Chovos Halevavos:

Okay, I think we left off, the Chovos Halevavos identified sort of three areas of knowledge, third of which is knowledge of Torah. Within knowledge of Torah, he distinguished two areas of Chovos Ha'evarim and Chovos Halevavos and he comments on the absence of any chibur which addresses Chovos Halevavos. He says maybe it's because the chiyuv is not so unequivocal, so he shows no, min hasechel, miTorah shebiksav, uMiTorah shebe'al peh, the three sources of knowledge, each of which all attest to the chiyuv of Chovos Halevavos. Then after that, I think this is where we left off, he says that כאשר התברר לי שחובת תורת המצפון, meaning the chiyuv of Chovos Halevavos מן המושכל והכתוב והמסור, again, the three sources of knowledge, trying to figure out, is there a reason why no one has compiled such a sefer, no one's authored such a sefer as he is setting out to do? He says maybe because it's not—maybe it's not binding at all times, in all places, and it's not nogaya. So the Chovos Halevavos says that no, these Chovos Halevavos are all mitzvos temidiyos, right? The emphasis on mitzvos temidiyos which we generally associate with the Sefer Hachinuch, because the Chayei Adam and the Mishnah Berurah both at the beginning quote from the Sefer Hachinuch the shesh mitzvos temidiyos. So the emphasis is that the Rabbeinu Bachya already has that emphasis here as well.

כאשר עיינתי בהם וראיתי שהם חובה עלינו תמיד כל ימי חיינו ואין הפסק בהם.

My father zichrono livracha once commented as part of his response, someone told him he'd been learning Chovos Halevavos and doesn't know מה כל הרעש הזה about the sefer of Chovos Halevavos. He wasn't so mispall from the sefer. So there were a few parts to the response, one of which is that what the Chovos Halevavos says became so yesoddik that we know it from later mecharbim, but he was the one who in many of these ideas was the first one to really shine the spotlight. So again, the emphasis here on the mitzvos temidiyos, he says it again a second time a few lines later. Again after he lists some more examples of Chovos Halevavos, yichud Hashem, chiyuv hamishma'as lo, hayirah mimeno, ahavaso, and says that

הרי כל אלו חובה עלינו בכל זמן ובכל מקום חוב תמידי.

Then he has an interesting comment at the end. He says, אין לנו אמצאה להפטר מהם. There is no legitimate excuse to absolve ourselves from the Chovos Halevavos,

ואין שום מונע מהם זולתי אהבת העולם הזה ואי ידיעתנו את השם יתרומם ויתהדר.

That the two things which encumber us, the two things which impose upon us and therefore divert us from Chovos Halevavos, A, is ahavas olam hazeh, and B, is אי ידיעתנו את השם, our lack of knowledge and lack of awareness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Later, I think it's towards the end of the sefer, I think it's all the way in the sha'ar of ahavas Hashem, so I think there, the Chovos Halevavos says a very, very... strong formulation, he says that love of Olam Hazeh and love of Olam Habah can no more coexist than fire and water. The same way esh u'mayim don't coexist, so Rabbeinu Bachya says that ahavas Olam Hazeh and ahavas Olam Habah — again, Olam Hazeh in its physical, material sense — that they can't coexist. See, sometimes we like to delude ourselves into thinking that a person can be zocheh l'shnei shulchanos in the sense that — not in the sense that Rebbi was. Rebbi was zocheh l'shnei shulchanos but didn't really partake of one of the shulchanos. But we like to sort of delude ourselves into thinking that a person can be zocheh l'shnei shulchanos and take a melo chafnayim from each of them. So says the Chovos HaLevavos, but to the degree that a person is oriented towards devarim gashmiyim, towards chayim gashmiyim, so to that degree he's ill-prepared and not positioned for the chayim ruchniyim, the chayim nitzchiyim of Olam Habah. And me'eila he says that what's matrid a person from Chovos HaLevavos is ahavas Olam Hazeh. It's a big avodah because as Ramchal points out that our connection to the physical is forged as in the first years of our life so that מיום עמדנו על דעתנו it's almost as if we begin having to overcome that. And that that's the avodah that we have is that that sort of natural involvement which translates into a degree of ahavas Olam Hazeh is something that a person has to be mevater on, something that a person has to — it's an avodah to work to overcome. He quotes as the prooftext to identify that these are the two sources which draw a person away from Chovos HaLevavos, cause a person to neglect Chovos HaLevavos, quotes the pasuk in Yeshayahu that

והיה כינור ונבל ותוף וחליל ויין משתיהם ואת פועל השם לא יביטו ומעשה ידיו לא ראו.

That these are two different sources of neglect of avodas Hashem of Chovos HaLevavos. First of all, again, the partying as representing, illustrating ahavas Olam Hazeh, and then the i-yedi'as Hashem is פועל השם לא יביטו ומעשה ידיו לא ראו, again, not having an awareness and an appreciation for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Yeah, there's an interesting question, we could stop it at many different points during the course of the Chovos HaLevavos to discuss. Let's say when you learn Chovos HaLevavos and in this respect the Mesillas Yesharim is not any different, there's a lot of seemingly very — not seemingly, but there's a lot of very practical, down-to-earth eitzos. Let's say this same topic so when Ramchal talks about it. More expansive. He talks about the tirda d'olmis, again that a person is unnecessarily encumbered with mundane pursuits and obligations. He talks about the sechok velatzon, that a kalus rosh, a mindset of scoffing, and then finally he talks about being with the wrong chevre. So the shaile is these parts of Mesillas Yeshorim, Chovos HaLevavos, and again, and k'seder you find in both of the sefarim and others, of course, other sifrei mussar that talk about how to acquire certain middos, what things are mafsidim of those middos. So this is b'geder eitza tova or this is mamash or cheftza shel Torah? Let's take משל למה הדבר דומה. Let's say you're learning Hilchos Sukkah. Learning Hilchos Sukkah. So lichora we would distinguish between the two following yedios. So one is you can learn the sugya in the second perek of Sukkah about how the mechitzos of Sukkah have to be עומדי בפני רוח מצויה. That's A, and then B, you can get some construction advice in terms of how to build your Sukkah, how to anchor your Sukkah that in fact the walls, the dfanos that you're building for your Sukkah should be עומדות בפני רוח מצויה. So lichora we would say that the first avada is Talmud Torah. The second is more just an engineering tip, is a tip in terms of the practicalities of constructing a Sukkah, but lav davka that the engineer who tells you how you should anchor your wall and how you should secure your schach that that it's going to be עומד בפני רוח מצויה, that's not cheftza shel Torah, that's practicality. So superficially it would seem that when we talk about the mafsidei different middos in terms of Chovos HaLevavos, it would seem superficially to be more analogous to the construction tips. And yet, it obviously can't be right, obviously can't be that that so much of again just al derech mashal we're mentioning the sefarim of Chovos HaLevavos and Mesillas Yeshorim and others, that they're b'geder eitzos and not cheftza shel Torah. So lichora at least shtei teshuvos badavar. One is that mistama an eitza which comes from Torah, by virtue of that very fact is not stam an eitza but is a cheftza shel Torah. And the Chovos HaLevavos isn't stam saying misvara d'nafshei, you know, you have to look out, be careful for too much partying and be careful for for being insensitive to yad Hashem, chochmas Hashem, etc. No, he's telling you that's the pshat in the posuk in Yeshaya, and that's what Yeshayahu HaNavi is already telling Klal Yisrael that their failure to be oved Hashem k'roy is to be attributed to these two causes. So when you have an eitza which is an eitza which is when you identify what's mafsid, what's antithetical and what interferes with Chovos HaLevavos is a posuk in Yeshayahu, so by virtue of that fact it's a cheftza shel Torah. That's A. B, the other perspective lichora is that rubo d'rubo I think, and this at least I think this at least is a good example, is that the tactical advice which the sifrei mussar give themselves shed light on what the tochen hamitzva is, dehaino. When the Rambam at the end of Hilchos Teshuvah talks about Ahavas Hashem, so

דבר ידוע וברור שאין אהבת הקדוש ברוך הוא נקשרת בלבו של אדם עד שישגה בה תמיד כראוי ויעזוב כל מה שבעולם חוץ ממנו כמו שצוה ואמר בכל לבבך ובכל נפשך.

So the line between the substance, the content, the tochen of the mitzvah, of the Chovos Halvavos, and the way to attain it and those things which interfere, so that line often doesn't exist. Dehaynu, what the Chovos Halvavos is saying that ahavas olam hazeh is matrid a person from Chovos Halvavos, so that's just the other side of the coin of understanding what the mitzvah of Ahavas Hashem is, that the mitzvah of Ahavas Hashem is something which is all-encompassing, is something which totally preoccupies a person's life, energies, thoughts, his all. So you can't really distinguish in this type of context between the again, the eitzah, the way to attain something and the understanding of what's involved in Ahavas Hashem. That the understanding that Ahavas Hashem means that the definition of the mitzvah, so it's an insight into the mitzvah, that it means עד שיעזוב כל מה שבעולם חוץ ממנו, so mimeila from that follows that ahavas olam hazeh, that the unnecessary tirdas olam hazeh which Ramchal talks about, that they're going to interfere with attaining Ahavas Hashem, with the Chovos Halvavos, so it's not stam an eitzah tovah, it's an eitzah tovah which is just which emerges from the understanding of what the mitzvah is. Okay, so the Chovos Halvavos are mitzvos temidiyos and certainly in that respect certainly warrant such a chibur. Maybe there isn't too much to discuss, maybe there are so few Chovos Halvavos, or maybe people are so bekiyim and people understand them so well, so he says that's not true either. He says very few people are mekayem Chovos Halvavos, very few people understand them. Chovos Halvavos continues to describe how basically study of Chovos Halvavos is a lifetime quest. He says echad min hachachamim talks about how for 35 years he's been working to understand Chovos Halvavos. He says another min hachachamim says hareini nishba that for 25 years I've already been working on tikkun hamaasim. And then he's ma'arich to rebut the argument. the yesodos haemuna without knowing them to the best of of his ability. In this context, it's it's interesting to to when you read the mashmaos in the Chovos HaLevavos is that takeh he doesn't think everyone is necessarily capable or cut out for the type of understanding which goes beyond just receiving a kabbalah, a tradition. His argument is that if a person is capable of it, so then he thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu certainly wants us that if we know it firsthand, so then we know it with greater certainty and greater conviction and therefore we're obligated to know it to the best of our ability. But he clearly indicates that he doesn't think everyone is capable of doing that. The pashus in the Rambam is that the Rambam thinks that in some level every, every bar mitzvah is capable in it. Because the Rambam again says Yedias Davar Zeh in the beginning of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah when talking about Anochi Hashem Elokecha and שמע ישראל השם אלקינו השם אחד, the Rambam says that Yedias Davar Zeh mitzvas asei. He even outlines for us what the, schematically, what the argument, what the logical demonstration is, and the pashus is something that's in Minyan HaMitzvos means that everyone is capable of fulfilling. There's no indication in the Rambam that well, if a person has a certain intellectual inclination or special aptitude, no, you have the impression that the Rambam thinks that efshar sheyeda'am hakol. Chovos HaLevavos certainly doesn't think so. His definition is knowing to the best of one's ability. What sort of goes unstated, well maybe not unstated but stated differently than we're about to formulate it in the Chovos HaLevavos, is the axiom that knowledge based on, let's say when the Ramban, I think we discussed last year a little bit, the Ramban in Parshas Yisro or in Parshas Bo where the Ramban comments on אנכי השם אלקיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים that the events surrounding Yetzias Mitzrayim all serve to demonstrate metzias Hashem and yecholas Hashem and yedia and hashgachas Hashem, all the pinos hatorah. And then we have all the mitzvos as zecher l'yetzias Mitzrayim that these should be transmitted from generation to generation, so the Ramban clearly, epistemologically, values a knowledge which is rooted in that source of transmission. He treats that type of knowledge as being of the, as being first-order, of highest magnitude of knowledge. He doesn't see that as any, as being anything inferior. The knowledge which is gained empirically and then which is transmitted through again reliable masorah, so for the Ramban that knowledge is a very, very strong type of knowledge and source of certitude. And the Chovos HaLevavos and the Rambam think that when it's possible to know logically on one's own, so then one is not supposed to be content with that type of knowledge and that's a very very fundamental difference of opinion in the Rishonim. Chovos HaLevavos, Rav Kapach in his notes points out the following in the footsteps of Rav Saadia Gaon as a very interesting interpretation or sort of heara about the pesukim in Parshas Shoftim about

כי יפלא ממך דבר למשפט ועשית על פי הדבר אשר יגידו לך.

So in Parshas Shoftim the Torah is talking basically about how a person has to go and defer to the Beis Din HaGadol. So he says you'll notice how none of the Chovos HaLevavos are mentioned here. בין דם לדם בין דין לדין בין נגע לנגע when the Torah is illustrating where a person will go and defer, so it's in these areas. And what Rav Saadia and Rabbeinu Bachya understand is that when it comes to Chovos HaLevavos, there shouldn't be any need for that because everyone should be able to come to the same conclusions. When you're dealing with a shaylah in halacha, so then that's the parshah of Parshas Shoftim, but in Chovos HaLevavos everyone should be able to everyone who's again muchshar to be engaging in it should be able to come to the same conclusion which is why the Torah doesn't illustrate again a question upon which you're going to be deferring to the Beis Din HaGadol by giving examples from Chovos HaLevavos. There is a very just see if I can find it here. With all Rabbeinu Bachya's emphasis on the ability and the need when it comes to Chovos HaLevavos, when it comes to emunah baHashem, yichud Hashem, etc. to know and understand things logically firsthand. With all that, so both Rabbeinu Bachya as well as Rav Saadia earlier, both emphasize, just reading here just a few lines:

אך כיון שאתה בעל תבונה ודעה שאפשר לך להשיג בהם אמיתת מה שמסרה לך הקבלה מפי הנביאים עליהם השלום מיסודי הדת ועמודי המעשה הרי אתה מצווה בהפעלתם כדי שיתקיים לך דבר זה בדרך המסורת ודרך השכל.

Dehaynu, again, with all the I don't know confidence or seeming confidence that they profess in the sechel ha'enoshi, but they both emphasize that when a person sits down to try to understand, he begins with knowing what the finishing line is, right? That's a person sits down, he knows that well we know bederech kabbalah because again it's not that Rav Saadia or Rabbeinu Bachya or the Rambam, they don't dismiss that knowledge. That's the knowledge that we have of שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד. Anochi Hashem Elokecha, so we know that. The sechel is now trying to again to be able to demonstrate how that can be known logically as well, but the conclusion is already known when the person is engaging in that chakira sichlus. משל למה הדבר דומה. You have some sugyas in Shas, let's say, take an example, the Gemara in Yuma where the Gemara tells a story about how the Tannaim were walking and they were discussing what's the mokor for the din if pikuach nefesh is דוחה כל התורה כולה with the exception of the gimel aveiros. Okay, so ich vais, is it from milah, is it from מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות, the the different suggestions. So it's quite clear that it was known bekabala that pikuach nefesh is doche, but it wasn't known bekabala where that is written in Torah She'b'ksav, where that is to be gleaned from Torah She'b'ksav, and what Chazal were doing is not trying to figure out what the din is, but Chazal were trying to figure out how the din can be discerned within Torah She'b'ksav as well. Dehainu, sometimes, no, the din wasn't known bekabala and they were trying to figure out what the din is. What's the din of a socher? That wasn't known bekabala. They were Rebbe Meir Rebbe Yehuda were applying s'vara and מידות שהתורה נדרשת בהן to figure out what the din is. In other cases, Chazal know what the din is bekabala, but even then it's part of Talmud Torah to know how that is recorded in the Torah She'b'ksav. And when you have this in mind, you see that there are many sugyas that are like that. Sometimes Chazal are trying, it was left to them to figure out what the din should be in such a case, and in other cases they had a clear kabala, they had a clear masora what the din is because that's for instance in that sugya in Yuma. So the Gemara says no, the source you're giving only tells me that vadai pikuach nefesh is doche. How do you know that even sofek pikuach nefesh is doche? So maybe the answer is ein hachi nami, maybe it's not doche, who said that it is? So it's quite clear that the conclusion is foregone there because we know it already b'derech hamasora and there the mitzvas Talmud Torah is to be able to bridge the Torah She'b'ksav and the Torah She'ba'al Peh, to know where in the Torah She'b'ksav the Torah She'ba'al Peh is hinted, where it can be discerned. And it's that type of understanding that the Chovos Halvavos and before him Rav Saadia were talking about. That's quite clear again here. כיון שאתה בעל הבנה in more than one place but just reading one excerpt:

כיון שאתה בעל הבנה ודעה שאפשר לך להשיג בהם אמתת מה שמסרו לך הקבלה,

meaning what it is, you're not trying to discover truth. Truth we takeh know. Again, it's not that they m'zalzel again in what the Ramban was talking about. They think that there's something when possible that there's even a higher type of knowledge that a person should have. But the truth is already known and the role of the seichel then is that a person should be able to, again, well I know the din in pikuach nefesh, the shaila is where is it? How can I prove it from the Torah She'b'ksav as well? And that's the moshal to what Rav Saadia and the Chovos Halvavos and for that matter the Rambam were all takeh talking about here as well. Okay.