Divine Foreknowledge & Free Choice (Al haTeshuva: Bechira & Teshuva, Part 3)

Hi, good morning Rabotai. I apologize for the delay. In the course of the drasha, the Rav touches upon the very cryptic and challenging Hassagas HaRavad in פרק ה הלכות תשובה. So maybe let's begin with the Rambam and then again try to see a little bit the Hassagas HaRavad and if we can understand a little bit how the Rav is explaining the Hassagas HaRavad. Shema tomar writes the Rambam in פרק ה הלכה ה. Shema tomar.

הלא הקדוש ברוך הוא יודע כל מה שיהיה קודם שיהיה.

Doesn't Hakadosh Baruch Hu know the future? Right? Hakol tzafui. Hakol tzafui. Right? And Hakadosh Baruch Hu sees, knows the future. ידא שזה צדיק או רשע או לא ידא? So again, let's be specific here. Did Hakadosh Baruch Hu know that Reuven would be a tzaddik or rasha or did He not know? אם ידא שהוא יהיה צדיק and Hakadosh Baruch Hu knew it, אי אפשר שלא יהיה צדיק. So then if the future is known, doesn't that mean the future is determined? ואם תאמר שידע שיהיה צדיק ואפשר שיהיה רשע, well He knew he'd be a tzaddik but he could have been a rasha. הרי לא ידע הדבר על בוריו. So then Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't really know. So how do you reconcile divine foreknowledge with bechira? In order to know something, it has to be, right? You can't, the same way if you're shooting an arrow, right? You can't hit a moving target. To know something, so it has to be, right? You can't know what isn't. So if Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows the future, doesn't that have to mean that the future is predetermined, the future is something set? Let's say, why do we as people, why do we know the past and not know the future? Because the past happened, the past is therefore has been determined, and therefore it's nitpas biyediya. We can and do know it. We don't know the future because certainly on the human level, so the future is indeterminate and therefore unknown. But if one says that on Hakadosh Baruch Hu's level, the future is known, so doesn't that mean that the future has already been determined? Okay.

דע שתשובת שאלה זו ארוכה מארץ מדה ורחבה מני ים וכמה עיקרים גדולים והררים רמים תלויים בה.

This question, or the answer to this question, touches upon major and profound philosophical principles. But the Rambam says I can and I do see it necessary to give a tamtzis. This is the fascinating thing. Despite the fact of just how profound this is, the Rambam felt that all of us need to have a handle on this question. He spoke about it in the Peirush Hamishnayos. He speaks about it again here in the Yad. Meaning in his chiburim that, unlike the Moreh, were not intended for some very select audience. No, it was intended for us, it was intended for all of us. And ואף על פי כן, Rambam feels that as intricate and profound and challenging as this question is, we all need to have a handle on it. We're not gonna understand it the way Rabbi Akiva and the Rambam understood it, but on our own level, we need to have some handle on this. Deh, okay, now.

כבר בארנו בפרק שני מהלכות יסודי התורה שהקדוש ברוך הוא אינו יודע בדעה שהיא חוץ ממנו כבני אדם שהן ודעתם שנים אלא הוא יתברך שמו ודעתו אחד.

Now if someone thought I didn't really understand that too well, not to worry.

אין דעה ואין דעתו של אדם יכול להשיג דבר זה על בוריו.

fully, entirely. וכשם שאין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא אמיתת הבורא, the same way a person can't understand the essence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so too a person can't understand what it means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu and his knowledge are one. A person and his knowledge are two. That's why I can learn things, I'm still the same person, I can learn things, I can forget things. A person and his knowledge are distinct. Hakadosh Baruch Hu and his knowledge are one.

שנאמר כי לא יראני האדם וחי, כך אין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא דעתו של בורא. הוא שהנביא אומר כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי נאום ה'.

The way I think and the way I know, says Hakadosh Baruch Hu, is not the way you think and you know.

וכיון שכן הוא, אין בנו כח לידע היאך ידע הקדוש ברוך הוא כל הברואים ומעשיהם.

We don't understand, as it were, the mechanism as to how Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows everything. אבל נודע בלא ספק שמעשה אדם ביד האדם, but we know that, but we do know, K-N-O-W, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows everything and even in the future and simultaneously

ואין הקדוש ברוך הוא מושכו ולא גוזר עליו לעשות כך ולא שלא לעשות כך.

So what did the Rambam answer him? So let's just see the beginning of the Hassagot HaRa'avad.

אמר אברהם לא נהג זה המחבר מנהג החכמים שאין אדם מתחיל בדבר ולא ידע להשלימו. והוא החל בשאלות ובקושיות והניח הדבר בקושיא והחזירו לאמונה. וטוב היה לו להניח הדבר בתמימות התמימים ולא יעורר ליבם ויניח דעתם בספק שמא שעה אחת יבוא הרהור בליבם על זה.

So the Ra'avad said he didn't answer. The Ra'avad says at the end of the day, the Rambam says we don't understand. So says the Ra'avad, what did the Rambam accomplish? Why raise the question if your response is going to be, well, we don't really understand? You didn't make any headway, and all you did is if there's someone out there to whom the question never occurred, maybe you've now set something which is unsettling for his emunah. So the Avodat HaMelech explains, and it's so clear that this is true, that one has to come back and try to rethink and try to understand the Ra'avad's hassagah. The Avodat HaMelech explains that the Rambam did respond to the question in the following sense. The question the Rambam points out, when we entertain the question of how is divine foreknowledge and human free will compatible, the Rambam says without realizing it, we're making a certain assumption in asking that question. We're making an assumption that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's knowledge functions the way our knowledge functions. We're extrapolating from our mode of knowledge and imposing that upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Dehainu, how do we know anything? So the answer is we know what is. Let's say, how do we know something factual? How do I know how do I know or how does anyone know chveiss what color what color tie I'm wearing? How does anyone know what what you can send in your votes as to whether you think it's a nice tie after shiur but but try not to get distracted now. How does anyone know, I like it, how does anyone know. How does anyone know what know something it is we're able to perceive it if it's not a factual truth, if it's a logical truth it is and we're able to apprehend it. Right? If it's a factual truth, what color my tie is, we're able to empirically, right, with our senses perceive it. If it's a logical truth that two plus two is four, so we're able with our minds to apprehend it. So it is and then we either perceive or apprehend it. Right? We grasp what is and that's how we know. And therefore what isn't yet is unknowable. You can't know what color tie I'm going to wear tomorrow. What isn't is unknowable because the way we know is we perceive what is, we apprehend what is. So that's the way our mind works. That's the way we know. That's what knowledge means on the human level. Now what the Rambam is pointing out to us, it goes without saying something very profound, that without realizing it, when we ask the question of how divine foreknowledge is possible and still allowing for bechirah, we're assuming that the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows is the same way we know. And since the way we know it's impossible to have an indeterminate known future, that's a contradiction in terms. An indeterminate known future is a contradiction in terms. So without realizing it, we're just transposing and imposing upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu our way of knowledge. Says the Rambam, but that is a very, very, very, very fundamental error on our part. Because the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows is not the way we know. How does Hakadosh Baruch Hu know? What's his mechanism of knowing? We don't know. For one reason, again, it's part of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's essence we can't know. And another thing is Hakadosh Baruch Hu is infinite so nothing is outside of him, right? הוא מקומו של עולם. So all his knowledge is really ultimately self-knowledge. So we cannot know how Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows. So now, when the Rambam finishes, did he answer the question? No. But did he respond to the question and explain why the question is not valid? Yes. And the Rambam is saying it's, I don't know, if you have someone who never, someone who grew up in a jungle somewhere, never saw any electric appliance and never studied any science, and then he sees that you take water, you put it into the freezer and instead of a liquid, you take out a solid. Or he sees you have water and then you put it on the fire and then instead of having a liquid, you have a gas. And he says it's impossible. A liquid is a liquid and a solid is a solid and a gas is a gas and it can't be that a box turns a liquid into a solid. That can't be. Boxes don't. We have boxes in the jungle. There's no such thing as a box. Okay, if a person transposes and makes assumptions about what he doesn't know, so a person can have all kinds of contradictions and the question, so basically the Rambam's response is that the question doesn't begin. Because we can't ask, we can't know that if there's a question, we can't ask a question without understanding how Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows and that itself is beyond us. And that's what the Ephodi explains, it's not that the Rambam asked the question and said at the end of the day we don't know the answer to the question. No, the Rambam asked the question and explained why the question is not valid and there's a world of difference between those two. Do you hear that? Yeah, okay, okay, good. The question is what's the Ra'avad's point? What's the Ra'avad's point? I mean how does the Ra'avad not see this? What the Rambam did accomplish with his discussion. Unless what the Ra'avad holds is, I don't know, this next part is very speculative, take it or leave it. You may be better off leaving it, I don't know what to tell you. But take it or leave it. Maybe what the Ra'avad says is: Look, you're writing, your audience here in Mishneh Torah again is not a select group of philosophers. You're writing for everyone. People, if you ask people a question, people want an answer. They don't want an explanation for why the question isn't valid. It's not something which is going to satisfy people. He's not commenting on the emes she-bo, maybe just commenting on the advisability she-bo. I don't know, is that really pshat in the Ra'avad? I don't know, take it or leave it and if you decide to leave it, I may agree with you. Okay. What does the Ra'avad say about this question? What's the Ra'avad's approach to this question?

אמר אברהם אף על פי שאין תשובה נצחת על זה טוב הוא לסמוך לו קצת תשובה ויאמר.

So the Ra'avad is suggesting ketzas teshuvah. Let's leave that phrase untranslated for the moment. He's not giving us a teshuvah gemurah, a teshuvah shleimah, he's giving us a ketzas teshuvah.

אם היו צדקת האדם ורשעתו תלוים בגזירת הבורא יתברך היינו אומרים שידיעתו היא גזירתו.

If a person's righteousness and or evil depended upon divine decree, so then we would have to say that what Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows is because he was gozer. Then

היינו אומרים שידיעתו היא גזירתו והייתה לנו השאלה קשה מאוד.

And then, I don't know, we would really be in a bind to try to understand how bechirah and divine foreknowledge, how הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה can coexist.

ועכשיו ועכשיו שהבורא הסיר זו הממשלה מידו ומסרו ביד האדם עצמו,

but Hakadosh Baruch Hu relinquished that control. Hakadosh Baruch Hu, had he wanted, we could be puppets. But Hakadosh Baruch Hu chose not to, right? He relinquished that control, ומסרו ביד האדם עצמו. So whether a person is a tzaddik or a rasha is not taluy on Hakadosh Baruch Hu's gzeirah, and therefore his yedi'ah doesn't have to imply gzeirah. Ein yedi'aso gzeirah. Okay, but if the yedi'ah is not because he was gozer, so where does that yedi'ah come from? If really where does that yedi'ah come from? אבל היא כידיעת האיצטגנינים. It's like the knowledge of astrologers שיודעים מכח אחר מה יהיו דרכיו של זה. If an astrologer is able to predict and see the future and say what's going to happen, it doesn't mean that he was gozer the future. Right? When the astrologer reads the stars and looks in the stars and tells you today is not a good day to try to find a parking space on such and such and such and such a street. So he's not being and let's assume that he nails that prediction. It's not that the astrologer is being gozer.

והדבר ידוע שכל מקרי האדם קטן וגדול מסרו הבורא בכח המזלות אלא שנתן בו השכל. להיותו מחזקו לצאת מתחת המזל והוא הכוח הניתן באדם להיות טוב ורע.

So a person is subject to the effect of mazalos. For our purposes, again, mazalos means constellations. That's what it means literally. It doesn't make a difference for our purposes whether a person talks about mazalos or whether a person talks about genetics. There's a certain - there are certain natural forces. We can attribute the natural forces to the constellations, we can attribute them to genetics, we can say that the constellations determine the genetics. It doesn't make a difference. But so I don't think we necessarily have to fully or even partially for that matter orient ourselves into a worldview with mazalos.

אלא שנתן בו השכל להיותו מחזקו לצאת מתחת המזל והוא הכוח הניתן באדם להיותו טוב ורע והבורא יודע כוח המזל וגופו אם יש כוח בשכל להוציאו לזה מידו אם לא וזו הידיעה אינה גזירה ובכל זה נענש ושובח.

So what did the Ra'avad say here? How did the Ra'avad explain this phenomenon, this fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows the future despite the fact that we have bechirah? So let's just read a few lines here from the Al Hateshuvah and then try to process what was just said. Ka'asher amar haRa'avad, if you happen to have the sefer in front of you, I am reading from the bifnim, page 241, the fifth line from the bottom. Ka'asher amar haRa'avad, even if you don't have the sefer in front of you, that's fine, but it might be a less relevant idea. Ka'asher amar haRa'avad, when the Ra'avad says that

והדבר ידוע שכל מקרה האדם קטון וגדול מסר הבורא בכוח המזלות כוונתו כי החיים טבועים אמנם בחותם החוקתיות הסיבתית.

There is causality. There is causality in life.

אלא שנתן בו השכל להיות מחזיקו לצאת מתחת המזל והוא הכוח הניתן באדם להיות טוב ורע להיכן יהיה חוק סיבתיות זה מוליכו.

Where this law of causality will lead the person,

לימינו ושמאלו לרע ולטוב דבר זה נתון בידי האדם. הבחירה החופשית אינה צריכה להתערב בכל עת שעומד אדם לפני הכרעה כלשהי. אין צורך שכל פעם תחזור ותבוא אביגיל,

right, this refers to what we had earlier in the drasha,

ותלחש לו באוזנו כי לאחר ליל שיכרון בוא יבוא ויהיה ממחרת. הבחירה החופשית אם אדם יודע לבחור נכונה יש בה לעצב מלכתחילה את הצורה בה יגיב ממילא ומעצמו לכשיגיע לרגע של ניסיון ומבחן.

So kimedumah that what the Rav is explaining here in the Ra'avad is as follows. It's a davar mechudash, davar mechudash that lechora the Rambam would not agree with, would not agree with. And that is sometimes the way a person will respond or react is not dictated by his decision at that moment but is the result of processes of decisions. that he's made in the previous days, weeks, months, years, decades. Not every situation of bechirah elicits from us bechirah at that moment. Sometimes the operative bechirah is the net result of the personality we've molded over the course of preceding days, weeks, months, years, decades. When a person is put into a and soon bli neder we'll try to concretize this and when a person is put into a certain situation sometimes what he'll do has been determined not by Hakadosh Baruch Hu, not by forces beyond the person's control, but has already been determined by himself. Now heyos shehadavar kein, but maybe first to concretize a little bit more what this means and to show another one of the hachmei hamasorah who is of this opinion. So if you take a look in Mesillas Yesharim in perek tes, if you have one handy take a look rabosai. In perek tes, perek tes is בביאור מפסידי הזריזות וההרחקה מהם. Hinei mafsidei hazrizus, what counteracts zrizus, heim magdilim ha'atzlah, is whatever increases laziness. Vehagadol shebikulam, the major anti-zrizus force, הוא בקשת המנוחה הגופנית is that a person is always looking for physical ease and comfort, lack of exertion. Sinas hatorach, despising exertion and ve'ahavas ha'idunim and love of comfort, indulgence, betashlum kol tena'eihem, to the nth degree. Hinei adam kazeh, this lazy person, ודאי שתכבד עליו העבודה לפני בוראו כובד גדול. He's going to experience the demands of avodas Hashem as being incredibly onerous. כי מי שירצה לאכול אכילתו בכל המנוחה, everyone who wants every meal to be very relaxed. ולישון שנתו בלא טורח and alarm clocks are, that's what people used before they had phones when they wanted to wake up at a certain time. And alarm clocks are persona non grata in his home because he wants to sleep as much as possible. וימאן ללכת אם לא לאטו, the person only strolls, there's no such thing as walking quickly or breaking a sweat. Vechayozei badevarim ha'eileh and the like. Hinei initially Ramchal just says yiksheh alav, it's going to be very difficult for him להשכם לבתי כנסיות בבוקר, to get up early for minyan, או לקצר בסעודתו מפני תפילת מנחה בין הערביים when in the winter he may find himself eating a late lunch and it will be necessary to abbreviate his lunch in order to daven mincha in time. It's going to be very difficult for him. או לצאת בדבר מצוה לאיזה אשר יבוא or to go out for a dvar mitzvah when the dvar mitzvah or talmud Torah, how much more so if we need him to run to do a dvar mitzvah, to get to the beis medrash. Now listen to this next line rabosai. ומי שמרגיל עצמו למנהגים האלה, a person who trains himself, who conditions himself in such a way that all this ease and comfort and laziness become habitual, einenu adon be'atzmo, he He is not sovereign לעשות הפך זה כשירצה. He's not sovereign to do differently when he'll want to. So Ramchal says mefurash, right? That the person's bechirah, there are some occasions when my bechirah is not right now, but my bechirah is the cumulative effect of the momentum I created of the habits I cultivated over the past days, weeks, months, years, and decades. The Rav is saying something similar, I think, in the Ra'avad. Now, if you would have a psychologist who was infinitely insightful, so then the psychologist would be able to tell you a lot of things about the future, right? These types of circumstances when they arise, if you had a psychologist who was infinitely insightful, he would be able to, let's call it, read the stars and tell you what's going to happen in the future. Says the Ra'avad, that's the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows the future. Now you'll ask, okay, so nicha, that some cases the bechirah is not at the moment, but the bechirah is the cumulative effect of the personality that I've molded and the habits that I've developed, but are those all cases are like that? So lichora definitely not, that's certainly not what Ramchal is saying. That's certainly not what Ramchal is saying and it just doesn't seem to be the case. So if that's so, then has the Ra'avad given us any handle on this question of bechirah v'yediah? And therefore is this the correct havanah in the Ra'avad? So come back to that introductory line that the Ra'avad said,

אמר אברהם אף על פי שאין תשובה נצחת על זה טוב לסמוך לו קצת תשובה.

So what does ktzas teshuvah mean? So ktzas teshuvah can mean either of two different things. It can mean a little bit of understanding in this entire sugya, to understand the answer, the full answer to this question, we can a little bit understand the answer to this question. That's one rendition of ktzas teshuvah. The other rendition of ktzas teshuvah is we can answer some of the cases. We can give a partial explanation, right? It's not a partial you can if I don't know, if we're partners in raising livestock, so it could be that I own half the livestock and you own the other half of the livestock and then we mate them or whatever, or it can be that we're both part owners of the whole, right? Not that we're complete owners of the part, but we're both part owners of the whole. Either way we're only part owners, right? So ktzas teshuvah can mean this is a ktzas teshuvah for the entire question, or it can mean no, this is a partial answer, it answers some of the cases. If you translate ktzas teshuvah that second way, so then we understand what the Ra'avad means, what the Rav is saying, what the Ra'avad means, that the Ra'avad himself wasn't presenting this as an answer for all cases which are subsumed in the yediah u'bechirah questions. He was saying no, some of them we takeh don't know the answer, but some of them we do know the answer, because some of them there are some cases where what I do at 12:30 today is not decided at 12:30 today, it's been decided by how I've lived my life for the past 50 years. And if you would have an infinitely insightful psychologist, and the Ribbono Shel Olam is infinitely insightful, so then without being gozer, he would know the future. But again, this havanah in the Ra'avad assumes and I think that's what the Rav must have been assuming also, that ktzas teshuvah means an answer that's amtzu. I'm a partner in that I fully own part of this. Ktsas tshuva means this is an answer for ktsas of the question, as opposed to being a ktsas tshuva on the the entire question. Lechora, ya Moshe. I don't understand what it means to have a partial answer. If if this answer is is sufficient for something should shouldn't doesn't I guess it's troubling me shouldn't this answer determine how all of a person's decisions are made? And if not, then it does it's not sufficient for any of the decisions. Why? Why? It's yesh v'yesh. There are there are cases... Meaning, if if it's only sufficient for some of the situations, then how could how could Hashem kiviyachol the great infinite psychologist accurately determine the future if not everything is really tell-able on the... So ein hachi nami, that's why it's only ktsas tshuva. That's exactly what we're saying. That's what the Ra'avad... let's say you you come and and you've got ten questions on the sugya. And and you go over to your chavrusa. And and you give him a list of ten questions. And the chavrusa says "I can help you ktsas." Now maybe that means he's gonna contribute to give you some understanding but not full understanding to all ten questions. Or maybe that means he'll answer five questions for you and not all ten. So the lashon lechora can mean either. So we're suggesting that the Ra'avad means the latter. He's answering five out of ten questions. I mean just to take a trivial example, but obviously there are non-trivial examples. You know, if if you had your choice of of Cornflakes and Cheerios this morning, I don't know it it's I mean it could be, no offense intended, it could be that you're addicted to Cheerios and and that really it was, you know, the the infinitely insightful psychologist would know you're gonna eat Cheerios. But more likely more likely there isn't anything in you which makes that decision a a function of some inexorable process that you're responsible for. More likely it could go either way and this something that just that that's indeterminate until that moment. Right. But Ramchal is not claiming that every situation is like that. Ramchal is claiming that you can have such situations. I don't think he's claiming that everything is like that. I guess my my issue is just that however it is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows those other situations, lechora should really encapsulate these or these first types of situations which we've been talking about, which means that the answer we're giving to the first group is is not the true answer. I don't know, so maybe that's what the Ra'avad says: וכל זה איננו שוה. I don't know. Maybe that's the Ra'avad's וכל זה איננו שוה. Because you're right, because presumably when you have ten questions in this context, there's one answer for all ten questions. It's not ten different answers. So what's the significance of of answering five of the questions? I don't know, maybe that's what the Ra'avad himself means by וכל זה איננו שוה. But but your question is is correct, is very very correct. Maybe just in terms of this yesod, again, whether the Ra'avad is saying it here, okay, so I don't know, maybe I'm maybe I'm misunderstanding, but Ramchal does say it meforash. I don't think there's any room for for for conjecture there. Lechora you find this approach that whereas we have unrestricted bechira, sometimes we ourselves will have boxed ourselves in. Lechora you find it in the Ibn Ezra as well. Where? So the Ibn Ezra very famously, as you know, in in Aseres Hadibros asks the question on Lo Sachmod:

ורבים יתמהו על זאת המצוה איך יהיה אדם שלא יחמוד דבר יפה בלבו כל מה שהוא נחמד למראי עיניו.

How can the Torah legislate Lo Sachmod? Meila the Torah can legislate don't do this. Because action is pre is deliberate, action is premeditated, and you can demand of a person the self-discipline not to engage in that action. But chemda, ta'ava... Right, if I look at a flower and I think the flower is beautiful, it's not a deliberate, do I think this flower is beautiful? Well, panim l'kocha, no, you look at the flower, you like the flower. You get a bouquet of flowers, you either like them or you don't like them. It's just a reflexive instinctive reaction. So how does the Torah legislate that? It's crucial to understand the question to appreciate the answer.

ואתה אתן לך משל דע כי איש כפרי שיש לו דעת נכונה.

A poor, crude, boorish villager who's of sound mind, וראה בת מלך שהיא יפה. Sees a beautiful princess,

לא יחמוד אותה בלבו שישכב עמה כי ידע כי זה לא ייתכן.

He's not chomeid to be able to marry the princess.

ואל תחשוב זה הכפרי, שהוא כאחד מן המשוגעים שיתאווה שיהיה לו כנפיים לעוף אל השמיים.

A person doesn't, is not chomeid to be able to flap his arms and fly. So that's the mashal, what's the nimshal? ככה כל משכיל צריך שידע. An insightful person needs to know,

כי אישה יפה וממון לא ימצאנו אדם בעבור חכמתו ודעתו רק כאשר חלק לו השם.

It's not happenstance, the money that a person has, the shidduch, it's not happenstance, it's a portion by Hakadosh Baruch Hu. A person knows that he can no more take away from someone else what Hakadosh Baruch Hu intended for that person and not for him, person can no more do that than he can flap his arms and fly, than the boorish villager can end up marrying the princess. That's the Ibn Ezra's answer. So how does that answer the question? When I'm chomeid, I'm not thinking, I'm just reacting instinctively, viscerally. So how does the Ibn Ezra answer the question? So lichora, the pshat is that the Ibn Ezra is saying that that yedia, that knowledge, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu apportions, and what Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't apportion to us, we're not going to get, is something that a person is supposed to not only know, but internalize to such a degree that it then creates and shapes and molds his instincts. There are some instincts that a person cannot create, shape, and mold. You know, when the reflex reactions that the doctor checks for, like he takes his little hammer and he bangs you on the knee, or so supposedly he's checking for reflex reactions, sometimes it just means he had a bad morning and he's got a good excuse to take it out on you and you won't be any the wiser, you have to choose your doctor with care, rabosai. But those kinds of, we're not talking about those kinds of reflex reactions. Those we don't shape or mold. But a reflex reaction such as jealousy, such as chemda, we can, we can mold those instincts, but not on the spur of the moment. That's based upon our bechira in the past days, weeks, months, years, decades. So lichora in the Ibn Ezra also, there are moments, there are occasions, when a person's bechira is not a function of what he chooses to do then, but what he has chosen to do time after time. time in the past. Again, that same yesod as Ramchal in perek tes of einennu adon be'atzmo לעשות היפך זה שירצה in some circumstances and perhaps that's what the Rav is telling us in the Hasagos HaRavad as well. Again, the way it pertains to the Teshuvah Drasha is that without compromising a person's bechirah, one can know the future of what a person will do because the future of what the person will do will be something that's been determined by his own bechirah because a person can create and shape and mold his own instincts, which is something remarkable. Something remarkable. That many instincts, many things that we will later experience instinctively, that we'll later experience and will happen reflexively, that a person can shape and mold and create and determine what those instincts are. Okay, so we'll stop here. Everyone should have a good gebentsht gezunt yor, gmar chasima tova, שנת חיים ושלום וטובה.