Absolute Truth and Alternate Life Styles

The number of sheets of notes which I have is no indication of how long I'm going to speak. I usually can't read my handwriting anyway, so it won't have any bearing. I'll try to condense what I wanted to discuss as much as possible. We live in a pluralistic democratic society which is built upon an ideological foundation of tolerance. What I'd like to explore with you together briefly is to what extent and within what parameters is tolerance a native Jewish halachic value and to what extent have we simply assimilated this from Western culture. I think we can identify two or three, depending upon perhaps a little bit of semantics, forms of tolerance and non-judgmentalism within halacha. And the list is not exhaustive, not intended to be. First of all, we certainly find instances where historical and personal circumstances are relevant to the judgment we form. The Mishna Pirkei Avot says אל תדין את חברך עד שתגיע למקומו, not to judge another person until one finds oneself in the identical set of circumstances, which almost never really happens. Now the poskim say, I think the Aruch HaShulchan is one of the prominent ones amongst them, who says we have a halacha of mumar dino k'akum, which means that if one is mechallel Shabbat b'farhesia publicly, so then in many contexts of halacha dino k'akum. He's treated as a Gentile. He can't shecht, you can't allow him to touch wine which is not mevushal, which is uncooked, etc. Mumar dino k'akum again applies if a person is a מומר לכל התורה כולה. A person is guilty either actually of violating the entire Torah or it's what he does is tantamount to violating the entire Torah. And the two aveiros which are singled out, which are considered tantamount to violating the entire Torah, either Shabbat or avodah zarah. So the halacha stipulates that if a person violates Shabbat willfully, bezadon, so then he has a din of mumar dino k'akum. So what does it mean? It means well, if I know that I'm not supposed to turn on the light and I turn on the light, so I'm doing it bezadon. If I don't know, if no one ever taught me that I'm not supposed to turn on the light, or I forgot that it's Shabbat, I forgot that it's assur, so then I'm doing it beshogeg. Now the Aruch HaShulchan says, so what happens if you have a Jew, unfortunately through no fault of his own, comes from an assimilated background, right? So he heard once upon a time that religious Jews don't drive on Shabbat, they don't flip the light switches on Shabbat. So Aruch HaShulchan says that doesn't make him meizid, because what the halacha has in mind when it says that if a person is mechallel Shabbat bezadon he becomes mumar dino k'akum, bezadon it means it's not enough for me to know that it says in the Torah you don't do it, I have to know that the Torah is an authoritative source. It's not enough for me to know that the Yosef Karo, a 16th-century rabbi, wrote in his Shulchan Aruch that you don't do it, I have to know that what this great rabbi wrote in the 16th century is authoritative and definitively so. And as long as one, due to again historical and or personal circumstances, doesn't know that, so one would not be classified as being mechallel Shabbat b'meizid and would not have the status of mumar dino k'akum. We find that in dinei shamayim, in terms of how HaKadosh Baruch Hu metes out punishment, again, historical and or personal circumstances often are taken into account, they can be considered as a basis for extenuation or mitigation. The famous Gemara in Berachot, I think Rashi al haTorah refers to it as well, commenting on the opening pasuk in Parshat Devarim of

אלה הדברים אשר דבר משה אל כל ישראל במדבר בערבה מול סוף בין פארן ובין תפל ולבן וחצרת ודי זהב.

So Di Zahav again, we know Chazal say that each of these names is really an allusion to some theme. So what does Di Zahav refer to?

אמר דברי רבי ינאי. כך אמר משה לפני הקדוש ברוך הוא.

This is what Moshe said to Hashem: Ribono shel Olam, בשביל כסף וזהב שהשפעת להם לישראל עד שאמרו די, hu gorem lahem, hu gorem lahem she-asu es ha-egel. Kavyachol Moshe Rabbeinu, Moshe Rabbeinu says to ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu, it's your fault that the Jewish people made the egel because you gave them so much, you spoiled them kavyachol. You were parent, you pampered your children too much. You spoiled them kavyachol that you gave them so much gold they didn't know what to do with it so they went and they made an egel hazahav. What's the point of this aggadah? Many points: how a leader is supposed to be melamed zechut on his people, how he's supposed to assume responsibility to daven for them. But one of the points also is that in dinei shamayim, again we see historical and personal circumstances being invoked as a basis again for extenuation, for mitigation. The second form of tolerance, I'm not quite sure of the difference between the first and second kind, so don't work too hard on trying to figure out the difference here, is tolerance in form of understanding. Meaning not simply mitigating, but almost to the point of absolving. And here I think that the classical source for this comes from the Rambam in the beginning of the second perek of Hilchos Mamrim. The Rambam writes, and I'm excerpting here without always indicating where I'm skipping a few words from the first three halachos in perek bet of Hilchos Mamrim:

מי שאינו מודה בתורה שבעל פה הרי זה בכלל האפיקורסים.

If a person denies Torah she-b'al peh, he's a heretic. And the halacha is according to the Gemara that מורידין אותו ולא מעלין, that one would cause him to fall into a pit from which he couldn't escape and one wouldn't, one wouldn't provide the ladder to help him get out if he had already fallen in on his own. שכל אלו אינם בכלל ישראל. We don't relate to them as though they're Jews. The Rambam continues: Bameh devarim amurim באיש שכפר בתורה שבעל פה במחשבתו ובדברים שנראו לו. This is a person who became a heretic basically out of hubris. A person who decided that he knows better than thousands of years of tradition, he knows better than the cumulative wisdom of all the chachmei hamasoret throughout the generations and he decides: no, I don't believe this, this can't be, I reject this. Such a person, again, a heretic from his own hubris, במחשבתו ובדברים שנראו לו, his own thoughts. What I think, I hold like this, I think like this. והלך אחר דעתו הקלה ואחר שרירות לבו. The Rambam, the Rambam here implies just between the lines here that often intellectual mistakes are driven by trying to accommodate some kind of emotional agenda. The Rambam says, achar shrirus libo,

וכופר בתורה שבעל פה תחילה כצדוק ובייתוס וכן כל התועה אחריהם.

Or in other words, what we're talking about here is first-generation heretics, the Rambam says. I'm talking about first-generation heretics.

אבל בני התועים האלה ובני בניהם שהדיחום אותם אבותם ונולדו בין הקראים וגדלו אותם על דעתם הרי הוא כתינוק שנשבה ביניהם.

But the second generation and certainly the third generation, so the Rambam says, chas v'shalom, I'm not speaking of them. There, שהרי הוא כאונס. Some people, these people it's as if they have been coerced because they were raised on these false, false beliefs. Lefichach, in sharp, sharp contrast to what the Rambam said initially, the second generation,

ראוי להחזירן בתשובה ולמשכן בדברי שלום עד שיחזרו לאיתן התורה.

On the contrary, it's our obligation to try to entice them to return to Torah and to recognize the truth of Torah. Again, a perfect example of how again historical and or personal circumstances is considered again a basis for extenuation, a basis for mitigation. The third type of tolerance is in the sense of multiple Torah truths. The famous Gemara in Eruvin of אלו ואלו דברי אלהים חיים, that it is possible within the parameters of Torah to have equally valid Torah opinions, equally valid Torah views. Again. but this is certainly a concept which continues to exist ad hayom hazeh. It doesn't necessarily mean that every time you sit down with your chavrusa and you have an argument about what the Gemara means, that אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים. It's a pretty safe bet that hopefully one of the two opinions is divrei Elokim chayim, but in all likelihood, both opinions are not. But when you're dealing with the gedolim, with chachmei hamasorah, so that's a concept which exists and which remains true ad hayom hazeh. So much for forms of, again, native halachic tolerance. Moreover, non-judgmentalism is a core value in halacha in the sense that we judge only out of necessity. The Torah says in Parshas Devarim פרק א פסוק יז כי המשפט לאלוקים הוא. Rashi on that pasuk quotes the Gemara in Sanhedrin daf ches

לא דייו לרשעים שנוטלין ממון מזה ונותנין לזה שלא כדין אלא שמטריחין אותי להחזיר הממון לבעליו

that Hakadosh Baruch Hu complains as it were. He says plaintively, right, not only when if you have a corrupt judge, a corrupt beis din, so not only are they the injustice which they perpetrate is that they wrongfully take money from one plaintiff and give it to the other plaintiff, but as it were, they burden me, they impose upon me to undo that damage. Why? Because clearly the point Chazal are trying to convey is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu says that they're representing me. When the dayan, when the judge is pasken, so they represent me. And therefore, it is my responsibility and kiveyachol they burden me in any miscarriage of justice, in that I have to undo that miscarriage of justice. And there are many halachos which reflect this again, very central idea, this motif that basically judging another person is really in the domain of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And consequently, we only judge out of necessity and even then, as emissaries of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Let's just mention one or two reflections of this idea. The Gemara in Berachos

מניין לשלושה שיושבין בדין ששכינה עמהם שנאמר בקרב אלוהים ישפוט.

When judges are sitting and they're grappling with a ten-dollar, ten-dollar lawsuit, it doesn't make a difference what the case is, דין פרוטה כדין מאה, but Shechina is with them. Why? Because really judgment is the exclusive domain of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, hence the Shechina has to be present because the judges again are acting as emissaries of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. To abbreviate, if you take a look in the Gemara in Shavuos on daf lamed, the Gemara tells a story how one of the Amora'im came to testify in a case. And the dayan had him sit down. The dayan had him sit down. So the Gemara says, but isn't there an obligation of ועמדו שני האנשים אשר להם הריב לפני השם, that the witnesses are supposed to stand when they testify in front of a beis din? So the Gemara answers, well, kvod HaTorah overrides. So the Rishonim ask a kasha, so if that's the case, how come when Yannai Hamelach had to appear before beis din, had to appear before a tribunal, they made Yannai stand? ינאי המלך עמוד על רגליך they told him. There's also an aseh of kvod malchus. So the Radbaz gives a fascinating, fascinating answer. He says as follows. He says

לגבי מילי דידן עשה דמלכות עדיף כדי שתהא מוראו על העם אבל לגבי שכינה מחמירן טפי לגבי מלך להכניע ליבו לפני השם יתברך.

Vis-a-vis us, kvod hamelach is even a stronger obligation than kvod Torah. But when it comes to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so then we have to impose more on the melech, and we have to insist that the melech stand in beis din. Why? Because his obligation to stand in beis din is not to accord respect to the three dayanim who constitute this beis din, but his obligation to stand in beis din is an obligation to stand before Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Again, a clear halachic reflection of the fact that כי המשפט לאלוקים הוא and again as such we have no right to engage in judgment, we have no right to judge another person except out of necessity. So by way of summation, tolerance and non-judgmentalism are certainly native Torah values. They're not simply imported or imbibed from modern Western culture. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference between halachic tolerance and l'havdil Western tolerance. Western tolerance is rooted in pluralism and relativism. The philosophy that one can't claim to possess absolute truth and consequently one must accord legitimacy to beliefs which run counter to one's own. The mindset of 20th and 21st century America is that truth is relative, subjective, and accordingly pluralistic. And this pertains not only to theological beliefs, but also to moral knowledge. If there's no absolute truth, there can't be any absolute morality either. Yahadus categorically rejects this epistemological and moral relativism. In the eyes of Halacha, there is absolute truth and accordingly there is absolute morality. Now here, just to digress for a minute, we are very uncomfortable. We, again, 21st century Westerners, Americans, are very uncomfortable with the notion of absolute truth. And the reason for that, there are a few reasons for that. First of all, and very understandable reasons. First of all because of the atrocities which have been and which continue to be perpetrated in the name of absolute truth. There's no shortage of examples and one's memory doesn't have to reach too far back. Second of all, the intellectual climate in which we live is relativistic. Modern historiography searches for historical causation. Everything can be understood historically, everything is simply a response to historical context, to social and political context. Well if that's the case, if nothing transcends its historical context, then there isn't really any absolute truth because everything is driven by historical circumstances. And that clearly is one of the basic beliefs of modern historiography. And finally, the social and political climate in which we live is entirely relativistic. Democracy at its very core is pluralistic and relativistic. And as a result of these forces and perhaps others as well, the truth is, again, when we look in the mirror we realize that we're very uncomfortable about and very weary, shy about professing absolute truth. And yet, Yahadus is certainly built upon a foundation of absolute truth. There's just no question about that, that is unequivocally the case. Again, this doesn't mean that in all areas, on all questions, there's a single monolithic absolute truth. We already mentioned the concept of אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים. However, אלו ואלו דברי אלוקים חיים notwithstanding, there are many, many truths which are absolute and which are monolithic. The pasuk in Yirmiyahu perek yud pasuk yud, Hashem Elokim emes. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is emes, Hakadosh Boruch Hu is true. This is the source for in Krias Shema, right? אני ה' אלוקיכם אמת. Really the emes belongs to the beracha, it doesn't belong to the Krias Shema, but based on this pasuk in Yirmiyahu so we're supposed to juxtapose the Hashem Elokeichem with emes. Absolute truth exists because Hakadosh Boruch Hu is emes. Hakadosh Boruch Hu is true. The Gemara in Shabbos nun-hey, אמר רבי חנינא חותמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא אמת. The signet of Hakadosh Boruch Hu is truth. Rashi explains very interestingly. Rashi says the three letters which comprise the word emes come from either extreme of the alphabet, the aleph and the tav, and the mem from the middle of the alphabet, which is an allusion to the pasuk, to the concept of the Hakadosh Baruch Hu being described as ani rishon. HaKadosh Baruch Hu outlasts everything and that is who HaKadosh Baruch Hu is. So there is emes, there is absolute truth because HaKadosh Baruch Hu is emes. We can and do know absolute truth because of revelation, because of Ma'amad Har Sinai. Torah, Torah Shebichtav, Torah Sheba'al Peh contain absolute truth. And finally, our masora has preserved these truths for us. Our masora has preserved these absolute truths for us. There's a fascinating introduction of the Aruch HaShulchan to volume one of Choshen Mishpat and he comments on just the miraculous nature and the precision of our masora. I'll just read you a few lines: ויתר מזה תראה נפלאות על אמתת הקבלה. He says you see something absolutely remarkable about the truth of our tradition, of our masora.

זה יותר משמונה עשר מאות שנה שעם ישראל מפוזרים מקצה אל הקצה.

It's more than eighteen hundred years now that the Jewish people are scattered all over the world. ואין להם שום חיבור זה לזה משינוי הלשונות. They can't even communicate because they speak different languages. They speak different vernaculars.

כמו בני ישראל בארצות רוסלאנד פולין ואוסטראיך עם בני ישראל בארצות פרס מרוקו אלג'יר תוניס טריפולי.

He says those who are in Eastern Europe, in Russia, in Poland, they have no contact and they have no common language with those in Iraq, in Morocco, in Algiers, etc. He says

וזה רק ארבע מאות שנה שיצא חכמת הדפוס לאור עולם.

It's only 400 years since the printing press was invented.

וקודם לזה לא היה שום התחברות ממדינות אלו למדינות שבאסיה ואפריקה.

And before this there was no contact between Eastern Europe, between Asia and Africa.

והנה אצלנו החודשים חודש מלא וחודש חסר וחשוון וכסלו פעמים ששניהם מלאים פעמים ששניהם חסרים.

He says and there's no discrepancy throughout the Jewish world. There's no contact and yet everyone has the same tradition, which months consist of 30 days, which months consist of 29 days, which months can be either such as Chodesh Kislev, and in which year Kislev is malei, and in which year Kislev is chaser, only consists of 29 days. A remarkable testament to the truth of our masora. So there is absolute truth because HaKadosh Baruch Hu Hashem Elokim Emes. That absolute truth is revealed to us in Torah, Torah Shebichtav, Torah Sheba'al Peh. And that absolute truth has been conveyed to us through our masora. Now one of the absolute truths and precepts of absolute morality which the Torah communicates is in Sefer Vayikra, Perek Yud Ches, Pasuk Chaf Beis, ואת זכר לא תשכב משכבי אשה תועבה היא. Do not lie with a male as you would with a woman since this is a disgusting perversion. The pasuk unambiguous and unambiguously understood by our masora throughout all generations prohibits male homosexuality. In Parshas Kedoshim, there are two parshas of arayos in the Torah, in Acharei Mos the Torah lists the prohibitions and in Kedoshim the Torah lists the punishment, so the Torah returns to this again in Perek Chaf, Pasuk Yud Gimmel, and the Torah specifies the punishment for male homosexuality.

ואיש אשר ישכב את זכר משכבי אשה תועבה עשו שניהם מות יומתו דמיהם בם.

I'm reading from the translation from Rabbi Kaplan's Chumash. If a man has intercourse with another man in the same manner as with a woman, both of them have committed a disgusting perversion, they shall be put to death by stoning. Now it's important to recognize that the Torah also prohibits female homosexuality, not in the same pasuk, not in these psukim, but the Torah forbids that as well. In Perek Yud Ches, in the introductory psukim to the parsha of arayos in Parshas Acharei Mos, it's the beginning of the afternoon kriya on Yom HaKippurim, כמעשה ארץ מצרים אשר ישבתם בה לא תעשו. Don't follow the ways of Egypt where you once lived.

וכמעשה ארץ כנען אשר אני מביא אתכם שמה לא תעשו,

nor of Canaan. U'vechukoseihem lo seleichu, do not follow any of their customs. Now the Sifra and similarly the Gemara in Yevamos explains: so what exactly is Ma'aseh Eretz Mitzrayim? What perversions happened in Mitzrayim? So the Sifra says, and the Gemara in Yevamos says this as well, and it's brought in the Rambam, it's brought in the Shulchan Aruch, every place one would expect it to be quoted: ומה היו עושים האיש נושא איש והאשה לאשה. So clearly this pasuk expands the prohibition that it's not only male homosexuality which the Torah prohibits, but female homosexual behavior as well. Now there is a difference, there is a difference in that Mishkav Zachar, male homosexuality is considered Arayos. And as such is one of the Gimmel Aveiros, one of the three cardinal aveiros for which there is a חיוב יהרג ואל יעבור, that even if a person is being threatened with death, he has to allow himself to be killed rather than to transgress. Female homosexuality presumably is not in this category, but it certainly is a prohibition d'Oraisa, categorically prohibited. Now in recent years there's been considerable debate and dispute regarding the existence of a gay gene. Is there a gene for homosexuality? Are people genetically programmed in terms of their homosexual orientation? Now genetic research lies far beyond my field of competence. Not sure exactly what my field of competence is, but it's certainly not genetic research. That much I am clearer on. But I would like to just note the following. First of all, even those who claim the existence of such a gene, and again, this is very controversial and has been subjected to a lot of criticism, they only maintain that sexual orientation is genetically influenced. No one, even the most politically correct geneticists maintains that sexual orientation, homosexual orientation is genetically determined. And the reason for that is that there have been studies of identical twins where only one is homosexual and the other is not. So it really belies any claim that what we're talking about, again, is anything beyond genetic influence. No one makes a claim, again, the most farbrentte advocates don't make a claim for genetic determinism for it. The most that is claimed is that the homosexual orientation is, again, genetically influenced. But again, that falls far short of any kind of genetic determinism. Now what's the view of the Halacha on this? I'm not interested in really responding to that question. It is clear that the Halacha doesn't consider homosexuality natural. How do we know that? Because based on the Gemara in Kiddushin, the Halacha is, if you take a look in Shulchan Aruch in אבן העזר סימן כד with the commentaries there, that whereas a man and a woman, not father and daughter, not mother and son, not husband and wife, there's an issur yichud, they're not supposed to be alone, there is no such issur yichud for two men, right? The issur or the prohibition of homosexuality notwithstanding, there is no prohibition of yichud. And the reason for that is the Rambam says is because the issur yichud is intended as a safeguard, as a safeguard, and the Halacha doesn't consider this a natural urge. If a person knows, presumably if a person knows, I think this is clear from Shulchan Aruch as well, if a person knows that he has a homosexual orientation, so then he would have an issur yichud with another man. But a person with the normal heterosexual orientation, there is no issur yichud. Now, but more importantly, more importantly than this whole dispute is that basically the dispute is not relevant. Why is the dispute not relevant? Because even if one were for argument's sake to posit the existence of a gay gene, it wouldn't challenge the Torah, it wouldn't challenge the Torah's prohibition. prohibition in the least. Allow me to explain what I have in mind. The Rambam begins Hilchos Deios as follows:

דעות הרבה יש לכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו משונה מזו ורחוקה ממנה ביותר.

People have many different predispositions and and they they they span the entire gamut. יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד. There's some people who naturally their predisposition is that they are quick to anger, always angry, always angry.

יש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל ואם יכעס יכעס כעס מעט בכמה שנים.

Some people are apathetic. You you can't get a rise out of them for anything. Anything you can't get a rise out of them.

יש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר ויש שהוא שפל רוח ביותר.

Some people are so arrogant and some people are so meek and they have no self-esteem and no self-confidence that they can't even function.

יש שהוא בעל תאוה לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאוה ויש שהוא בעל לב טהור מאד ולא יתאוה אפילו לדברים מעטים שהגוף צריך להן.

Some people are basically hedonistic by nature and and they're never content. As much pleasure as they have, they're driven for more and more. And some people are ascetic by nature.

יש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון שבעולם כענין שנאמר ואוהב כסף לא ישבע כסף.

There are Donald Trumps in the world. They they can't get they can't get enough money.

ויש מקצר נפשו שדיו אפילו דבר מועט שלא יספיק לו ולא ירדוף להשיג כל צרכו.

And there are other people who are not even motivated to to to acquire what they need for the most basic necessities. What's remarkable about this Rambam, you know what's remarkable about this Rambam? And this observation is made by the Mei Marom, by Yaakov Moshe Charlap... Rav Charlap and the... his grandfather has remarkable, remarkable observations on this Rambam. If the Rambam's describing different types, right? So he describes a type who's always angry, right? Very volatile, always angry. And he describes that some people who are apathetic. So why doesn't the Rambam describe someone who's who's balanced? Someone who's who's not apathetic, he's feeling, but he's not quick to anger. He only, you know... In each of In each of the dualities, in each of the contrasts the Rambam presents, no one's on target. See, he So Rav Charlap says a remarkable thing. So apparently no one, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't create any of us on target. Everyone, everyone has a task of tikkun hamidos. Everyone has a task to refine, to curb, to challenge. In extreme cases, to to to transform and overhaul his instincts. No one is directly on target. Similarly, the Tosafos HaRosh in Maseches Niddah make the following comment. Maseches Niddah is one of the places where one finds the Gemara of הכל בידי שמים חוץ מיראת שמים, right? We have free will whether a person is righteous or not righteous, we have free will. If a person is tall, if a person is short, if a person is a person has hair, if a person nebach doesn't have hair, that's all, that's all bidei shamayim. Nothing we can do about that, right? But yiras shamayim, that we have a that we have a say over. So the Tosafos HaRosh asks, Tosafos HaRosh asks this as well, that from the Gemara in Shabbos it would appear that depending upon what mazal, what what constellation a person was was born at that time, that that seems to dictate whether he's going to be a tzaddik or a rasha.

והא דאמרינן בסוף מסכת שבת האי מאן דמתיליד בצדק יהי צדקן במצות אטו צדיק ורשע תלי במזל.

So isn't it determined by by astrology? Okay, so we wouldn't call it astrology, we would call it genetics, right? Some people, don't they have they just have an instinct and and a sensitivity for for emunah, for faith, for for spirituality? And don't some people lack it?

יש לומר שאף שמזלו מוטה באחד מן הדרכים מכל מקום בידו הוא להתחזק על יצרו.

Everyone, of course we have predispositions. Of course we're not... I don't think the Rambam, I don't think the Tosafos HaRosh, I don't think the Rishonim would have agreed with the with the empiricists and the idea of of a blank tablet and and that a person is is created without any without any predisposition. Okay, so in modern biological terms, we'll call it genetic predisposition. Of course there are genetic predispositions. Bechira chofshis doesn't mean that there aren't genetic predispositions. Bechira chofshis... As necessary, these genetic predispositions. So in that sense, the dispute about a gay gene is not really so relevant to us. If there is a gay gene, yavo eliyahu v'ye'amar, yavo eliyahu v'ye'amar that there would be one, it wouldn't come as a big surprise if they were to come and tell us that. But yavo eliyahu v'ye'amar that there is one, so then we would just know that the same way a person who's predisposed to anger, the same way a person who's predisposed to pursuit of riches, the same way the wrathful individual and the aspiring magnate have to curb, they have to channel, they have to change as necessary, so too the person with the gay gene would also have to be mischazek al yitzro. There's a remarkable Midrash which I think is a well-known Midrash that in Bereishis Rabbah, the Midrash comments: וכיון שראה שמואל את דוד אדמוני. When Shmuel saw that David was a redhead, nisyarei, he was afraid, ve'amar, אף זה שופך דמים כעשו. This must be an indication again of being bloodthirsty, right? That's what it represented. It represented such a genetic predisposition in Esav. Gevalt, does that mean that David HaMelech has the same predisposition? אמר לו הקדוש ברוך הוא. HaKadosh Baruch Hu answers Shmuel, עשו מדעת עצמו הוא הורג. Esav shed blood capriciously, aval zeh, David HaMelech, מדעת סנהדרין הוא הורג. He does it in consultation with the Sanhedrin, only when it's a mitzvah. So what's the point of the Midrash? The point of the Midrash is, yes, of course we have, we all have urges and instincts, and very often those instincts are not such holy instincts. But the point is that they have to be curved, they have to be challenged, at times they have to be outright stifled so that we mold ourselves in accordance with the Torah's ideal for what we should be, and that's a major, major component of our avodas Hashem. Let's just in the final few moments, let's speak in very concrete terms. How do we balance the halakhic values of tolerance and absolute truth regarding homosexuality? First of all, homosexuality can never ever be legitimized directly or indirectly. And here I have to share with you a case that actually happened, actually happened. Two women living openly as lesbians, openly. They publicized it, they professed it. So one of them became pregnant via artificial insemination and gave birth to a boy, a baby boy. Then in shul, an announcement is made that the Shalom Zachar for so-and-so's, for their son, is on Friday such-and-such a time, and the bris will be held, and the time and place were given for that. So that's incredible, that's incredible. So that's legitimizing it, that's legitimizing the practice, but that is absolutely, absolutely unacceptable. It can't happen, it can't be allowed to happen. If you have a shul directory and you have a couple, be it male, be it female, who want to be listed as homosexual, it can't, it can't happen because that's to confer legitimacy on what the Torah says is yehareg v'al ya'avor. It can't be. But there are even more subtle applications, and that is, I haven't seen it, but I'm told that this movie which was shown not that long ago—was it called 'Trembling Before God' or something?—which has a very sympathetic portrayal of homosexuals and their struggles. But the sympathy is extended towards practicing homosexuals and and that's again to to show sympathy to the practice of homosexuality. Okay, we're not discussing people yet, we're discussing the practice of homosexuality. There's nothing according to what the Torah says, to'evah. So how can it be, how can it be that, that, that we're going to push a movie which has a sympathetic portrayal not of people who are struggling with their orientation, but of people who say openly, from what I'm told, that you'd see it in front of the camera that they are practicing homosexuality. So I don't know, do we, I don't think we glorify, or I'll be happy to answer in a couple of minutes. And I don't think we don't glorify chillul shabbos. Now that notwithstanding, the fact that the practice of homosexuality can never ever be legitimized again, either directly or indirectly, we can and should feel compassion for individuals who quietly, sincerely are struggling with their homosexuality. And moreover, while we unequivocally condemn the practice of homosexuality, because the Torah unequivocally condemns the practice of homosexuality and the Torah is absolute truth, we reserve judgment regarding the people themselves. We condemn the practice, we don't condemn the people. HaKadosh Baruch Hu judges people. HaKadosh Baruch Hu decides whether or not there were mitigating life experiences or whatever, that's in HaKadosh Baruch Hu's province. We don't judge people, but we do judge behavior, because the Torah tells us, if you don't judge behavior, so then the lines between right and wrong, between mutar and assur, become totally blurred to the point of being eradicated. The behavior is unequivocally wrong. The behavior cannot be legitimized, again in any of the fashions or forms we discussed. We don't judge people. And finally, this attitude towards people, there is one exception and that is that individuals, especially if they seek to invoke rabbinic authority to do so, who seek to legitimize homosexuality, to distort the Torah's teaching, so that has to just be unequivocally rejected. There is no room for that and there is no room to allow that to stand and it has to be revealed for what it is. Just a total distortion of Torah, of our belief system, of our mesorah, thousands and thousands of years. Just in conclusion, obviously this recognition that there is absolute truth has many, many other applications, and maybe at some other time we'll explore some of those. I'm sorry, did you want to ask? Yeah. First of all, the Rosh Yeshiva admitted he has not seen the movie, Trembling Before God. The movie Trembling Before God, it gives you, you have the interviews, people speak to explain how they are struggling and they would love not to be homosexuals, but unfortunately this is who they are. I don't understand the Rosh Yeshiva's point when he says that because two women are living together and she asked him when they stayed with each other, that when they had a baby boy, and now the Rosh Yeshiva says that no, they shouldn't have had a Shalom Zachor, they shouldn't have a Shalom Zachor. The Torah also says many times that people who eat seafood, it's an abomination, but we don't say they shouldn't have a Shalom Zachor, they shouldn't. And also I take umbrage at the Rosh Yeshiva's comparison that there is a similarity between a person's disposition to behavior, all the other lists the Ramban gave, and a person's sexual orientation. I don't think the Rosh Yeshiva himself would say that if theoretically we found a new Torah, that was a true Torah, that said, you know, we've got it wrong, it really, people are not supposed to be heterosexuals but they should be homosexuals, that then the Rosh Yeshiva and everyone else would come along and say okay, now I think I'm going to have to overcome my sexual orientation because the Torah that God really gave says that we should all be homosexual. I don't think the Rosh Yeshiva would say that we would have to somehow control or adapt our sexual orientation to follow the Torah. Okay, so maybe I'll try as best I remember the points, I'll try to take them up one by one. No, I didn't see the movie, and if I mischaracterized the movie, I apologize to the film's producers and to any other vested interest, but the point, so let's just make the point without relating it to the movie. Again there can be sympathy for people. There should be sympathy for people. But not sympathy which insinuates that when one is doing something which the Torah unequivocally categorically prohibits, one can't insinuate that somehow or other we have no control over that. If the sympathy is insinuating that this is beyond my control and that I simply cannot do otherwise, so no, that's misplaced sympathy. That's misplaced sympathy. If one says, you know, if someone says in front of the camera or in any other context, yes, this is what my orientation is, but since I know the Torah prohibits it, I realize that I can't act on it. I realize that I can't indulge it. And because of that, I'm so lonely and I'm so miserable, of course one has compassion for him. Of course, one's heart should bleed for such an individual. But if the sympathy is meant to convey, and whether this is true of the movie or not, I don't know. I don't know. But if the sympathy is meant to convey and insinuate, maybe with subtlety, to insinuate that somehow or other, you know, the practice of homosexuality is involuntary, so that's unacceptable. And what was the second point? Shalom zachar. Shalom zachar. Yeah, I think the child should have a bris. I think the child should not have a shalom zachar. A shalom zachar is clearly when a community joins in a celebration. When a community joins in celebration, one is joining in a celebration of something which is pure. We celebrate a bar mitzvah, we celebrate a wedding, we celebrate pure events. A woman who, again, who chose to publicize the fact that she flaunts Torah law, that she flaunts halacha, that she flaunts thousands of years of tradition by living openly and proudly, and that's the case I'm referring to, as a lesbian. And because of that flaunting of halacha, because of that flagrant disrespect to halacha, the child who was born via artificial insemination, no, that's not an occasion which we can come together to celebrate. Should the child have a bris? Of course the child should have a bris. Very importantly, the mohel should go and go be mal the child. But there can't be a shalom zachar and there can't be a bris with bagels and lox and platters with whitefish. And it certainly can't be announced from the bima in a mikdash me'at, in a shul. And finally, in terms of the relevance of the Rambam in Hilchos De'os and the Tosafos HaRosh, the point was clearly, and I apologize if I didn't make this point clear, in terms of the strength of different instincts or urges, I don't mean to equate the strength which one type of instinct or urge may possess with that of another. But the point is the same. The point is that our belief in the bechira chofshis is that there's no such thing, no matter how strong the predisposition, no matter how strong the orientation may be, and even if for argument's sake, and this is very hypothetical, very theoretical, even if for argument's sake one wants to say that it is genetically influenced, there's no such thing as genetically or biologically determined behavior. And in that sense, there is a common denominator in terms of the punchline of the Tosafos HaRosh, that it is our obligation lehischazeik al yitzro to overcome the yetzer. So no matter what that yetzer is, and no matter how strong that yetzer is, that's what the belief in the bechira chofshis is. Otherwise, we're a bunch of puppets. Otherwise, we go through life as a bunch of puppets. We don't believe that because the Rambam says if you believe that, then all of Torah doesn't make sense. How can Hakadosh Baruch Hu say if you do this you'll be rewarded and if you do this you'll be punished if ultimately I don't have the ability to transcend my genetic predispositions. So I'm not equating the strength of the urge. And yes, if one wanted to imagine that the Torah said differently, then we would all be obligated to either A, ideally change ourselves and change our orientation, or B, if for some reason we tried therapy and we were unable to do so, so then we would be obligated to restrain that urge which the Torah prohibits.