Eumah, Esteeming Mitzvos, Purim

Last week we talked about hashgacha pratis. Tonight perhaps also with Purim in mind we'll move to a closely related topic, the topic of emuna. Obviously there are many many elements, many many subtopics, but we're going to focus primarily on one. Emuna is central to Purim, which basically is a yom tov of devoted to mechiyas Amalek. We're all familiar with the famous mishna in Rosh Hashana commenting on the pasuk of

והיה כאשר ירים משה ידו וגבר ישראל וכאשר יניח ידו וגבר עמלק,

and then not coincidentally the Torah says the lashon ויהי ידיו אמונה עד בא השמש, that the instrument with which Amalek is vanquished is emuna. And the reason for that is because Amalek represents asher korcha baderech. Rashi quotes three pshatim, the first of course is lashon mikre that Amalek embodies the denial of hashgacha pratis, the denial of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's involvement in the world, and the only way that can be countered is with vayehi yadav emuna, בזמן שישראל משעבדים לבם לאביהם שבשמים, and yesh leha'arich baze. But instead I want tonight to talk about another element of emuna which is critical, integral to milchemes Amalek. And that is, besides the obvious relevance of the haftara Parshas Zachor that it deals with another confrontation with Amalek, there's another important connection between the haftara and Parshas Zachor. The Navi says as follows:

ויהי דבר ה' אל שמואל לאמר נחמתי כי המלכתי את שאול למלך כי שב מאחרי ואת דברי לא הקים ויחר לשמואל ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה. וישכם שמואל לקראת שאול בבקר ויגד לשמואל לאמר בא שאול הכרמל והנה מציב לו יד ויסב ויעבר וירד הגלגל. ויאמר שמואל מה קול הצאן הזה באזני.

And then a couple of psukim later,

ויאמר שמואל אל שאול הרף ואגידה לך את אשר דבר ה' אלי הלילה ויאמר לו דבר.

And then Shmuel goes on to relate to him the very sharp and devastating tochacha which Hakadosh Baruch Hu had communicated to him. What's remarkable about these psukim? What was Shmuel's reaction when he first hears that Hakadosh Baruch Hu has decided that malchus Yisrael will not continue through Shaul? So the Navi tells us that vayichar leShmuel. Shmuel was angry, he was outraged. Obviously kavyachol Shmuel didn't agree. Shmuel obviously felt vayichar leShmuel, vayichar leShmuel. Right, it's reminiscent of Yona getting angry. Obviously Shmuel felt that kavyachol that this wasn't a just decree, it wasn't a just gzira, and ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה in an effort to overcome. What would we have expected in the morning when the night ended unsuccessfully for Shmuel? We would have expected Shmuel to come somewhat stammering, stuttering, and apologetically telling Shaul, you know, I don't really understand it and I empathize with you, but what can I do? I have to relay this message which the Ribbono shel Olam sent. That's not what he says. If you only see and hear Shmuel in his encounter with Shaul, so you would imagine, you would feel that Shmuel was so outraged at Shaul's behavior that he thousand percent endorsed the gezeirah. You don't see any trace, there's not even a shemetz of that initial reaction, a reaction which lasted all night of ויחר לשמואל ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה. So what happened? So clearly Shmuel realized that if all his tefillos notwithstanding HaKadosh Baruch Hu refused to reverse what he had said, נחמתי כי המלכתי את שאול למלך. So Shmuel obviously realized that maybe he didn't have, he, Shmuel HaNavi, didn't have the moral capacity to understand why what HaKadosh Baruch Hu was saying was right. But that notwithstanding, he had a thousand percent conviction that if that's what the Ribbono shel Olam is telling him and that's what the Ribbono shel Olam is communicating to him, so then that must be right. And therefore when he talks to Shaul, so he's not, he's not role-playing, he's not posturing rachmana litzlan. He's speaking with a hundred a thousand percent, again, conviction that this is the right thing, that the punishment which HaKadosh Baruch Hu has decreed is the right thing, though he personally in terms of his own personal moral sense doesn't really understand it. But nevertheless, his acceptance is not simply a hachna'ah that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is omnipotent, is the Ribbono shel Olam, and therefore we follow what he says. No, the acceptance is not just that we have to accept it, we have to follow it, the acceptance is predicated on the notion that what HaKadosh Baruch Hu says is right. And that's a very important component of emunah is in situations where we are called upon to display emunah, it doesn't simply mean to begrudgingly accept what HaKadosh Baruch Hu says. It means to affirm what HaKadosh Baruch Hu says. It means to accept it as what's right and what's true. To affirm it, not merely to begrudgingly accept it. We'll give several examples of that in a minute. Now, Amalek lich'ora is the mitzvah, the paradigm of a mitzvah, mechiyas Amalek is the paradigm of a mitzvah which offends our moral sensibility. The famous Gemara in Yuma, it's also a Midrash Rabbah in Koheles on the pasuk of

אל תהי צדיק הרבה. בשעה שאמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא לשאול לך והכית את עמלק אמר ומה נפש אחת אמרה תורה הבא עגלה ערופה כל הנפשות הללו על אחת כמה וכמה.

The Torah tea- teaches us that one life is so valuable, is so precious, is so unique, that we have the whole parsha of Egla Arufa. כל הנפשות הללו על אחת כמה וכמה. And then, it's

משורת הדין אם אדם חטא בהמה מה חטאה אם גדולים חטאו קטנים מה חטאו,

how can it be a mitzvah to kill innocent children? יצאה בת קול ואמרה לו אל תהי צדיק הרבה. A person can't be more moral, more sensitive, more understanding than the Ribono Shel Olam. And that also is part of the link between the Haftarah and the Krias HaTorah Parshas Zachor. The Krias HaTorah Parshas Zachor of Timchei Zecher Amalek means perhaps, not perhaps, but definitely you can't understand it. It doesn't correspond to your moral sense, but part of your emuna is again not only to accept it in the sense of, well we're weaker and Hakadosh Baruch Hu is stronger and He's the Ribono Shel Olam so we have no choice b'leys brera we accept it, but rather as we see Shmuel accepting it, meaning that maybe we don't have the moral capacity or the profound understanding to understand why it's right, but we're supposed to accept it again, not simply begrudgingly b'leys brera, but with a sense of affirmation that it's not only metzuva but that it's emes. And that's an important and critical component of emuna. Let me just mention a few other sources which point to that. First of all the Gemara in Berachos which we mentioned a few weeks ago where the Gemara has the chiyuv of saying the beracha of Dayan Emes. So the Gemara says

חייב לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה, אמר רבא לא נצרכה אלא לקבולינהו בשמחה.

Based on this Gemara the Rema paskens in Yoreh Deah that when a person makes the beracha, when a person says tziduk hadin, so a person is not supposed to say what can you do, that's what the Ribono Shel Olam wanted, because the implication the Rema says is well, if somehow or other we could have had our way Rachmana l'tzlan against the Ribono Shel Olam's way then we would have. The Rema says on the contrary when the person says Baruch Dayan Emes he's supposed to affirm the correctness and the truth of what Hakadosh Baruch Hu did, not just an acknowledgment of submission but an affirmation, an affirmation, and that's the essence again of this dimension of emuna which we're discussing. Similarly the Rambam writes at the end of Hilchos Meila as follows

ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף עניינם כפי כוחו. ודבר שלא ימצא לו טעם ולא ידע לו עילה,

let's say you study a mitzvah and it doesn't seem to make any sense, there's no self-evident reason,

אל יהי קל בעיניו ולא יהרוס לעלות אל ה' פן יפרוץ בו, ולא תהא מחשבתו בו כמחשבתו בשאר דברי החול. בוא וראה כמה החמירה תורה במעילה, ומה אם עצים ואבנים ועפר ואפר כיוון שנקרא שם אדון העולם עליהם בדברים בלבד נתקדשו, וכל הנוהג בהן מנהג חול מעל בה ואפילו היה שוגג צריך כפרה, קל וחומר למצווה שחקק לנו הקדוש ברוך הוא שלא יבעט האדם בהן מפני שלא ידע טעמן, ולא יחפה דברים שלא כן על השם ולא יחשוב בהן מחשבה כדברי חול. הרי נאמר בתורה ושמרתם את כל חוקותי ואת כל משפטי ועשיתם אותם, אמרו חכמים ליתן שמירה ועשייה לחוקים כמשפטים. העשייה ידועה והיא שיעשה החוקים.

So what else do we have to do? What more is there to do besides asiya? The Torah says do the mitzvah, I did it. So what more do you want from me? והשמירה שיזהר בהן ולא ידמה שהן פחותין מן המשפטים. So the Rambam says, my father kaparat mishkavo always called attention to this Rambam, that shmirah is an obligation to esteem the chukim. Ushmartem va'asitem means that we're not yotzei our chova just by observing and fulfilling mitzvot, but there's a chiyuv to esteem them even if, even if we're stumped by the mitzvah and even if we don't begin to understand the mitzvah.

לתת שמירה ועשייה שיזהר בהן ולא ידמה שהן פחותין מן המשפטים.

The same thing, the same point the Rambam makes in a more with a narrower focus. Here it encompasses all chukim and by implication all mitzvot. The Rambam says in Hilchos Avodah Zarah after he talks about the issur of

לשאול באוב וידעוני מכשף אוחז העיניים ודברים האלו כולן דברי שקר וכוזב הן והם שהטעו בהן עובדי כוכבים הקדמונים לגויי הארצות כדי שינהגו אחריהם ואין ראוי לישראל שהם חכמים מחוכמים להימשך בהבלים אלו ולא להעלות על לב שיש תועלת בהן כל המאמין בדברים האלו וכיוצא בהן ומחשב בליבו שהן אמת ודבר חכמה אבל התורה אסרהן אינן אלא מן הסכלים ומחסרי הדעת.

It's not enough just to abstain from all these idolatrous practices ov, yidoni, kishuf etc., but a person has to, again, not just to submit, not just to comply, but a person has to affirm the truth of what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is telling us. The Ramban al haTorah makes the same point in Parshas Eikev. The pasuk

כי אם שמור תשמרון את כל המצווה הזאת אשר אנכי מצווה אתכם לעשותה לאהבה את ה' אלוהיכם ללכת בכל דרכיו ולדבקה בו.

Says the Ramban

שלא תפרד מחשבתו מן ה' אל אלוהים אחרים שלא יחשוב שיהיה בעבודה זרה שום עיקר אלא הכל אפס ואין.

Again, it's not enough ulidavka bo says the Ramban adds an added, and another component to the obligation. Again, it's not enough to abstain from avodah zarah but to think maybe there's something to it rachmana litzlan, but rather

אלא הכל אפס ואין. והנה זה כמו שאמר עוד ואותו תעבודו ובו תדבקון והכוונה להזהיר שלא יעבוד ה' וזולתו אלא לה' לבדו יעבוד בלבו ובמעשיו.

And one final, there are many more that we could mention, but one final mareh makom again, it's one we've seen already, the Maggid Mishneh at the end of Hilchos Lulav where the Rambam quotes the pasuk of

תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלוהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב מרוב כל,

that the Torah is so, so harsh on someone who observes mitzvot but doesn't do it besimcha. He's מדקדק במצווה קלה וחמורה but he doesn't do it besimcha. So what's so terrible if he doesn't do it besimcha? So the Maggid Mishneh explains if he doesn't do it besimcha, so it means that he, that he basically is only submitted, but really he thinks that these are burdensome. He doesn't think that this is the right thing to do. He thinks that this is burdensome, onerous, it's something I have to do lelais breira because otherwise I'm gonna have to And again, give a din v'cheshbon, but he doesn't think it's right. He doesn't think it's emes. He doesn't have emunah in it, and that's why the Torah is so so harsh with this person of

תחת אשר לא עבדת את ה' אלוהיך בשמחה ובטוב לבב. חייב לעשותן והוא שמח בעשייתן.

Not מצד שהן חובה עליו והוא מוכרח ואנוס. But rather

יעשה הטוב מצד שהוא טוב ויבחר באמת מצד שהוא אמת

v'yakal b'einav tarchon. And again there are other marei mekomos. The last phrase in the Magid Mishnah of v'yakal b'einav tarchon, that whatever effort or exertion is required for kiyom hamitzvos should seem to be inconsequential in his mind. משל למה הדבר דומה, let's say a person has to dig for there's a treasure which is five feet buried five feet deep in the ground. So it's cold out so digging is very difficult because the ground is frozen. Would anyone consider it a burden? Would anyone consider it onerous to have to dig the five feet deep to get the treasure? That's what the Magid Mishnah says. Rav Moshe Feinstein had a very powerful and sobering observation. Rav Moshe zichrono livracha said we're all familiar with a phrase in Yiddish. It was a commonplace, it was margala b'fumaihu of those who came to America earlier in this century when not working on Shabbos meant losing a job. So margala b'fumaihu after a krechtz, עס איז שווער צו זיין א ייד. It's difficult to be a Jew. So Rav Moshe said that that attitude destroyed an entire generation. And the reason that the children of these people assimilated on such a large scale was because they identified Yiddishkeit with עס איז שווער צו זיין א ייד. And as difficult as it was, the reaction should have been what a minor and worthwhile sacrifice it is for the Ribono Shel Olam and his Torah. And that's exactly the Magid Mishnah's v'yakal b'einav tarchon. So not only, so what Rav Moshe adds to what we've seen in all these other marei mekomos is not only is this emunah required but also without it not only are we lacking in the emunah but it doesn't take long until we're lacking rachmana litzlan even in the actual observance as well. Now the Mishna says in Pirkei Avos Perek Kinyan Torah, נקנית במ"ח דברים. Amongst those mem ches devarim is emunas chachamim. What does emunas chachamim mean? So emunas chachamim, it should have said, it should have said kabbalas divrei hachachamim. What's the lashon emunas chachamim? So it's quite clear, the Machzor Vitry talks about this. Emunas chachamim means that there is no Torah she'baal peh if we simply submit to the authority of Chazal. There's no masorah, can't be sustained, or better, better formulated, our belief in masorah won't endure if all we do is accept the divrei hachachamim. buttressed by the lav of lo sasur, so what can I do? But it's supposed to be emunas chachamim. There's supposed to be a belief that what Chazal said, not only is authoritative, but is true. And without that, our belief in mesorah and in Torah sheba'al peh can't endure. Now, as self-evident as as that may seem, it's something which needs a lot of reinforcing. And again, Purim, a yom tov of mechiyas Amaleik, which is based on emunah, so certainly this element of emunah is also something which we need to reinforce. To say that we're Orthodox Jews and as such, we have no choice but to accept what Chazal said. We have no choice but to say brachos which Chazal formulated, but the truth is that the brachos are insulting to half of Klal Yisrael, but we have no choice but to submit to what Chazal says is not acceptable. Is not acceptable. Emunas chachamim doesn't mean to accept as authoritative and to simultaneously disparage as insulting. Emunas chachamim means that we accept and we affirm that what Chazal, what our chachmei hamesorah have taught us and have told us is not only authoritative but is true. Now we may or may not have the capacity to understand why it's true. Our reaction may be like Shmuel's reaction was, vayichal le'shmuel. But the difference in the parshah of Amaleik between Shmuel and Shaul, where Shaul was over on אל תהי צדיק הרבה the Gemara in Yuma says, and Shmuel after vayichal le'shmuel ויזעק אל ה' כל הלילה, so the Ribbono shel Olam said no, then his no is not just that he submitted, but he affirmed what the Ribbono shel Olam said. And that same attitude is not only vis-a-vis d'oraisa, the same attitude is vis-a-vis d'rabanans as well. Kimdumani that in the famous story of Rabbi Akiva, when Rabbi Akiva was in jail and had only a few precious ounces of water and said that he would rather use it for netilas yadayim than even drink what was necessary to sustain himself, that he would rather risk his life than be over al divrei chaveirav, Rabbi Akiva said. Kimdumani that Rabbi Akiva didn't simply mean that if you don't have the gezeiros and the syagim that Torah won't survive. But Rabbi Akiva said if you don't have the emunas chachamim in Chazal, so Torah won't survive either. And even though and Rabbi Akiva was muchan, he was ready literally to be moseir nefesh to reinforce that point. If if someone insinuates that Chazal acted out of a personal bias or out of a sociological bias, so the Gemara in Brachos says in Mi Shemeiso, that yechayev niduy for that. Dugma hishkuha, if you say that Shemaya and Avtalyon gave a certain psak about geirim because they themselves were geirim, not because it was correct, not because that's what they held was the halachah, but that they were just influenced, that Chazal were influenced either by a personal bias or any other any other bias, anything other than a pure Torah consideration. So that's not acceptable. And moreover, even if a person accepts it as authoritative... but to simultaneously disparage, that's not Emunas Chachamim. That's not what—if that had been acceptable, then Shmuel would have come to Shaul and said, 'What can I do? B'leis brira I have to deliver this message.' And when Shmuel speaks to Shaul, he speaks to him with 100% total conviction. In making a cheshbon hanefesh why we are nichshal in this crucial, crucial element of emuna, the answer, unpleasant though it may be, is that it's rooted in middas hagaiva. A person is over an אל תהי צדיק הרבה when he feels that his or his society or his generation's moral sense is the standard for morality and therefore what doesn't correspond is lacking in morality. Now that's basically gaiva. Basically gaiva to say that what we understand, what we feel, is the standard and therefore if we can't understand a particular bracha which chazal introduced, maybe we can, maybe we can't. But the point is whether we do understand or whether we don't understand, there are always going to be things we don't understand. In every סוגיא בכל התורה כולה, there are always going to be things we don't understand. Whether we do or whether we don't, it's very important that we attribute the flaw and the inadequacies to ourselves and

לא ישים מחשבתו בהם כמחשבתו בדברי חול ולא יחפש דברים אשר לא כן על מצוות

says the Rambam. At the beginning of the parsha of eved ivri in mishpatim, so the Ibn Ezra writes as follows:

אמר לך כלל לפני שאחל לפרש כי כל משפט או מצוה כל אחד עומד בפני עצמו אם יכולנו למצוא טעם למה דבק זה המשפט על זה או זאת המצוה על זאת נדבק בכל יכולתנו

ve'im lo yacholnu. We can't understand a particular pasuk, we can't understand a particular mitzvah, נחשוב כי החסרון בנו מחוסר דעתנו. We should attribute the chisaron to ourselves, not to the object of study. And even though at this point the Ibn Ezra only seems to be talking about d'oraisas, from his conclusion it's clear that he was also talking about how chazal interpreted the Torah. His conclusion after he then tells you that כי תקנה עבד עברי refers again not to a k'naani, not to avdo shel ivri, but actually an eved ivri, which is the way chazal tell us, after bringing all the rayos he says,

הנה התברר כי דברי קדמונינו נכונים כי עליהם נסמוך בכל המצוות כאשר קיבלו מאבותיהם.

So it's quite clear from the way he concludes that his initial omar lecha klal was not just a sense of humility vis-a-vis the Torah and Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but a sense of humility vis-a-vis chazal as well. Just mention one Midrash Rabbah in Shemos. But take a look, I'm sorry, I don't remember, I don't remember the loshen on the pasuk of Elohim lo sekallel, so Rashi already tells us from Chazal that it refers both to Birkas Hashem as well as to dayanim. So the Midrash is focusing on the second pshat that it refers to dayanim. And it says, given that the issur klala applies to any Jew, lo sekallel cheresh, it applies to anyone, so why does the Torah here single out dayanim for as the object of the klala in formulating the lav? So it says that even though there's an issur by, by any Yisroel, it's especially chomer by dayanim שמלמדים את העם משפט. And it says v'chein motzinu by Korach and adaso that nigzar dinam because they started off with Moshe and Aharon. And so too we find by the anshei Yerushalayim, ויהיו בוזים במלאכי אלוהים, the nevi'im. They were, they had contempt for the nevi'im. And then all of a sudden the Midrash switches, shifts gears. And the Midrash talks about someone who doesn't interpret the words of Chazal properly. Someone who doesn't apply himself to understanding the words of Chazal. And the implication in the Midrash is remarkable. That that same attitude of irreverence and disrespect which is evident when a person is mekallel a dayan and which the Torah so forcefully condemns, it's that same attitude which also underlies that same irreverence and lack of respect when we dismiss the words of Chazal just out of, out of hand. It doesn't make sense, it's not right, but we have to do it anyway, we have to do it anyway. And the Midrash implies by the smichas haparshiyos that that too in an axiological sense also is included in the issur of Elohim (in the sense of dayanim) lo sekallel.