Hashem as Moral Diety; Tnai for Kiyum Maaseh Breishis

Maybe we'll, but today a little divrei aggadah before Shavuot. Some of, some of what we'll discuss, what we already discussed on Thursday night but to elaborate it as well בעזרת השם בלי נדר. Rashi quotes the Chazal on ויהי ערב ויהי בוקר יום השישי that תנאי התנה הקדוש ברוך הוא עם מעשה בראשית that when Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, so as it were, he stipulated that if Bnei Yisrael will be mekabel Torah on Vov Sivan good, and if not, so

אחזיר את העולם לתוהו ובוהו. תנאי התנה הקדוש ברוך הוא במעשה בראשית.

So let's try to, we're not coming to resolve any difficulty. There's nothing inherently difficult about that ma'amar chazal but perhaps maybe to a little bit deepen our understanding and appreciation of it. We discussed a little bit in one of the Thursday night shmuzen. We saw a very remarkable Ramban in the beginning of Parshat Kedoshim where the Ramban explains the continuum between the psukim of אל תפנו אל האלילים and וכי תזבחו זבח שלמים להשם לרצונכם תזבחוהו that אל תפנו אל האלילים means not only rachmana litzlan should a person not engage in avodah zarah but a person shouldn't even have any, shouldn't lend any credence to it. He, he shouldn't think that there's any significance to what the מתנבאים בשם עבודה זרה say. And then the Ramban quite clearly indicates that the next posuk is a direct continuation of that when it says that our avodah should be motivated and geared purely lirtzonchem to find favor before Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So the Ramban writes

והטעם שלא תחשבו שיהיה בעבודת הצלמים שום תועלת ולא תעשו עבודת השם הנכבד על מנת לקבל פרס אלא לעשות רצונו כי רצונו הפשוט הוא הראוי והמחייב.

So we saw the Ramban is clearly linking the two psukim as though ridding ourselves of the shelo lishma of על מנת לקבל פרס is part of the, is the ultimate and completion of the אל תפנו אל האלילים that shelo lishma is part of an avodah zarah-dik mindset. That's what we discussed. I think we elaborated with two other Rambans kimdomani. Ramban in the beginning of, at the end of Parshat Shemot when Moshe and Aharon come to Paroh and they say

כה אמר השם אלוקי ישראל שלח את עמי ויחוגו לי במדבר.

So Paroh's reaction is מי השם אשר אשמע בקולו לא ידעתי את השם. And then Moshe and Aharon seemingly repeat and they say ויאמרו אלוקי העברים נקרה עלינו. So the Ramban explains very beautifully that Moshe and Aharon realized that they hadn't been, they hadn't used the exact words Hakadosh Baruch Hu had told them. That Paroh said I know Elokim but I don't know yud-kay-vov-kay and that's why הם נזכרו וחזרו ואמרו לו that Hakadosh Baruch Hu had takeh told them to speak in the name of Elokei Ha'ivrim. So Paroh knows Elokim. Paroh doesn't know yud-kay-vov-kay. So what's the pshat in that? So we suggested that again the lashon Elokim means power. It means shofet, shalit, serarah, mi chamocha ba'elim, yesh le'el yadi. It means power. That the whole understanding that ovdei avodah zarah have of deity is just The deity is a powerful being. Is a powerful being. Yud-Kei-Vav-Kei suggests something, we'll see soon bli neder im yirtze Hashem, something much more and something very, very in terms of the the whole of the conception, very, very different. Per se, I never heard of that. Per se, I never heard of that. I think we mentioned that also, that the Ramban at the beginning of Parshas Vayikra quotes the meimar Chazal at the end of the Gemara in Menachos that throughout, throughout the parsha of Korbanos so everything is to Hashem and and the Torah consistently אשה ריח ניחוח להשם, tzafon lifnei Hashem, the Torah always employs the Shem Hashem of Yud-Kei-Vav-Kei not that of the of Elokim. So we suggested that the pshat is again not only that the Korbanos should be to Hakadosh Baruch Hu and not rachmana litzlan to avoda zara, to elohim acherim, but that what Chazal have in mind is is that it shouldn't be to even even to Hakadosh Baruch Hu it shouldn't be with that avoda zara-dik conception of of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and should be davka to Yud-Kei-Vav-Kei. I think all this we discussed on Thursday night. My son-in-law pointed out to me the Ramban, there's a remarkable Ramban that sort of corroborates this. If you take a look in Shemos 22:19 on the pasuk of זובח לאלהים יחרם בלתי להשם לבדו. So to the peshuto shel mikra, obviously is that elohim here is lashon chol, that's the way Rashi says l'elohim, Rashi says l'avoda zara. The Ramban has one line, again cryptic k'darko. He says:

ויש בכאן עוד בדרך הזה סוד עמוק יובן ממנו ענין הקרבנות ויכול המשכיל לדעתו ממה שכתבנו במקום אחר. ועוד רמזנו אנחנו בתורת כהנים בעזרת השם יתברך שמו לעד ולנצח.

So the Ramban says based on what I'm going to tell you at the beginning of Vayikra there's another pshat in this pasuk. So the pshat is what he means, the pshat is what he means is that even if a person is mechavein to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, it shouldn't be with that even if you would read it bilashon kodesh, not bilashon chol, it shouldn't be with that avoda zara-dik conception of of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and that the korban is simply a way to placate the the ultimate power and even if a person would have a monotheistic conception of of that, even if it would be elokim bilashon kodesh, but that's what the pasuk is saying bilti l'Hashem levado. Okay. So let's maybe I don't remember if we discussed it then but itachen, I don't remember if we discussed this already on Thursday night, that itachen that this approach of the Ramban, and that's what the Ramban writes in Parshas Kedoshim, that the contrast על מנת לקבל פרס is that רצונו הפשוט הוא הטוב והמחיה because again because if Hakadosh Baruch Hu is just a powerful being, so there's no room for avoda lishmah, but if Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a perfect being, the source of chochmah, the source of morality, the source of chesed, so then רצונו הפשוט הוא הטוב והמחיה. So the Ramban would would provide us with an answer for for the following question. That אמר רב יהודה אמר רב the meimar with which you're all familiar, it appears in a few places

לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ומצות אפילו שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

So the question is, so it's takeh a psychological, a religious principle that מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. Okay. But what's but רב יהודה אמר רב says more than that, רב יהודה אמר רב says as it were that the only reason to be oseik shelo lishmah is because mitoch shelo lishmah you'll be ba lishmah. So that's a pelleh. Lichora you have to do things Hakadosh Baruch Hu said to do it, so do it. Hakadosh Baruch Hu said to do it, do it. The the purity of motivation is is extra, is optimal, but but you don't need the even that's zol zein that it wasn't מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה so אף על פי כן the Torah said b'erev tochlu matzos so so you have to eat matzah whether or not you have a ideal kavonah or not. So ela mai, yitachen that according to the Ramban, the answer is that that every shelo lishma really is on a certain level, I mean, deeply, deeply objectionable because it insinuates a distorted conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That every, every shelo lishma, again, insinuates, okay, so this is a power that I need to stay on His good side. So I need to placate Him, I need to, I need to, I need to, I need to get along with Him. So that, that insinuated distortion, so yitachen that maybe it's not so poshut, maybe it's not so poshut to do things shelo lishma. So comes רב יהודה אמר רב and says, all that is true and the hashkafa is all true, halacha l'ma'aseh לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצוות אפילו שלא לשמה. A person should do shelo lishma, a person should never hesitate because he thinks, he feels, he knows that he's doing shelo lishma. A person should always do שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. But l'ma'aseh, l'ma'aseh, there really is something, something very, very wrong about shelo lishma because of, it's not just a lack of purity of motivation on our part, it, again, there's a conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu that it insinuates which is deeply troubling. Now on that pasuk what Pharaoh says in Parshas Shemos,

מי השם אשר אשמע בקולו לא ידעתי את השם וגם את ישראל לא אשלח.

So the Sforno says, לא ידעתי את השם. If there were a contest throughout history of who could say the most in the fewest words, the Sforno would zicher, zicher be in amongst the finalists for that contest. It's extraordinary how much he compresses the gift he had into so few words. So the Sforno writes, לא ידעתי שום נמצא מהווה אחר אפסות מוחלט. Meaning Pharaoh understood, he didn't understand, but he understood, that when Moshe Rabbeinu invokes כה אמר השם יקוק אלקי ישראל, that what the name יקוק represents, and all meforshim say this in Aseres Hadibros on Anochi Hashem Elokecha as well, that the שם יקוק comes from loshon havayah, right, it's derived from the root of havayah which means existence, and therefore it implies amongst other things: A, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is kadmon, right, that He exists eternally in that He is existence, and that B, what that also implies is that He alone exists eternally, He alone is existence, and everything else Hakadosh Baruch Hu brought into existence, Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives existence to. So Pharaoh said, I never, ever heard of briah yesh me'ayin. I know from Aristotle that the world is eternal. I never, ever heard of a briah yesh me'ayin. So let's, let's perhaps, again, try to understand just a little bit the depth of this. The Rav zechono livracha used to say, and he has this in a lot of his in his written works as well, that the pshat in the pasuk in Tehillim, Olam chesed yibaneh, means that without ascribing motivation for why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world. We don't know why Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, and it's impossible, that's beyond the limits of human inquiry. We only know Hakadosh Baruch Hu through His actions. To know why He created the world is to think about Him independent of His actions, right, even before His actions. So that's beyond human understanding, beyond the boundaries of human inquiry. So nothing we're saying is ascribing In the beginning of Yesodei HaTorah, the Rambam writes that אם יעלה על הדעת that Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't exist, so nothing else could exist. But אם יעלה על הדעת that nothing else existed, so then לא יבטל הוא לביטולם, meaning that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is absolutely independent. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't need

שהכל צריכים לו והוא אינו צריך לו לו להם ולא לאחד מהם.

That everything that exists depends upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and Hakadosh Baruch Hu depends upon nothing either individually or collectively. So that being the case, again, without describing reason, we just know that berias ha-olam was an act of chesed. Was an altruistic act, was an act of chesed because there was nothing in it for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't need it. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't need the world. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is absolutely self-sufficient and that's what it means that olam chesed yibaneh, that our conception of of berias ha-olam is that it's an act of chesed. The emes is the the Ran, I think you'll find this idea in many places, but you have it in the Ran as well. The Ran here in Drasha Hashishis, the Ran writes as follows: ein safeik. In this edition, it's page resh yud tes. ein safeik says the Ran שהמציאות הזה כולו חסד פשוט. That existence is is pure chesed

כמו שאמר הכתוב עולם חסד יבנה כי לא קדם לנו דבר ראוי שנקבל עליו גמול.

There was nothing that anyone or anything did to to deserve to warrant being being created. That's the idea that the Rav used to used to talk about. I think some say that's what it means when we say in Shmoneh Esrei that mechalkel chayim bechesed. That that chesed means the same thing in in the bracha there, in mechalkel chayim bechesed. Again, it means a chesed which is which is a a just totally pure unadulterated chesed. If you take a look at the end of Sefer Iyov, you see something you see something remarkable. After after the the whole sefer presents what Iyov and and and the others say, so then Hakadosh Baruch Hu appears to to Iyov. And Hakadosh Baruch Hu says to Iyov, there's the the whole string of psukim, Hakadosh Baruch Hu says to Iyov where were you when I created the world? And several psukim describing the beriah. And then inserted into those psukim there's one pasuk, one half pasuk. If you take a look at the Ibn Ezra on that pasuk where Hakadosh Baruch Hu says that how the sun comes up and it and it does away with, it it punishes the reshaim. And then the psukim go back again to talking about how Iyov doesn't understand anything about about the entire beriah. So what you have there in those... world and and confronting Iyov with his complete ignorance of the natural world. Then within that Hakadosh Baruch Hu mentions and you don't understand anything about how I punish reshaim because the pshat is, this is what the Rav used to say, the pshat is once you have this idea that olam chesed yibaneh, so then that the world is a that Briat Haolam is a moral act on Hakadosh Baruch Hu's part. It was an act of chesed, it was a moral act. So then there's no line between natural law and between moral law because Briat Haolam isn't just again a natural and scientific event, it's something which at its root, at its core, is a chesed, is a moral act. So kumt ois like this, when Paroh says מי השם אשר אשמע בקולו, so Paroh says I never heard of a being who creates the world yesh me'ayin. Because my gods don't create the world yesh me'ayin, so they're not moral beings. I know, I know you can talk to me about Elokim which represents power. You're talking about Hashem who created the world yesh me'ayin, you're talking about a notion of Elokus which is not simply power. Avada it's part of it, avada part of our conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is that he's Ba'al Hakochos Kulam, but you're talking to me about Hakadosh Baruch Hu who was מהווה כל נמצא אחר אפיסות מוחלט, so you're talking to me about a moral being. That's not part of my religious conception or part of my religious understanding. So there's a direct correlation here between the belief in yesh me'ayin and what one's conception of Elokus is. That's what emerges and that's what the Ramban is saying that avoda shelo lishma, so that's associated with avoda zara. Avoda zara doesn't believe in yesh me'ayin, it's just placating a power, staying on the good side of a power. Believe in yesh me'ayin, so then it's olam chesed yibaneh, so then the conception of Elokus is entirely different. תנאי התנה הקדוש ברוך הוא עם מעשה בראשית, so maybe a little bit of the omek of that Ma'amar Chazal, again we're not coming to resolve any difficulty, there's no difficulty with it, but maybe a little bit of the omek of the pshat is like this: that Hakadosh Baruch Hu said I created the world again, it's not just a remarkable scientific accomplishment to have created such a world, but this was a moral act on my part. It's a moral creation. It's not just a natural and scientific creation, it's a moral creation. תנאי התנה הקדוש ברוך הוא עם מעשה בראשית in order for the world to continue to exist, it's not just enough that the law of gravity will continue to function and all the other natural laws. No, but the natural laws are intertwined with the moral laws and it will only be if Klal Yisrael be mekabel haTorah, so then Ma'aseh Bereishis will be able to endure, will be able to exist because again because Ma'aseh Bereishis is a moral creation, so only if there will be Torah in the world can this be sustained. It's not pshat that it's simply a natural. Yeah, okay, so we know that after yom tov we'll go back to the sidrei hazmanim. א גוט יום טוב.