1997, L’chvod the Rav’s Yahrzeit

It’s nearly 57 to 58 years ago after the passing of the legendary Rav Moshe Soloveitchik, zecher tzaddik livracha, that the Rav began out of a profound and incredible filial devotion the institution of the yahrtzeit shiur in memory of his great father. That shiur became the focal point, a calendar landmark for talmidei chachamim and gedolei Yisrael as well, who came from every direction. There was electricity in the beis medrash or in the auditorium as the case was as the crowds grew very, very large. And therefore upon the passing of the Rav, and it’s hard to believe for us anyway that next week tonight we will be observing the fourth yahrtzeit of the passing of רבן של כל בני ישראל as we understood him, Harav Yosef Dov Halevi Soloveitchik, zecher tzaddik livracha. Upon the initiation of Dr. Lamm, we felt it would be entirely appropriate to remember the Rav in the same way he remembered his father and to establish an annual yahrtzeit shiur. Unfortunately the calendar is not too hospitable to this sort of landmark because the Rav unfortunately passed away in the middle of Pesach, the second day chol hamoed Pesach. Among if not the most splendid legacy the Rav left behind was a superlative array of roshei yeshiva and talmidei chachamim who are in the first rank of marbitzei Torah today, and chief among them are his own progeny, his own family. And so it was decided at the very outset that the greatest tribute to be paid to the Rav, even as the Rav gave shiurim in honor of his father, to have his own children, his own progeny, his own immediate family deliver the shiurim from year to year. This series began with our very illustrious rosh yeshiva, the grandson of the Rav, Rav Mayer Twersky in nineteen hundred and ninety-five. A very difficult year for Rav Mayer. We had hoped when it was first broached that certainly among the maggidei shiur of this shiur would be his own esteemed great father, Dr. Isadore Yitzchak Twersky, who was an unusual amalgam and blend of a rebbe, a professor, and most importantly, talmid chacham. I have the great kavod of presenting to you our Rav, Rav Mayer Twersky. Thank you, and, Harav Shustak, Menahel Hayeshiva, Rav Blau, Mashgiach Hayeshiva, Rabbonim, Talmidim. First Mishna in Pesachim: אור לארבעה עשר בודקין את החמץ לאור הנר. Rashi comments, בודקין שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובבל ימצא. The purpose of the Bedika is that we should not violate the Issur בל יראה ובל ימצא. Tosfos takes issue with Rashi: פירש הקונטרס שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובבל ימצא, v'kasha l'Riva,

כיון דצריך ביטול כדאמר בגמרא הבודק צריך שיבטל ומדאורייתא בביטול בעלמא סגי אמאי אטריחו חכמים בדיקה כלל?

Tosfos says the problem of Bal Yeiraeh is solved through bitul chametz, and bitul chametz is required regardless, habodek tzarich she'yivatel. So if that's the case, a Bedika to protect us from Bal Yeiraeh is totally redundant. So that can't be the reason or the goal of Bedikas chametz. V'nireh l'Riva

דאף על גב דסגי בביטול בעלמא החמירו חכמים לבדוק חמץ ולבערו שלא יבא לאכלו.

The Riva says that Bedikas chametz has got nothing to do with בל יראה ובל ימצא. בל יראה ובל ימצא is addressed by Bitul and the purpose or the reason for Bedikas chametz is to ensure, is a precautionary measure against the issur achilas chametz. That since chametz is lo badila minei, since we're accustomed to eating chametz year-round, so Chazal took extra precautionary measures to ensure that we wouldn't be nichshal in the issur achilas chametz on Pesach and hence for that reason they mandated Bedika. On the surface, the machlokes Rashi and Tosfos seems to be a rather innocuous one, as it were, as to what the reason for Bedikas chametz is. Whether Bedikas chametz is בל יראה ובל ימצא as Rashi defines it, or whether Bedikas chametz is shelo yavo l'ochlo as Tosfos defines it. However, it emerges from several Sugyas that this is not the case, and the machlokes Rashi and Tosfos is not really rooted in the ta'am, in the reason for Bedikas chametz, but rather in the very essence of the chiyuv bedika which Chazal imposed. The Gemara in, later in דף ט עמוד ב, says as follows:

תשעה ציבורין של מצה ואחד של חמץ ואתא עכבר ושקל ולא ידעינן אם מצה שקל אם חמץ שקל.

If there are nine piles of matzah, one pile of chametz, and an achbar, some rodent, comes and it takes from one of the piles, and we don't know whether it took matzah or whether it took chametz. Hainu tes channuyos. This would be parallel to the case of the braisa of tes channuyos, which the Gemara is about to quote. פירש ואתא עכבר ושקל היינו סיפא. If the achbar doesn't go and take the piece out of the pile, but rather one piece gets dislodged, displaced from the pile and is sitting equidistant from all the piles, and then the achbar takes that piece and runs into a house with it, so then that corresponds to the seifa of this same braisa.

דתניא תשע חנויות כולן מוכרות בשר שחוטה ואחת מוכרת בשר נבילה.

If you imagine some kind of square, and along the perimeter of the square, so there are ten channuyos, nine of which sell kosher meat, one of which sells treife meat. ולקח מאחת מהן ואין יודע מאיזה מהן לקח. A person was not aware of the fact that one of these stores wasn't kosher. He went into one without paying attention which store he went into, he bought a piece of meat, and now the question is did he buy kosher meat What did he buy? What did he buy trayf meat? ולקח מאחת מהן ואינו יודע באיזו מהן לקח, safeik assura. This is a case of kavoa, since he went into the store, so this would be treated as kavoa, and kavoa the Torah has gezeiras hakasuv that כל קבוע כמחצה על מחצה דמי that we don't follow the odds, we don't follow probability here. The Torah's gezeiras hakasuv is that we treat kavoa as a safek כמחצה על מחצה דמי and therefore we have to say, well, the safek is whether or not this store that he entered was selling kosher meat or trayf meat, and we have to treat it as a safek d'oraisa l'chumra and the meat is assur ba'achilah. uvenimtza halacha k'harov. If, however, he doesn't go into the store but the piece of meat is in the middle of this square around which there are ten stores around the perimeter, so then that's a case of kol d'parish and כל דפריש מרובא פריש. Now the question is: what exactly is the analog of this case? So Rashi says

עשה עכבר ושקל ונכנס לבית בפנינו ולא ידעינן אי חמץ ושקל וכיון דחזינא צריכין אנו לבדוק או דילמא מצה שקל.

So Rashi says that we're dealing with our question is regarding bedikas chametz. We have a house which is b'chezkat baduk. We have a house where we already performed bedikas chametz. Then the achbar goes and it takes this unidentified piece of chametz from one of the ten piles and it brings it into the house. And we don't know where it is. So the question is: do we have to go turn the house upside down and inside out to find this piece of maybe matzah, maybe chametz which the achbar brought in or not? So the safek concerns bedikas chametz. Tosafos says that can't be. That can't be because if we're dealing with bedikas chametz, so why would the Gemara say that this case parallels the case of tisha chanuyos? In the case of tisha chanuyos, our shaylah is about basar neveilah versus basar shechutah, or in other words, we're dealing with a shaylah d'oraisa. So if you're dealing with a potential d'oraisa, and then you have the gezeiras hakasuv of kavoa, so the result is that you treat it as a safek d'oraisa and you go l'chumra. However, if you're dealing with bedikas chametz, and bedikas chametz is only m'derabanan. Why? Because בביטול מדאורייתא בביטול בעלמא סגי מן התורה ביטול and therefore bedika is only derabanan. So by bedikas chametz, even when it's the case of kavoa, even when the achbar goes to the pile and takes the piece out of the pile and we don't know whether it took a chametzdikke piece or not, at worst, if the safek which you're trying to clarify is whether or not you're chayav in bedika again, it's still at worst, even with gezeiras hakasuv of kavoa, it should only be a safek derabanan l'kula. So how does the Gemara say that this should be parallel to the case of tisha chanuyos where the shaylah concerns a d'oraisa when bedikas chametz is only a derabanan? That's Tosafos' kasha on Rashi. Tosafos says, well, according to it, you'd have to make a mokimta in the Gemara that he hasn't been mevatel and maybe he's not going to be mevatel, and in absence of bittul, so then bedikas chametz would be a d'oraisa. But otherwise, says Tosafos, if he had been mevatel already, if he had been mevatel already, so then even in a case where asa achbar v'shakal and it is a case of kavoa, we should treat it as a safek derabanan l'kula. What's the answer for Rashi? So the answer for Rashi is that here the true machlokes between Rashi and Tosafos on daf beis emerges. And that is, when Rashi says that the bedika is שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובל ימצא, the Ran explains as follows: The Ran amplifies what Rashi says, Rabbeinu Dovid as well amplify what Rashi says as follows: min hatorah, there's one of two routes available to avoid בל יראה בל ימצא. One route is the combination of bedika and biur, and the other route is bittul. min hatorah, you have both of those options available to you. The Mishnah's halacha, the Ran says, what Rashi is telling us, is that Chazal came along and said that even though min hatorah you have a choice between either the combination of bedika and biur on the one hand or bittul on the other hand, Chazal said: we want you to opt for bedika and biur, we don't want you to rely on the option of bittul. words according to the Ran what Rashi here is telling us is that when Hazal were mechayev in bedikas chometz so what Hazal said is that mi-derabbanan we are requiring you to undertake a bedika which will satisfy the issur bal yera'eh. In other words, mi-derabbanan we're saying it's as if there was no, it's as if we don't want you to rely in bitul. And Hazal were mechayev, not that they were mechayev in a bedika de-rabbanan, Hazal were mechayev that we have to do the bedika which the Torah would require in absence of bitul. Even though in reality we have been mevatel, we will be mevatel, nevertheless the de-rabbanan of אור לארבעה עשר בודקין את החמץ לאור הנר is that Hazal require that we undertake the de-oraisa-dik bedika which will protect us from בל יראה ובל ימצא. Tosfos by contrast says no. Once Hazal insisted on bitul, so Hazal said that satisfies בל יראה ובל ימצא. The bedika which we're requiring is not the de-oraisa-dik bedika which would protect you from בל יראה ובל ימצא. The bedika in which we're being mechayev you is a bedika mi-derabbanan. Or in other words, according to Rashi, the cheftza shel bedika which Hazal imposed upon us is the bedika de-oraisa. That bedika de-oraisa which the Torah requires in absence of bitul, so then Hazal require that in all events even if there were bitul. The question always is, the requirement is that we have to do what the Torah would have required without bitul. Whereas according to Tosfos that's not the case at all. Once Hazal required bitul they said now forget about בל יראה ובל ימצא. The fact that we are requiring bedika has got nothing to do with the Torah's bedika. It's just happens to be the same word, it's a shem hamoshutaf. What we're requiring is a totally different bedika and the reason for this bedika, and not just the reason for this bedika but the cheftza shel bedika is different. It's a בדיקה מדרבנן שלא יבוא לאכלו. It's got nothing to do with the Torah's bedika שלא יעבור עליו בל יראה בל ימצא. L'mai nafka mina between these two approaches? So that emerges here on daf tes. Tosfos raised the question against Rashi, if you have a safek about bedikas chometz it should be a safek de-rabbanan le-kula. So even in the case of kavua, even in the case of kavua, still you shouldn't be chayiv in bedikas chometz because safek de-rabbanan le-kula. Why? Because according to Tosfos not only is it Hazal who are mechayev us in bedika, but the bedika in which they were mechayev us was not the bedika de-oraisa. It was a brand new bedika. They created a new chiyuv yesh mei-ayin of bedika שלא יבוא לאכלו. Whereas according to Rashi what Hazal said is that we insist that you do a bedika which would protect you from בל יראה ובל ימצא even if you have been mevatel. If that's the case, even though the chiyuv bedika is only a de-rabbanan, but they were mechayev us in the bedika de-oraisa. So if that's the case, when there will always be a chiyuv mi-derabbanan if there would have been a chiyuv min ha-torah if I wasn't mevatel. So be-makom safek how are we machri'a? We'll be machri'a on a de-oraisa-dik level. We'll say that min ha-torah in such a case without bitul what would the halakha have been? The halakha would have been safek de-oraisa le-chumra and I would be chayiv to be bodek and to be meva'er. So therefore mi-derabbanan even if I was mevatel I'm going to be chayiv in bedika. Because the chiyuv bedika mi-derabbanan was to do that bedika which the Torah would require without bitul even though I was mevatel. So that's the machlokes between Rashi and Tosfos again, whether or not the bedika is a bedika de-rabbanan, meaning everyone agrees the fact that you must do bedika and cannot rely on bitul is clearly mi-derabbanan. Is clearly mi-derabbanan, that's the Gemara מן התורה בביטול בעלמא סגי and bedikas chometz is de-rabbanan. That's clearly the case. But the question is what did the Rabbanan say? According to Tosfos the Rabbanan say well since the de-oraisa bal yera'eh has been satisfied so this bedikas chometz is mi-techilasov ve-ad sofov totally de-rabbanan. If that's the case if you have a safek about bedikas chometz so what would the din be? Safek de-rabbanan le-kula. And that's why Tosfos can't understand Rashi's p'shat here on daf tes. However according to Rashi what Hazal said is no, Hazal said even though on a de-oraisa-dik level bitul. does satisfy the requirements of bal yera'eh, mi-derabbanan we insist that you perform the bedikah, which would have protected you, which would be sufficient to protect you from בל יראה בל ימצא. In other words, you have to do the de-oraisa-dik bedikah. If that's the case, then you always have to ask the question on a de-oraisa-dik level, without bittul, would I have been chayav in bedikah? If the answer to that is yes, so then the answer mi-derabbanan, even with bittul, is that you're going to be chayav in bedikah. So therefore, even even if you were mevattel, according to Rashi, safek bedikas chametz will be lechumra. The exact same machlokes Rashi and Tosafos you have on דף ט עמוד א as well. The Mishna implies on דף ט עמוד א that if we were already bodek a house and then we see a chulda bringing vadai chametz into the house, so we have no right to assume that the chulda certainly consumed the piece of bread which was which it carried into the house. We have no right to do that because אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. It's vadai that the chulda brought chametz into the house, it's only a safek whether or not the chulda consumed the chametz. We have no right to assume that אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. Even though the safek, Tosafos explains the safek we're dealing with here is not a safek hashakul, but it means that it's it's more of a rov, but nevertheless the fact that it's vadai, it's certain that the chulda brought chametz into the house and it's only a likelihood that the chulda consumed the chametz, so ke-hai gavna אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי vechayav in bedikah. So the Gemara says, is it really true that we hold אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי? And the Gemara asks from the case of

וחבר שמת והניח מגורה מלאה פירות אפילו הן בני יומן הרי הן בחזקת מתוקנים.

A chaver who is known to be mafrish terumos and maasros immediately for many produce, so even if he dies, even if the produce in his house was just brought into the house that day, we assume that he was already mafrish terumos and maasros and you don't have to be concerned with an issur tevel. So the Gemara says, isn't this an example of אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי? The peiros are vadai tevel, it's a safek, we can't be absolutely certain that the chaver was mafrish terumos and maasros, so isn't this an example of אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי? So the Gemara gives two answers. Right, it gives two answers. The second one, which is the one which is relevant to us, is that the case of chaver that it's not ספק מוציא מידי ודאי, it's only ספק מוציא מידי ספק. It could be that the chaver brought the peiros into the house without the peiros becoming tevel min ha-Torah. Why? Because it's entirely possible that he followed the strategy described by Rav Oshaya. Rav Oshaya says

מערים אדם על תבואתו ומכניסה במוץ שלה כדי שתהא בהמתן אוכלת ופטורה מן המעשר.

Rav Oshaya says there are three, there are three stages or three mechayvim necessary to trigger tevel de-oraisa. You have to have a certain a certain degree of growth in the field, hava'as shlish in the case of tvuah, you have to have meru'ach which is the stage of gemar melacha in the field, and finally you have to have re'iyas pnei ha-bayis. Rav Oshaya says, what happens if you invert the the sequence here? What happens if you bring it into the house and you have the re'iyas pnei ha-bayis before the meru'ach? You haven't separated the kernel from the chaff and then smoothed it into an even pile which is the stage of gemar melacha, and you prematurely bring it into the house so that you have the re'iyas pnei ha-bayis before the meru'ach? So Rav Oshaya says when you do things out of sequence like that, so then you don't have tevel de-oraisa. You don't have tevel de-oraisa, so when you find fruit in the or or tvuah in the chaver's in the chaver's kitchen, so you don't know that it's vadai tevel, it's only safek tevel, it's only safek tevel, so we can rely on the safek that the chaver was mafrish terumos and maasros. So that's what the Gemara answers. That's why the case of chaver doesn't disprove the klal with which we're operating that אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. So Tosafos said, wait a minute. Rav Oshaya's Rav Oshaya's case where a person brings the the fruit into the house before gemar melacha only preempts tevel de-oraisa. However, in such a case, it would be tevel mi-derabbanan. In such a case, from the time of hava'as... From the time the tvua reaches shalish of its normal gidul out in the field, so there's already איסור אכילת קבע מן התורה. So in terms of issur tevel d'rabonon, we are relying on ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. When this chaver dies and we find piros in his house, so what's the what's the calculation here? The calculation is that mi d'rabonon it's vadai tevel. Mi d'rabonon it certainly was assur bachilas keva because that issur was chal when it reached the stage of hava'as shalish. Now we rely on the sofek that the chaver was mafrish trumos u'maasros and that's מוציא מידי ודאי טבל דרבנן. So apparently in d'rabonons we do say ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. So if that's the case, hadra kushya l'duchta because our mishna is dealing with bdikas chametz. Our mishna is dealing with bdikas chametz. What did our mishna say that if I was bodek my house and then a chulda ran into the house with a piece of chametz, אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. We can't assume that the chulda consumed the piece of chametz. אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי and I'm chayav bdika. But bdikas chametz is only d'rabonon. And don't you see from the case of the chaver that when it comes to d'rabonons we say ספק מוציא מידי ודאי? When the chaver dies you have something which is vadai tevel d'rabonon and nevertheless we say that the sofek that the chaver was mafrish trumos u'maasros is motzi midei vadai. So apparently in d'rabonons you do say ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. If that's the case, hadra kushya l'duchta for purposes of bdikas chametz which is only d'rabonon. Why don't you say ספק מוציא מידי ודאי there as well? So Tosafos answers with the same u'kimta as they say in דף ט עמוד ב. You have to say that the mishna is dealing with a case where you weren't mivatel. And Tosafos implies that ein hachami, if you had been mivatel, so then for purposes of bdikas chametz you could rely on ספק מוציא מידי ודאי because in d'rabonons you rely on ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. Rashi makes no such u'kimta. From Rashi it would appear that the mishna is talking that the mishna will be true and the din of the mishna will be true even if a person had been mivatel. Ai, but didn't Tosafos prove from the sugia that when it comes to d'rabonons ספק מוציא מידי ודאי? So the answer is the exact same thing which we said on tes amud bais and that is, according to Rashi, when we say that bdikas chametz is שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובל ימצא, it means that chazal mechayev us in the bdika d'oraisa. Chazal said for purposes of bdika, pretend that you weren't mivatel because the takana of bdikas chametz is that you have to do a bdika which independently, which is self-sufficient to be moneia the issur בל יראה ובל ימצא. If that's the case, the same way for purposes of bdikas chametz we'll say sofek l'chumra because we have to evaluate it on a d'oraisa level, because the chiyuv d'rabonon is in the d'oraisadeke bdika, we'll say the same thing as far as ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. If min hatorah ein sofek motzi midei vadai, so then for purposes of bdikas chametz also אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי because chazal mechayev us in the d'oraisa bdika. The d'oraisa bdika on a... when it comes to d'oraisas you say אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. So then when it comes to bdikas chametz you'll say אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. Because that's what Rashi on daf bais was telling us when he said that the bdika is כדי שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובל ימצא. He meant that chazal insisted that for purposes of bdikas chametz you have to make a bdika which is self-sufficient. So in other words, you're always going to have to assess the chiyuv bdika on a d'oraisadeke level because they imposed the bdika min hatorah. Lechora according to Rashi this is how we should understand the shakla v'tarya which the gemara has in two places, both on דף ד עמוד ב as well as tes amud bais going over to yud amud aleph. The gemara has as follows: the gemara says if you have someone, let's say a katan who is not ne'eman when it comes to עד אחד נאמן באיסורין מן התורה, so is he נאמן לגבי בדיקת חמץ? So the gemara says you would have thought that he's not ne'eman, מהו דתימא לא להימנו רבנן because...

קמשמע לן כיוון דבדיקת חמץ מדרבנן הוא דמדאורייתא בביטול בעלמא סגי ליה הימנוהו רבנן בדרבנן.

The Gemara answers no, we do believe the koton, even though the koton has no ne'emanus min hatorah, but bedikas chametz is only mederabanan, so Heimnuhu rabanan bederabanan. Chazal gave him ne'emanus for a derabanan. What exactly was the shakla vetarya here? The Gemara clearly knows all along that bedikas chametz is only mederabanan. The fact that bitul alone is sufficient, the Mishna says mefurash later in the third perek, the Mishna says that mevatlo belibo, that even if a person knows he has chametz, but he's on his way lishchot es pischo

או למול את בנו ולאכול סעודת אירוסין בבית חמיו ונזכר שיש לו חמץ בתוך ביתו אם יכול לחזור ולבער ולחזור למצותו יחזור ויבער ואם לאו מבטלו בלבו.

So the Mishna says in Daf Mem-Tes mefurash that bitul alone is enough. The Gemara didn't discover that, so the Gemara knew all along that bedikas chametz was mederabanan. So why did the Gemara in its hava amina think that a koton shouldn't be ne'eman? What was the big discovery that Heimnuhu rabanan bederabanan? So the teretz is according to what we're explaining in Rashi, it's a tremendous chiddush. Be'emes, the hava amina here is more intelligible than, more easily and readily understandable than the Gemara's maskana. The Gemara said like this, ein hachi nami we know that bedikas chametz is only mederabanan. However, what is the chiyuv derabanan of bedikas chametz? To do a bedika which would satisfy the Torah, right? To do a bedika which would satisfy the Torah. Now, mide'oraisa, if a koton would come and say about this house which is bechezkas eino boduk, a koton would come and say, "no, badakti, I was bodek this house," could you rely on the koton? Of course not, because the koton has no ne'emanus min hatorah. So I would have thought again, since the whole chiyuv bedika, albeit mederabanan, but what is that chiyuv derabanan? To do a bedika which would have satisfied the Torah. So I would have thought the same way when it comes to safek, what do we say by bedikas chametz? ספק בדיקת חמץ לחומרא. When it comes to ספק מוציא מידי ודאי, so the halacha is like this: In de'oraisa, אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. In mederabanan, safek is motzi midei vaday. What do we say for bedikas chametz? We say אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי. We always follow the model mide'oraisa because that was the takana of bedikas chametz, to do the de'oraisadikke bedika. So that's what the Gemara says very well, מהו דתימא לאו הימנוהו רבנן. The rabanan, even though bedikas chametz is only mederabanan, but Chazal shouldn't have been able to accept the word of the koton here legabei bedikas chametz. Kamashma lan, for whatever reason which we're not going into now, but Kamashma lan that Heimnuhu rabanan bederabanan. In a similar sugya you have on the same shakla vetarya on דף ט עמוד ב דף י עמוד א. So in sum, the machlokes Rashi and Tosfos then is that according to Tosfos, the bedika which Chazal required is not that bedika which the Torah would have required in absence of bitul, because we're not playing games, lemaiseh the guy is mevatel. The bedika is totally mederabanan mitchilaso ve'ad sofo and therefore we treat it as a pure mederabanan. Safek bedikas chametz is lekula, safek is motzi midei vaday, we treat it as a mederabanan. According to Rashi, the mederabanan of bedikas chametz is to do the Torah's bedika, to satisfy the איסור בל יראה בל ימצא based on bedika alone. So therefore, even though the fact that you must opt for bedika as opposed to bitul is only a mederabanan, but we always evaluate and assess your chiyuv min hatorah and therefore ספק בדיקת חמץ לחומרא and אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי by bedikas chametz the same way we would say in de'oraisas. Lichora there's one Gemara which simply contradicts Rashi's approach and confirms what Tosfos says. The Gemara says in

דף י עמוד ב בעי רבא כיכר בשמי קורה צריך סולם להורידה או אין צריך.

Let's say you look up and you see that on top of the cover of the light fixture, so you see a piece of chametz. You see a piece of chametz. So do Chazal require us to go get a ladder and take the chametz down or no? Maybe since that chometz there's no chashash of shema yavo lochlo. There's no chashash of shema yavo lochlo with chometz out there, so chazal would let us be mivatel that chometz or no? Maybe chazal are afraid that the chometz might fall down over Pesach, and therefore chazal would require us to be bodek and meva'er that chometz as well.

בעי רבא ככר בשמי קורה צריך סולם להורידו או אין צריך מי אמרינן כולי האי לא אטרחו רבנן כיון דלא נחית מנפשיה לא אתי למיכליה.

The chometz is not going to fall down by itself, so therefore there's no chashash of shema yavo lochlo. או דילמא זימנין דנפל ואתי למיכליה. Or no, you can never know what's going to happen. It's possible that it might fall down. It's possible that somehow or other it may slip and get dislodged, and then there would be a chashash of shema yavo lochlo, so maybe the chiyuv bedikah and biur derabanan extends to that kikor bashmey kora as well. Now b'emes Tosafot quotes this Gemara and asks against Rashi on daf daled. Why is this such a devastating kasha against Rashi? For the simple it's not superficially it seems like Tosafot is just asking because the Gemara says the lashon of shema yavo lochlo, that it's clear from the Gemara that bedikas chometz is motivated by a chashash of shema yavo lochlo. But that much Rashi could very easily agree with. Rashi says ein hachi nami, the reason for bedikas chometz is shema yavo lochlo, but nevertheless the chiyuv bedikah which chazal imposed is that d'oraisa'dik bedikah. So if that's all Tosafot had in mind, זה הכלל נמסר בידינו, if you don't have to work hard to be meyashiv a kasha of Tosafot, so then obviously we didn't understand the kasha correctly in the first place. It's too easily answered. Okay, so you see from the Gemara that the reason is shema yavo lochlo. But that's neither here nor there. The reason is shema yavo lochlo. What did chazal say because of this chashash shema yavo lochlo? Did they impose the d'oraisa'dik bedikah or not? What Tosafot really means with a kasha from that Gemara is as follows: If chazal really imposed a bedikas chometz which would be self-sufficient to protect us from בל יראה ובל ימצא, so how can there be any baya? Unless you get rid of all chometz, you're not safe from בל יראה ובל ימצא. If bedikas chometz shema yavo lochlo is bedikas chometz is שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובל ימצא, then it's an all or nothing proposition. If I knowingly have a piece of chometz in my house, so min ha'torah would that bedikah be adequate? Would that bedikah have been adequate without bittul? Of course not. The bedikah has to be complete. You have to be meva'er all chometz. So Tosafot says if the bedikas chometz which chazal imposed is a bedikah derabanan, so then what? So then you can say this piece of chometz there is a chiyuv bedikah and this piece of chometz there's no chiyuv bedikah. But if the chiyuv bedikah which chazal imposed is the bedikah d'oraisa, what did chazal say you have to do? What's the reason? The reason is shema yavo lochlo. But forget the reason. What did chazal say as a result of this reason? That you have to do a bedikah which will ensure what? שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובל ימצא. So what's the discuss kikor bashmey kora? Min ha'torah are you chayav b'bal yira'eh for kikor bashmey kora? Absolutely, you're chayav b'bal yira'eh for kikor bashmey kora. If that's the case and the bedikah derabanan in which we're chayav is שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה ובל ימצא, so then it should be self-evident that you should be chayav miderabanan to go get the sulam and bring the piece of chometz down. That's what Tosafot asks on Rashi, and l'chora it's a devastating, devastating kasha. L'chora to answer this kasha on Rashi, we have to understand a little bit about the איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא. Tosafot says in a couple of places here in Pesachim that בל יראה ובל ימצא is a lav ha'nitak l'aseh, but you wouldn't get malkus with בל יראה ובל ימצא even if you violated בל יראה ובל ימצא in a such a fashion that it was a לאו שיש בו מעשה. You koneh chometz on Pesach or you actually you baked a cake on Pesach. You baked a chometz'dik cake on Pesach. Tosafot says nevertheless you wouldn't get malkus because it's a lav ha'nitak l'aseh because the lav of bal yira'eh is... nitak to the aseh of tashpisu. Tosafot says it on tzadi-hei as well as kof-tes amud-bet.

כאן משמע כמו שפירש ר"י בכל שעה דלא יראה הוי ניתק לעשה.

That's what Tosafot says. And kayaduah the Rambam disagrees. Okay. But al kol panim, according to Tosafot, בל יראה בל ימצא is a lav ha-nitak le-aseh and again, the Ba'al Ha-Tosafot who tells us this is the Ri. Question is as follows: The Ri himself says in Tosafot in Ketubot how do we know when a lav and an aseh are related and constitute a package deal of lav ha-nitak le-aseh and how do we know that, I don't know, maybe they just sort of overlap. How do we know when it's a lav ha-nitak le-aseh, when it's not a lav ha-nitak le-aseh. So the Ri says that there are two ways in which the Torah indicates to us that a lav is nitak le-aseh. One is if the aseh is written immediately after the lav.

לא תותירו ממנו עד בוקר והנותר ממנו עד בוקר באש תשרופו.

The Torah says the aseh immediately after the lav. So that's to tell us that this aseh functions as the aseh of lav ha-nitak le-aseh. The other case is when mi-sevara we realize that the aseh is oker the lav, even though ve-heshiv is not written right after lo tigzol. So how do we know that it's a lav ha-nitak le-aseh? So Tosafot says in this case we know that it's a lav ha-nitak le-aseh mi-sevara. That since the aseh of ve-heshiv has the effect of doing what? Of being oker the lav. The lav was lo tigzol. The lav was was depriving the person of of his money, of his assets, so והשיב את הגזלה אשר גזל is oker that. It reverses the lav. It reverses the lav. Now, in the case of tashpisu and בל יראה בל ימצא, so the pasuk of tashpisu is not be-neshimah achat, is not immediately after בל יראה בל ימצא the way the aseh of sereifat notar immediately follows the lav of notar. So apparently בל יראה בל ימצא is nitak le-aseh mi-sevara. Apparently mi-sevara we recognize that the aseh of tashpisu is oker the lav of bal yera'eh. However, when you think about it, lichora it doesn't tally for the following reason: Again, take the mashal of notar. Tosafot says that notar would not have been understood as a lav ha-nitak le-aseh were it not for the fact that the aseh of והנותר ממנו עד בוקר follows immediately on the heels of the lav of lo tosiru. Why not? The lav was not to leave it over and now I'm destroying it. So the answer is that by destroying it you're just sort of preventing the extension of the lav. You're not being oker the lav. The lav was that the basar kodashim shouldn't be allowed to be notar until morning. When you burn it a half hour later you haven't been oker that. You've just prevented an extension, a continuation of the lav. You haven't been oker that. Mi-sevara we wouldn't have classified this as a lav ha-nitak le-aseh. However, since the Torah writes the aseh immediately after the lav, so that's to tell us you should construe it as a lav ha-nitak le-aseh. Now similarly by בל יראה בל ימצא, by בל יראה בל ימצא, lichora the issur is what? Is to have chametz on Pesach. To have chametz on Pesach. So if I had chametz on Pesach and then all of a sudden I wake up first day Chol HaMoed and I clop al chet and then I go ahead and I destroy the chametz, I'm not being oker the lav. I'm not being oker the lav mi-sevara any more than I'm being oker the lav of notar when I burn the notar. I'm just preventing the continuation, the extension of the lav. I'm not really being oker the lav. So why do we construe בל יראה בל ימצא as a lav ha-nitak le-aseh? So lichora the teretz is as follows: The Geonim, the Rishonim all quote the following Mechilta. The Mechilta says in Parshat Bo

שבעת ימים שאור לא ימצא בבתיכם בבתיכם למה נאמר לפי שנאמר בכל גבולך שומע אני כמשמעו תלמוד לומר בבתיכם מה ביתך ברשותך יצא חמצו של ישראל שהוא ברשות אינו ישראל, אף על פי שהוא יכול לבערו אבל אינו ברשותו, יצא חמצו שאינו ישראל שהוא ברשותו, וחמץ שנפלה עליו מפולת, אף על פי שהוא ברשותו אבל אינו יכול לבערו.

The Mechiltas says as follows: the Mishna says if you have chametz shenafela alav mapolet, there's no chiyuv of biur. You don't have to unearth the chametz which has been buried underneath the collapsed building. You don't have to unearth it. And that's min hatorah. Min hatorah you can just leave the chametz there. Mechiltas says, "How do you know this?" Mechiltas says it's gezerat hakatuv of bevateichem. Bevateichem means that the chametz, number one, has to be birshuti, and then number two, it has to be that yachol leva'aro. Chametz shenafela alav mapolet is inaccessible. It's eino yachol leva'aro. So therefore, that's not subject to the issur of בל יראה בל ימצא. That's what the Mechiltas says. But this Mechiltas is very, very difficult to understand. Why should the issur of בל יראה בל ימצא be contingent upon the possibility of my having access to the chametz, easy, unfettered access to the chametz to be meva'er it? Lich'ora, the issur בל יראה בל ימצא is that I shouldn't own chametz on Pesach. So let's say I own a restaurant, and then the restaurant collapses, and then I have all my spaghetti underneath the mapolet. So it's true that it would take a construction crew two days to unearth the spaghetti and another day to find the ketchup. So it's true that it's eino yachol leva'aro, that he can't easily be meva'er the chametz, but of what relevance is that? Issur בל יראה בל ימצא should hinge upon whether or not I can, whether or not I can get rid of the chametz from my reshut. Chametz shenafela alav mapolet, you can't have an issur which a person can't avoid. That's correct. The Torah isn't going to impose an issur which places us on a collision course that there's no way that a person can avoid the issur. However, the issur בל יראה בל ימצא is that I shouldn't have chametz on Pesach. If I have chametz shenafela alav mapolet, all I have to do is be mevatel the chametz, whether bittul is hefker, whatever bittul is, all I have to do is be mevatel the chametz and then this chametz shenafela alav mapolet I won't be over בל יראה בל ימצא. Why should the applicability of בל יראה בל ימצא hinge on yachol leva'aro? The applicability of בל יראה בל ימצא should hinge on does it still belong to me and is there any way for me to avoid the issur בל יראה בל ימצא? If the chametz still belongs to me and I can easily avoid בל יראה בל ימצא, so then it should be subject to בל יראה בל ימצא. So chametz shenafela alav mapolet, it still belongs to me and I can easily be mevatel it, so there should have been an issur בל יראה בל ימצא. Why did the Mechiltas say that chametz shenafela alav mapolet, since even though it's birshuto but it's eino yachol leva'aro, that there's no issur bal yera'eh? So what you see from the Mechiltas is as follows: that the issur of בל יראה בל ימצא is not an issur of owning chametz on Pesach. That's not the issur בל יראה בל ימצא. Rather, the issur בל יראה בל ימצא is the reason I am over בל יראה בל ימצא if I own, if I maintain my ownership over chametz on Pesach, is because חמצו של ישראל בפסח טעון ביעור. There's a chalos in the cheftza shel chametz. The chametz bepesach is ta'un bi'ur. And if a person, instead of being meva'er that chametz, holds onto it, he keeps it, so then he's over בל יראה בל ימצא. But it's not simply that it's an issur gavra of owning chametz bepesach. No, that's not the case. Rather, the din is that the chametz is ta'un bi'ur. Chametz bepesach is supposed to be destroyed and if I hold onto the chametz instead of destroying it, so then I'm liable for בל יראה בל ימצא. Okay, so that's a crucial distinction. It's not the fact that I own chametz on Pesach per se, rather the fact that my chametz on Pesach is ta'un bi'ur and if I ignore that and instead I maintain my ownership, that constitutes בל יראה בל ימצא. If the yesod... So then the Mechilta makes perfect sense. Then the Mechilta says it's true that I could circumvent the issur bal yera'eh by being mafkir this chametz. It's true that I could, I could avoid bal yera'eh by being mevatel the chametz, but since if the yesod of issur bal yera'eh is that the chametz is te'un bi'ur, you can't have an איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא unless it's ata yachol leva'ero. If אין אתה יכול לבערו, if אין אתה יכול לבערו, you can't have an איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא. That's the yesod which emerges from this Mechilta. And be-emes that's clearly how Tosfos understood the איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא as well. We asked according to Tosfos why is it nitak la'aseh if the aseh is not samuch to the lav? It's not similar to gezeilah. Le-chora it's similar to nosar. Nosar is only a lav hanitak la'aseh because of the proximity of the aseh to the lav. And that's not the case. But le-chora according to this Mechilta, so then the איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא is what? The איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא is the fact that chametz which was te'un bi'ur on Pesach was not niv'ar min ha-olam, but rather I held onto it. That's what constitutes the איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא. So now if I will be meva'er it, so then that's takeh being okeir the lav. If the issur simply was the existence, the fact that I owned chametz, so then there's no way to be okeir that. You can't be okeir that anymore than you can be okeir nosar. Nosar was that you shouldn't let the basar kodshim see the light of morning. You let it see the light of morning. Once you pass that boundary, you can't be okeir that. Gezeilah you can be okeir by returning it to the ba'alim. Nosar you can't be okeir because once you cross that line and it sees the light of morning, so the lav is finished. All you can do is not let the lav continue. You can prevent perpetuating the lav. You can't be okeir it. If however the lav of bal yera'eh is not like the lav of nosar, it's not simply having chametz on Pesach, but rather that chametz which is te'un bi'ur not being meva'er it. So then when you're meva'er it, so then that's considered an akiras halav. So what do we see from this Mechilta? What do we see from Tosfos? That the איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא is not simply an issur gavra of having chametz on Pesach, but is rather an issur cheftza. That chametz shel yisrael is te'un bi'ur and therefore if I'm not meva'er that chametz, but instead I hold onto it, that's why I'm being over. I'm being over for having chametz which is te'un bi'ur and not being meva'er the chametz. Now if we come back to, if we come back to our kasha which we had back here in daf beis. Rashi says that bedikas chametz is shelo ya'avor alav בבל יראה ובל ימצא and we saw based on the gemara in tes amud alef, tes amud beis what that means is that the bedika has to be a bedika which would mafki'a the איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא. According to Tosfos the bedika doesn't have to do anything for איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא. It just has to ensure shelo yavo le'ochlo. Tosfos says isn't that, isn't our pshat confirmed by the gemara in daf yud? The gemara in daf yud is willing to say that some chametz is not included in the de-rabbanan of bedika. If it's not included in the de-rabbanan of bedika, so that means that your bedika wouldn't suffice for issur bal yera'eh min ha-torah because issur bal yera'eh is an all or nothing. Right? It's an all or nothing. The issur is that I shouldn't own chametz. So Rashi holds as follows. Rashi agrees with this whole mahalach based on the Mechilta. Rashi says that the yesod of issur bal yera'eh is the fact that the cheftza shel chametz is te'un bi'ur. If that's the case, so then Rashi holds that we can distinguish that every issur bal, every piece of chametz is a separate issur bal yera'eh. Meaning, if bal yera'eh is simply an issur gavra, so then Tosfos says correctly and you can't dispute what Tosfos says. If bal yera'eh is an issur gavra, so what sense does it make to have a bedika which gets rid of 85% of the chametz? That bedika hasn't satisfied anything about איסור בל יראה ובל ימצא. You can't say that that... If however, and therefore Tosfos says since the Gemara in daf yud is willing to allow us possibly to leave the kikor b'shmay kora, it must be the bedikas chametz has got nothing to do with בל יראה בל ימצא. It's not the Torah's bedika. According to, if you say however that issur בל יראה בל ימצא is not an issur gavra, but rather the essentially the root of the issur is an issur cheftza, that chametz in Pesach is ta'un biyur. So what does that mean? It means that this bagel is ta'un biyur, it means that that box of Oreo cookies is ta'un biyur and that that donut is ta'un biyur. Then the chiyuv bedikas chametz can be individualized to each cheftza shel chametz. And then Chazal could say that vis-a-vis that chametz שיש בו חשש שמא יבוא לאכלו, so then you are chayav to do a bedika שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה בל ימצא. Once the issur בל יראה בל ימצא is not simply an issur gavra, so then it's not an all or nothing proposition. The bedika doesn't become meaningless if you don't dispose of all chametz. Ein hachinami, I'm leaving the kikor b'shmay kora. What's the chiyuv bedika if I have food in my cupboard on Pesach? The chiyuv bedika is that that chametz is ta'un biyur. I can be meva'er it. Every piece of chametz is ta'un biyur. Min HaTorah you can be meva'er it either through bittul or through bedika u'biyur. Now, Chazal said any piece of chametz where there's a חשש שמא יבוא לאכלו, you have to be meva'er it through bedika u'biyur. Once the issur בל יראה בל ימצא is an issur cheftza, so then already Chazal could distinguish between one piece of chametz on another piece of chametz. If it were an issur gavra, so then what's the definition of the of בל יראה בל ימצא? You shouldn't own any chametz on Pesach. So then it's ridiculous to say that the bedika שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה בל ימצא, but you can keep one piece of, you can keep one piece of chametz. No, so then the bedika didn't accomplish anything shelo ya'avor, because you measure the bedika in terms of the gavra, in terms of the gavra, he still has chametz. But if issur בל יראה בל ימצא is an issur cheftza, again as the Mechilta says, that you only have בל יראה בל ימצא where it's ata yachol l'va'ero, so then you measure the the bedika in terms of the cheftza shel chametz. And therefore you can speak of a chiyuv bedika which is limited to that chametz which poses a חשש שמא יבוא לאכלו. Vis-a-vis that chametz which is ta'un biyur min HaTorah, Chazal said how should you be meva'er it? You should be meva'er not through bittul exclusively, but also through bedika u'biyur. So l'chora that's how we have to say p'shat in the in the Rashi and Tosfos. The machlokes just to to sum up the halacha, the machlokes Rashi and Tosfos in bedika, according to Rashi, Chazal were mechayeiv us in the bedika shel Torah. Therefore sofek l'chumra. Therefore אין ספק מוציא מידי ודאי, the way we would say by d'oraisa. According to Tosfos, Chazal were mechayeiv us in a bedika d'rabbanan. Bal yira'e is satisfied by bittul. Forget about bal yira'e. The bedika is kulo d'rabbanan. Therefore sofek l'kula. Therefore ספק מוציא מידי ודאי when it comes to bedikas chametz. This in turn hinges whether or not this whether or not Rashi's p'shat is plausible in light of the Gemara in דף יוד עמוד ב, in turn hinges on a fundamental machlokes in the d'oraisa of בל יראה בל ימצא. For Tosfos, the d'oraisa of בל יראה בל ימצא is an issur gavra and therefore to speak of a bedikas chametz mid'rabbanan שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה בל ימצא, it would have to be all chametz which is in the possession of this gavra and there couldn't be a hava amina to exclude a kikor b'shmay kora. According to Rashi, the issur בל יראה בל ימצא the d'oraisadika issur is an issur cheftza, that every piece of chametz has a chalos that it's ta'un biyur on Pesach independently as it were. Every piece of chametz bifnei atzmo independently has a chalos that it's ta'un biyur and therefore you can compartmentalize and you can speak of a bedika שלא יעבור עליו בבל יראה בל ימצא vis-a-vis this cheftza shel chametz but not vis-a-vis that cheftza shel chametz. Let's perhaps just take a few moments to reflect on the significance of these halachos al pi Haggadah. In HaTorah, we have two options: there's an option of bedika and biyur, alternatively there's an option of bittul. We can either search and destroy chametz, or we can nullify the chametz. Mi-derabbanan, Chazal insisted that habodek tzarich she-yevattel. That we must use the two in tandem, both the combination of bedika and biyur, searching and destroying, as well as bittul, as well as nullifying. Why is that? There is a very famous Gemara in Berachos with which you're all undoubtedly familiar: רבי אלכסנדרי בתר דמצלי אמר הכי. Ribbono shel olamim,

גלוי וידוע לפניך שרצוננו לעשות רצונך ומי מעכב שאור שבעיסה ושיעבוד מלכויות.

Rabbi Alexandri after praying the Shemoneh Esrei said thus: Master of the world, it is revealed and known before you that our will is to perform your will, and who prevents us? The yeast in the dough and subjugation to foreign regimes.

יהי רצון מלפניך שתצילנו מידם ונשוב לעשות חוקי רצונך בלבב שלם.

May it be your will that you save us from their hand and that we return to perform the statutes of your will with a complete heart. The Gemara identifies two primary obstacles to our avodas Hashem. The first is se'or she-ba-issa, which Rashi explains refers to the yetzer hara she-bi-levavenu, the yetzer hara within us, and the second is shibud malkhuyos. We need to amplify both of these terms and concepts. Moreover, Rabbi Alexandri concludes with a bakasha that נשוב לעשות חוקי רצונך, that we should comply with, we should fulfill the chukkim of your will. The Torah refers consistently to mitzvos Hashem as being comprised of mishpatim and chukkim. Why does Rabbi Alexandri single out chukkim? La'asos chukkei retzonecha. Let's focus initially on shibud malkhuyos. The term shibud malkhuyos should be understood broadly, referring not only to political and physical subjugation, but also cultural and philosophical subjugation to foreign regimes. Zos chukkas HaTorah, Rashi quotes

לפי שהשטן ואומות העולם מונין את ישראל לומר מה המצוה הזאת ומה טעם יש בה.

The nations of the world monin es Yisrael. They're not preventing Yisrael in this instance by some kind of governmental decree which is backed up by a threat of death or imprisonment, but rather the instrument here of the shibud malkhuyos is the philosophical attack on the integrity or rationality of Torah. Similarly, the Gemara in Sanhedrin which states that בשעת גזירת המלכות אפילו מצוה קלה יהרג ואל יעבור, that at a time of governmental decree, even for a minor custom, a person has to surrender his life rather than violate it. According to the Rav, zichrono livracha, the gezeiras ha-malchus refers not only to legislation of a politically and religiously oppressive pagan regime, but also, this is a quote, 'to situations in which a small number of God-fearing and Torah-loyal people is confronted with a hostile attitude on the part of the majority dominated by a false philosophy,' close quotes. This too is an instance of gezeiras ha-malchus according to the Rav. And thus, shibud malkhuyos in Rabbi Alexandri's tefillah should be similarly understood. We're prevented from fulfilling and complying with ratzon Hashem not merely by anti-religious legislation or physical subjugation. But by cultural trends and intellectual climates which are antithetical to Torah. In fact, our experience as American Jews and for that matter the experience of most Jewish communities today doesn't involve any shibud malchuyos in its literal political sense. We don't really experience that kind of shibud malchuyos. Most of us in this room certainly don't remember any such shibud malchuyos. We only know it from history. But we are severely challenged by shibud malchuyos in its cultural and philosophical sense. We're constantly beset by a plethora of isms which seek to prevent us from asiyas chukei ritzonecha. The cultural philosophical element of shibud malchuyos is also a type of se'or sheba'isa or yetzer hara. The yetzer hara is not only internal within us but also external. The external yetzer hara is embodied in false philosophies which are antithetical to Torah. And this is one major obstacle or impediment to our avodas Hashem. There is however a second major obstacle as well: the se'or sheba'isa, the internal yetzer hara. The sign of chametz, the Mishnah tells us in Pesachim, the effect of yeast in the dough is when the dough swells and as a result you begin to see the siduk, the cracking of the dough because it swells. And similarly the internal yetzer hara consists and is identified by ga'avah, haughtiness and hubris which cause us, which cause our egos to swell. The consequences of this internal process of chimutz, the internal se'or sheba'isa, are that we question the Torah, dinei haTorah, chachmei haTorah, minhagei Yisrael when they don't correspond to our moral religious constructs. The result of se'or sheba'isa, of internal chametz, is that we're unwilling to subordinate our moral religious judgments to those of Chazal and chachmei hamesorah. To a degree our motives may be sincere and our intentions noble. We may to a degree sincerely speak of spiritual quest and religious longing. And yet מי מעכב שאור שבעיסה, the internal yetzer hara. It has caused us to swell and made us unwilling to abide by chukei ritzonecha, those mitzvos or even minhagim which appear to defy reason, which appear to contradict our moral religious intuition, which seem to us even to be discriminatory. Bedikah u'bi'ur on the one hand and bittul on the other hand represent two different approaches to hashpasas se'or, to the destruction of chametz. Mi'd'oraisa the combination of bedikah u'bi'ur suffices. A bedikah u'bi'ur does not need min haTorah to be complemented by bittul. Bedikah u'bi'ur focus on the external chametz, the shibud malchuyos as represented by philosophical schools and cultural trends which are antithetical to Torah. Bedikah is conducted l'or haner, כי נר מצוה ותורה אור. The light of Torah illumines and identifies the components of modern culture which are unacceptable to a yirei shamayim. Bedikah culminates in bi'ur. We reject these false isms and comply with the dictates of Torah, pure and unsullied, authentic and unadulterated. Bedikah u'bi'ur facilitate such uncompromising allegiance and ideally, and that's what's reflected in the din d'oraisa, the combination of bedikah u'bi'ur really do suffice. However in our imperfect world, mi... It's not possible, it's simply impossible to scrutinize all cultural philosophical trends and influences all the while taking for granted that we're not affected or infected by an internal chametz. And thus, habodek tzarich she'yevatel, we have to be mevattel chametz as well. Bittul, the Gemara tells us, is b'lev. Mevatlo belibo. Bittul is a process of introspection, not focusing on external philosophies, cultural societal trends, but rather a process of introspection which seeks to ensure our own hispattlus, submission and subordination to Torah, its halachos, its minhagim, its chachmei hamassorah.

הבודק צריך שיבטל מאי טעמא אמר רבא גזירה שמא ימצא גלוסקא יפה ודעתיה עילויה.

Lest he find a nice roll and his daas will be attracted to it. In our imperfect world, where we have already been internally affected by chametz, bedika and biyur are insufficient. Moreover, without an accompanying bittul, bedika and biyur are doomed to failure. שמא ימצא גלוסקא יפה, if we don't subordinate, if we don't consciously reinforce and introspect and ensure that we have subordinated our religious and moral judgments to those of the Torah, שמא ימצא גלוסקא יפה ודעתו עילויה. Our independent non-Torah daas will be attracted to a gluska yafa. In reality chametz, but Rashi says when we see it, our reaction will be chossa leh mivauro. We won't recognize it as such, we won't identify the cultural influence as chametz and instead of being meva'er, we will assimilate it. And thus, Chazal ordained that bedika and biyur must be accompanied by bittul. Mevatlo belibo, we are mevattel ourselves to Torah, its halachos, its minhagim, and then we can successfully undertake bedika and biyur to insulate ourselves from external chametz, to identify and reject it. The complementary processes of bedika and biyur on the one hand and bittul on the other hand provide an apt simile for the Rav's approach to modernity, its challenges and crises, opportunities and responsibilities. The Rav neither summarily rejected nor indiscriminately accepted philosophical schools or cultural trends of modernity. My father, hareini keporas mishkavo, described the Rav's approach as follows: he engaged modernity on his terms, not on its terms, but rather on his terms. The Torah doesn't advocate indiscriminate biyur. Biyur is preceded by bedika l'ohr haner, so that our biyur is limited and discriminate and doesn't destroy matzah together with chametz. The Rav's carefully formulated and finely honed positions on such complex modern issues as religious Zionism, interdenominational relations, and secular studies all reflected careful painstaking bedika. The Rav's firm unequivocal stand on the issues of his and our day, be it his adamant stand during the mechitzah controversy, when in effect the Rav said that maintaining a mechitzah was yehareg v'al ya'avor, or be it his firm unequivocal opposition to women's tefillah groups and tampering with minhagim, these were all instances of a discriminate biyur following a discerning bedika. The Rav succeeded in bedikah and biur because his bedikah and biur were accompanied by a bitul baleiv. He was exceedingly humble, especially when engaging in Talmud Torah. He insisted that Talmud Torah means understanding Torah on its own terms, not in our categories, but rather according to Torah's indigenous categories. He vehemently rejected any disparagement of Chachmei HaMasorah throughout the generations. His bitul baleiv was comprehensive and complete, and thus he successfully engaged in bedikah and biur as well. He could discerningly be bodek and consequently discriminately be meva'er. It is our obligation not just to recall what the Rav did, but to also fulfill the complementary mandates of bedikah and biur on the one hand, and bitul on the other. We must approach the process of bedikah and biur from a posture of bitul. Bitul, total bitul to Torah, to Masorah, Chachmei HaMasorah, mitzvos and minhagim. Concrete illustrations are always more edifying and meaningful than vague generalities. So let's focus on a prime, perhaps primary example of our day, and that is, of course, women's issues. This complex network of questions and issues must be approached sensitively and discerningly. Surely there is need for bedikah. The Torah does not advocate an indiscriminate biur. The Torah doesn't advocate indiscriminate rejection or automatic opposition. But such an honest and authentic Torah approach, bedikah, is only possible and can only succeed if it emerges from a posture of bitul. Our goal must be to identify those aspirations and those initiatives which are consistent with the totality of our Masorah, including minhagim. We can't allow ourselves to be infected by the se'or sheba'isa and adopt the tactic of changing or abandoning minhagim. And certainly we cannot merely begrudgingly comply with halachos while simultaneously disparaging Chazal and Chachmei HaMasorah. It's absolutely unacceptable to state that the bracha of shelo asani isha instituted and coined by Chazal is insulting to women, and that accordingly men in a gesture of empathy and sensitivity should not recite the bracha aloud. Perhaps we can successfully interpret the bracha to our satisfaction, perhaps not. But either way, the mitzvah of bitul chametz, the posture of bitul, demands not only compliance but respect and reverence for Masorah and Chachmei HaMasorah. לפי שהשטן ואומות העולם מונין את ישראל, the same Rashi from Parshat Chukat, similar lashon in the Gemara in Yoma,

לומר מה המצוה הזאת ומה טעם יש בה? לפיכך כתב בה חקה, גזרה היא מלפני אין לך רשות להרהר אחריה.

Note carefully the lashon of Chazal. Not אין לך רשות שלא לקיים מצותיה, but אין לך רשות להרהר אחריה. Not only is deviation from the chok prohibited, but also irreverence and disrespect. אין לך רשות להרהר אחריה. Even if you will comply, but simultaneously be meharher achareha, displaying, betraying irreverence or disparagement, the Torah doesn't allow that. And thus, as we undertake the crucial task of bedika, it must be done from a posture of bittul, rather than attacking, seeking to abandon minhagim in the name of spiritual quest and religious aspirations. Instead, we must formulate those spiritual quests in accordance with minhagei Yisrael. The Rav's various piskei halakha in this area are paradigmatic, both in terms of methodology as well as substance. It is a truism that the Rav was profoundly sensitive and very active in responding to the needs of modern women. His efforts on behalf of and support for women's Torah education are well known. And yet, it should be understood that this didn't reflect rachmana litzlan any kind of capitulation to any form of unisex egalitarianism. On the contrary, and here a historical perspective is very enlightening. The Rav advocated intensive Torah education for women long before the feminist movement emerged within Orthodox or traditional circles. In fact, it would seem to me that the absence of feminism when the Rav first adopted this position and advocated such intensive chinukh, in large measure helped advance the Rav's efforts. At that time, it reduced the chances of his being misunderstood. And presently, unfortunately, the advent of feminism and the attempt to co-opt the Rav's support for intensive chinukh for women as evidence of his support for an egalitarian orthodoxy, not only doesn't it advance those programs, but it serves to imperil those chinukh programs advocated by the Rav. The Rav simultaneously, while advocating and working for intensive chinukh in Torah for women.