Beginning of Hakdama to Perek Chelek

So בלי נדר אם ירצה השם we'll go back to the beginning of the Rambam's Hakdama to Perek Chelek. The truth is one could make a very strong case that what one is that what we're supposed to do after we finish learning the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is go back to the beginning and start learning them again. The Rambam writes at the conclusion of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, he says, חזור על דברי אלו פעמים רבות והתבונן בהם טוב, excuse me,

והתבונן בהם טוב ואם הטעה אותך חריצותך שהבנת את ענינו מפעם אחת או מעשר הרי יודע השם שהטעה אותך לשווא.

If you think from learning the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim once or even ten times that you understood, maybe he means fully understood, or maybe he means understood, he says understood, so then you're misled, you're mistaken. And so why aren't we doing that? So why are we going back to the beginning? I don't know, because maybe the Rambam would've taught us to skip the beginning either, so for sure that there's more of a pircha on this than there's a pircha on the other way, so we'll go back to the beginning here.

ויסוד הדבר הזה הוא יסוד הרבים של אמונה שהם גדולי ערך מאוד. דע כי אנשי התורה נחלקו דעותיהם.

That there are multiple opinions

בטוב שישיגהו האדם בקיום המצוות האלה שציוונו השם בהן על ידי משה רבנו וברע שתדבקנו כשיעבור עליהם.

Everyone agrees that it's one of the Yesodot Ha-Emunah to believe in s'char va-onesh, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu rewards and punishes as a person's actions warrant. But what that ultimate s'char va-onesh consists of, so there are many opinions על פי שכליהם השונים. The Rambam seems to be indicating... what does it mean sichleihem ha-shonim? The Rambam seems to be indicating that the cause of error and confusion, the next line: ונשתבשו בזה הדעות שיבוש רב. That the cause of error and confusion in this context and presumably in many other contexts is when people exceed their own limitations. And when people undertake to determine with their own sechel what their own sechel is not equal to, so then the inevitable result is going to be error and confusion. There are machlokos rabos me'od, there are many divisions, many different opinions

על פי שכליהם השונים. ונשתבשו בזה הדעות שיבוש רב עד שכמעט לא תמצא בשום פנים אדם שבירר לו העניין הזה וכן לא תמצא בדבר ערוך לשום אדם אלא בשיבוש רב.

There's no clear presentation. והנה יש כת סוברת שהטובה אינה אלא גן ועדן. Ella Gan V'eden. The pasuk in we generally just say Gan Eden. The pasuk in Bereishit says ויטע השם אלוקים גן בעדן מקדם. Sounds like the Gan, that there's an Eden which is bigger than the Gan, and the Gan is in Eden.

אלא גן ועדן ושהוא מקום שאוכלים ושותים בו בלי עמל גופני ובלי יגיעה ושיש בו בתים מאבנים יקרות,

marble columns, u'vimos shel meshi. ונהרות המושכים יין ושמנים של בשמים והרבה ממין זה. V'chee hara'ah, Gehennom,

ושהוא מקום אש בוערת שבו נשרפות הגוויות ומשתייסרים בני אדם בו במיני ייסורים

ya'arich perutam.

וכת זו למדת ראיה על אמונה זו ממאמרים רבו מדברי חכמים

aleihem hashalom שטעמם כביכול על פי פשוטם ltanasam alei rubam. So this is something of course that the Rambam will talk about at length later in the Hakdama, the mistake of reading Agadeta literally. The same way whenever, I mean it's obviously true for various chelkei ha-Torah, but l'havdil, it's true for any work that one needs to know how the work is intended to be studied, how it's intended to be understood. Let's say משל למה הדבר דומה, let's say משל למה הדבר דומה. If in wartime or something and a message is being sent in code, so if the message is not decoded, if one doesn't recognize that it's being written in code, so it will seem like gibberish and it will be gibberish. If one knows that it's in code, A, and one doesn't know what the code is, so at least one reserves judgment and will say I don't know what it's saying because I don't know the code. Or if one successfully decodes it, so then one will have an accurate reading of what it says. But if you take something again which was written in code and you take it at face value, so it will be gibberish or it will be something which is trite and inconsequential when the reality is very much otherwise. So the same thing is true in terms of knowing how to interpret Torah she-bi-khtav, knowing how to interpret within Torah she-ba'al peh, that there's a difference between Agadeta and Halacha. And that's what the Rambam says, yeah they do have proofs for this from ma'amarei Chazal, but שטעמם כביכול על פי פשוטם. When you look at divrei Agadeta and you assume that divrei Agadeta are intended to be understood literally as opposed to metaphorically. The Rambam says that the Rambam says in I forget in one of the Igros, he writes that there are people who very piously maintain that it's kefira if a person thinks Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't physical, because the Torah says Yad Hashem, the Torah speaks of body parts of Hashem, Einei Hashem. So a person has to know what the assumptions are, what the guidelines are to interpreting Agadeta, otherwise a person can be insisting on what's sort of the diametrically opposed genuine meaning.

וכת שנייה מאמינה וסוברת שהטובה המיוחלת אינה אלא לימות המשיח מהרה יגלה. וכי באותו הזמן יהיו בני אדם כולם מלאכים קיימים ויגדלו גוויותיהם ויימשכו לעדי עד. ואותו המשיח על פי אמונתם יחיה

k'hiskayem ha-Borei yisromam shemo pa'aro וכי באותו זמן תצמיח הארץ בגדים ארוגים ולחם אפוי. And dozens of every trade, belachem afui

ודברים הרבה שהן מן הנמנע כאלו. והראיה היא שלא יהיה אדם באותו הזמן בלא השכלה והשגה. ולמדו גם כן ראיה על כך ממאמרים רבים הנמצאים לחכמים ובכתובים מן המקרא שפשוטיהם תואמים לטענתם או מקצתם. כת שלישית מדמה כי הטובה המיוחדת היא תחיית המתים והוא שיחיה אדם לאחר מותו ויחזור עם בני ביתו וקרוביו יאכל וישתה ולא ימות עוד וכי הרעה היא שלא יחיה. והם כמו כן למדו ראיה על זה ממאמרי החכמים ומקצת פסוקים שבכתובים התואמים לטענה זו.

Vekat revi'it medama. So the first one says all the sechar is in Gan Eden. The second one doesn't single out Gan Eden but again has the same physical conception of sechar. The third one introduces techiyat hametim again, which, which, which reintroduces a a physical life of comfort and indulgence.

וכת רביעית מדמה כי הטובה שנשיגנה בקיום המצוות היא שלוות הגוף ומילוי משאלות מענייני העולם הזה כגון טוב הארץ וריבוי הנכסים וריבוי הבנים ואריכות ימים ובריאות הגוף והביטחון ומלכות שתהיה לנו ונהיה מושלים על אויבינו וכי הרעה שתפגענו ותבואנו היא בהיפך למצבים הללו כדרך שאנחנו שרויים בזמננו זה זמן הגלות. ולמדו ראיה כפי דמיונם מכל שאר התורה בברכות ובקללות ובזולתם מכל המעשיות הכתובות במקרא. וכת חמישית והם הרוב מחברים בין כל העניינים האלה ואומרים כי התוחלת היא שיבוא המשיח ויחיה המתים וייכנסו לגן עדן ויאכלו שם וישתו ויתקיימו כהתקיים השמים והארץ.

A patchwork of all of the above. And they all miss the point.

אבל הנקודה הזאת הנפלאה כלומר העולם הבא הנה מעט הוא שתמצא בכלל מי שמעלה על דעתו או חושב בזה או שעוסק ביסוד הזה או חוקר על השמות הללו מה הם חלים. ואם היא התכלית או אחת בין הדעות הקודמות היא התכלית ויבדיל בין התכלית ובין הסיבה המביאה אל התכלית. ולא תמצא כלל מי שחוקר בזה ומדבר בו אלא כל בני אדם חוקרים ההמון והמיוחדים איך יקומו המתים ערומים או לבושים והאם יקומו באותם הבגדים עצמם שנקברו בהם ברקמתם וציוריהם ויופי תפירתם או בכסות המכסה גופו בלבד. וכשיבוא המשיח האם ישווה בין העשיר והדל או שיהיה ימי החזק על החלש ורבים מן החקירות הללו בכל עת.

It's very reminiscent of Ramchal's introduction in Mesillat Yesharim where he talks about how even people who learn don't direct their attention and their energies appropriately. Okay, the Ramchal is talking about the neglect of understanding what yira truly is, what ahava truly is, what chasidut truly is. The Rambam's talking about a different type of neglect, the neglect of of what the ultimate sechar is and and the implications of that. But it's similar in terms of this sort of misplaced focus.

ואתה הבן ממני את המשל הזה ואז תכין לבך כדי לשמוע דברי בכל זה.

So the Rambam has to, again, not only clarify what the ikkar sechar va'onesh is, but he also has to clarify what the significance of, given that obviously the Rambam's going to explain to us that the ultimate sechar is Olam Haba and the ultimate onesh rachmana litzlan is to lose one's chelek in Olam Haba. So what about, what's all the berachos and klalos about in, in Bechukotai and Ki Tavo, which the kat revi'it focus on? Understood. And what are the various maamarei Chazal talking about that the other kitos focused on? And so the Rambam not only has to clarify what the correct understanding is, but he has to explain all the sources that seemingly indicated otherwise, which is why he begins with this discussion of shelo lishma and lishma.

ואתה הבן ממני המשל הזה ואז תוכן בלבך כדי לשמוע דבר בכל זה. מניח שנער צעיר לימים.

Right, we use the word tza'ir to mean young. But the way it comes to mean young is actually tza'ir is the same as ze'ir, just as in Aramaic ze'ir. Ze'ir means something when there's very little of something. So someone who has very few days behind him is young, right? That's why the real phrase is, when you use tza'ir to mean young, you're using it as an abbreviation for tza'ir leyamim because tza'ir really just means in terms of kamus there's a small kamus. So a person who has very few days or years behind him, so he's still young and a person who he's tza'ir leyamim. Rav Nebenzahl signs tze'ira machaveraya. That's the way he signs. So 70 years ago that was true. It's obviously baruch Hashem not true in the sense of the youngest of the chabura anymore. No, but what tza'ir means small, it doesn't mean young. Small in when you're talking about time, so then small is young.

מניח שנער צעיר לימים הכניסוהו אצל מורה ללמדו תורה וזאת טובה גדולה עבורו מצד השלמות שתסג לו.

There's nothing, there's no greater tovah than that to bestow upon the child.

אלא שהוא בכלל בגלל צעירותו וחולשת שכלו אינו מבין את ערך אותה הטובה ואת השלמות שתבואהו.

But he's not sufficiently mature, either emotionally or intellectually, to understand, to appreciate the tovah of Torah.

ועל כן ההכרח יאליץ את המלמד שהוא יותר שלם ממנו לזרזו על הלימוד בדבר האהוב אצלו בגלל צעירותו. ויאמר לו למד ואתן לך אגוזים או תאנים או אתן לך חתיכת סוכר.

So he motivates the child with candy.

אזי הוא לומד ומשתדל לא לעצם הלימוד לפי שאינו יודע אותו הערך אלא כדי לקבל המאכל ההוא ואכילת אותו המאכל היא בעיניו חשובה יותר מן הלימוד וטובה יותר בלא ספק.

If you tell him learn, he won't learn. If you tell him learn and you'll get a candy, he'll learn. So the candy is more chashuv to him than the learning.

ולפיכך הוא מחשיב את הלימוד כעמל ויגיעה שהוא יגע בו כדי להשיג באותות היגיעות אותה התכלית האהובה והיא אגוז אחד או חתיכת סוכר.

Ukesheigdal vehischazek sichlo. So again he's a little older and intellectually more developed, still developing, but at the next stage of development. והוקל בעיניו אותו הדבר שהיה מחשיבו מלפנים. So the candy lasts two minutes, and for that I'm going to sit here for an hour and learn? The candy that lasts two minutes? And so he chaps, it's not such a good deal.

מפתים אותו גם כן וחזר להחשיב דבר אחר. מפתים אותו גם באותו הדבר החשוב בעיניו ויאמר לו המלמד למד ואקנה לך מנעלים יפים או בגד כזה וכזה.

The latest celebrity endorsed sneakers.

אזי ישתדל גם כן לא לעצם הלימוד אלא לאותו המלבוש באותו הבגד יקר בעיניו יותר מן הלימוד והוא תכלית הלימוד. וכשיהיה שלם בשכלו יותר.

Next stage of intellectual development. והוקל בעיניו גם ערך הדבר ההוא. Okay, this first prize is $25.

והוא כמו כן לומד ומשתדל על מנת לקבל אותו הממון. וקבלת הממון אצלו אז נכבדת בעיניו יותר מן הלימוד, כי תכלית הלימוד אצלו אז היא כדי לקבל הדינרין שהובטח בהם. וכשנהיה בעל הבחנה יתירה והוקל בעיניו גם ערך דבר זה.

I don't know, do people ever outgrow the chemdas mamon, or I don't know, at some point they realize that $25 doesn't go too far. I'm not sure which the Rambam means here. You know, one wonders if it's the latter.

וידע שזה דבר שערכו פחות, מפתה אותו בדבר שהוא חשוב יותר מזה, ואומר לו: למד כדי שתהיה רב ודיין, יכבדוך בני אדם ויעמדו מפניך ויקיימו דבריך ויגדל שמך בחייך ואחר מותך כפלוני ופלוני. והוא קורא ומשתדל כדי להשיג מעלה זו, ותהיה אם כן התכלית אצלו הכבוד שבני אדם מכבדים ומנשאים ומפארים אותו.

So that's kind of the ultimate shelo lishma that motivates us is kavod.

וכל זה מגונה, אלא שנצרכנו לזה בגלל חולשת שכל האדם שקובע תכלית הלימוד דבר אחר זולת הלימוד. ואומר: לשם מה אני לומד לימוד זה אלא כדי להשיג בו.

The truth is,

דמיון שוא על פי האמת. וזהו אצל החכמים שלא לשמה, כלומר שהוא מקיים המצוות ועושה אותן ולומד ומשתדל לא לשם אותו הדבר עצמו אלא לשם דבר אחר.

So the Rambam seems to give us pretty clearly a definition of lishma and shelo lishma, right?

שעושה אותן ולומד ומשתדל לא לשם אותו הדבר עצמו אלא לשם דבר אחר.

And it could be as we continue a question will emerge on this. But I was thinking in Mishneh Torah, you have the following. The first time the Rambam talks about lishma and shelo lishma is in Perek Gimmel of Talmud Torah, Halacha Hey. If you have your Rambam, take a look.

תחילה דינו של אדם אינו נידון אלא על התלמוד ואחר כך על שאר מעשיו. לפיכך אמרו חכמים: לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה, שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

Good. Then again in Perek Yud of Hilchos Teshuvah, Halacha Hey, Yud Hey.

כל העוסק בתורה כדי לקבל שכר או כדי שלא תגיע אותו פורענות, הרי זה עוסק בה שלא לשמה. וכל העוסק בה לא ליראה ולא לקבל שכר אלא מפני אהבת אדון כל הארץ שציווה בה, הרי זה עוסק בה לשמה. ואמרו חכמים: לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה אפילו שלא לשמה, שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

So the question is, why does the Rambam wait until Hilchos Teshuvah to define what shelo lishma and lishma means? If the terms need to be defined, so then what we'd expect is that the Rambam should define them the first time he uses those terms. The Rambam in Hilchos Shabbos at the beginning of in Hilchos Shabbos tells you what pattur is going to mean throughout Hilchos Shabbos, what chayav is going to mean throughout Hilchos Shabbos, what pattur is going to mean throughout Hilchos Shabbos. And in Hilchos Gerushin Perek Aleph, the Rambam tells you throughout Hilchos Gerushin what get pasul will mean and what get battel will mean throughout Hilchos Gerushin. So if you need to define terms, you define terms either the first time you use it or even before the first time you use it. But you certainly don't wait till the second. defines his terms. So lechoira as follows. The emes is that there there are two different lishmahs and shelo lishmahs. Call it two different michaivem and therefore two different meanings of lishmah and shelo lishmah. There's sort of one michaivem of lishmah built into every mitzvah. Built into every mitzvah there's the proper way to do the mitzvah and there's an improper way to do the mitzvah. What's the proper way to do the mitzvah? If someone asks you why you're eating matzah, the answer is because it's a mitzvah. Because Ribbono Shel Olam said to eat matzah. That's why I'm eating matzah. If you answer because it's tasty, because I'm going to get schar, etc., so then you're not doing it because it's a mitzvah. You're doing it for some other reason. That's one lishmah and shelo lishmah. Another lishmah and shelo lishmah is not a michaivem which is built into every mitzvah, but is the michaivem of the mitzvah of ahavas Hashem. The mitzvah of ahavas Hashem says that we should do every mitzvah מפני אהבת אדון כל הארץ שציווה בה. Anything less than that is shelo lishmah. And what mitzvas ahavas Hashem says is that we should do everything מפני אהבת אדון כל הארץ שציווה בה. So now like this. In Hilchos Talmud Torah the Rambam is not talking about mitzvas ahavas Hashem. He's talking about mitzvas Talmud Torah. The simple meaning of the terms lishmah and shelo lishmah. Lishmah means for its own sake and shelo lishmah again, just what are the, just what's the literal teitch, just what do the phrases mean etymologically. So lishmah means for its own sake and shelo lishmah means not for its own sake. That's what the words mean. So in Hilchos Talmud Torah the terms don't need to be defined because if you speak Hebrew, if you read Hebrew, the Rambam is using the terms just the way they literally translate. So when the Rambam tells you in Hilchos Talmud Torah to learn lishmah, it means you're learning Torah because it's a mitzvah to learn Torah. Why are you learning Torah? Because it's a mitzvah to learn Torah. That's why I'm learning Torah. That's what lishmah means. And if there's a different answer to that question, if it's for the chatichas sukar, if it's for the min olim, if it's for the dinarin, if it's for the kavod, so then he's not doing it because it's a mitzvah. He's doing it for some not for its own sake. In Hilchos Teshuvah in perek yud of Hilchos Teshuvah where of course perek yud of Hilchos Teshuvah is the entire perek is devoted to mitzvas ahavas Hashem, so here the Rambam says that mitzvas ahavas Hashem introduces a new dimension to lishmah. Right? Until now the answer we gave of lishmah is why are you taking a lulav? Because it's a mitzvah. You didn't say anything about ahavas Hashem. It's a mitzvah and I have to do what Ribbono Shel Olam said and I'm doing what Ribbono Shel Olam said. Maybe that's yira, maybe that's ahava, but lav davka that it's ahava. Lishmah just means I'm doing it because it's a mitzvah. I'm doing it because it's a mitzvah. In Hilchos Teshuvah the Rambam there where he's talking about not the lishmah which is sort of inheres in every mitzvah, but the lishmah which is מחייב מצד מצות אהבת השם. So here that means more than what you would just know from literally translating the terms. So here the Rambam explains what lishmah and shelo lishmah mean. And again we may have a question in this as we proceed here in the Peirush Hamishnayos. So that's the pshat in the Yad. So that's what the Rambam is saying here initially. וזהו אצל חכמים שלא לשמה if you see the words hachachamim shelo lishmah, that's in all the translations because that's in the original.

וזהו אצל חכמים שלא לשמה כל שמקיים מצות ועושה אותן ולא משעבד לו לשם אותו הדבר עצמו.

And it's here again, not for its own sake. Not for its own sake. אלא לשם דבר אחר. I'm sorry, did you want to ask? Yeah, is the lishma discussed here kind of like a baseline and the lishma in Hilchos Teshuva like a raised level, like a kind of middas chasidus or both are looked at like as part of the ikar lishma? I don't know, I don't think the Rambam presents it as a middas chasidus because he says that it stems from the mitzva of ahavas Hashem, so I don't think he would classify it as a middas chasidus. There are like two aspects of lishma and you need to be mekayeim both of them in order to be called lishma and not having one of them... Right, it's kind of bechol ma'asecha imanah because אהבת אדון הכל שצוה בה subsumes the lishma of Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Talmud Torah. Perek Gimmel, the lishma of Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Talmud Torah sort of leaves some things to be determined. Meaning the lishma is I'm doing it because it's a mitzva. I'm doing it because it's a mitzva. Now you can, okay, clearly that means I'm not doing it for kavod and I'm not doing it for money. But am I doing the mitzva because if I don't do mitzvos I get an onesh or because אהבת אדון הכל שצוה בה? So that's not dictated by the lishma which is inherent in every mitzva, but that is dictated by mitzvas ahavas Hashem. Yeah. Does yiras Hashem dictate a certain sense of lishma? I'm sorry, does yiras Hashem dictate what? Like if you have ahava not yira, does that sort of leave out the lishma? I don't think there is such a thing. I don't think there is such a thing that a person has ahava without having yira. Chovos HaLevavos says that, says that explicitly. Everyone says that explicitly. Me'or Einayim we were learning during the break, the last few lines that we didn't get to, says that explicitly. Everyone says that explicitly. There isn't real ahava without yira. Me'or Einayim says there's counterfeit ahava without yira. If a person learns Torah and he does it because it's a mitzva but the person also naturally intellectually enjoys learning Torah per se, so he can't help that natural feeling that he has but ma'aseh it's there, does that take away from a person's lishma at all? So the Eglei Tal, the Eglei Tal talks about the question in his hakdama to that sefer. He says there are people who think no, you should bedafke not enjoy it to be lishma. And he says no, aderaba, he says to delve into Toras Hashem, the mitzva, the mitzva of Talmud Torah is to learn Toras Hashem, to appreciate Toras Hashem, so the enjoyment that a person has doesn't in the least detract from the lishma. פקודי ה׳ ישרים משמחי לב. It's something which is exhilarating. He's ma'arich on this in the hakdama to Eglei Tal.

והזהירו אותנו החכמים עליהם השלום מזה ואמרו לא תעשם עטרה להתגדל בהם ולא קרדום לחפור בהם.

So what are the two different meshalim that Chazal gave?

רמז למה שביארתי לך שלא ישים תכלית הלימוד לא שיכבדו בני אדם אותו,

right? Don't make it into a crown for your own self-aggrandizement. So that's dismissing the shelo lishma of kavod. ולא קרדום לחפור בהם, that's dismissing the shelo lishma of money. ולא יחזיק את תורת ה׳ פרנסה. Right, so famously the Rambam in Peirush Hamishnayos and all of this and then again in Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Talmud Torah was vehemently, vehemently, maybe that's an understatement, was vehemently opposed to what everyone else says that we do, that teachers of Torah can be paid. So the Rambam was vehemently opposed to that.

ולא יחזיק את תורת ה׳ פרנסה לא תהיה אצל תכלית הלימוד אלא

What's the point of doing the mitzvah? To do the mitzvah. Right? It's not it's not doesn't have to have some mundane goal.

ואסור לאדם השלם לומר אם עשיתי מעשים טובים אלו וסרתי מן המעשים הרעים שהזהיר השם מהם במה יהיה שכרי.

Because as the youth says 'What will they give me?' and we say to him such and such a thing. For when we see one whose intellect is short of understanding this light and seeks a tachlis tachlis, right? He's for what's the ultimate tachlis, he wants there should be a tachlis. משיבים לו לפי שיעור סכלותו ענק זה תקבל. Now this is a case where you do answer the fool on on his level.

וכבר הזהירו אותנו חכמים על זה גם כן כלומר שלא ישים האדם תכלית עבודתו וקיום המצוות דבר מן הדברים.

And that is what the perfect pious man said, the one who possesses the truth.

אל תהיו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת לקבל פרס.

But rather,

היו כעבדים המשמשים את הרב על מנת שלא לקבל פרס.

And their intention in this is only to believe in the truth for the sake of the truth. And this is the matter that they expressed as oved me'ahava. And they said about it השלם במצוותיו חפץ מאוד אמר במצוותיו ולא בשכר מצוותיו. How great is this proof and how clear it is. For it is an explicit proof of what we have said above.

שמא תאמר הריני לומד בשביל שאהיה עשיר בשביל שאקרא רבי בשביל שאקבל שכר בעולם הבא תלמוד לומר לאהבה את השם כל מה שאתם עושים לא תעשו אלא מאהבה.

Now this matter has been explained and it is clear that this was the intention in the commandments v'yesod emunas chachamim. I don't know if this is the girsah. It's it's funny what does it mean? V'yesod emunas chachamim. So presumably if the girsah here is emunas chachamim, it's not the way we use emunas chachamim to have trust in chachamim but it's rather the the belief that the chachamim subscribe to. Right, when I think in I think grammarians talk about the objective and subjective genitive. Do you know what that is? So let's say you have you have a phrase 'love of love of God'. So that can mean a person's love for God. So then Hashem in in that understanding is the object of the love. So that's an objective genitive. Or it can mean Hashem's love for let's say for Knesset Yisrael. So then Hashem is the subject of the love. That's a subjective genitive. So emunas chachamim can be an objective, it can be a subjective. So it doesn't seem to make any sense. We usually use it objective, right? The emunah that we have in the chachamim. What's this got to do with the v'yesod emunas chachamim? This is the kavana bi-mitzvot and it's v'yesod emunas chachamim. Doesn't make any sense. So if that's the correct reading, there's an alternate one here on the bottom. But if that's the correct reading, so again it means it's a subjective one. Meaning this is what the chachamim believe, not this is the basis for our belief in the chachamim, but this is the yesod of what the chachamim believed. It's a subjective genitive.

ויסוד אמונת חכמים ולא יעלם עינם ממנו אלא אויל וכסיל שאיבדוהו כבר מבוכת מחשבת השכל והדמיונות הגרועים.

You have to be very krum not to not to recognize what I'm telling you says the Rambam.

וזוהי מעלת אברהם אבינו שעבד מאהבה ועל דרך זה ראויים להתעורר.

There's something here. I don't know. Sounds like the Rambam sounds like from the Rambam that he taught us a big chiddush here. But you can't question the chiddush because the rayos that I'm bringing you are are equal to the chiddush. They fully prove what I'm telling you, right?

וכמה גדולה היא ראיה זו ומה ברורה היא שהיא ראיה מפורשת על מה שאמרנו לעיל.

V'yoser gedola mizo. So what's the Rambam what's the Rambam arguing against here? Right? It's clear that right you you clearly get the sense here that the Rambam is telling us something with... which he considers, again, relative to what people think, a big chidush. And but the Rambam is saying, just look, I'm proving to you from Chazal. Look at these rayos from Chazal. Look at Antigonus Ish Socho, look at the gemara במצותיו חפץ מאד, look at the Sifrei, shema tomar, all this proves. What's he saying that's so? You get that sense, you hear the question, Reuven? I mean, how else would one have understood oved me-ahava? What's the, what's the competing view that the Rambam is rejecting? It's clear, right? He's telling us כמה גדולה היא ראיה זו. Now to us it seems like devarim pshutim. I guess it's always hard to know, you know, that devarim pshutim because the Rambam made them devarim pshutim. So it's sort of hard to go back to you know before the Rambam made them devarim pshutim to understand what the competing and what the Rambam is telling us erroneous understanding was. So I'm not sure, but maybe as follows. Do you have a Chovos HaLevavos in your computer? Sha'ar Ahava, perek daled. Sha'ar Ahava in Chovos HaLevavos perek daled. אם האהבה באלהים היא ביכולת האדם ומלאו. So you'll take a look. It's not a long perek. Maybe 60% of the screen here. Not a long perek. Kitzer ma'aseh, the Chovos HaLevavos says as follows: He says ahavas Hashem can express itself in giving away one's money, one's fortune for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Like Avraham Avinu tells the Melech Sedom that

אם מחוט ועד שרוך נעל ואם אקח מכל אשר לך.

He won, Avraham Avinu won the what's it called, Powerball lottery, and he doesn't take the prize. He walks away from the, walks away from the two billion dollars. אם מחוט ועד שרוך נעל. Then another is to be willing to endure pain. Who says Avraham Avinu does that also? Mitzvas milah. So first is be-mamono, the second is be-gufo. Both of those, says the Chovos HaLevavos, a person is naturally capable of cultivating and displaying such an ahavas Hashem. However, the third, which is to give one's life, היא למעלה מן היכולת הבשרית מפני שהטבע הפכה וכנגדה. Right? The most basic, elemental instinct a person has is for self-preservation. Right, it's only Rachmana litzlan if a person is very, very mentally ill Rachmana litzlan that a person doesn't abide by that basic instinct for self-preservation to live. אין ביכולת כל בשר לסבול מפני שהטבע והיצר כנגדה. Ay, but we see that throughout the generations Chassidei Elyon have been moser nefesh. That's only because when a person does everything he can for ahavas Hashem so then Hakadosh Baruch Hu elevates him and lets him do this also. But it's not something a person can do naturally on his own. It doesn't happen naturally on his own.

ומי שמתמיד על האהבה שהיא לתוחלת ולתקווה או ליראה בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא שהיא ביכולת רוב המדברים לקיים מצוותיו ומשתדל בה תמיד יאמצהו הבורא ויעזרהו על האהבה הנאמנה שתהיה לגדל ולרומם לבורא יתעלה אשר היא למעלה מן היכולת הבשרית.

It could be I'm not sure that the Rambam is arguing against something along the lines of the Chovos HaLevavos. And maybe what the Rambam is saying is maybe the pushback to the Rambam is again it seems like he's just quoting straightforward ma'amarim and saying look what a rayah this is to what I'm telling you. So maybe there is one assumption in everything the Rambam is saying that maybe the Rambam thought we would challenge and maybe maybe he even has the Chovos HaLevavos in mind which is is it really is ahavas Hashem really something that a person has a capacity for? Maybe the same way the Ramban says on famously on v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha that Hakadosh Baruch Hu hardwired us that our self-love is greater than our love for others. And therefore he says v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha to say that you should love someone else as much as you love yourself is derech haflagah. And then he gives a different teretz; that's why it says l' not es, that the pasuk never even said it. So maybe you would have thought and again the Chovos HaLevavos doesn't say it in those terms he says it differently but it amounts to something very similar if not the same thing maybe you would have thought the same thing to give one's life for Hakadosh Baruch Hu so one has to love Hakadosh Baruch Hu more than oneself? Maybe that's also min hanimna. And the Rambam's saying but al korchoch Chazal are telling us differently. Antignos Ish Soko didn't tell his talmidim do whatever you can and then Hakadosh Baruch Hu do the rest. No, he said do it. He said do it. So clearly Antignos Ish Soko was saying that we do have such a capacity. It takes a lifetime of work to try to realize that potential. And that's what all these ma'amarim the Rambam is saying point to. It's not so much that in other words the pshat was suggesting is not so much that the Rambam is clarifying that this is what ahavas Hashem means but the Rambam is clarifying that it's something which is within naturally within human reach. De-lo k'Chovos HaLevavos it's something which is naturally a potential. potential human attainment. Not easy. Not common. Maybe that's the pshat. Maybe that's what the again this big chiddush is that the Rambam is saying look, but the ma'amarei Chazal, the ma'amarei Chazal attest to it. That's what he goes on to say,

לפי שידע החכם עליהם השלום שענין זה קשה מאד ואין כל אדם משיגו.

Again, it is kasheh me'od. The Rambam's not saying that it's something which is easy, that it's something that a person effortlessly accomplishes. But it is naturally possible. Maybe, maybe the following Rambam is also relevant to this. If you take a look in perek vav of Hilchos Teshuva, halacha hey.

ומהו זה שאמר דוד טוב וישר ה' על כן יורה חטאים בדרך. ידרך ענוים במשפט וילמד ענוים דרכו.

So if a person has bechira, and because he has bechira he has a chiyuv teshuva, and he needs to exercise his bechira to do teshuva, what does it mean that yoreh chata'im badarech? So first pshat the Rambam says is

זה ששלח להם נביאים מודיעים להם דרכי ה' ומחזירים אותן בתשובה.

That doesn't mean that Hashem does it for them, but he teaches them how to do it. He sends them nevi'im to give them mussar and to tell them the need for teshuva, what they should do to do teshuva, but it doesn't mean that Hakadosh Baruch Hu propels us involuntarily mitzideinu along that path of teshuva. Ve'od, this is the line that's relevant to us now rabosai, שנתן בהם כח ללמוד ולהבין. What it means that על כן יורה חטאים בדרך is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us a capacity. When Hakadosh Baruch Hu designed the human personality, when Hakadosh Baruch Hu designed the neshama, נתן בהם כח ללמוד ולהבין שמדה זו בכל אדם. Everyone, everyone has this mida, rabosai, everyone,

שמדה זו בכל אדם שכל זמן שהוא נמשך בדרכי החכמה והצדק מתאוה להן ורודף אותן.

A person naturally is drawn when he exposes himself to chochma ve'tzedek, so he's naturally drawn to it. And he naturally is misaveh and rodef. והוא שאמרו חכמים בא לטהר מסייעין אותו. Mesayin oso means in the sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu helps him in the sense that Hakadosh Baruch Hu designed, again, our neshamos, our personalities that way, that if we take the first steps, so then we'll desire to continue and to push forward. כלומר ימצא עצמו נעזר על הדבר. Could be that it's this capacity, sort of this Rambam sort of leshitaso here, that it's this capacity that we have within us which makes ahavas Hashem a potentially natural human attainment. The Rambam has an Ishut issue in terms of one's relationship with one's wife. He says to be mechabed her yosair migufo and oheiv her kegufo. So I always assumed that the reason the Rambam limited ahava was because you can't love something more than you love yourself. But if it's the case that in our teva that we really do have that ability, so why did the Rambam limit ahava as opposed to kavod? So two things. A, even even he doesn't, there too the Rambam doesn't equate. I think we once spoke about this in context of the lashon haRambam in Perek Vav, Hilchos Deios by Ahavas Yisrael, מצווה על כל אדם, Perek Vav, Halacha Gimmel, לאהוב כל אחד מישראל כגופו, shenemar v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha. So at first glance, that seems to be against the Ramban, but it really isn't, because the Rambam says לאהוב כל אחד ואחד מישראל כגופו. Like if someone asks who the real you is, so you're not going to say it's my guf. So first of all, it's not even equating in terms of ahava. It's the same ahava that a person has for one's guf, which is not, one's self-love is much deeper and much more profound than that. That's A. And B, the capacity the Rambam is talking about is bedivrei chochma, it's inyanim ruchniyim, which leads to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the capacities spoken of in Perek Vav of Hilchos Teshuvah, which is more expansive than—which can surpass the self-love. So love for one's wife can—if it does, it's the same way, I think the seforim explain, the same way that parents love their children. Parents do love their children more than themselves, but I think some of the seforim said that's because when you scratch the surface, it's sort of because parents, I mean this is not a critique, this is still very noble and halevai all parents should be this way, this is not a critique kehu zeh, but just a description, a classification, it's because parents really see their children as extensions of themselves. Right? Parents will see their children as their nitzchiyus. And so while it's certainly true that parents do emotionally, they do love their children more than they love themselves, but conceptually, that's not necessarily the case. So the same, you would have the same distinction maybe in a marriage also possibly. So then why didn't the Rambam say that? No, there is no chiyuv for that to be the case. It may happen, it may not happen. I'm just telling you what's normative, not what might happen. Okay, we'll stop here.