Existential Awareness of Tenuousness of Life

Continuing with the Rambam here in Sefer Hamitzvot, the mitzvah of Yirat Hashem, and the mitzvah, the fourth, she-tzivanu להאמין ביראתו יתעלה u-le-hifached mimenu

ולא נהיה ככופרים ההולכים בקרי אבל נירא ביאת עונשו בכל עת

ve-hu omro yis'aleh את ה׳ אלהיך תירא. The phrase אבל נירא ביאת עונשו בכל עת minimally means that the mitzvah is to have a constant sense, awareness of Yirat Ha-onesh, but Yirat Ha-onesh should be something that a person is always mindful of. But maybe the "at all times" is a double modifier, and maybe the full translation is that a person should always have a sense of Yirat Ha-onesh that could be forthcoming at any time. Maybe the "at all times" is not just a modifier of the verb, of the fear, but it's also a modifier of potential onesh. So perhaps that question can be resolved, the Mishnah in Avot, Nitai HaArbeli omer: Harchek mishachen ra, ואל תתחבר לרשע, ואל תתיאש מן הפורענות. What does that last phrase ואל תתיאש מן הפורענות mean? So the Rambam writes: כשתחטא או תראה חוטא, whether one is reflecting upon one's own sin rachmana litzlan and culpability or that of someone else,

לא תבטח ותאמר שהשם יתברך לא יעניש שהוא אלא בעולם הבא ולא תתיאש מהנקם ממנו מהרה על החטא ההוא.

Don't think that puranut necessarily is far off, that it's something which is remote, something which is distant. No, it could be maherah. So the peshat is, in light of this comment of the Rambam, that the full translation of this phrase אבל נירא ביאת עונשו בכל עת is that the "at all times" is a double modifier, that the yirah should be a constant awareness, and it should be a yirah of the prospect that onesh could be forthcoming at any time. That second element suggests the same type of mindset as again the Mishnah in Avot, the Gemara in Shabbat, of שוב יום אחד לפני מיתתך. A person doesn't know when that is. So ein hachi nami, so he should do teshuvah today. לעולם יראה אדם את עצמו, the way the Rambam presents it in Hilchot Teshuvah:

לעולם יראה אדם את עצמו כאילו הוא נוטה למות ושמא ימות בשעתו ונמצא עומד בחטאו לפיכך ישוב מחטאיו מיד ולא יאמר כשאזקן אשוב שמא ימות קודם שיזקן. הוא ששלמה אמר בחכמתו בכל עת יהיו בגדיך לבנים ושמן על ראשך אל יחסר.

So let's try, בעזרת השם בלי נדר, to get a little perspective and context on this. On the one hand, the halachah is, and it's a halachah, that שמא ימות לא חיישינן. If you have an eishes kohen and her husband is muparesh viyotzei bashayara, he goes to medinas hayam. So she's not chosheshes that maybe there's no sofek that maybe her husband's no longer alive. No, he's bechezkas chai and she continues to eat trumah as an eishes kohen is allowed to do. The Torah encourages us to make plans for the future.

לעולם ילמד אדם תורה ואחר כך ילמד אומנות ואחר כך ישא אשה.

If a person really entertained a very very big sofek whether he would ever ply his trade, whether he would ever be in a position to or need the omnus, it wouldn't make any sense to spend time learning the omnus. So clearly we do operate and we're supposed to operate, not just that we do, but al pi din we're supposed to operate with an assumption that a person is going to live a normal lifespan. Simultaneously there's also room and again with all the implications of that expectation. Simultaneously there's also room for

לעולם יראה אדם עצמו כאילו הוא נוטה למות ושמא ימות בשעה זו.

There's room for נראה בעיני שונאו בכל עת. So it's not a contradiction, but it's worthwhile to try to just articulate what that, how those two perspectives integrate. So on a superficial level one could simply say that when it comes to again let's say the example we gave of לעולם ילמד אדם אומנות ואחר כך ישא אשה, so a person should invest the time to learn the omnus. Once upon a time it probably meant becoming an apprentice for a few years, now it would mean getting the requisite education and degrees. So just as a matter of practicality a person can't in that context see כאילו יראה עצמו כאילו הוא נוטה למות. And if he doesn't then he's going to starve, so I guess it would be a self-fulfilling chashash so that's not too desirable. So just practically mah shein kein there's nothing impractical about doing teshuva today. There's nothing impractical about not procrastinating and not postponing teshuva. So on one level one could simply say that sort of practicality determines what the operating assumption is. But lichora the a little bit of the omek hadavar is that it's not a little bit of the omek hadavar is that what is the mindset of שמא ימות בשעה זו? The mindset of נראה בעיני שונאו בכל עת highlights the tenuousness of life. It highlights a person's complete and total vulnerability and all the emphasis and all the Torah mandated exertion and hishtadlus and initiative and effort and effort a person should take, but his ultimate helplessness. A person can't guarantee any result from one second to the next, most importantly his own, his own existence. That's what the mindset of shema yamut bashata highlights. That actuarial tables are predictors but not, not guarantors. So itachen again what a little bit of the omek is is that not just as a matter of practicality, but if the issue is a practical issue, so then the vantage point is the natural one. If the issue is an existential issue, so then the vantage point should be existential. To, again, let's return to the, to the example that we've been using of Yom hamovess, so that's a practical, that, that exists on the practical level, on the natural level. So the vantage point from which the Torah says to approach that is the natural one. So on a natural level, again, actuarial tables predict what, what, what one's life expectancy is. Tshuva's not a practical issue, and even truma hagam that it's a mitzva, but it's part of the mundane, it's part of eating, it's part of natural life. Tshuva is not, is not practical, tshuva's something existential. If when it comes to, to something existential, so then the vantage point should not be the practical one, the vantage point should be an existential one, and existentially life is tenuous. A person doesn't have a, a grip, a grasp on life, a person is totally helpless. If the medubar is existential, yiras honesh, tshuva, so then the perspective, the mindset should be existential. Itachen that this, this approach is, is strengthened by the fact why did the Rambam hold off until perek zayin to share this perspective? The Rambam talked about the chiyuv tshuva earlier in the first perek of hilchos tshuva also. So why didn't the Rambam say in perek bais for instance? He should have said not just because the tshuva if he's at the same stage of life is optimal, but he should have said there's another compelling consideration also, that a person doesn't know if he procrastinates whether he'll ever get to do the tshuva. He doesn't, he doesn't bring that perspective to bear earlier in hilchos tshuva, only in perek zayin. So itachen that in light of what we're discussing the explanation is that earlier in hilchos tshuva the Rambam's talking about doing tshuva for a discrete cheit. Person rachmana litzlan is guilty of a specific cheit,

כל מצוה שבתורה בין עשה בין לא תעשה אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן, איזהו תשובה גמורה זה שבא בידו.

chuva for specific chet, chuva for specific chet again is something limited. In Perek Zayin, the Rambam isn't talking about chuva for specific chet.

כל רשות כל אדם נתונה לו כמו שביארנו ישתדל אדם לעשות תשובה ולנקות כפיו מחטאיו.

Here the Rambam already is talking about changing the whole person. So the chuva has been elevated from sort of a delimited chiyuv to something existential. Or once, once chuva is on that level, so now the vantage point becomes the existential vantage point and now a person should, in this context, operate with that understanding of existentially how tenuous and unpredictable life is. Yitachen that there's another example of when a person should adopt again this existential vantage point rather than the natural vantage point which we're supposed to operate with in most other contexts. In Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Teshuvah, the Rambam writes that

כל אחד ואחד מבני האדם יש לו זכויות ועוונות מי שזכויותיו יתירות על עוונותיו צדיק ומי שעוונותיו יתירות על זכויותיו רשע מחצה למחצה בינוני וכן מהמדינה וכן כל העולם כולו.

In Halacha Gimmel,

כשם ששוקלין עוונות אדם וזכויותיו בשעת מיתתו כך בכל שנה ושנה שוקלין עוונות כל אחד ואחד מבאיי העולם עם זכויותיו ביום טוב של ראש השנה מי שנמצא צדיק נחתם לחיים ומי שנמצא רשע נחתם למיתה.

Skipping a few lines,

לפיכך צריך כל האדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב וכן כל העולם חציו זכאי וחציו חייב חטא חטא אחד הרי הכריע עצמו והכריע את כל העולם כולו לכף חובה וגרם לו השחתה עשה מצווה אחת הרי הכריע עצמו והכריע כל העולם כולו לכף זכות וגרם להן תשועה והצלה.

So what's the logical sequence here? So the metzius of HaKadosh Baruch Hu's hanhagah of the world is that a person is, if he's זכויותיו יתירות על עוונותיו, he's tzaddik, rachmana litzlan the opposite, he's the opposite. The same, the same classification is given to a medinah, the same classification to the world. It's also part of HaKadosh Baruch Hu's hanhagah of the world that on Rosh Hashanah, כל אחד ואחד מבאיי עולם, his avonos and zechuyos are weighed and a determination is made בדעתו של קל דעות whether the person is a tzaddik or a rasha. Why does it follow from there that

צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה כאילו חציו זכאי וחציו חייב?

Imagine every, the first of every month, you have to pay the rent. The rent is a thousand dollars. So all month long you should see yourself as having only a thousand dollars and if you waste one dollar you won't be able to pay the rent and no, okay, the reality is that I have to pay a thousand dollars on the first of the month and let me make a candid assessment, I've got fifteen thousand dollars in the bank so it's not nothing to worry about. I've got twenty dollars in the bank and then I've got to roll up my sleeves here and see what can be done. Well, why does it follow that a person? See itachen and here I'm I don't know if I'm repeating or adapting he’aros from my son. itachen what the Rambam is saying is not something practical. Rambam's not saying as a matter of practicality you never know it could be it could be that right now you're in a perfect perfectly balanced averos and zechuyos and whether you waste the next five minutes or learn the next five minutes is going to make all the difference in the world for you. Could be moreover that the whole world is in a perfect balance and whether you learn the next five minutes or waste the next five minutes is going to have cosmic consequences. What are the odds of that being true? All right, so the Rambam says we don't really know because the whole shikul is בדעתו של קל דעות so we have no idea what the odds are. But אף על פי כן we have no reason to think it's not true but we also have no reason to think it is true because we have no musag of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's system. So why does it follow? Kavyachol no, itachen that the lefichach is not is not that the Rambam is telling us practically, Rambam is telling us heyos that existentially a person can end up a tzaddik, a person can end up differently. Heyos that existentially the world can end up being tzaddik, the world can end up הן לטוב הן למוטב can end up in the opposite way. So then mimmela existentially that's the mindset a person has to have of that everything is hanging in the balance and that anything and everything I do is so consequential. And here too maybe maybe this havana is strengthened by noticing so

כשם ששוקל עבירות אדם וזכויותיו בשעת מיתתו כך בכל שנה ושנה שוקל עבירות כל אחד ואחד מבאי עולם וזכויותיו ביום טוב של ראש השנה.

So the yom hadin is יום טוב של ראש השנה. But the lefichach is צריך כל אדם שיראה עצמו כל השנה כולה. Why kol hashanah kulah? I don't know, maybe Rosh Chodesh Elul, maybe once you begin slichos, or maybe erev Rosh Hashanah. No, on Tu B'Shvat. There's going to be a yom hadin on Rosh Hashanah, so since there's going to be a yom hadin on Rosh Hashanah, so I better make sure that I know the dinei kadima u'brachos for all my for my fruit platter on Tu B'Shvat. How does how does that follow? No, because the Rambam is not telling us that this follows from practical logic. It follows from existential logic. A person should realize that what it means to be human is to be hanging in the balance. That a person can go shtei drachim lefanav and a person can go in either of those two drachim and because of that existentially he should feel that he's hanging in the balance and that whatever he does is potentially so so consequential. Lulai demistafina, but ma'aseh sometimes it's good to be afraid. Lulai demistafina. The Gemara Kiddushin says that

לעולם ישלש אדם שנותיו שליש במקרא שליש במשנה שליש בתלמוד.

So the Gemara says מי יודע כמה חיי. So the Gemara answers ela le-yomei. Okay. So maybe here it doesn't compel the yesod that we're talking about because מי יודע כמה חיי, even if a person's not going to be choshesh shema yamut in the near future, okay, but if a person doesn't know if he's going to live to be 70 or 80 or 90, so then how does he know at age 20 is he dividing up 50 years, 60 years, or 70 years? But le-maiseh, Rashi understands that the Gemara of מי יודע כמה חיי le-yomei, when the Gemara answers, so Rashi says you're dividing up the days of the week. So two days of the week is mikra, two days of the week is mishna, two days of the week is talmud. And Tosfos is masig on Rashi and says no, how does a person know he's going to live out the week? So Tosfos understands that the kasha מי יודע כמה חיי that it means more than what we just said, a person doesn't know to divide into three equal parts. I have to know what the total is to know what a you have to know what the total is to know what a third represents. But Tosfos, no, Tosfos objects to Rashi, Tosfos objects to Rashi even in assuming that the Gemara is objecting to even assuming that the person will live out the week. Okay, so maybe maybe at a certain age, at a certain advanced age, I don't know, but itachen that the pshat is that talmud torah also, unlike the the mitzvos aseih, but talmud torah also is something which is to be classified as something existential and and is supposed to be approached and viewed through this lens. And the existential lens again is the tenuousness and the and the helplessness and the vulnerability, and and that's the מי יודע כמה חיי. So mimaila legabei talmud torah, so the שליש במקרא שליש במשנה שליש בתלמוד is is something which translates into a a daily division and according to the Ba'alei ha-Tosfos and and not even a not even a a weekly division. Just to maybe state the the obvious, this existential vantage point that that we're trying to identify has nothing to do with with morbidity, nothing to do with with having a depressed outlook on on life, having a morbid point of view. It's it's entirely consistent with תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלהיך בשמחה. But simcha doesn't require simcha is entirely compatible with an existentially true and accurate picture of of human frailty. So we're not talking about a sense of there's a difference between morbidity is when a person is choshesh shema yamut on a natural level, but when it comes from this again existential vantage point, it has nothing in common with morbidity, but it's just an orientation that a person has as to what it means to be. a helpless, again, all the chiyuv of hishtadlus and effort and initiative notwithstanding, but ultimately helpless being who is kachomer beyad hayotzer.