A Torah Perspective on the Hostage Deal

There've been some requests to comment, to share a perspective on the hostage deal. So בלי נדר בעזרת השם I'm going to try to do so, and for two reasons. Number one, in its own right, it's obviously something of great importance and something which concerns every one of us. But even more than that, to maybe relate to it and use it as a test case in the interface of halacha and politics and what room and role there is for a Torah perspective in such situations. Rabbanim, teachers of Torah in whatever guise, obviously should and baruch Hashem do provide the direction and guidance in matters of Torah, in inyanei halacha. But on the other hand, they should not express their political preferences or political opinions. And that's so for two reasons. First of all, because a rav never, a rav, a teacher, a melamed, never really steps out of that association. And when he speaks, על אחת כמה וכמה if it's a rav speaking from the pulpit, if it's a melamed speaking in the classroom, so even if there are disclaimers attached, but he speaks qua rav, qua melamed. And politics is beyond his area of expertise. It's second of all, when Rabbanim identify, let's say be it with a certain political candidate or certain political party, so they become partisan. And that inevitably l'machtza hashlish orevia or maybe even more can and will interfere with their functioning as a rav, in their ability to teach, to guide, to inspire, to counsel. If there's distance which is created because of the polarizing effect of political disagreements, so then that interferes with the melamed, with the rav carrying out his job and his function of again teaching, guiding, directing, counseling. Some issues are political, other issues albeit that they become thoroughly politicized are really religious issues, they're really halakhic issues. So one obvious example of that in certainly in Western society is abortion. Abortion is a very hotly contested political issue in the political arena, but it's not a political issue. It's a religious issue that has been politicized. And certainly it's very much within the province of a melamed, of a rav to teach that abortion is asur for Bnei Noach as well, and that's unequivocal. But many issues, maybe we should say most issues, are a complicated web separate out to isolate the halachic elements from the political elements and that a melamed anyone who's associated with Torah should be very careful with surgical precision to be talking about the halachic elements not about the political elements. And that's true as regards the recent hostage deal. Again to begin by just reiterating the obvious, every Jewish heart has been bleeding since that Shmini Atzeres at the plight and fate of the hostages. That's not what we're talking about, that's a given, it's something that we all feel for ourselves and know about each other. No one can be impervious or apathetic to the living gehennom of being held by such savages. But since Shmini Atzeres, since the milchama began, the debate in the political arena was what the number one priority of Medinas Yisrael and therefore Tzahal in executing, in implementing the policy, what the number one priority was supposed to be. Was the number one priority securing the release of the hostages or was the number one priority destroying Hamas? Because obviously there was and itochein still is to a large degree an irreconcilable tension and conflict between those two goals. So that issue as to what the priority should be, again it's thoroughly politicized but is a halachic issue. And it is an issue that halacha speaks to clearly. And halacha prioritizes pikuach nefesh of the rabim over pikuach nefesh of the yachid with all the רחמנים בישנים גומלי חסדים notwithstanding, but pikuach nefesh of the rabim is always prioritized over pikuach nefesh of the yachidim. If the reality of securing the release of the hostages is that entails ending the milchama prematurely and leaving Hamas intact to rachmana litzlan live and fight another day and perpetrate rachmana litzlan, one doesn't even want to finish the sentence. So pikuach nefesh of the rabim has a din kadima over pikuach nefesh of yachidim. The pikuach nefesh of the millions and millions bli ayin hora of Jews in Medinas Yisrael has a din kadima over the pikuach nefesh Hashem yerachem of yachidim who are being held under such horrific life-threatening conditions. That's one halachic I think unambiguous, unequivocal guideline. The other one is that as you know the Mishna in Gittin says that אין פודין את השבויים יותר מכדי דמיהן that one is not allowed to ransom shvuyim, the ma'amar Chazal of אין לך מצוה גדולה כפדיון שבויים notwithstanding, one has to be very careful when... Torah is a miksha achas. One can't cherry pick a single maamar without comprehensively bringing to bear all the relevant sources in Torah. So אין לכם מצוה גדולה כפדיון שבויים notwithstanding, so the mishna says אין פודין את השבויים יתר כדי דמיהן. The gemara suggests as an ibaya two possible reasons for that, and one of it is because it incentivizes them to be moser nefesh to take more shvuyim. chazal don't need empirical verification, but obviously, unfortunately we all know that there is empirical verification available for what chazal b’chochmasom understood. See, the problem, lu yehi that when Gilad Shalit had been held captive, if someone could have not only posted his picture and it was obviously a bitter rachmanus on him, but if someone could have posted the pictures of all the people who would be taken hostage on October 7th, people would have reacted differently. But obviously you couldn't put a face to what chazal said in maseches gittin. And because of that, when we react emotionally as opposed to having halacha guide our emotions and then emotion help energize us after halacha has identified the goalposts. But when we're led by emotions, so we see the pictures now. What chazal takeh talk about in terms of what the result is going to be of incentivizing, so by definition we can't see that, we don't see that. So we react emotionally, we act, we react subjectively and to say things clearly, misplaced rachmanus, albeit coming from a very good place in a person's heart, can end up playing out as achzariyus. Misplaced rachmanus in a whole variety of contexts, misplaced rachmanus can play out as achzariyus. And that's what chazal say. Is it a rachmanus on the shavui? Absolutely, there are no words to describe, no words to describe, and as much as we try, it's impossible to imagine. The only one who understands what they're going through are those who are there. But that notwithstanding, chazal say when our sworn enemies see what the value of a shavui is, so they're incentivized to take more shvuyim. So that means that the rachmanus now, down the road is an achzariyus. So that's a hard truth, but it's a truth. So both of those perspectives, those are not political perspectives, those are halachic perspectives. The priority of pikuach nefesh of the rabim if a hostage deal entails ending the milchama prematurely and short-circuiting the goal of destroying Hamas, assuming that one feels that that is otherwise attainable, otherwise realistic. And number two, אין פודין את השבויים יתר כדי דמיהן because of, again, and that's even without talking about what all the... What they're going to do once they're released. Now does that mean that the Israeli government from a halachic perspective acted wrongly in agreeing to this deal? So that already, here there's a political variable which rabbanim should not be commenting on. What would the consequences have been in terms of future American support if they had bucked the intense, intense pressure to which they were subjected? And we're all aware of just how intense that pressure had to have been. So what's the right thing in light of that pressure? That already depends upon a political assessment. A political assessment. And that's why itachen, the fact that the halachic priorities are prioritizing pikuach nefesh of the rabbim over pikuach nefesh of the yachid, and the fact that ואין פודין השבויים יתר על כדי דמיהן, but does that translate into that we think or we know that the hostage deal was wrong? No, it doesn't translate. Because here there's a political assessment of what would the price have been to say no. That already depends upon, we can't know because we're uninformed in terms of what was said privately and not publicized. Who knows? And even if we knew everything that was said privately, ultimately that's already a political calculus of what the fallout would have been of saying no. Two other just related issues. How do we react to bechasdei Hashem three hostages have been freed? How do we react to that given that certainly the hostage deal lechatchila is not something that in light of these halachic principles is not something halacha would have sanctioned? And bedieved given the pressure, so again, we don't know, that's a political calculus. It's not for us to say. How does that impact our reaction to the freedom of the hostages? Does that mean that our reaction to those hostages who have been and will be freed under the terms of the deal, so is our reaction muted? Is it different than when Tzahal through a military operation was able to save them? So the paradigm lichora is that there is a din that if rachmana litzlan a person hears of, let's say rachmana litzlan a son hears of his father's death. So conceivably he makes two brachos. He makes the bracha of dayan emes, but he also makes a bracha of hatov vehametiv on the yerusha. That's a din. So how is that possible? How is that possible? Would we assume that he's so heartless and so cruel and callous that there's a single event that had two consequences here. One consequence is the father's death and the other consequence is a yerusha and the sort of shkulim, shkulim k'echad? So hedge your bets, you know. He makes a dayan emes on on on on on on on the father's demise and and hatov v'hameitiv on on his newfound newfound wealth. So shouldn't it be that obviously on the whole this is just such an overwhelmingly besorah ra'ah? So what room is there for hatov v'hameitiv? And yet the halacha is that that the individual makes both brachos. He makes a dayan emes as well as hatov v'hameitiv. So the answer is that even though, this is a very very important yesod, that even though the way the way both of those each of those consequences came about was they they were linked, but that linkage is not essential. Really there were two, it could have been that the father's stock portfolio would have been wiped out a second before he died and and he could have died without leaving yerusha. It could be that that without dying his stock portfolio would have would have gone way up and he would have given a big present to his son. Those two events conceptually and providentially and therefore halachically are separate and unrelated. Hagam that the way they came into this world was that they were packaged together. משל למה הדבר דומה. A mailman comes and and he brings you a letter you've been waiting for for... I'm showing my age. Who's sending letters, mailman? Okay, whatever, but so just you know humor me, okay? A mailman comes and and he delivers, he delivers two letters. One of them is a letter you've been waiting for for a long time from a friend you haven't heard from with an update or or maybe it's an acceptance letter to a school or or a job offer. Then he also brings a letter which has a bill from a collection agency. So it was one mail delivery but you don't decide you know that well I either have to hug the mailman or punch him. No you do both. You hug him and then you punch him. They were packaged together. It came in the same day's mail but they're totally separate. The fact that they came in the same mail delivery doesn't mean doesn't mean that they were one and the same. That's just that's a coincidence. And even though it may seem to us as not being a coincidence, providentially and therefore halachically it is a coincidence. You need to think about this. And that's why the halacha says, not rachmana litzlan that the person sees a silver lining in the cloud of of his father's death rachmana litzlan. No chas v'shalom that's not what it is. It's that these are two separate events. The mailman in the same mail delivery brought two letters. One of them was a letter that you're thrilled to receive and the other one is a letter that you dread to receive. So you're excited about the thrilling letter and you're devastated by the dreadful letter. You don't sort of have only one reaction, you have you have both reactions because providentially and therefore halachically they're separate even if they come in the same delivery. And that's why the halacha says that the person makes both brachos. He makes a dayan emes and he also makes hatov v'hameitiv on the yerusha. So the same is true here. The sense of gratitude and and happiness that there are three bnos Yisrael who have been freed from those savages doesn't depend upon knowing whether or not the... I mean again at best it was b'diavad because it was imposed with such pressure and such. Ominous threats as to what would be if they didn't go along with it. That's not relevant because providentially and halachically there are two different events and therefore the reaction to the freedom of the hostages is not muted, is not adulterated by this context. The other and with this we'll conclude, Rashi comments in Parshas Noach that when the rain began for the mabul even though Hakadosh Baruch Hu had been waiting 120 years for there to be teshuva and certainly in retrospect when we date the mabul, be it to Cheshvan be it to Iyar, whatever it was, so those first drops of rain were the beginning of the mabul but there was still potential if they would have done teshuva then for that to turn out to be gishmei bracha. Through teshuva and tefilla we have the capacity that Hakadosh Baruch Hu will redefine what happened and even if it's already happened even if the clouds have already burst but there's still potential to convert it into gishmei bracha. It doesn't mean that now inexorably it's mei hamabul and it's certainly I mean it's always true but it's true in this context as well whether the deal that was forced and it obviously was forced upon the Israeli government how we'll view that in retrospect as a stage in what process that is still to be determined and what will determine that is our, speaking obviously in very broadly, teshuva and tefilla moving forward. There is again that same midah it can be gishmei bracha it can be mei hamabul there is the midah of ויהפך ה' אלוקיך לך את הקללה לברכה even when something happened which besha'ato when Bilam first conceives the thoughts of what he's going to say it's a klala and yet that becomes the basis for bracha when Hakadosh Baruch Hu wills it and that's what through our Torah and tefilla we have the opportunity and therefore the obligation to be lobbying for.