Case Studies: Ka’as, Laziness

Last time what we outlined, an approach to tikkun hamiddos, the underlying principle is that we mold ourselves to borrow and adapt a term which you all know from the Sfas Emes, the nekuda hapnimis within us, by internalizing basic yesodos ha'emunah v'hashkafos. In so doing, we discover that even emotional and instinctive reactions which happen so quickly and immediately as to seem involuntary and inevitable, so in reality these instinctive reactions really reflect a pnimius which we control, which we either thoughtfully or mindlessly have created and have molded. And the illustration of this which we saw last time was in the Ibn Ezra's discussion of lo sachmod, again coveting is at times an instinctive reaction. There's nothing calculated, there's nothing premeditated about that reaction of the pauper when he's walking outside a beautiful mansion. He's walking in tattered clothing and he's starving. There's nothing premeditated about the chimud that he feels. But the Ibn Ezra tells us that a person is only chomed, number one, what he thinks is within the realm of possibility and, number two, what he thinks is good. A person's not chomed either what he thinks is impossible, or what a person doesn't think is beneficial, what a person doesn't think is good. Just parenthetically when you study that Ibn Ezra, so sometimes we have a little bit of difficulty with it because the world we live in, so people don't really think anything's impossible. Right? With modern technology, so there really isn't anything that we think is impossible. But the principle which the Ibn Ezra presents, namely that our instinctive reactions really reflect hashkafos which we have again either thoughtfully, carefully, deliberately internalized or behesech hadaas absorbed by osmosis, it's these hashkafos which are really reflected in the instinctive reactions. The instinctive reaction to be chomed reflects, as the Ibn Ezra explained, a lack of internalizing emunah v'hashgacha pratis. And so generalizing from that example, the method practically which we outlined is as follows. Number one, a person makes a cheshbon hanefesh. The purpose of the cheshbon hanefesh is to identify those middos within oneself which need tikkun, to identify character flaws. Obviously that implies, maybe we should really list it separately, that a person recognizes what's a middah meguna and what isn't. Sometimes that can be subtle. The second stage after the cheshbon hanefesh is a stage of iyun b'toras hamiddos to try to understand what basic hashkafos are betrayed by the middah meguna in question and then finally in the words of the Mesillas Yesharim, chazara vehas'mada, the constant reinforcement, the focusing with a lot of energy and concentration and just constantly reminding oneself of those basic hashkafos repeatedly over the course of a day to reinforce it until gradually it becomes internalized. But we said we were going to try to do tonight... is to try to undertake a few case studies of specific middos. What the relevant hashkafos are that need to be internalized to address and correct certain middos. Now before doing so, I think the modaa is an obvious one, and that is that obviously in a public setting so we can't do justice to any particular midda, because tikkun hamiddos is something that has to be individualized. We may share, someone sitting here may share with me one of my middos megunos, and yet it's not going to play itself out the same way for two different people. The way it's manifest is not going to be identical, the causes are not necessarily the same, the dynamic is different. So obviously we can't do justice to this topic in a public setting and yet that modaa notwithstanding there are general perspectives that it's possible to lay out and would perhaps be valuable as well. Let's begin by discussing the midda of ka'as. Let's say a person again in making his cheshbon hanefesh looks in the mirror and sees that he's a baal chema, that he's a person who is ko'es. What basic hashkafos are reflected? What wrong hashkafos are reflected? What correct hashkafos have insufficiently been internalized if a person sees that midda within himself? And again coming back to that modaa, obviously some of these hashkafos will only be relevant sometimes. Very often a comment of the Rambam is being ignored when we get angry. The Rambam says in discussing the issur of nekama at the very end of Hilchos De'os, the Rambam says:

הנוקם מחברו עובר בלא תעשה שנאמר לא תקם ואף על פי שאינו לוקה עליו דעה רעה היא עד מאד.

Malkus should not be used as a measuring stick for the chomer haissur as the Rambam says:

אלא ראוי לו לאדם להיות מעביר על מדותיו על כל דברי העולם שהכל אצל המבינים דברי הבל והבאי ואינם כדי לנקום עליהם.

Says the Rambam, what is it invariably that a person takes nekama for? Things which ultimately are petty, again, which the Rambam describes as divrei hevel vahavai. And it's certainly a correct extension of the Rambam to say that in the overwhelming majority of cases in which a person grows angry, so what is he grow angry about? A person was pogei'a in his kavod, a person again didn't reciprocate a tova which I had done for him, something of that variety says the Rambam, again, divrei hevel vahavai. Ultimately there's nothing which justifies the intensity of the emotion of ka'as. And clearly that's one hashkafa which has been distorted when a person sees himself growing angry is the disproportionate importance which he gives to devarim ketanim. And is clearly one area in which a person has to be mechazek himself. When one thinks some more about ka'as and what the experience of ka'as entails, so then we realize... That most displays of anger can be reduced to the following formula: that when I grow angry, in effect, what a person is saying verbally or by way of actions is, "How dare you do this to me?" Or in other words, there's almost no instance of ka'as which doesn't involve gaiva, which doesn't involve gaiva. The ka'as, again, emphasizes the "me" of "How could this be done to me? How could you do this to me?" And again, clearly, in seeking to identify those hashkafos which need to be internalized, which need to be reviewed and reinforced, so one has to focus on gaiva as well if one sees ka'as within himself. And finally, and obviously these hashkafos are not being listed necessarily in order of importance or centrality. Usually, even a person who is a ka'asan by nature, there are certain occasions when he will find the self-control to restrain himself, to discipline himself. Sometimes it's just the fact that he finds himself in a public setting. A person's not going to, because I think, ultimately, ultimately we know it's very difficult to really convince yourself that ka'as isn't a midah meguna. Ultimately, if a person has any, any self-honesty, self-awareness, so we know that ka'as is a midah meguna, and as a result, usually the awareness that "I'm in public" will act as a restraint because I don't want to embarrass myself in public by displaying that midah of ka'as. And even if the public forum, per se, doesn't have that effect on one, usually it's the case that if within the audience there's someone whom we respect, we admire, whom we fear, so that too will act as a restraining influence. Or in other words, if a person finds himself being ko'eis, it also betrays a lack of שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד. If a person had that awareness of שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד, it's basically unthinkable that a person would succumb to the types of things which one says when one is angry, the types of things which one does when one is angry. My father, zichrono livracha, was very fond of citing the Baal Shem Tov's interpretation of שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד. So the simple pshat is Shivisi is loshon of placing, the same as שמתי ה' לנגדי תמיד, that I place Hashem always before me. הבעל שם טוב הקדוש says that שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד is loshon shoveh, loshon hashtavos, that Shivisi, that I've always, again, loshon shoveh, equal, I've always maintained equanimity, my moods don't swing, why? Because Hashem l'negdi tamid. And then the final stage, again, would be the hazara v'hasmada on these three basic hashkafos. And again, again, change happens incrementally. Even if it's only one midah, if, as very likely may be the case, there's at least these three basic hashkafos which need to be reinforced, which need to be internalized, so one would begin working on them one by one. Let's now consider atzlus, laziness. So first of all, and again, this is perhaps anticipating the limmud, the iyun in the middah, but it's very important to recognize that laziness is a spiritual flaw. It's not something that we intuitively feel necessarily, but it's vitally important to recognize that atzlus again is very much a ruchnius'dike problem. Whether it's psukim in Mishlei that castigate an atzlan, whether it's the Mesillas Yesharim's emphasis on zehirous and zerizous, whether it's Rav Yisrael Salanter's listing zerizous in his yud gimmel middos, it's quite clear from Chazal, from sources in Torah, that laziness again is a middah meguna, is a spiritual flaw. Why is that? What is it again, what hashkafos are missing when a person detects within himself this middah of atzlus? A person who's atzel clearly has no concept of yakrus hazman. Clearly has no concept of the preciousness of time. A person who's lazy does things in slow motion. There's nothing driving him. There's no engine pushing him forward. There's nothing fueling him. There's nothing energizing him. And clearly what that reflects is a lack of appreciation for yakrus hazman. The Chofetz Chaim used to say in the

מי האיש אשר בנה בית חדש ולא חנכו ילך וישוב לביתו פן ימות במלחמה ואיש אחר יחנכנו.

So it's quite clear from each of the exemptions of nota kerem or bana bayis that if a person has invested in something, so the Torah says it can't be that that investment should be futile. So ילך וישוב לביתו פן ימות במלחמה ואיש אחר יחנכנו. Why? He invested so much time in building this tremendous house. It can't be that פן ימות במלחמה ואיש אחר יחנכנו. Says the Chofetz Chaim but the Gemara says what's the shiur of a house for the chozrim me'orchei hamilchama? Dalet amos on dalet amos. Dalet amos on dalet amos? How long exactly, how much time did the person invest in building this house which is dalet amos on dalet amos? I don't know, maybe an hour. He went out, he chopped down a tree, and then he built himself a little, I don't know what you'd even call it, I don't know what we would call a dalet amos on dalet amos. And yet, the Torah says it can't be that that investment should turn out to be futile. Chofetz Chaim used to cite this in trying to illustrate and communicate yakrus hazman. Why don't we have yakrus hazman? Why is it that we have no appreciation for the preciousness of time? So there are basically three reasons. Number one, we don't sufficiently appreciate what a bracha, what an opportunity it is to have time, to be alive, to study Torah and to do mitzvos. We have no sense for אשרינו מה טוב חלקנו to have that opportunity. The famous mashal from the Shelah Hakadosh that two people are brought to a desert island which is full of valuable jewels. And they're both told that they have an hour to spend there and however much they can gather during that hour is theirs to keep. But they're not going to be given a second opportunity to visit this island and to be able to avail themselves of the treasures there. So the Chochom goes and again with tremendous energy, tremendous energy gathers as much as he can over the course of an hour. The other one, less than a Chochom, so he ambles about and he bends down slowly, picks up a few, and then has very little to show for his efforts at the end of the hour. So the Shlah Hakadosh goes on to explain what the Nimshal is obviously. So number one we don't appreciate how wonderful the opportunity is to be involved with Torah and Mitzvos and we also don't sufficiently appreciate how great our obligation is to be involved with Torah and Mitzvos. היום קצר והמלאכה מרובה הפועלים עצלים ובעל הבית דוחק. We don't sufficiently appreciate that where there's opportunity and Bracha in Yahadus, there's also obligation and Tzivui and because of that Ba'al Habayis Docheik. And finally, the third reason that we have either no Mussag or an inadequate Mussag of Yakrus Hazman is that we don't appreciate the inexhaustibility of Torah and Mitzvos. We don't appreciate the fact that you can never have, we can never have enough time for what we should want to accomplish be it in Torah, be it in Chesed, be it in Mitzvos, be it in Kiruv. There's just what a person has to do, what a person needs to accomplish far, far exceeds the amount of time that we have available to us. And if we would recognize that fact in learning Torah מים שאין להם סוף, in doing Chesed צרכי עמך מרובים ודעתם קצרה, there's no such thing as as not feeling pressed for time. So each of these three reasons, recognizing the opportunity of Torah, the obligation of Torah, the inexhaustibility of Torah and Mitzvos, each of these needs to be reinforced in order to have the proper Yakrus Hazman. If a person has Yakrus Hazman, there's no such thing as saying, well my Teva is to be lazy and I can't overcome it. And again each of these needs Chazarah v'Hasmada. Here in this context, just want to digress for a minute before we, I don't know if we'll do it tonight or next week, move on to other Middos to share with you two very, very important Parallelos. Number one, illustrating in respect to Atzlus, of course ultimately the reason that laziness is a Middah Megunah is because of its detrimental effect on one's Torah and Mitzvos, on one's Talmud Torah and Shmiras Hamitzvos. Accordingly it's very tempting to think that the need for Zerizus is only with respect to Torah and Mitzvos, but in Milei De'alma perhaps Atzlus can be indulged. Perhaps if be-teva I'm lazy, so leaving aside the other problems which are inherent in this, so maybe when it just comes to Milei De'alma, so I'll have other people run errands for me, I'll We're talking about millei de'alma and again the reason atzlus or whatever other middah we're talking about is a middah megumah is because of its effect on Torah mitzvos. So presumably the middah can be indulged in other innocuous contexts. Now this is a very tempting thought but also a very erroneous thought and for two reasons. Number one, almost always, not always, the millei de'alma end up impacting on our avodas Hashem. The laziness or procrastination in dealing with millei de'alma inevitably will cause time to be lost, time to be wasted, which does detract from one's avodas Hashem. So the distinction is somewhat artificial. But even more than that, equally importantly if not more importantly, a person's character, the nekudah pnimis within a person, is not compartmentalized. If a person allows himself, his neshamah, to be tainted by a middah megumah, again we're taking the example of atzlus, so even if consciously he only indulges that middah again in seemingly innocuous contexts, but if a person is an atzel, so it's wishful thinking and fallacious thinking that there's an off-on switch that a person controls and says, well I will I will make sure that that atzlus is only indulged in millei de'alma and not when it's a question of maximizing every minute and learning with as much intensity as possible. If a person is tainted, he allows his neshamah to be tainted by atzlus or by some other middah, inevitably it's going to again it's going to be manifest when it comes to inyonei shamaya as well, not only in millei de'alma. It's impossible to compartmentalize and we fool ourselves if we think we can. Now the other general he'arah which I just wanted to leave you with tonight is that the entire approach that we've been developing and applying assumes that one's Torah, one's emunah can be and should be the source for dealing with problems, with midos megumos. And that's a vitally important and profound truth. But it's also very very important to recognize that there is a potential danger to this truth as well, and please I'll try to try to be very clear. If a person genuinely is committed to Torah, is a ben Torah, so then the approach which we've been outlining again is true and is correct. But a person has to be on guard for the following. If a person let's say has a problem with certain midos and he and he seeks refuge for it in Torah but not in the healthy way that we've been describing of internalizing these emunos and de'os which which stand at the center of his life and at the core of his existence. If it's a person whose attachment to Torah is much more casual, so some times people run away from their problems and they go to religion as a way of running away from their problems. And chas v'shalom what we're talking about should not be misunderstood as any kind of endorsement of that. That's something which is very dangerous. When a person has a genuine connection to Torah or a person is seeking to develop a genuine connection to Torah, that's what we're talking about. But to use it as, as again, a place of refuge of saying, well I have to, I have to immerse myself in Torah, that's, that's the answer. But again if a person's doing that, if it's min hasafah v'lachutz and it's really a way of running away from problems, so then it's very dangerous. And it's devarim hamesurim lalev. It's devarim hamesurim lalev but in dealing with ourselves, in dealing with others, a person has to be aware of this possibility. Very often, very often, when, not always, not always, but very often people come with questions which they honestly think they have questions in emunah. They have questions that they're struggling with. And the truth is that it's something which is being projected onto Torah. That it's some issue within themselves that they're not really facing up to, which is then projected onto Torah. So one has to be very careful of not abusing what we're discussing. It's true and it's the correct approach but it has to be applied honestly and appropriately. Bli neder next week we'll continue by considering a few other nekudos.