Bitachon and Hishtadlus in Times of Crisis (Shidduchim, Parnassah)

In the presence of our Rosh Yeshiva, in the presence of our Mara D'asra of Westmount, Rabbi Fox, the question of the balancing bitachon and hishtadlus having a genuine sense of trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu with human initiative is one of the most basic issues in religious life for two reasons. First of all, just very practically, it's relevant to so many situations on almost a daily basis. Second of all, bitachon is something which is absolutely crucial and should be very central to our lives. Let's perhaps elaborate that second point for a moment. אנכי ה' אלהיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים, the famous question raised by the Ibn Ezra, he says it was posed to him by Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, why when Hakadosh Baruch Hu presents his calling card, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't identify himself as אשר בראתי שמים וארץ. The Ibn Ezra says that to be able to recognize the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the borei, is the creator of shamayim va'aretz, perhaps a person needs a certain philosophical bent that not everyone necessarily has, whereas to recognize to see Hakadosh Baruch Hu's fingerprints in history is something that we're all capable of. But perhaps additionally the peshat is as follows. In parshas Behar the Torah says כי עבדי הם אשר הוצאתי אותם מארץ מצרים. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu again says that he's entitled to our being his avadim because he took us out of slavery in Mitzrayim. So our immediate association with avdus, servitude, that a person takes his marching orders from the master twenty-four seven, is beholden to the master twenty-four seven, and that's certainly a correct association. But there is another one as well. And that is the gemara in Brachos tells us the famous story that when רבן יוחנן בן זכאי's son was dangerously ill, he sends a messenger to his own talmid, רבי חנינא בן דוסא, that he should daven on his behalf. And רבי חנינא בן דוסא does, and רבן יוחנן בן זכאי's son recovers, at which point רבן יוחנן בן זכאי comments that

אלמלא הטיח בן זכאי ראשו בין ברכיו כל היום לא נענה.

I could have davened all day long and my tfillah wouldn't have been accepted the way Rabbi Chanina was. At which point his wife protests vechi Chanina gadol mimcha? After all, you're the Rebbe and Rabbi Chanina is your talmid, is your disciple. And somewhat cryptically רבן יוחנן בן זכאי answers, no, but I'm דומה כשר לפני המלך, and רבי חנינא is דומה כעבד לפני המלך. I have cabinet rank, I have cabinet status, he's a secretary. So the truth is I outrank him but on the other hand, if you want to walk into the president without an appointment, you can have cabinet status, you can be Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, whatever, but you can't walk in to the president without an appointment. If you're his personal secretary, so then you have free and almost unlimited access. That was the moshal which רבן יוחנן בן זכאי gave his wife. So whatever whatever that means fully in context, what it suggests to us in our context is that another association with avdus is that there's a certain intimacy between an eved and adam, an intimacy which isn't necessarily present in other relationships. Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants that our avodas Hashem should involve a personal relationship with him. That we should be avadim, avadai hem, not only in the sense of recognizing that we're beholden and that we have to serve Hakadosh Baruch Hu twenty-four seven, not just avadim in that sense, but avadim in the sense of k'eved lifnei hamelech, avadim as suggesting, as representing a sense of personal connection and intimacy as it were with the Ribono Shel Olam. So there Hakadosh Baruch Hu says my claim on that is not asher barasi. shamayim va'aretz. Had it only been the case that barasi shamayim va'aretz and I wasn't personally involved with you, so then Hakadosh Baruch Hu, as it were, says, I wouldn't necessarily be able to stake a claim that you should be my avadim. But in light of the fact hayos that אנוכי ה' אלקיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים that I'm personally intimately involved in your lives, intervening, getting involved in your lives, so that's the basis for my for my claim to to your avdus. It's possible to often one sees this truth when looking in the mirror, it's possible to be shomer Torah umitzvos, to learn and and not incorporate or not incorporate sufficiently this aspect of having a personal relationship with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, of Hakadosh Baruch Hu not just being rachmana litzlan, an object of a remote object of belief, an abstract concept, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu as a living presence within our lives with whom we have again a personal relationship. And the two mitzvos which perhaps more than others directly address this and directly cultivate and and develop this personal relationship with the Ribbono shel olam is having a sense of bitachon. That when a person walks through life in every step of the way, a person has this sense of bitachon, again as we'll try a little bit to explain, as is appropriate, this sense of trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so then that means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu again in his life isn't just an an object of belief, not just someone who sent a a telegram with the 613 mitzvos, but someone again a presence, the ultimate presence and reality and center of a person's experience, and that's what it's supposed to be. Bitachon and tefillah are the two mitzvos again which more than anything again directly challenge us to to develop and to feel this personal connection with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So for that reason, focusing on bitachon and the role of bitachon in our lives is something which is very very basic and and fundamental. Bitachon and tefillah are not are not unrelated. The Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the beginning of Berachos that basically the the what underlies tefillah is that if a person is boteiach ba'Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so then a person is mispallel. That what underlies tefillah, the the underlying assumption, the unstated premise for tefillah again is this sense of bitachon. Obviously, in the few minutes we're going to spend tonight, the it's not going to be possible to be comprehensive, but we'll begin perhaps with a few general comments about bitachon and then as the the title suggests, focus specifically on times of crisis, the two that that we're supposed to discuss, the economic crisis as well as in terms of shidduchim. Well what's the source in the Torah? Is there a source in the Torah for the chiyuv bitachon, to trust Hakadosh Baruch Hu? Is that a is that a pasuk anywhere in Chumash? So the truth is as basic as it is, it doesn't necessarily have to be a pasuk. There are a lot of very very basic things which for whatever reason are so axiomatic to Torah that they're assumed and not necessarily encapsulated directly in in psukim. Most famously, Rav Chaim Vital in the Sha'arei Kedushah much quoted says that you don't have mitzvos which encapsulate, which incorporate middos, that middos is almost kadma l'Torah. So that's axiomatic to Torah and because of that you don't you don't have Rav Chaim Vital is assuming we don't have mitzvos which which specifically contain the the mandate for all the proper middos that a person is supposed to have. So not necessarily the case that there has to be a pasuk in in Chumash which contains the the imperative, the mandate for bitachon. Nevertheless, in a very very beautiful exposition, the Meshech Chochmah says that he thinks that there is a pasuk for bitachon. Meshech Chochmah in in Parshas Eikev commenting on the pasuk of את ה' אלקיך תירא אותו. uvishmo tishaveia says, he refers to the Rambam quoting from Chazal that the way a person fulfills the mitzvah of dveykus is by connecting himself to a talmid chacham and trying to be of service to a talmid chacham so that through the talmid chacham's Torah he's he's attaching himself, he's clinging to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The Ramban he references the Ramban's understanding of uvoso sidbok of the type of dveykus which very great tzaddikim and baalei avodah are able to are able to accomplish. And then he says that he thinks the pshat in uvoso sidbok, he understands uvoso sidbok in in a based on a pasuk in in Yehoshua that he quotes. I guess the the a close parallel that we have in English idiom for what Rav Meir Simcha sees in the pasuk of uvoso sidbok is let's say you're you're new on the job somewhere and someone who's gonna be training you and someone who's gonna be teaching you the ropes so say to you stick with me and I'll take care of you. Or you come to town somewhere, you don't know your way around town, you don't know where to go, you don't you're not you're not oriented at all. So the person who's who's local and and knows his way around so stick with me, stick with me and I'll take care of you. The Meshech Chochma says uvoso sidbok stick with me, right, stick with Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the sense of trust that Hakadosh Baruch Hu will take care of you and that uvoso sidbok contains the chiyuv of for having bitachon, for maintaining a sense of bitachon of trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And then he explains very very beautifully how this comes on the heels of את ה׳ אלהיך תירא. The yiras shamayim that we have, the sense of fear and awe that we have before Hakadosh Baruch Hu is because ein od milvado. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is is everything. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the source of life. Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustains life. Everything exists through Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is is infinite, omniscient. The sense of of fear and awe which that engenders within a person, so says Rav Meir Simcha, should also engender within a person a sense of trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu because those very same qualities that that we perceive in Hakadosh Baruch Hu that we recognize in Hakadosh Baruch Hu also gives us reason that that's the one we should be trusting and את ה׳ אלהיך תירא means if a person fears Hakadosh Baruch Hu what it means is he fears Hakadosh Baruch Hu exclusively. I fear Hakadosh Baruch Hu if a person fulfills the mitzvah and it means I don't fear other forces, other factors, את ה׳ אלהיך תירא in an exclusive sense. If a person fulfills את ה׳ אלהיך תירא so then that automatically will then lead into that's going to segue into uvoso sidbok, stick again, stick with him in the sense of trust Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's the same basis for yiras shamayim. So it's it's quite remarkable thing. According to Rav Meir Simcha, the same the same reality which inspires fear and awe also inspires a sense of trust and of bitachon and as the Chovos Halevavos discusses so much in Shaar Bitachon that part of a sense of bitachon is a sense of menuchas hanefesh, a sense of serenity that that since everything depends upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu what's going to be will be letovah. Before we get somewhat more specific so just one I guess disclaimer. That there are both in Chazal and Rishonim opinions about bitachon which which hinge to a larger extent on on opinions on hashgacha pratis are by no means monolithic. So for our purposes tonight I'm assuming a certain mahalech, I think it's the one which is certainly most prevalent in the past couple of hundred years amongst the baalei machshava but I don't mean to suggest that that all sources, be it in Chazal, be it in Rishonim or Achronim are necessarily monolithic on this topic. Hakadosh Baruch Hu's hashgacha pratis, the divine providence which Hakadosh Baruch Hu exercises is all-encompassing. כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו מ Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. How much a person is going to earn, what success he'll enjoy financially is determined on Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. ארבעים יום קודם יצירת הולד, a bat kol, a heavenly voice, announces bas ploni l'ploni. Hakadosh Baruch Hu arranges shidduchim. הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים, but for our purposes, the emphasis is on the first half of the statement that Hakol bidei shamayim. The Sefer HaChinuch writes in explaining the rationale, the shoresh hamitzvah for the Torah's prohibition against seeking revenge. So our generally our gut reaction is that the Torah prohibits taking revenge because it's a mida mushcheses, it's a very corrupt character trait. I don't think the Sefer HaChinuch would necessarily disagree with that, but the Sefer HaChinuch gives a different explanation. He says that the reason the Torah prohibits taking revenge is because theologically it represents a terrible distortion. If I try to take revenge for something that was done to me, something that ploni almoni does to me, so the what motivates the revenge is if not for him, then I wouldn't have suffered this setback. If not for him, I wouldn't be enduring this pain. If not for him, I wouldn't have suffered this humiliation. That's sort of the unstated premise and assumption for any desire for revenge. If I were to know, if I were to believe that what happened to me would have happened to me regardless, if it hadn't happened through the agency of ploni almoni, it would have happened otherwise, so then that takes all the wind out of the sails. Then there's not going to be any desire for revenge. Says the Sefer HaChinuch, that's why the Torah prohibits revenge, because a person is supposed to recognize כי כל אשר יקראהו whatever befalls a person, mi'tov ad ra, again, whether from the human vantage point it's good or from the human vantage point it's bad, הוא סיבה שתבוא עליו מאת השם יתברך. That this is something which Hakadosh Baruch Hu signs off on. And if it wouldn't happen through the agency, through the instrumentality of this person's bechira chafshis, it doesn't exonerate the person for the bad he does, he's not acting al pi nevuah, he's still responsible for what he's doing, but in terms of how the person who was the object is supposed to process it and how he's supposed to react and respond to it, he's supposed to recognize כי כל אשר יקראהו whatever befalls him comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. This sense of, again, an all-encompassing hashgacha pratis,

מי יעני מי יעשיר מי ישפל מי יתייסר מי ינפש,

that we have to trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Again, trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu to the exclusion of trusting of arur hagever, as Yirmiyahu says, who trusts people to the exclusion of fearing people or other factors and forces and trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Nevertheless, the all-encompassing nature of divine providence, of hashgacha pratis, notwithstanding, so bitachon doesn't in any way translate into passivity. There's no equation between bitachon and passivity. This is true on two levels: on a natural level we're supposed to be active, proactive, as well as on a spiritual level. How do we sort of reconcile this pro-activism with bitachon? If after all everything is coming from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so what exactly what role is assigned to our hishtadlus, to our initiative? So maybe let's just to get a little bit of a handle on it, consider the following two meshalim. Let's say that food supplies are being airlifted to a certain remote area. Okay, maybe it was hit by a, ich veis, some natural disaster, whatever it is, whatever occasions the airlift, but food supplies are being airlifted into a certain area. Okay, so there's no question about what the source of the food is, there's no question that the food is only going to come if the people with the airplanes decide to send the food, that's all clear, that we can't on our own, the people who are living in this remote area, cut off, so they can't on their own dictate the result, they can't force any. one's hand to provide the food. That notwithstanding, so they do have to position themselves to receive the air drop. If the air drop is going to be in the northeast corner of the region and they insist on sitting blindly in the southwest corner of the region, so then despite the fact that everything is dependent upon others, nothing is going to come their way. Chazal says, again, everything comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu.

כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו מראש השנה ועד יום הכיפורים.

A person's parnasa, a person's livelihood is determined, is dictated by Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And so in every area of a person's life, but hishtadlus means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu says since I'm going to send it to you through natural channels, so your obligation is to position yourself to receive that gift which I'm going to be sending you min hashamayim. In terms of understanding the role again of call it spiritual hishtadlus, be it in the form of tefillah, be it in the form of teshuvah or amassing zechuyos through different ma'asim tovim. So perhaps the mashal which lets us understand how that is integrated and plays out alongside the sense of bitachon that ultimately everything's from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So imagine that you have a child who doesn't seem to be too motivated in school. He, she is a very bright child, but not especially motivated. So the parents decide they're looking to motivate the child, so they tell the child, "You know what, if you'll maintain a 90 average for the next year, so then we're going to... we're going to buy you, I don't know, an iPod." It used to be a bike, but I'm not sure that you can get away with that now. I don't think you'll get an 80 average just for a bike, so let's call it an iPod. So we'll buy you an iPod if you maintain a 90 plus average. Now the kid doesn't have a penny in the bank, doesn't have a penny to his or her name. There's no way they can get the iPod on their own. Clearly the iPod, if it comes, is only coming from the parents. Nevertheless, the kid is able, has a role to play in terms of determining whether or not he makes himself worthy of the parents' benefaction. So in that sense, that's perhaps a perspective on the interplay between the spiritual hishtadlus through the form of tefillah, through the form of other zechuyos, mitzvos and ma'asim tovim, and again, how that in no way contradicts the all-encompassing hashgacha pratis. Is anything different about the chiyuv bitachon and how to balance bitachon with hishtadlus in times of crisis, times which are not as routine? So on one level, not really. There's always the chiyuv to have trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu and yet simultaneously be appropriately proactive and we always have to try to figure out what the balance is. That having been said, the Chazon Ish comments very poetically, lyrically, as his entire monograph in Inyanei Emunah u'Bitachon. He says, מה שאנו רואים בחיים, he says, what we observe in life,

ובין איש מוסרי ובין איזה בעל מוסר וזמרת הביטחון על דל שפתיו תמיד.

He's always humming the tune, he's always singing the tune of bitachon. מגנה את רוב ההשתדלות ומתעב את הרדיפה אחר פרנסה. He's constantly criticizing people who engage in excessive human initiative, who are excessively proactive, and says that again to be too involved is something despicable, mesayev, leshon to'eivah. ואמנם הוא איש מצליח. He's got a thriving business, so it's not so hard for him to preach bitachon because he has a very thriving business which seems to run on its own momentum and he takeh only... needs to spend a few hours in the office every day. Vehinei niftanu pit'om, says the Chazon Ish,

לראות את ראובן הבוטח משלחש עם נעריו ואנשי עצתו איך להפר עצת איש הרע האומר לפתוח חנות כמותו.

And then all of a sudden he says we're shocked to see how Reuben is whispering and conspiring with his people how to try to undermine someone who wants to go into business competing with him. So the Chazon Ish says that when times are good, so it's hard to tell whether we really have bitachon because it's easy to, things are going well, and as long as things are going well, so it's easy to sort of only be paying lip service to bitachon. Chazon Ish says that rachmana litzlan when Hakadosh Baruch Hu tests us and things are not going so well, that's when we really find out whether again it was only lip service that we were paying to bitachon or whether or not it's something which we have really internalized. Certainly one perspective in terms of times of crisis. Yitachen that given the equation that we mentioned before from the Rabbeinu Yona in terms of bitachon and tefillah going hand in hand, so the same way there is a special obligation, there is a special mitzvah when a person feels himself in a time of crisis in an eis tzara to davven, so mistama given the fact that the davvening is an application, is something which flows from the sense of bitachon that maybe there is a heightened obligation in terms of the bitachon as well in an eis tzara. So now let's perhaps maybe spend just a few minutes looking at the two issues. Again, I don't necessarily mean to dramatize and classify these as crises. I leave that to others, but these were the two issues that I was supposed to discuss a little bit in the area of shidduchim as well as the current economic climate. Again, whether that's the best word, maybe it is, maybe it isn't, I leave that to others to decide. Hishtadlus in every area, the definition of hishtadlus has to be something which is reasonable, something which is realistic. Again, since the idea of hishtadlus is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu chooses, again, since we left the midbar and not to send mann but to operate through natural channels as it were, so hishtadlus by its very definition has to be something which is reasonable, it has to be realistic. Which is why if a person finds himself, herself, in a difficult situation, so the response shouldn't only be to reach in and draw upon bitachon, but in addition, since there is an obligation to make hishtadlus, we're obligated to review and make sure that the hishtadlus that we've been making is reasonable and is realistic. It may very well be that after engaging in such a cheshbon hanefesh that we'll find that it has been and that in fact the only reaction that we're supposed to have to the current difficulties and adversity is one of bitachon because the hishtadlus has been on the mark, it has been on target. Or it might be that we'll recognize, that we'll discover that there are certain adjustments that perhaps need to be made in our hishtadlus. In terms of shidduchim, again, many of these considerations can be transposed to different areas as well. A person can't be too particular in the sense for the hishtadlus to be considered reasonable and realistic, a person can't have such a list of specifications for what he or she is looking for that what one is looking for is a point on the spectrum. In order for hishtadlus to be realistic, in order for it to be reasonable, so there has to be a certain part of the spectrum in which a person could find his or her mate, but if the list of specifications is so long and so detailed that it's one in a million who could possibly match, so that's not hishtadlus. Part of the hishtadlus being reasonable is whether or not the process is a reasonable one as well. Sometimes people are dating people from the wrong circles, people that they don't have any common ground with, whether the people who are introducing them or whatever don't really know them or whatever the miscommunication is, whatever the gap is, but they're not necessarily moving in the right circles where it's reasonable to expect that they would find someone who would be appropriate for them. Sometimes a person has to check in terms of the hishtadlus, whether he or she for some reason doesn't project himself or herself accurately and well. The question needs to be asked at times whether or not the person is afraid of marriage, is afraid of commitment, whether or not the person is being too selective and even deciding who to meet. So all these are part of the review in terms of checking to make sure that the hishtadlus is a realistic and reasonable one. Probably, but maybe just to mention this but then leave it for I don't know maybe someone else in some other venue. Probably when a problem is widespread, one which doesn't only affect a few individuals but widespread, so it should be occasion for not only a personal cheshbon hanefesh and a personal review of the appropriateness and the reasonableness of hishtadlus, but for a collective cheshbon hanefesh as well. And presumably in this area, that's also very much warranted. What's the spiritual hishtadlus in this area? So tefillah is always, tefillah is always a part of any hishtadlus. A person has to ask Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Tefillah is I think Rav Pincus writes in his monograph on tefillah, he gives the following mashal that tefillah affects things in two ways. First of all, when a person davens, I think I don't remember if he quotes this, but the Baal Shem Tov is quoted as saying that if a person is the same after davening as he was before davening, then he didn't really daven. But if a person mamash if we would really really daven, so then a person is supposed to come out a different person, supposed to come out a changed person. Second of all, and this Rav Pincus talks about this point, he says that משל למה הדבר דומה, let's say that you call in an order to the supermarket. Okay, and you call in, you tell them what you want, and they fill the order and they deliver and they leave it on your doorstep. And as you open the door, so everything might be right there and waiting for you, but you have to open the door. That part of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's hanhagah of the world is that what opens the door for the bracha that Hakadosh Baruch Hu has prepared already is tefillah. Tefillah opens the door for all bracha that Hakadosh Baruch Hu delivers to us as it were. So certainly tefillah is always a part of any spiritual hishtadlus. The Mishna Berura says that if a person needs something and is mispallel ba'ad chaveiro, presumably the same would be true to try to help out a friend who's in the same situation, so then hu na'ana techilla, so that has a special zechus, a special merit if a person extends himself or herself for someone who has the same need and is not so preoccupied with one's own need, but recognizes the same need in others, that that's also a special zechus and mistama looking to improve one's middos in terms of in general in terms of bein adam lachaveiro, all of that are appropriate areas of hishtadlus. In terms of parnassa again, it's only hishtadlus. כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו, everything is determined, is dictated by Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Here, I think perhaps the point which needs to be emphasized the most in terms of hishtadlus for parnassa is that if we... do recognize, as we must, again, that everything comes from the Ribbono Shel Olam, that our hishtadlus doesn't dictate results, but it's something that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants, that we should engage in as a sine qua non for his beracha. So then we have to be scrupulously careful that the hishtadlus is consistent and compatible with the bitachon that we profess. What does that mean? So first of all, let's say the example that which the Chazon Ish gives of how a person deals with competition and competitors, that the hishtadlus in which a person engages, again, the initiative and his way of being proactive in terms of seeking parnassa has to be totally consistent with a sense of bitachon, that ultimately this isn't going to determine or dictate the livelihood, but again, it's an obligation that I have that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants me to fulfill before he gives me that livelihood. So it has to be, again, so I have a competitor, so the competitor is not going to determine whether or not I have parnassa, and I have to make sure that I deal with him in a way that's consistent with that sense of bitachon. Chazon Ish also says based on the midrash where Chazal fault Yosef Hatzaddik, he says, "What exactly was Yosef Hatzaddik's error in dealing with the Sar Hamashkim?" He was making hishtadlus. So the Chazon Ish gives a very important guideline and says that one of the areas in which one can distinguish whether or not we view what we're doing again as a sense of human initiative that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants, but not one that ultimately dictates the results, the results are going to come from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. How do you sort of measure which of the two I'm engaged in? So the Chazon Ish says if a person engages in acts of desperation, things which don't really make any sense, acts of desperation, that he says is inconsistent with a sense of bitachon. Reasonable again can mean that we can't be too laid back in terms of our hishtadlus, but reasonable also means that what we're doing shouldn't reflect a sense of desperation, at clutching at straws. Chazal say that for Yosef Hatzaddik to think that that rasha, the Sar Hamashkim, was going to give a second thought to Yosef Hatzaddik reflected desperation, and that was incompatible, that type of hishtadlus, the hishtadlus again which bespeaks desperation, that's incompatible with bitachon. Because if it's bitachon, so what I'm doing is again, I have a chiyuv to engage in hishtadlus. If it's not hishtadlus, if this is going to determine my fate because I'm responsible for determining my own fate, it's not in the hands of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so then if I'm desperate, so then you have to grab at straws. That's what the Chazon Ish understands pshat by Yosef Hatzaddik. The story is told that some yeshiva bachurim came to the Chofetz Chaim and the Chofetz Chaim was opposed to shaving, and they wanted a heter from the Chofetz Chaim to shave their beards because they were having trouble with shidduchim, and they wanted the Chofetz Chaim should give them a heter to shave their beards. Okay, so the Chofetz Chaim was opposed to that. So against that background, the Chofetz Chaim said to them, "So what do you think? The Ribbono Shel Olam is mezaveig zivugim. That's part of the Ribbono Shel Olam's daily schedule as it were kavyachol. The Ribbono Shel Olam is mezaveig zivugim. You think the Ribbono Shel Olam can't find you a shidduch as long as you're complying with what the Torah says in terms of לא תשחית פאת זקנך?" So again, so transposed to this area, what it means is that if a person has bitachon, so there's no room for cutting corners, there's no room for cheating, there's no room for engaging in dishonest business practices, whether it's geneivat da'at, whether it's false advertising, whether it's cheating on taxes or whatever it is. The Ribbono Shel Olam doesn't need us to engage in these kind of practices in order to send us our parnassa. If it's up to me, okay, so then maybe I'm going to make more money by, and maybe the only way I think I can earn a living for myself is by engaging in these dishonest business practices. If I recognize that this is just again an obligation I have to engage in hishtadlus, to be active, to take initiative, but ultimately it comes from the Ribbono Shel Olam. of that sort in order to provide parnassa. In the realm of the Rabbeinu Bachya in Chovos HaLevavos also gives what he considers a test case for whether or not the hishtadlus is one which is consistent with a sense of trust in Hakadosh Baruch Hu or not. He tells a story, again the story is as we'll see in a minute obviously anachronistic in terms of its particular example of a chasid echad who meets a certain heretic. And the heretic says to the chasid, so who do you think provides you with your livelihood? So he says the Ribbono Shel Olam who created shamayim va'aretz, heaven and earth, and who sustains all life, my parnassa comes from him. So then the heretic says to him, what line of work are you in? So he says I'm in import-export and I travel overseas, which in the early medieval times when Rabbeinu Bachya was writing the Chovos HaLevavos was literally sakannas nefashos to have to travel ocean voyages, yordei hayam, was mamash a very, very, was a mortal danger every time a person wasn't wasn't like today. So he says to him, so what do you think? So he says your actions contradict your words, your belief. If you believe that your livelihood comes from the Ribbono Shel Olam, do you really think that he needs you to risk your life in order to engage in the hishtadlus, in the human initiative which he requires of you? So the Chovos HaLevavos says that on the spot he quit that job, this chasid echad, and found himself a more local parnassa. Again, the example is anachronistic obviously, but the idea that what we're doing is hishtadlus and therefore it's reasonable to think that Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants us to stay in certain bounds, Hakadosh Baruch Hu presumably doesn't want us to relocate to a place where there's no Jewish community, where there's no support system, where there's no chinuch for children and even for one's own observance, or even for those who perhaps are at an earlier stage in their careers, there are careers which are more demanding in terms of hours and there are careers which are somewhat more moderate. So it's not clear that the Ribbono Shel Olam can only provide parnassa through a 12-hour or 13-hour work day and is equally ready to provide parnassa with a with a more moderate type of work day. One final comment in terms of the hishtadlus in terms of parnassa on a spiritual level in terms of engaging in tefillah as we mentioned before, tefillah to be answered has to be a tefillah haguna. To improve our chances that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should answer our tefillos, we have to ask for what's appropriate. If our tefillos are for something exaggerated because our desires are for something exaggerated, so then again the tefillah which is such a critical component again of the package of human initiative, so then that tefillah is undermined. If when I'm looking for parnassa, I'm looking that Hakadosh Baruch Hu should give me a parnassa that will support an indulgent, opulent lifestyle, so that's that undermines the tefillah, that detracts from the tefillah. If I'm asking, Yaakov Avinu asks לחם לאכול ובגד ללבוש, okay, so nistama we would have difficulty making do with just לחם לאכול ובגד ללבוש. But even so, even assuming that we have to upgrade that a little bit given what we're accustomed, but that the tefillah should be for something which is so the exaggerated lifestyle that we've come to take for granted, that that tefillah is undermined because we're asking for what's not really appropriate, what's not really necessary. If a person recognizes that what he's doing is hishtadlus but has bitachon in Hakadosh Baruch Hu... Also, it's not, it's gonna undercut any, any yeitzer hara he may have to otherwise chanfeh his boss to be very obsequious and flattering in, in a very insincere way. And, and finally, just to end on this note, Rabbeinu Bachya writes in Chovos HaLevavos that when a person has bitachon, so one of the corollaries of bitachon is that a person's able to live with a tremendous sense of menuchas hanefesh, tremendous sense of serenity. I think Rabbeinu Bachya is assuming, having introspected and made sure that his hishtadlus is on target, so then a person has the serenity, has the, the serenity of knowing that whatever happens is supposed to happen. And if whatever happens is supposed to happen, so maybe we can't necessarily appreciate that from our vantage point, but then a person knows that it's good. A person knows that it's good and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu intends it for his or her benefit, so no matter how trying it might otherwise be, again, from the human perspective, that sustains a person. There is a very beautiful story which is told about Rav Aharon Kotler zecher tzaddik l'vracha that in his final day or days, when he was literally on, on an eres devai, on, on his deathbed, so that his rebbitzen wanted to encourage him. So she says to him, you know, Aaron, the doctor says that tomorrow's going to be better. And he says, and he answered her as follows, he says, what is has to be, that is what is is not accidental, is not happenstance, it's because Hakadosh Baruch Hu said וואס איז דאס זיין, and וואס דאס זיין איז גוט, and what has to be is good. When a person knows, a person makes the cheshbon hanefesh, a person reviews, checks his or her hishtadlus, so once a person does that and knows that the hishtadlus is on target, so then a person knows that voss doss zein, I'm making the right hishtadlus, I, again, from the human vantage point things aren't going well, so וואס איז דאס זיין, it's supposed to be that way. And if it's supposed to be that way, so then a person has the menuchas hanefesh of knowing that that's good.