו חכמים בא ליטהר. This is why for these two lines that we're looking here now at the seifa,

והוא שאמרו חכמים בא ליטהר מסייעין אותו, כלומר ימצא עצמו נעזר על הדבר.

So the Rambam clearly does not learn pshat that בא ליטהר מסייעין אותו means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is pulling strings to sort of getting involved in the teshuvah process. The Rambam says no. The Rambam says the pshat in that ma'amar chazal of בא ליטהר מסייעין אותו is that that siyua is part of human nature. That siyua is part of human nature. You find that, for instance, the Radak comments a similar—again, the Radak is obviously being misyacheis to psukim, but the Rambam here is being misyacheis to a ma'amar chazal, but we'll see the p'nim, b'ezrat Hashem, the principle is the same that when something is attributed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it could be that it means it's attributed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu sort of as the immediate cause, or it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it's attributed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu in that Hakadosh Baruch Hu when he created the world, created the world in such a way that this ensues. So in Ashrei, in Tehillim,

עיני כל אליך ישברו ואתה נותן להם את אכלם בעתו.

So all animals, all fish, everything looks to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and Hakadosh Baruch Hu provides them with their food. The Radak says it doesn't mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is manning a soup kitchen and all the fish are lining up and all the chickens are lining up and all the sheep are lining up and all the cows are lining up. It means that he created the world in such a way that all creatures find and have sustenance within the world. So it's attributed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu as the first cause in having created the world in which ochlam b'ito is provided. And basically it's that same type of havchanas, again, the Rambam's not talking about a pasuk here, he's talking about a ma'amar chazal, but it's the same type of havchanas that the Rambam's giving here for בא ליטהר מסייעין אותו. It doesn't mean mesay'in oto that there's sort of direct, immediate intervention the way the Rambam understands this ma'amar chazal, but it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world in such a way that if a person naturally good, goodness, the emes resonates with a person. Emes resonates with a person. Chochmah, emes resonate with a person. In light of that, it's not as if again, coming back to our halacha, daled daled, it's not as if that ordinarily HaKadosh Baruch Hu is, you know, inserting himself into into the teshuva process. So what is it that that's missing by these four because of the godel hacheit, because of the magnitude of sin? So my son-in-law suggests I think it's a correct peshat that that in this context what what maspik beyado means is the middah of erech apayim, the amount of time necessarily that HaKadosh Baruch Hu provides for the chotei to to be chozer b'teshuva. And that over here because of the godel hacheit, so I don't know for some khatan's, I don't know HaKadosh Baruch Hu waits 50, 60, 70, the even longer years, the middah of erech apayim is is can can really really provide you know an extraordinary amount of time. And the אין הקדוש ברוך הוא מספיק בידו means that there's less of that of that latitude in terms of doing the teshuva and the person has to be much more zariz in in doing teshuva. What are the four? Alef, hamachti es harabbim. He causes the rabbim to sin. ובכל עון זה המעכב את הרבים מעשות מצוה. Meaning whether he's machti es harabbim and he's he's the catalyst for rabbim doing a lo saaseh or whether he's the catalyst he's responsible for their neglecting an asseh, either way that's b'geder machti es harabbim. Beis, המטה חברו מדרך טובה לדרך רעה, yonassas umeadiach. Gimmel, הרואה בנו בתרבות רעה. He sees his son involved, he's moving in the wrong circles, he's associating with with the wrong people, he's on the wrong path, v'eino memocheh beyado. And the father's not mocheh.

הואיל ובנו ברשותו אילו מיחה בו היה פורש ונמצא כמחטיאו.

What does it mean that b'no b'reshuso? So possibly it means that the Rambam's talking about a stam case where the the son, the child is סומך על שלחן אביו, that he's financially dependent upon the father, which gives the father an opening to be mocheh. Alternately, the Gemara in

קידושין דף ל עמוד א: אמר ליה רבא לרב נתן בר אמי אדידך על צוארי דברך משיתסר ועד עשרין ותמני ואמרי לה מתמני סרי ועד עשרים וארבעה.

Kedanya:

חנוך לנער על פי דרכו. רבי יהודה ורבי נחמיה: חד אמר משיתסר ועד עשרין ותמני וחד אמר מתמני סרי ועד עשרים וארבעה.

Rashi's second peshat is בשעה שעוד ידך תקיפה עליו. When you still are in a position to I don't know have leverage, when you're still in a position to wield influence, הוי זהיר ללמדו תוכחות. That's the time for the the father to to be mocheh. ואיזהו זמנו משיתסר ועד עשרין ותמני. from six, according to the first opinion, from 16 to 22, according to the second opinion, from 18 to 24. So what sort of what does that tekufah represent? Bar chi mishetzar until the child is 16 אין בו דעת לקבל תוכחות כל כך. And therefore ואל תרבה עליו יסור ותוכחה. You can't challenge too much, you can't be too demanding, right? At no point can you challenge too much, at no point can you be too demanding, but what constitutes too challenging or too demanding? So there's a qualitative shift between under 16 as opposed to hitting 16 or alternatively under 18 or hitting 18. Ve'yosei me'esrim ve'tarten according to the first opinion when it's beyond 22, according to the second opinion beyond 24 יש לחוש שלא יבעט. At that point the child is already a full fledged adult and the father at that point should not be telling him what to do. This is a fascinating Gemara because it provides a source we take for granted nowadays. I don't know if you sort of draw a timeline of a person's life, so we talk about childhood and adolescence and then adulthood and the question is is that oisgeholten al pi Torah? Maybe al pi Torah a person's bar mitzvah or bas mitzvah, so the child is now an adult. The child is now an adult. Do we really recognize that there's this in between period? So again, obviously in terms of katnus and gadlus, no there is no in between period. It's one day the child is a katan and the next day a gadol. But within gadlus you takeh do see that the Gemara carves out this period, this tekufah in the child's life that until age 16 so the child is not fully, whether it's I don't know, intellectually or emotionally mature or whatever the Gemara is referring to, although he's not fully mature to be fully challenged. U'me'idach gisa there's a recognition obviously that a parent should not be telling an adult child what to do. So yitachen that that's another, again, do the Rambam learn pshat in this Gemara like Rashi? Because Rashi has two leshonos and this is the second lashon in Rashi. I don't know but that's the alternative perhaps of what u'beno berishuso, maybe it means birshuso not exclusively or not necessarily referring to that financially he's somoch al shulchano but rather means more that he's still birshuso that he's receptive to the father's instruction. At, again, not that the Rambam's talking exclusively about 16 to 22 or 18 to 24, but birshuso in the sense of that he's still receptive to the tochacha in to whatever degree is age appropriate.

ובכלל עון זה כל שאפשר בידו למחות באחרים בין רבים בין יחידים ולא מיחה אלא הניחם בכשלונם.

So what all these three have in mind is that the person is responsible for causing cheit on behalf of others. Machati es harabim, meisis u'madiach, and the silence, the apathy of the parent when he sees beno deta'at.

ד' והאומר אחטא ואשוב ובכלל זה האומר אחטא ויום הכיפורים מכפר.

It's interesting what Daled has in mind with the first Gimmel is that the person is basically being machti es atzmo. By making this calculation of echta veashuv, it's okay, I can do the cheit because I can always do teshuvah later. I can do the cheit, don't, not to worry, it's going to be Yom Kippurim and, and Yom Kippurim is mechaper. So it's a bechinah of where the person is being machti es atzmo. He's not just being chotei, but by that sort of premeditation, that rationalization that, that he provides himself of echta veashuv, אחטא ויום הכיפורים מכפר is he's being machti es atzmo. Let's jump for a moment to Halacha Hey which is the last subcategory here of the twenty-four. The twenty-four, they all have in common that they're meakvim es hateshuvah, that they impede or interfere, again, never prevent. They impede or interfere but in different senses. That's why the Rambam breaks them down into into different subcategories.

ומהן חמישה דברים הלכה ה העושה אותן יימשך אחריהן תמיד.

They're very addictive behaviors. Right, not all behaviors, I mean a person can sort of get used to lots of things, but not all behaviors are equally potentially addictive in terms of how difficult it is to, to reverse or, or to change that behavior. So the Rambam is saying that there are some things that are especially addictive. A person can drink orange juice, a person can drink scotch, so there's something different in terms of how difficult it is for the person. So the drinking orange juice, I don't, I don't know that I don't, I've never heard of an orange juice addiction. It's not, it can be a habit and, and if the person wants the to break the habit it might be challenging, but I don't know if we would say that it rises to the level of an addiction. Ma she'ein kein if he has the same, same habit not of drinking orange juice but of drinking scotch, so then that's something which is addictive.

ומהן חמישה דברים העושה אותן יימשך אחריהן תמיד והן קשה לפרוש מהן.

So here again, this is meakev es hateshuvah in a very different sense, right? The first was meakev es hateshuvah maybe in that, you know, the the sand is is going quickly through the hourglass. It's meakev es hateshuvah in that sense. And this is meakev es hateshuvah in a different sense, just that it makes the challenge of doing teshuvah more formidable.

לפיכך צריך אדם להיזהר מהן שמא יידבק בהן. והן כולן דעות רעות עד מאוד.

And again, they're all, they're all very bad, insidious character traits. ואלו הן רכילות לשון הרע ובעל חמה, anger, uba'al machshava ra'ah, and vehamis-chaber lerasha. So here you have basically explicit confirmation, I think we've mentioned this, I don't remember whether it's come up this year, but on other occasions. Here you have, again, confirmation for in Perek Zayin of Hilchos De'os, if, if you just go back for a moment, Rabosai, Perek Zayin of Hilchos De'os, so this is where the Rambam has of Lashon Hara and Rechilus. To just get, it occupies in the first six Halachos of the Perek.

המרגל בחברו עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תלך רכיל בעמיך.

Halacha Bet again just to get a feel for the Perek. איזהו רכיל זה שטוען דברים והולך מזה לזה. A Rachil is sort of an itinerant peddler, a traveling salesman. So what does it mean Lo Telech Rachil? So he's not going and peddling his wares, but he's peddling stories, gossip.

איזהו רכיל זה שטוען דברים והולך מזה לזה ואומר כך וכך אמר פלוני כך וכך שמעתי על פלוני. יש עון גדול מזה עד מאוד והוא בכלל זה והוא לשון הרע. והוא המספר בגנות חבירו אף על פי שאמר אמת.

Gimmel the Rambam tells us about the Chomer Ba'issur of Lashon Hara in particular, not Rechilus, Lashon Hara in particular. Halacha Dalet he introduces Avak Lashon Hara. Halacha Hei he sort of expands the definition of Lashon Hara.

אחד המספר בלשון הרע בפני חבירו או שלא בפניו והמספר דברים שגורמין אם נשמעו איש מפי איש להרע לחבירו בגופו או בממונו.

Anything that can prove harmful or injurious to the person. Halacha Vav כל אלו הם בעלי לשון הרע. What's so striking here is that the Rambam doesn't in Hilchos De'os tell us about the Issur to be Mekabel Lashon Hara. The only passing reference he has to being Mekabel Lashon Hara is in Halacha Gimmel, but that's only Agav quoting a Maimar to tell you how Chamur Lashon Hara is. But he doesn't even there record the Lav from Mesaper Lashon Hara. Because Lo Telech Rachil is only the Lav for Mesaper Lashon Hara. It's not the Lav for Mekabel Lashon Hara. The Lav for Mekabel Lashon Hara is from לא תשא שמע שוא and that the Rambam doesn't tell us until Hilchos Sanhedrin. What's it doing in Hilchos Sanhedrin? Because לא תשא שמע שוא is also an Azharah to the Dayan not to listen to the Tainos of one Ba'al Din if the other Ba'al Din isn't present. So it's a Pele, Mamash a Pele. Here's where the Rambam has all Hilchos Lashon Hara and he leaves out such a fundamental part of Hilchos Lashon Hara. So Lichora the Pshat is as follows. If you go back to... yeah Lichora is as follows. The Pshat is that okay let's leave that question aside for a moment. What's Hilchos Lashon Hara doing in Hilchos De'os anyway? How does it come into Hilchos De'os? I think we think of Hilchos Lashon Hara the way we sort of classify the Din of Lashon Hara is that it's Shemiras Halashon, right? There are Halachos about how we act, there are also Halachos about how we speak. So how does it come into Hilchos De'os? So it's clear that the Rambam is saying that yes, sort of the way the Issur translates, the way it manifests itself is through speech, but the crux of the Issur is a De'ah Ra'ah. The crux of the Issur is that it reflects, it bespeaks something deeply flawed within me if I'm disparaging a fellow Jew. For no purpose, there's no need for it, just Min Hastam I'm disparaging another Jew. The way this de'ah manifests itself is in dibbur. So that if you're classifying halachos, this doesn't really belong to halachos of shemiras halashon per se, as much as it does to hilchos de'os. And that's exactly where the Rambam puts it. But says the Rambam, bameh devarim amurim that it's a hilchos de'os-dike issur, mesaper lashon hara. Mesaper lashon hara, he's the one who's initiating it. He's the one who's initiating it, so that really it comes from a de'ah ra'ah. It comes, it comes from a de'ah ra'ah. Where a person happens, lav davka initiator, a person can hear lashon hara without intending to hear lashon hara, without any, no, without any malice, without any premeditation on his part. And there is this, we're all, we have a tendency. You hear something, you read something, you have a tendency to believe it. So, mekabel lashon hara is not a hilchos de'os-dike issur. Oh, so when the Rambam had to choose between, you know, should I be comprehensive in one place, or should I maintain the conceptual clarity? So the Rambam goes, goes with the latter. And he prefers to temporarily omit, he prefers to postpone telling us about the lav for kabbalas lashon hara rather than insert it here because that would blur the fundamental difference between the lavin. You see elsewhere that there are other proofs that this is the way the Rambam functions. That in hilchos de'os he doesn't look to cover what he's talking about exhaustively, but only what stems from hilchos de'os. And so for instance, if you go back to perek gimmel, halacha beis. The context here is the Rambam expounding upon the כל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים. So in this context, at the end of halacha beis, the Rambam writes

וכן כשיבעול לא יבעול אלא כדי להברות גופו וכדי לקיים את הזרע לפיכך אינו בועל כל זמן שיתאווה אלא בעת שידע שהוא צריך להוציא שכבת זרע כמו דרך הרפואות או לקיים את הזרע.

So the Rambam talks about that it should be the l'shem shamayim is that a person should do it when it's something that is warranted for his health. So amar Avraham, the Ra'avad says, וכן מצות עונה היא מפורשת. And also obviously to be mekayeim mitzvas onah. So why didn't the Rambam mention it? So it's, it's clear why the Rambam didn't mention it. Because that has nothing to do with hilchos de'os. The Rambam is telling us what the guidelines are mitzade hilchos de'os, mitzade a person being balanced and restraining taivos. So the hilchos de'os-dike considerations are the ones he presents. Now, even though that doesn't encompass the topic fully, no, but hilchos de'os the Rambam doesn't want to blur. And and he only tells you what's נוהג מצד הלכות דעות. There are, there is at least one other example, probably more, but there is at least one other example of this as well. So our Rambam, and and that's the pshat in terms of why the Rambam doesn't record mekabel lashon hara. It yitachen also that that it explains something else there in in the last perek of hilchos de'os, which is that the Rambam doesn't have any of the exceptions of what we call exceptions to talking lashon hara. He doesn't have the Yerushalmi about talking lashon hara about ba'alei machlokes if need be to sort of expose what what they're doing and the divisiveness which which they're creating. He doesn't have the Chofetz Chaim's famous examples of to'eles in terms of a prospective business partner, a prospective shidduch. He doesn't have any of these. So perhaps, and the kasha from the Yerushalmi maybe is So perhaps the answer's as follows. If one understands issur lashon hara, again, it's the halachos the same way there are halachos that govern actions, there are halachos that govern speech, and to say something which reflects negatively on a person is forbidden speech. So then conceptually these examples are exceptions. Conceptually these examples are exceptions and memila you have to list the exceptions. You have to list the exceptions. But once one understands that for the Rambam the issur lashon hara is not, again it's not dinim about dibbur, it's a hilchos de'os-dikke issur, so then it's not that these are exceptions. That's not a de'a ra'a. The reason a person is providing this information is because he's being asked, he's received an inquiry in context of shidduchim, in context of prospective business partnership. That's the context in which the person is sharing without a scintilla of exaggeration, he's sharing the information. That's not a de'a ra'a. It's not that conceptually it's an exception. It's that that's not de'a ra'a. Lashon hara means when a person is when the negative, not just that the speech is negative, but it reflects negativity on the part of the person. That's not negativity on the part of the person. He owes it to the sho'el to provide that information. So our Rambam basically if there were any question about that whole ma'aracha, so this Rambam here corroborates. Right? The Rambam says meforesh כולם דעות רעות עד מאוד and then he lists rechilut and lashon hara. So clearly the Rambam is telling you these are hilchos de'os-dikke issurim. They shouldn't be understood just again as dinim which regulate speech. No, they're hilchos de'os-dikke issurim. Let's take a look perhaps for a moment at halacha gimmel. ומהם חמישה דברים העושה אותן. Again, each of the categories again they impede, they interfere with teshuva in a different sense, in a different way. Halacha aleph was in terms of the time. Halacha hey is in terms that the person makes the challenge of teshuva, he makes it more formidable for himself. Halacha gimmel is another category.

ומהם חמישה דברים העושה אותן אי אפשר לו שישוב תשובה גמורה לפי שהן עוונות שבין אדם לחברו ואינו יודע חברו שחטא לו כדי שיחזיר לו או ישאל ממנו מחילה ואלו הן:

hamakalel es harabbim. לא קלל אדם ידוע כדי שישאל ממנו כפרה. vehacholek im haganav. He buys stolen goods.

לפי שאינו יודע גניבה זו של מי היא אלא הגנב גונב מרבים ומביא לו והוא לוקח. ג'. המוצא והמוצא אבידה ואינו מכריז עליה עד שיחזירה לבעליה ואחר זמן כשיעשה תשובה אינו יודע למי יחזיר.

So all these are instances of a חטא בין אדם לחברו where a person will not be in a position to meratzeh his chaveiro and to ask mechila. Let's go back for a moment to פרק ב' הלכה ט', beis tes. פרק ב' הלכה ט' be-ezras Hashem:

אין התשובה ולא יום הכיפורים מכפרים. אלא עבירות שבין אדם למקום כגון מי שאכל דבר איסור או בא על בעילה אסורה וכיוצא בהן. אבל עבירות שבין אדם לחברו כגון חובל חברו או מקלל חברו או גוזלו וכיוצא בהן אינו נמחל לו לעולם עד שיתן לחברו מה שהוא חייב לו וירצהו. אף על פי שהחזיר לו הממון שהוא חייב לו צריך לרצותו ולשאול ממנו שימחול לו. ואפילו לא הקניט את חברו אלא בדברים צריך לפייסו ולפגוע בו עד שימחול לו.

The Rambam says that

אינו נמחל לו לעולם עד שיתן לחברו מה שהוא חייב לו וירצהו.

That a person only gets mechila for bein adam l'chavero if he mollifies, he pacifies his friend. Otherwise אינו נמחל לו לעולם. Let's go back, go back to פרק ב הלכה א for a moment or so. Right, the third case, the third scenario of teshuva that the Rambam has in

פרק ב הלכה א. אפילו עבר כל ימיו ועשה תשובה ביום מיתתו ומת בתשובתו כל עוונותיו נמחלים שנאמר עד אשר לא תחשך השמש והאור והירח והכוכבים ושבו העבים אחר הגשם שהוא יום המיתה מכלל שאם זכר בוראו ושב קודם שימות נסלח לו.

So the Rambam says here that basically if a person does teshuva on his deathbed, so the Rambam says kol avonotav nimchalim. But what about his עונות בין אדם לחברו? I mean, the Rambam is not describing, he doesn't say anything to intimate that every person that he may have wronged is present and he's meratzeh at that moment. So clearly that's not what's happening. That's clearly not the scene that the Rambam is painting. So this kol avonotav nimchalim, so in light of פרק ב הלכה ט, so you have to make a little bit of a ukimta. The Rambam means kol avonotav nimchalim means bein adam l'makom, it doesn't mean bein adam l'chavero? So that's obviously not the mashmaut, that's not. Clearly, clearly the meaning of פרק ב הלכה א is teshuva gemura, kol avonotav nimchalim. That's clearly the pshat. But how do you reconcile that with פרק ב הלכה ט? So lefi zeh you see kvar that what the Rambam says in פרק ב הלכה ט is: No, if my chaver is right here whom I wronged in some way, maybe it was klala, maybe it was chabala, maybe, maybe it was hiknit b'dvarim. He's right here so then meratzeh es chavero and asking mechila is me'akev. And kol zman that that opportunity exists, so then the Rambam says אינו נמחל לו לעולם if he doesn't take advantage of that opportunity. But if that opportunity doesn't exist, if he can't, so then it's not me'akev. Nothing prevents a person from doing teshuva. I think Rav Kook has, if you look in Orot HaTeshuva. Rav Kook writes without, writes so much without revealing what mareh mekomos he has in mind. What does he have in mind? He has in mind nigleh, he has in mind nistar, what does he have in mind? And he just sort of wrote, this overflow, this outpour and he doesn't, doesn't give you the mareh mekomos. Maybe he has these Rambams in mind, maybe he has something else in mind, I don't know, but these Rambams certainly would be an appropriate source. He says that the ma'aseh. it's even bein adam l'chaveiro, if a person can't, he can still get mechila, he can still get kappara. If a person cannot be meratzeh chaveiro, and lich'ora it's klar from when you juxtapose these two Rambams, פרק ב הלכה ז and פרק ב הלכה ט, it's klar that that's what the Rambam means. Because what the Rambam says that that עשה תשובה באחרונה ביום מיתתו כל עוונותיו נמחלים, he clearly means kol avonosov. Ai, Halacha Tes? Halacha Tes means no, if chaveiro is right there, so don't think that that you can ignore the chaver in doing teshuva. But but if that possibility doesn't exist for whatever reason. And the maiseh further raya to that comes from our halacha. Because the Rambam in our halacha in פרק ד הלכה ג, so the Rambam says mefuresh

אינו יודע חברו שחטא לו שישאל ממנו למחול לו. אף על פי כן,

again these are only things which are me'akev the teshuva, it will make it iy efshar for teshuva gemura, but but it's efshar to do teshuva. Teshuva is and again teshuva we know from Beis Aleph, teshuva gemura means the highest level of teshuva. It doesn't mean the only thing which is a real teshuva, because that's what the Rambam says also, Beis Gimmel, the Rambam uses the same lashon, it's not a teshuva gemura but it's a teshuva. And and it's a teshuva mo'eles afilu. So lich'ora you have further raya to again what emerges from juxtaposing the two halachos in Perek Beis from our halacha here as well. That that bakashas mechila is only indispensable and and the Rambam only says this absolute lashon of אינו נמחל לו לעולם when the person right now when he's looking for to do teshuva, when he's looking for the kappara and the ritzuy chaveiro is in a position to to to mefayes es chaveiro. And Halacha Gimmel, what, no, Halacha Daled, I'm sorry, just one last he'ara before we stop.

ומהן חמישה דברים העושה אותן אין חזקתו לשוב מהן לפי שהן דברים קלים בעיני רוב האדם ונמצא חוטא והוא ידמה שאין זה חטא.

So these interfere, that they impede teshuva in the sense that a person is prone to not recognizing these as chataim. If he doesn't recognize the chet then obviously he's not going to do teshuva for the chet.

א האוכל מסעודה שאינה מספקת לבעליה שזה אבק גזל והוא מדמה שלא חטא ויאמר כלום אכלתי אלא ברשותם.

A person is invited a very poor family they don't really have enough food for themselves invites him so a person is not supposed to accept that invitation and it's avak gezel if he does.

המשתמש בעבוטו של עני שהעבוט של עני אינו אלא כגון קרדום ומחרישה ויאמר בלבו אינם חסרים הרי לא גזלתי אותם.

gimmel vehamistakel ba'arayos.

מעלה על דעתו שאין בכך כלום שהוא אומר וכי בעלתי או קרבתי?

There was neither actual bi’ah asurah nor was there even kerivah legiluy arayot, there wasn't chibuk venishuk, there was no physical contact.

וכי בעלתי או קרבתי והוא אינו יודע שראיית עיניים עוון גדול הוא שהיא גורמת לגופן של עריות שנאמר ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם.

I don't know there's a little bit of a tzach de'ayuni here I don't know in this hafatzat haman maybe maybe they're not printing what it says in the manuscripts here. I don't know looking back in the shinuye nuschaot you would have expected the Rambam to quote ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם ואחרי עיניכם because the words in the pasuk that are relevant to histaklus ba'arayos are acharei eineichem not acharei levavchem. Because acharei levavchem the Rambam explained earlier in perek bet of Hilchos Avodah Zarah halacha gimel is when a person gratuitously entertains kefirah vekachshat gratuitously raises questions or challenges ikarei haemunah not that the question somehow was ever posed to him and he's struggling to answer no just gratuitously stam he decides he's going to study comparative religions and compare and compare things like that. So the Rambam says that's what ולא תתורו אחרי לבבכם is.

כך אמרו חכמים אחרי לבבכם זו מינות ואחרי עיניכם זו זנות.

I don't know this girsa here has acharei eineichem as well yeah bestam that has to be the it doesn't have the shinuye nuschaot on there but stam that has to be the that has to be the right girsa. Rambam later here that the Rambam sounds like again the the difference is conceptual not really practical but but here the Rambam defines the issur as because davar ze gorem because it's גורמת לגופן של עריות. shel arayos. But another thing, someone pointed out that if you look later in Hilchos Isurei Biah chaf aleph beis, so here the Rambam notes

ואסור לאדם לקרוץ בידיו וברגליו או לרמוז בעיניו לאחת מן העריות.

A person shouldn't wink or something like that. There shouldn't be flirtation, whatever form it takes. So לקרוץ בידיו וברגליו או לרמוז בעיניו like winking,

וכן לשחוק עמה או להקל ראש אפילו להריח בשמים שעליה או להביט ביופיה אסור וכל המתכוין לדבר זה מכת מרדות והמסתכל אפילו באצבע קטנה של אשה ונתכוין ליהנות כמי שנסתכל במקום התורף.

So here the mashma'us in the Rambam is that it's also, it's not only an issur because of, because of a syag, because of what it leads to, but that arayos are off-limits and and that translates even to things like mistakel and niskaven l'hanos. Again, it doesn't mean that the, a person sees מקומות מגולים שבה and he's not being mistakel for the purpose of hana'ah, he doesn't violate the this issur. It either means that he's looking intentionally al m'nas l'hanos or it's מקומות מכוסים שבה or it's those parts which are supposed to be covered. And even then, the Gemara in Bava Basra says leys dacha achrina, there's no other way to get where he has to go in the summertime and and they're dressed immodestly, leys dacha achrina, it's also not not assur. But conceptually in terms of what the issur is, so here in Hilchos Teshuva the Rambam defines it as a syag because davar ze goreim and in Isurei Biah, Isurei Biah sounds like no, that's per se off-limits. It's it's part of the fact that that arayos are off-limits. Okay, we'll stop here and im yirtzeh Hashem we'll resume on Sunday.