Aggadata – Shabbos 31A – part 2

We was talking on daf lamed aleph in Masechet Shabbat and the story with the ger that came before Shammai and then Hillel about Torah Kulah. So first, how is that Torah Kulah? So Rashi says there, the first pshat in Rashi is that the averos in this context, re'acha refers to HaKadosh Baruch Hu.

דעלך סני לחברך לא תעביד זו היא כל התורה כולה ואידך פירושה הוא זיל גמור.

So if you want to know what the yesod of Torah Kulah is, it's to do retzon Hashem. Interesting. Rashi says in the pasuk of שמן וקטורת ישמח לב ומתוק רעהו מעצת נפש, so Rashi says the pshat in u'metok, the pshat Rashi gives is not u'metok lashon mesikut, but u'metok lashon re'us. רעך ורע אביך אל תעזוב, that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is with Am Yisrael and the friendship of HaKadosh Baruch Hu is with them. Not as a way of downplaying or devaluing the relationships that we have and that should be cultivated, but ultimately, the ultimate relationship, the one that endures, the one that's most real, is a person's connection to HaKadosh Baruch Hu. And that's also reflected in the way that Hillel is telling two things. Hillel is telling him that Torah Kulah represents doing retzon Hashem, but it's also telling him something about what the relationship is, how a person should conceive of that relationship, that HaKadosh Baruch Hu is conceived of as a personal relationship, that they should understand that HaKadosh Baruch Hu, again, as it were, is his friend in the sense that HaKadosh Baruch Hu gives him existence, HaKadosh Baruch Hu mchalkel chayim b'chesed. So Hillel is telling him not only the secret yesod of being devoted and dedicated to retzon Hashem, but also in what context to think of and understand the relationship one looks to develop and connection with HaKadosh Baruch Hu. The Baal HaTanya talks about this gemara also. Take a look. There's a famous perek in Tanya, Perek Lamed Beis of Tanya. So maybe we'll read a little bit together. So the Baal HaTanya writes:

הנה על ידי קיום הדברים הנזכרים לעיל להיות גופו נבזה ונמאס בעיניו.

If a person has scorn for that which is physical, doesn't give it any independent, intrinsic value, רק שמחתו תהיה שמחת הנפש לבדה. What gives him simcha, what allows him to experience simcha, is simchas hanefesh. He says, the Baal HaTanya, הרי זו דרך ישרה וקלה. This is the direct path, this is the easy and direct path. לבוא לקיום מצות ואהבת לרעך כמוך. It's an amazing thing. So it's, I think a lot of us find it in our avodah, right? In our avodah to have ahavas Yisrael. Says the Baal HaTanya, you want to know how to achieve ahavas Yisrael?

הדרך ישרה וקלה לבוא לקיום מצות ואהבת לרעך כמוך לכל נפש מישראל מגדל ועד קטן.

Without exception. To have ahavas Yisrael for every Jew without exception. What's it got to do with the fact that a person is not interested in pleasures and in the physical and is only fully interested in ruchniyus? So says the Baal HaTanya,

כפי מה שגופו נמאס ומתועב אצלו והנפש והרוח הם העיקר.

What a person focuses on, what a person recognizes is real,

מי יודע גדולתם ומעלתם בשורשם ומקורם בחיים ובשם שכולם מתאימות ואב אחד לכלנה ולכן נקראו כל ישראל אחים ממש מצד שורש נפשם בהשם אחד רק שהגופים מחולקים.

That's what the Baal HaTanya says. An amazing and very very fundamental yesod. He says, on the level of the nefesh, so kol Yisrael are every Jew is what's all from one source, we're all very very closely related on that level. The pirud that exists, says the Baal HaTanya, מצד שהגופים מחולקים. The pirud is on the physical level, on the level of the guf. ולכן, says the Baal HaTanya,

העושה גופו עיקר ונפשו טפלה אי אפשר להיות אהבה ואחוה אמיתית ביניהם אלא התלויה בדבר לבדה.

You can't really have a genuine ahava because there's just too much of a distance, there's too much of a gap. וזהו שאמר הלל הזקן and that's what Hillel HaZaken said to the ger on

על פי מצוה זו זו כל התורה כולה ואידך פירושה.

The yesod and shoresh of kol HaTorah kulo. What's the yesod of haTorah?

להגביה ולהעלות הנפש על הגוף מעלה מעלה עד עיקרא ושרשא דכל עלמין.

The yesod of haTorah again is that the person should elevate the soul and let it dictate to the body so that a person is in touch, again, with the shoresh of his neshama. And then, since the mekor of nishmos kol Yisrael is takeh one, so then there can be then there can be ahavas Yisrael. He said that's what it means when we ask ברכנו אבינו כולנו כאחד. Do you see the chidush of the Baal HaTanya? That ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha, he's not interpreting it like Rashi with the posuk in Mishlei of רעך ורע אביך אל תעזוב. No, he's interpreting it kifshuto kemashmao, that re'acha means your friend. And what he's saying is, if a person can be mekayim the mitzvah of ve'ahavta lere'acha kamocha bishleimus, so that means that the person again is connecting to the shoresh of the nefashos, to the spiritual element, the spiritual dimension, and that's takeh what avodas Hashem is all about. The Gaon, the Vilna Gaon also has something along this in mind. The Gaon says... שאומר על רגל אחת, what he means is that the Mishna that says Ashrecha ba-olam ha-zeh. There are three pillars that that hold up the world. There are three legs that support the world. And the Gaon is saying, I want you to simplify it further, I want you to reduce it to one. So Shamai goes and no, how do you reduce it to one? It's on Torah, on avodah, on gemilut hasadim, you can't reduce it to one. And Hillel says no, if you want to in fact you can reduce it to one, you can depict כל התורה כולה על רגל אחת. Again, I don't know if the Gaon would elaborate what he has in mind but it certainly seems to be something along the same lines and results from the Devaram Atikim. And on a more exoteric level as well, even without the without trying to relate to what the Devaram Atikim is depicting al pi kabbalah, but on a more prosaic exoteric level, what what challenges us in in with regard to the mitzvah of Ahavat Yisrael is the differences between ourselves and others. They could be temperamental differences, they can be religious, ideological differences, but what challenges us is that those differences just sometimes bother us, they irritate us. When when a person has a sense of shiflut, and a sense of shiflut that's engendered by his awareness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, if a person, as we say in the Igeret, from the Igeret we borrow it every morning from the Modeh Ani, it doesn't allow for the type of toughness which we feel, even if we don't demonstrate, vis-a-vis others because of the differences. There has to be an ego in not in a positive sense of the term to be irritated, to be annoyed by by others, to be unacceptably intolerant and and not patient for others, that there has to be there has to be an ego involved in that. A person has a sense of of shiflut engendered by the Modeh Ani,

ודמי לעין בשר ואנא אתה בא ולאן אתה הולך ולפני מי אתה עתיד ליתן דין וחשבון,

a person isn't going to be makpid on others. Again, a mashal which perhaps captures a little bit of this idea is the following. Imagine, this used to happen before the days of back in ancient times before they had ATMs. There were certain times when if you wanted to to withdraw money from the bank, so you you had to wait in line and you had to go to the teller. So there were certain times when when the lines would be very long, like before the weekend, right after the weekend, certain times the lines would be very long, like right before a holiday weekend and the bank was going to be closed for three days, so then then the lines literally could be, you could stand in line for an hour. So imagine someone who's been standing, standing in line for an hour if not longer, then all of a sudden someone walks in off the street, cuts the line, goes right So everyone with one exception is up in arms and they're irate and they're ready to tear the guy to pieces. There's one person who is just standing very quietly, very sedately, and he doesn't seem to be at all affected. So someone asks him, how do you do it? How is that? How is it possible that you're not agitated, that you're not provoked? Isn't it outrageous? And this person answers, well, I'll share a confidence with you. He says, what he's doing back there, I don't think it's right. I think it's very wrong. But you know what? I'm actually the owner of the shop. I'm having the standing there, so I don't really have any standing to be moche on other people even when what they're doing isn't so wonderful. So the תשס"ח began Shas after Ma'ariv. At that level also the bein adam lamakom can and should be reflected bein adam lachaveiro. Again, just so the moshal is not misleading, again the moshal would not be intended to suggest that we're not supposed to draw lines and object when people distort Torah and when people distort halacha. I'm not talking about that, the nimshal of the moshal with personal irritants and annoyances. Not talking about that the person is supposed to be lackadaisical about things which are distortions of Torah. Okay, let's go back. The masechta actually basically discusses this story, we've started it. Let's look at the gemara. Tanu Rabanan

לעולם יהא אדם ענו כהלל ואל יהא קפדן כשמאי. מעשה בשני בני אדם שעמדו והישילו זה אומר מי יתני ד' מאות זוז למי שילך ויקניט להלל אמר אחד מהם אני אקנינו אותו היום ערב שבת היה והלל היה חופף את ראשו הלך ועבר על פתח ביתו אמר מי כאן הלל מי כאן הלל

nit'atef ve-yatzah likrato

אמר לו בני מה אתה מבקש אמר לו שאלה יש לי לשאול אמר לו שאול בני שאול.

And this is besides you know what we discussed with the Hashkafa and Rashi, דברים שמותר להקניט אותן לגירות, or the devarim that the candidate for geirus... obviously this gemara reflects the tziyur of an am ha'aretz kan, just the person doesn't have that tziyur, the person wouldn't act the way Hillel did. Who would have thought that such a motivation is so ridiculous that there's nothing to relate to? But Hillel obviously had a tziyur of what it really reflected.

מפני מה ראשיהן של בבליים סרסויות אמר לו בני שאלה גדולה שאלת מפני שאין להם חיות מיילדות. הלך והמתין שעה אחת חזר ואמר מי כאן הלל מי כאן הלל נתעטף ויצא לקראתו אמר לו בני מה אתה מבקש אמר לו שאלה יש לי לשאול אמר לו שאול בני שאול מפני מה עיניהן של תרמודיים תרוטות אמר לו בני שאלה גדולה שאלת מפני שדרין בין החולות. הלך והמתין שעה אחת חזר ואמר מי כאן הלל מי כאן הלל נתעטף ויצא לקראתו אמר לו בני מה אתה מבקש אמר לו שאלה יש לי לשאול אמר לו שאול בני שאול מפני מה רגליהן של תרמודיים רחבות אמר לו בני שאלה גדולה שאלת מפני שדרין בין הצים. אמר לו שאלות הרבה יש לי לשאול ומתיירא אני שלא תכעוס נתעטף וישב לפניו אמר לו כל שאלות שיש לך לשאול שאול אמר לו אתה הוא הלל שקורין אותך נשיא בישראל אמר לו הן אמר לו אם אתה הוא אל ירבו כמותך בישראל אמר לו בני מפני מה אמר לו שאיבדתי על ידך ד' מאות זוז אמר לו הוי זהיר ברוחך כדאי הוא הלל שתאבד על ידו ד' מאות זוז והלל לא יכעוס.

Amar Shmuel מעשה שהיה בנשיקת כוסו של הדר emunas ve-sechel de-hadar u-tehuva ve-sechel de-hadar u-mishtakh-ha shalva de-nehora yeshua ve-sechel de-hadar chochma ve-sechel de-hadar da-as ve-sechel de-hadar ויראת השם היא אוצרו. Maybe we can go up a little bit and look back at it. But through it all ויראת השם היא אוצרו. ויראת השם היא אוצרו and that's the point because yiras Hashem allows for the retention of the divrei Torah. That's the Sforno's pshat that the divrei Torah is a context of yiras Hashem. Itochen and the tachlis hachazara also. The tachlis hachazara is not simply that okay, the way memory works is that a person reviews so then he retains. But the tachlis hachazara also is that okay, so Chazal talk about different dargos of chazara and there's a minimum of four times, Chazal say go over a perek and then a bayis hachadash as they say at least four times. There's a midrash I think that if you take עיניים מן המשפחה וברכות and the gemara of

לעולם ישלים אדם פרשיותיו עם הציבור שנים מקרא ואחד תרגום.

So he says according to some tashbetz what that mitzva adds up to is to assume that a person is going to be in shul and שנים מקרא ואחד תרגום and that together with the שנים מקרא ואחד תרגום so it means that they'll have been through every parsha four times. And he correlates that with a midrash I think in this week's in this week's parsha. There's an inyan of four times and Chazal mention an inyan of 40 times כמנין ימי הר סיני, an inyan of the temuna of tshuva, and then of course there's an inyan of 101 times. אינו דומה שונה פרקו מאה פעמים לשונה מאה ואחת. But the pshat certainly by 40 and 101 and reishis maybe to a degree even by four is that it shows a mesiras nefesh. To chozer over and over and over is stiff. The natural impulse and instinct is to push forward. When a person chozers over and over, so that discipline, that mesiras nefesh, so that allows him to connect a kinyan in Torah. It too is not just the natural process of review and reinforcement, but it's that mesiras nefesh. The Rogochover in one of his teshuvos he says in the same way in physical objects so for kinyanim, so we know that karka is nikneis by kessef, shtar, ve-chazaka, then for d'oraisa, metaltelim are nikneim bi-meshicha, then d'rabbanan bi-meshicha u-vimsira, bi-meshicha u-vimsira. So too spiritually there are also kinyanim. So what's the meisiv kinyan in the spiritual realm? So he says mesiras nefesh. And quotes a few ma'amarei Chazal, for instance ותקח מרים הנביאה אחות אהרן את התוף בידה. So one of the explanations given לפי אחות אהרן ולא אחות משה, so one of the explanations given is לפי שמסר נפשו עליה שנצטרעה, that since Aharon would later in parshas Behaalosecha he was going to be moser nafsho on the shemen she-nitzta'er, that's a kinyan. So she's known as achos Aharon. So the way a person makes it a kinyan in the spiritual realm is through mesiras nefesh. Because there's again, 45 times, 101 times, it's a mesiras nefesh there and and and that allows for for the kinyan to happen. Om lo lo lo, Nasata v'nasasta be-emunah. Om lo lo lo, Nasata v'nasasta be-emunah. So the peshat is if you conduct business honestly and and when you conduct your business were you honest. The Chassidus point of Nasata v'nasasta be-emunah also on a very basic level is when you conduct business, when you're out making a hishtadlus for your livelihood, do you do it with emuna? Do you realize that it's not kochi ve-otzem yadi which is going to yield the the parnassa, that everything is from Hashem? Nasata v'nasasta be-emunah, even when you're doing business, when you're buying and selling stocks and you're investing, do you do that with a with a sense of emuna? Kavata itim la-Torah. Kavata itim la-Torah means that there isn't a requirement when it comes to talmud Torah like a mitzvas tefillin, no. Talmud Torah a person is supposed to have a keviyas itim. Not just that every day I'll look for time for time for I'll consult my my schedule every day and I'll I'll I'll try to chap arein. No, but a person is supposed to have a keviyas itim. And those itim that a person is koveya have a different status than extra time that that a person finds to learn. The Mishnah Berurah quotes in סימן קנה, somewhere around there in Orach Chayim, Orach Chayim he writes that a person that a person leaves the the beis knesses in the morning, so before he goes to work, before he goes to the office, he should go to the beis medrash first and learn. So in that context the Mishnah Berurah quotes a Yerushalmi, I think it says it in Sotah, that the Yerushalmi is illustrating who are baalei amana? Who are people who have emuna? So the Yerushalmi tells a story that someone had a keviyas itim. That he used to learn Torah, whatever his seder was, every morning after Shacharis. And he was a merchant. And and there was someone who came by and was calling out that that he wanted to make a very, very large purchase, one which would have been incredibly lucrative, but he had to do it right now. Had to do it right now. So the baal amana, so this person who was in middle of his keviyas itim, turns, if he wants to have it he'll have it, but I shouldn't be mevatel my keviyas itim, and and he ignores the guy. And he doesn't go out. So the pshat in keviyas itim is that again, when you make the avoda, I'm not allowed to intrude upon the keviyas itim. Even if a person is offered again, is offered a meeting with a business contact that he's been looking to be able to connect with for the longest time and potentially that meeting could could lead to tremendous profit, but he can't do it during his keviyas itim. So the keviyas itim has a has a special, again, inviolable status. Again, there's a midrash here also, that we find it sometimes that the pasuk says Hayikva adam Elokim. Sometimes we find a lashon of keviyah, not to affix, not to set, but a lashon of stealing. So the the the sort of aggadic pshat of kavata... is that a person has to steal time for Torah. Is that sometimes, in hachi nami, a person may be very busy and he's going to be asked, did you steal time? Afu dechein, did you did you make time for the Torah? The mitzvah of keviyas itim that the Rambam writes based on the pasuk in Yehoshua, והגית בו יומם ולילה, is yomam valayla. Means that even if a person has a keviyas itim that he's able to arrange things, he doesn't go to work until 11 in the morning, so he davens at 6 and then he learns from 7 to 11, but he has to have a keviyas itim balayla also. If the mitzvah is

והגית בו יומם ולילה, חייב אדם לקבוע זמן לתלמוד תורה בין ביום בין בלילה.

Keviyas itim must be both bayom as well as balayla. Now, because of that Yerushalmi, so a person should be realistic. A person, a person, a place, if he's a trader and and being there when the market opens at 9:30 is is something that's very important to his job, so his keviyas itim shouldn't be sof shacharis with, you know, every Monday and Thursday, you know, it's going to be a big nisayon for the parnassa. It doesn't make sense in the first place that that should be his keviyas itim. The keviyas itim should be realistic. Once he makes that realistic keviyas itim, so then that's where the Yerushalmi kicks in and and then a person really really is supposed to see to it that that nothing nothing intrudes on the keviyas itim. This is one of the examples when when you think about when you ask, what is the halacha l'ma'aseh of bitachon? So the truth is that to a certain degree and to a certain extent, bitachon is a question of attitude. Given the fact that there is a chovos hashtadlus, so to a certain degree, to a certain extent, the difference between the ba'al bitachon and one who doesn't have bitachon is not, again, to a degree, is not so much in what they do as much as it is in the attitude that they have towards what they're doing. You can have two people that both take the same subway train, they both go to the same office, and bitachon, they may even spend the same number of hours in the office, and one person is doing it with an attitude of bitachon b'Hashem, and the other person is doing it with with a realization, with a firm belief, that

כל מזונותיו של אדם קצובים לו מראש השנה ועד יום הכיפורים,

and that there's a chovos hashtadlus, and Hakadosh Baruch Hu stipulates that yes, I have I have this parnassa waiting for you, but as a chovos hashtadlus, that you do have to put in the ishtadlus in order to get it. So to a certain degree, the halacha l'ma'aseh bitachon is attitude. But then there are certain and and certain respects then the bitachon becomes on a practical level halacha l'ma'aseh. The Yerushalmi is a has a great example of where where bitachon becomes actually halacha l'ma'aseh. What are other types of halacha l'ma'aseh applications of of bitachon? Again, given the fact that there's a chovos hashtadlus. So the pshat is is like this. Let's say a person is is looking for a job. So if it's bitachon b'Hashem, so then lichora, he should be following and pursuing every possible lead. If it's ishtadlus, so then the pshat is, let's say he hears about and sees a listing for a job some place where there's no Jewish community, there's no there's no shul, and maybe there's no there's no schools to provide chinuch for his children. So here lichora, again, there is a a difference in the halacha l'ma'aseh of bitachon. Chovos Halevavos tells a story about a chasid at length who who was asked by, I guess, a non-believer. He says what do you believe? And the Chassid says he believes in Hakadosh Baruch Hu, mechalkel chayim b'chesed, ומחיה מתים ברחמים רבים, somech noflim, v'rofe cholim, umatir asurim. So then the Am Ha'aretz says, but you contradict yourself. How so? Because the Chassid was in, I guess what we would call in our terms, he was in import-export. So he used to travel overseas and then come back and sell the merchandise. So a thousand years ago, so that was traveling. It was mamash just sakkanas nifashos. You took your life in your hands whenever you made an ocean voyage. So the Am Ha'aretz, again, the Apikoros, the person says to the Chassid, if you really believe what you say you really believe, you really think that you need to risk your life to earn your parnassah? Your parnassah really comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu and all your effort is hishtadlus. So in apply that to today's metzius, I don't think anyone would say that the person shouldn't fly out of town on business because obviously the risk factor involved at the airport today is not what the risk factor was in overseas voyages a thousand years ago. But lechoira, something like this would be such an application to pursue a job in some far-flung place where there's no Jewish communal framework to live properly, so that would be an application of something that the Baal HaMaor says in Maseches Yevamos. Pirya v'rivya, I'm sorry, I'm trying to look up maseches, let's take a look at the Baal HaMaor at the Rosh Maseches Yevamos. It's obviously not kiyum hamitzva on some level so you go to your local bookstore and you buy it out of ma'os and you go ahead and you mekayem hamitzva. So the question becomes are you mekayem hamitzva? Pirya v'rivya is only ידי חובתו לעשות המצוה, אבל לא בקיום המצוה. Only for the oseh of the mitzvah. And the Gemara tells a story that interpreting a pasuk in Navi that Chizkiyahu was very sick. And Yeshayahu Hanavi comes to him and says that you're not going to live, you're going to die. And the Gemara darshans 'you're not going to live' and 'you're going to die'—'you're not going to live' in Olam Hazeh and 'you're going to die' in Olam Haba because you weren't osek b'pirya v'rivya. So Chizkiyahu tells him, it's because chazai b'ruach hakodesh that I'm going to be having banim d'lo me'alyi. I saw in the Ruach Hakodesh that I was going to have banim who would be rasha'im. So Yeshayahu tells him:

בהדי כבשי דרחמנא למה לך מאי דמפקדת איבעי לך למיעבד ומאי דניחא קמיה קודשא בריך הוא לעביד.

You shouldn't be messing around with Hakadosh Baruch Hu's secrets. You should be doing what you're commanded to do and Hakadosh Baruch Hu will do as He sees fit. What's the dimyon l'inyana? Let's talk in terms of Purim. So the Gemara says at the end of Masechet Avodah Zarah:

מיום שפשטה מלכות הרשעה על ישראל ואין אנו מחפשין סרסור.

From the time that the Roman government has spread and all Jews are living under the rule... under the rule, the harsh rule and the decrees of the Roman government, so then Ben Azzai גזר על עצמו שלא לישא אשה ולעסוק בתורה. And merely decision by Ben Azzai not to get married and not to have children because the gezeirah make it impossible for us to raise the children properly. But it's but אין גוזרין על הציבור. You can only be gozer if if הרוב הציבור יכול לעמוד בו. And so this gezeirah couldn't catch. And what would have happened to the mitzvah p'ru ur'vu? The Tosafot says she'ma what the Gemara means is after a person was molid ben u'vat and he fulfilled the mitzvah p'ru ur'vu, then then גזר על עצמו שלא להוליד. The Tosafot says she'ma because the dikduk of the Gemara says she'ma. The dikduk of the Gemara is that if a person can't be m'kayem his children, he shouldn't have them. Ee teima, the Tosafot's alternative to the she'ma, they only say she'ma though in the answer they get. But the alternative to the she'ma is but to have the children and not be m'kayem them is not fulfill the mitzvah p'ru ur'vu. Mitzvah p'ru ur'vu is to have children who will be a link in the mesorah. To just biologically father children and then not be m'kayem them, not not nurture them and and raise them and be m'kayem them to become links in the mesorah is not mitzvah p'ru ur'vu. And Ee teima, the Gemara brought drashas like this when Yishayahu says to Hezekiyahu החיה בביתך כי מת אתה ולא תחיה. Hezekiyahu wasn't wrong in thinking that the mitzvah p'ru ur'vu is not to molid a child. He was telling him you can't make decisions based on what you see through ruach hakodesh. בהדי כבשי דרחמנא למה לך? What you see that that you would be m'amesh the ruach hakodesh, you can't base psak halacha on that. מאי דמפקדת איבעי לך למיעבד. On that level, Yishayahu Hanavi told him that his reasoning was was invalid, incorrect. But in terms of the understanding that he wasn't over m'kayem p'ru ur'vu with Menashe, that's correct. The mitzvah isn't again just to to have children. The mitzvah is to raise children who perpetuate the mesorah within Klal Yisrael. So number one is nasasta v'nasata b'emunah. Number two is kavata itim laTorah. Number three is asakta b'pru ur'vu. Number four is tzapisa liyeshua. Tzapisa liyeshua. The Rambam writes in the hilchos melachim in the beginning of perek yud-alef: Melech HaMashiach

עתיד לעמוד ולהחזיר מלכות דוד ליושנה לממשלה הראשונה. ובונה המקדש ומקבץ נדחי ישראל וחוזרים כל המשפטים בימיו כשהיו מקודם. מקריבים קרבנות ועושים שמיטין ויובלות ככל מצותה האמורה בתורה.

But listen to this mainas-vas-hei:

וכל מי שאינו מאמין בו או מי שאינו מחכה לביאתו לא בשאר נביאים בלבד הוא כופר אלא בתורה ובמשה רבינו.

So the Rambam writes explicitly that not only is there an obligation to believe in bias HaMashiach, but there's a chiyuv to be m'chakeh l'vi'ato. And clearly that comes from our Gemara, right? Tzapisa liyeshua doesn't just mean do you believe that there's going to be a yeshua, but did you tzapi for the yeshua? Did you yearn for the yeshua? And you look at the Rambam. The Rambam says

שכר הצדיקים הוא שהם יזכו לנועם זה ויהיו באותה טובה והחיים האלה אין עמם מיתה.

Mishna in Avos. U'kvi'as Ha-itaim. This is the beginning of this question. Do we believe? It's v'dvar Hashem. It's the question also being mechakke l'viaso. We're supposed to be waiting for Moshiach to come. I heard a story once, on one level, inadvertently, it was a cruel incident, but it also shows something. So in camps, so they have color, so על פי משה סיני you have to have color, you have to have a breakout for color. So every year the camp administration has to come up with some some different shtick, dramatics for color war breakout. So again, I'm not commenting on the propriety of anything like that, that's not the point. So there is no implicit endorsement in the story. So one year, this is a ma'ase she'haya. So one year they decided that the breakout would be that they announced in camp that Moshiach had come. And there was a camper, a young girl, I don't know how old she was, who was an yasoma. And she got so excited that she thought Moshiach is here, techiyas ha-meisim, she's going to see her father. And then the devastation that she felt when the whole thing turned out to be a some ridiculous, worst in that way of breakout color war. So when you think about that story, if I would tell you right now that or if you would tell me right now, 'Geulah is here, Moshiach has come,' so how would you react? With skepticism? After this girl, it didn't happen for her. She wasn't any younger or more naive than any of her friends in the camp, but she was mechakke l'viaso. She was mechakke l'viaso, so when you hear something that you're waiting for, so you're not skeptical about it, you're not cynical about it, you seize on it, that's what you want to hear, so you seize on it. Who wouldn't have fallen for that? And the reason we wouldn't have fallen for that is not because we're less naive. The question is, how do we work on that? How do we work on this thing of being mechakke l'viaso? Because you look in the Chafetz Chaim, I think in a couple of places, I don't remember the exact references, I think one is in, he has a small kuntres, he picks it up in some of his works, but there's a kuntres that was also collected and reprinted, so it was a small kuntres of a few pages long on Tzipisa L'Yeshua. I think he says it there at the very end and maybe also in Likutei Amarim towards the end and maybe also in Nesivay Chayim, I forget where the other place is. Question is mechakeh liviaso. Can a person, is it, does it qualify as mechakeh liviaso let's say on Chol Ha-Moed if a person is sick? So when Moshiach comes, so everyone's going to be cured. Let's say that's why he's mechakeh liviaso because then he has some kind of debilitating machlah. So he's mechakeh liviaso because Moshiach-tzeit represents and על פי דרך הטבע it is even a cure for whatever he has. So Moshiach-tzeit represents again when he can have a refuah. So is that mechakeh liviaso or mechakeh liviaso has to be because of his galus ha-Shechinah? So the Chofetz Chaim in Tzipita li-Yeshuah writes in a couple of places about mechakeh liviaso. Does the mechakeh liviaso have to be for galus ha-Shechinah or for what's in it for us? Another shailah is, so how how do you practically bring this out to that madreigah of mechakeh liviaso? So obviously in the general sense,

לעולם יעסוק אדם בתורה ובמצוות שלא לשמה שמתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה.

Obviously in the general sense, the more hissaskus we have in Torah-mitzvos, the more that is our life, the more that dominates our life, the more that is our life, כי הם חיינו ואורך ימינו, so מתוך שלא לשמה בא לשמה. The person, when a person's holding on a madreigah of lishmah, so you see gedolim, tzaddikim, you know, sometimes they'll sign off, what do they write? Hametzappeh le-rachamei shamayim, Hametzappeh lishu'as Hashem. It's so easy to write those words but but in their daily life, you know, the dikduk in be-mitzvos that reflects that feeling. So if a person is being osek li-shmah, so then takkeh his concern is for galus ha-Shechinah. But specifically, specifically, in addition to that, before a person or there is a a very very important yesod that the Chofetz Chaim quotes from Masechet Derech Eretz. I don't remember if מסכת דרך ארץ רבה or מסכת דרך ארץ זוטא, but what it says, it says in Masechet Derech Eretz that הרוצה שחבירו יאהב אותו יאהב אותו. Let's say there's someone that that I don't like and I want I want to bring myself to like him. Masechet Derech Eretz says I should do something for him. You would say, let him do something for me, let him show me that he's a nice person and then I'll like him. Masechet Derech Eretz says the opposite. If there's someone that that I realize that I'm not being the kind of mentch vis-a-vis that person, so I need to be moseir nefesh for him. The yesod is that when a person invests in someone or something, so then that develops a a feeling for it. When a person invests in someone else, so that develops within him, within the investor, within the giver, within the oseh, an ahavah for the recipient. And it's true, ask ask your parents. Above and beyond whatever instinctive love parents have for children, that love intensifies the more parents are moseir nefesh for their children. And one experiences the koach of what Masechet Derech Eretz says. If we invest, if we look, if we try through our actions to be conscious of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, conscious of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and what image we project as Shomer Torah Umitzvos, ישראל אשר בך אתפאר, עבדא דאנחנא ודעתיקא פה, Shomer Torah Umitzvos, to be conscious of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, try to reflect, drawn depictions of Torah, that we have mesiras nefesh for Hakadosh Baruch Hu, even if, even if we have to push ourselves to do it, even if there isn't the natural, the natural drive because we're not on the madreiga yet, but we push ourselves to do it, so then tanchus takes root within us. A person can only await something if he feels that there's something missing now that it would add something. Right? When children are little and let's say the father is away on business, then they're missing him, something's missing, so they're awaiting him. But if a person has everything, a person is not, a person is not missing anything, you don't await anything. A person has to, again, try to instill within himself a concern for Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and then tanchus is more effective.