13 Ikarim: Rambam Perek Cheilek. Hakdama part 2, Yesod 1

Before we enter into the Ikarim themselves, two more introductory notes. I saw once a couple of pages of notes from Shiurim that the Rav delivered in the 70s on the Yud Gimmel Ikarim, some years ago on the Yud Gimmel Ikarim. And the point that I saw, he made a point of such fundamental importance, it's hard if not impossible to exaggerate just how fundamental this point is. That what the Rambam is conveying in delineating the Yud Gimmel Ikarim is that the Ikarim are a matter of Halakha. It's not a matter of Aggadah or Hashkafa that one has to begin to try to figure out its normativeness, but that what the Rambam in the very undertaking of delineating the Yud Gimmel Ikarim, that what the Rambam is emphasizing is that it's a matter of Halakha. I'll just both illustrate and concretize that. The Rambam writes in Hilkhot Shechitah Perek Dalet Halakha Yud Aleph:

ישראל משומד לעבירה מן העבירות שהיה מומחה הרי זה שוחט לכתחילה.

However, skipping two and a half lines,

ואם היה משומד לעבודת זרה או מחלל שבת בפרהסיא או מין והוא הכופר בתורה ובמשה רבינו כמו שביארנו בהלכות תשובה הרי הוא כגוי שפסולה עבודתו.

So it's a Halakhic category. A person who's a heretic, an infidel, whatever English term will operate though, a person who's not a Ma'amin, it's a Halakhic category in this context, in the fact whether or not he's eligible to shecht. In Perek Yud Aleph of Hilkhot Gezeilah Va'aveidah:

אפילו היה בעל העבירה רשע ואוכל נבילות לתיאבון וכיוצא בו מצוה להשיב אבדתו אבל אוכל נבילות להכעיס הרי הוא מין והמינים שבישראל והאפיקורסים ועובדי עבודה זרה ומחלל שבת בפרהסיא אסור להחזיר להן אבידה כגוי.

Again, there's a Halakha which hinges on the definition of what's considered Minut, what's considered Apikorsus. And one more example, in הלכות רוצח ושמירת נפש, obviously this Halakha is not operative Bzman HaZeh, as the Chazon Ish and others explain, but obviously it still illustrates what we're talking about, that it's not operative Bzman HaZeh. So in פרק ד הלכה י of Hilkhot Rotze'ach, talking about the Din of Moridin Velo Ma'alin, so the Rambam writes:

המינים והם עובדי עבודה זרה מישראל או העושה עבירה להכעיס אפילו אכל נבילה או לבש שעטנז להכעיס הרי זה מין והאפיקורסין והן שכופרין בתורה ובנבואה.

So to begin with, our ikar is the Rambam's halachic definition and delineation of halachic category. That's very, very fundamental. The other introductory note: when we, im yirtzeh Hashem, when we get to the yesod hasheneim-asar about Moshiach, so we'll review this. But Reb Velvel was very, very adamant that the yesod hasheneim-asar entails not just having a belief and a conviction that the Melech HaMoshiach will come, but that the Melech HaMoshiach can come today. Potentially, it might be today. It doesn't mean a person believes that it definitely is going to be today. Obviously, that's not what the emuna is. But the emuna is that, as Reb Velvel punctuated, the Ani Ma'amin's in the siddur is אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא. Not just אחכה לו בכל יום, that at some point sheyavo, no, אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא. That every day it could be that today Moshiach is going to come. So that's what the emuna is. So Reb Velvel was asked how that can be true given the fact that the Gemara in Perek Cheilek has different simanim for what the tekufa is going to be when the Melech HaMoshiach comes. So what if a person looks around and sees that none of those simanim are true? Or what if it's one of the days when Eliyahu HaNavi is not going to come? And all the same different permutations of that kind. So Reb Velvel answered. Reb Velvel didn't make jokes. A kafan, it wasn't intended to be a joke. So Reb Velvel answered, when Moshiach comes, we'll ask him the kasha. So given that that wasn't a joke, so what did he mean? So kimedumeh that what he was conveying is there are different standards by which we operate in studying the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim than all other chelkei haTorah. In all other chelkei haTorah, I think the Rav quotes in Ish HaHalacha from Reb Chaim that part of the way Torah is, you only understand Torah by asking kashas, by finding stiros, and that leads a person to the deeper and true understanding. And how do you know that's the case? Reb Chaim says because that's the

שני כתובים המכחישים זה את זה עד שיבוא הכתוב השלישי ויכריע ביניהם.

That a person is supposed to recognize the שני כתובים המכחישים זה את זה. A person is supposed to have a kasha. Not supposed to artificially force the kasha, but if the kasha is really there, you're supposed to recognize it, and you're supposed to ask it, and you're supposed to bring it to the surface. That's what the שני כתובים המכחישים זה את זה is. And it's only if a person recognizes the שני כתובים המכחישים זה את זה, only then will he understand, appreciate, and come to the correct understanding based on a kasuv hashelishi. When it comes to Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, a person is not supposed to be mechadesh. A person can't be mechadesh. A person is just supposed to be. Again with tremendous, tremendous koved rosh, be mekabel those emunas which have been transmitted to us. And says Rav Avigdor, okay, so you have a kashe, so you have a kashe. You can't go ahead based on that and start saying shtiklech Torah in speculative shtiklech Torah in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Uv'maiseh in any Bava Kama, in any limud, there's supposed to be a sense of koved rosh, a sense of achrayus and before a person says, this is what I think the Gemara means, this is what I think the Rambam means in any page in the kisvei haRambam, any daf in Shas, there has to be a koved rosh. When you say a p'shat in a Rambam, you say a p'shat in the Gemara, so a person is presuming to say what it says in Toras Hashem. You're not giving a deiah on who's gonna win in the November elections. Okay, you want to say a vitz, you want to say a boich-sevareh who's gonna win in the November elections, so whatever, you have nothing better to do, you'll have an itch to say something, but emes is that there always needs to be a, there always supposed to be a koved rosh. There always supposed to be a koved rosh. In a Rambam, Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, it can't just be an idea. There always has to be, it has to be with a sense of koved rosh. Ella mai, with that koved rosh, so of course a person can and should suggest that kimedumeh, kimedumeh that this is the p'shat. Kimedumeh that this is the p'shat. And you can and again at times should and must as part of learning and as part of being מכוון לאמיתה של תורה, and if the person has the requisite yedios and the requisite koach hachiddush, he should, not only he can, but he should. Because a person says it all along with the caveat that l'aniyus da'ati this is the p'shat. And that moda'ah or again with the koved rosh, with the amala, that moda'ah of l'aniyus da'ati this is the p'shat, so then again, that not only allows for, but depending upon the person, depending upon the who, what, not only allows for, but a person is supposed to, a person is supposed to. Hakadosh Baruch Hu chadi b'pilpula d'oraissa. But at the same time a person has to say kimedumeh. So then maybe this is the p'shat from the kashe about how to reconcile and based on that so maybe what the emunah is is this. No. With the appropriate koved rosh, with the appropriate amala, with the appropriate everything else in place, you can say like that in Bava Kama, you can say like that in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Today, there's no koved rosh about talking about divrei Torah in general. Everyone has an opinion on divrei Torah the way they have an opinion on politics. Okay, so everyone wants to have an opinion on politics. You're allowed to have an opinion on politics. Everyone's allowed to vote. They can have their opinion on politics. But that mindset carries over. Everyone has an opinion on divrei Torah. Everyone has an opinion on divrei Torah. So when there's that kind of kalus rosh about divrei Torah in general, so people don't step on the brakes when they talk about Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, and so of course people have kalus rosh when they talk about that also. And it's literally playing with fire, literally, literally playing with fire. So that's why I think it's important to understand what the basis of... But the kasha doesn't produce an impossibility, because whenever there's a kasha, the kasha is... maybe have asked last Thursday night, we were talking about how the Rambam writes in the hakdama to the Mishne Torah. So the way the welt paraphrased what the Rambam says in the hakdama to the Mishne Torah is that there's no chiddushim in the Mishne Torah. The Mishne Torah is just a review and reinforce what everyone knows. But lamaiseh, when you read what it says in the hakdama, the Rambam says something very different. And the Rambam says, addressing each of us directly, he says כי לא תמצא ברוב דברי אלא דברים שהם מפורשים. It doesn't say אין ברוב דברי אלא דברים מפורשים. Instead, it says כי לא תמצא ברוב דברי. He says, you, with your shlach kof, he says to me, you, with your shlach kof, you're not going to find chiddushim here. Aval aval, there's חידושים עד אין סוף here. He says, you, with your shlach kof, and then he says hakorei lefi sichlo. He says it once you pick up on it, once one is sensitized to it. So what do you mean an impossibility? An impossibility... if I don't know a teretz, it doesn't mean there's an impossibility. And to draw a conclusion, so then I have to be able to say there is no teretz and therefore that can't be the... People who can't... who don't know the rudiments of Torah, whether it's because they didn't have the correct upbringing, whether it's because they never chose to apply themselves, so they first pontificate and then pass judgment on the Torah's opinion and attitude towards this and the Torah's opinion and attitude towards that. Such a kal vachomer, such a kal vachomer. They have no place in any... any daf in Shas, any pasuk in Chumash, any seifer in Orach Chaim, עד כאן ועד כאן, when that spills over to... l'havdil l'havdil she-omrim... In the physical world, so there's such a thing as parachuting into a certain place. A plane flies overhead, and the person jumps out and pulls the cord and then parachutes into a certain place. There's no such thing in... not only in learning, in Torah, l'havdil l'havdil l'havdil, it's true in any l'havdil l'havdil discipline. There's no such thing as parachuting in. There's no such thing as I'm not merely intellectual. I happen to be interested in a certain topic, so I'll master what the Rabbis said in the Talmud about that topic because I'll learn that one page in Shas. I don't really have any feel for the yad as a whole, but I'm interested in philosophy, so I'll parachute into one page in Mishne Torah where the Rambam is dealing more with philosophical. The Derekh HaLimud, the context, the perspective requires that a person can't parachute in and then think that he's understanding that one page. A person can't parachute in from one daf in Shas or one page in the Rambam that really, no, really my background, my primary focus is elsewhere. But based on that, based on that, I want to investigate what the Rambam says about my area of interest, my area, kaviachol, of expertise and then being totally uninformed and unoriented on the Rambam Sefer HaMitzvos and or the Rambam Mishneh Torah, so I'll learn those things and I'll make the diyukim and I'll draw conclusions. To understand one daf in Shas, a person has to have a feel for what Limud HaGemara is in general. To understand one halakha in the Rambam, a person has to have a feel for how the Rambam writes in general. A person has to have that broader perspective. A person has to have broader yedi'ot to know what's a diyuk, what isn't a diyuk, what's significant, what isn't significant. Okay, maybe we'll begin. The emes is that the first point that we were talking about, the Rav's point, that for the Rambam the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is a question of halakha. So emes, the Rambam right here in Perek Helek, you don't need to go to the Yad, the Rambam right here in Perek Helek makes that point very emphatically. The Rambam says after completing the list of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim,

וכאשר ידע אותו האדם כל אלה היסודות ואמונתו נכונה בהם הרי הוא נכנס בכלל ישראל וחייבים לאהבו ולחוס עליו וכל מה שצונו השם על האהבה והאחוה זה עם זה.

On the other hand, if rachmana litzlan

נתרופף לאדם יסוד מאלו היסודות הרי יצא מן הכלל וכפר בעיקר וחייבים לשנואו ולאבדו

etcetera. So it's quite clear that here too the Rambam is again very, very emphatic on this point, that the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim are a halakhic definition of emuna. It's something which is subject to normative halakhic definition. Okay, HaYesod HaRishon, Metzi'ut HaBoreh Yishtabach. The existence of the creator, may he be praised. The HaYesod HaSheni, the Rambam says Achduso Yisaleh. May he be elevated in people's minds, in people's understandings. So what is Rambam doing with he just said HaYesod HaRishon, Metzi'ut HaBoreh, HaYesod HaSheni, Achduso, so what's the Yishtabach? So one pshat is So what's the Yishtabach? So one pshat is, it's from, I don't know what, when people hear Shem Hashem or a bracha, they respond ברוך הוא וברוך שמו. You mention Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so if a person doesn't do it with clinical detachment. Metzius haBorei Yishtabach, ברוך אתה ה' ברוך הוא וברוך שמו. One of my more recent visits to Eretz Yisrael, I was taking a Mi Ke-amcha Yisrael, Mi Ke-amcha Yisrael, so I was taking a cab somewhere. So I got into the cab and asked the driver, how are you? Yishtabach Shemo. Mi Ke-amcha Yisrael. Those are from Jews who don't lay tefillin. So that's one pshat, but itachen that there's more than only also. The Rambam very famously writes in Perek Beis of Hilchos Yesodei haTorah, Halacha Beis,

היכן היא הדרך לאהבתו ויראתו? בשעה שיתבונן האדם במעשיו ובברואיו הנפלאים הגדולים ויראה מהם חכמתו שאין לה ערך ולא קץ, מיד הוא אוהב ומשבח ומפאר ומתאוה תאוה גדולה לידע השם הגדול.

Itachen that the omek of of the formulation, a little bit of the formulation, עמוק עמוק מי ימצאנו, but a little bit of of the omek of the formulation Metzius haBorei Yishtabach that the Rambam is saying is that that halevai on the deepest level a person should have an emunah, should have a hakara in Metzius haShem, which leads him to be meshabeiach, which leads him again the other side of the coin of being meshabeiach is is that ahava el habriyos is the desire that others should be meshabeiach as well. So it's not only that the Rambam says Yishtabach again,

כי שם ה' אקרא הבו גודל לאלהינו ברוך הוא וברוך שמו,

that there shouldn't be this clinical detachment. But itachen Rambam is also being meramez that halevai that we should be tofes the Yesod haRishon on a sufficiently deep level, and I don't think the Rambam would tell us that this is me'akev in being in compliance with י"ג עיקרי התורה, I don't mean to imply that, chas veshalom. But the Rambam is being meramez that halevai that we should be tofes the Yesod haRishon on such a level that that's that's our reaction to to Hakadosh Baruch Hu again the other side of the coin of being meshabeiach umefaer is ahava el habriyos and that to want that others should be meshabeiach as well. והוא שיש שם מצוי ושלמות ביותר שבכל פני המציאות. So again here we're obviously reading in translation. The Rambam in the beginning of the Yad also: יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון. So the Kesef Mishneh over there explains that it's really an Arabic idiom that the Rambam imports and here he's writing in Arabic, so he's not importing it, but in the Yad that the Rambam has has imported that again sham. So we generally translate the word sham in Lashon haKodesh in spatial terms, but obviously that isn't what it means here. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't have a doesn't have an address. Rather we have it in English, so we have the idiom, right? There is. So it doesn't necessarily mean that we're talking about in a certain, right? There's reason to do such and such. So the there isn't connoting anything spatial. It's not there's no spatial connotation. So the Kesef Mishneh explains that that's what it means in writing in Arabic and that's what the Rambam then generated that idiom in Leshon Hakodesh as well because in Mishneh Torah you have it elsewhere in the Yad also in פרק ג' הלכות תשובה when the Rambam is listing the Ikkarim there, so the Rambam says האומר שאין שם אלוה אלא אחד or האומר שיש שם אלוה אבל הם שנים and again the sham is not, no spatial connotation obviously. And then the Rambam has it again in Hilchos Ta'anis in פרק ה' הלכות תענית the Kesef Mishneh gives examples that the Rambam says

שיש שם ימים שכל ישראל מתענים בהם מפני הצרות שארעו בהם

he means there are days. Again, obviously no, no spatial connotation there. Does that originate in Lashon HaKodesh originally? So what what does sham add to the sentence? Yeah, that's a good question. I'm not sure what the answer is. Maybe maybe the answer is Ein hachi nami and the reason that the Rambam sort of finds this a better equivalent is again in in Lashon HaKodesh let's let's say when we say yesh, right, when when we're trying to explain to someone what it literally means we'll say it is, you know what I mean, like there is, but the verb is not there, right? The verb is just understood. The verb isn't there in Lashon HaKodesh. So maybe to sort of compensate for that, for what's missing, so maybe that's why the Rambam thinks the fuller idiom of yesh sham is better. שיש שם מצוי שלם ביותר שבכל הנאצלה המציאות. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a perfect being, perfect existence והוא עלת מציאות הנמצאים כולם because of the existence of everything else, all other things that exist Uvo kiyum metziusam and through Him their existence is sustained U'mimeno hasmadas kiyumam and from Him again their existence is not only sustained in the present but is perpetuated. The way he writes it in the Yad,

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא.

So what the Rambam is again emphasizing in both places in in the Yad, so the Rav used to underscore the fact that the Rambam writes in the present tense: והוא ממציא כל נמצא. That the Rambam doesn't, right, when we talk about, we would have written in the past tense. We would have said Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, Hakadosh Baruch Hu brought everything into existence, we would have said it in the past tense. The Rambam says it in the present tense: והוא ממציא כל נמצא that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives in... He gives existence to everything that exists. So the difference between today and between Sheshes Yimei Bereishis is that Sheshes Yimei Bereishis so new forms of life and existence were brought into being. But it's not that at the conclusion of Sheshes Yimei Bereishis then things continue to exist by virtue of inertia. No. What it means that Vayishbos Mikol Melachto is Hakadosh Baruch Hu said I'm no longer bringing in bringing into existence into the world new forms of existence. But it remains true that everything only continues to exist because Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtziah kol nimtzah. Only Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists and everything else feeds and continues to feed both בו קיומם וממנו השמדת קיומם. Everything feeds and continues to feed off of His existence. And we're studying these ideas in in the Rambam. The Rambam is obviously the classic text for defining Emunah. Nothing idiosyncratic, it's just the Rambam's ideas as opposed to any other Rambam so this is the Jewish view, the Jewish understanding. So for instance in Nefesh Hachayim, Rav Chaim Volozhin and obviously Nefesh Hachayim of Rav Chaim Volozhin is drawing on the whole tradition of Kabbalah down to and including the Gra. So he also explains that's what it means what we say in davening every day that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is constantly renewing everything. Kol yom obviously doesn't mean at 6:00 that the headlights and the lights in the streetlights go on and every day at 6:00 it means every moment every instant. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is המחדש בכל יום טובו מעשה בראשית. That there is, there can't be existence outside of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, independent of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is infinite existence. There's no existence beside Him, beyond Him, without Him. Everything even though again as substances we're distinct. We're not Hashem. That's pantheism, that's not true. But the existence is an existence which is drawn from Hashem. The mashal obviously by definition will be inadequate is if you think of the identity of any electric appliance and define its identity in terms of its functioning, its being able to function. So clearly the refrigerator, the fan, the air conditioner, the electric stove is something distinct from the generator, but it has no existence which is distinct from the generator. Right? It's something distinct. Here's the stove, here's the refrigerator, and over there is the generator. Something distinct. But again if you define for purposes of the mashal if you define its existence in terms of its functioning it has no existence so Hagam that its existence is parasitic, that it feeds off of, it exists because of through the nimshal within the generator, but it is something different and distinct. That's what it means obviously again, that's what the phrase in the Torah means Ein Od Milvado. That's what it means. ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו. If we could imagine rachmana litzlan Hashem not existing then there would be nothing nothing else could exist because again nothing ever ever exists independently of Hashem. Rambam again says it the same way in the Yad:

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת הימצאו.

So that corresponds to the

הוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם ובו קיום מציאותם וממנו התמדת קיומם.

Then in Halacha Bet, the Rambam continues

ואם יעלה על הדעת שהוא אינו מצוי אין דבר אחר יכול להימצא,

which corresponds to what he wrote here in the Peirush Hamishnayot אילו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו. So the question is it's the same statement so the question is the same in both places: what does the Rambam mean by that? He said it. He said that everything exists from Hashem, because of Hashem, through Hashem. What does he have to say: Think, why not? Why not? Lichora you would have thought that in light of the way the Rambam defines the lav of לא תסורו אחרי לבבכם that that extra sentence is kol hamosif goreia, right? The Rambam tells us in Perek Hey of Hilchot Avodah Zarah that the issur לא תסורו אחרי לבבכם means that a person is supposed to be intellectually disciplined. He's not supposed to gratuitously sort of wander and conjure up hava aminas and sevaras. If a person has a sincere question, so aderaba he should find the appropriate address and ask the question. Rambam's not talking about how to stifle a sincere question but baderech klal a person shouldn't need to answer just stam, stam comparative religions, stam comparative philosophy. Rambam says no, לא תסורו אחרי לבבכם is

כל מחשבה שגורמת לו לאדם לעקור עיקר מעיקרי התורה הוזהרנו שלא להעלותה על ליבנו ולא נסיח דעתנו לכך ונחשוב ונמשך אחר הרהור הלב.

So given that lav, why not skip Halacha Bet? Why not skip this sentence of אילו יכולנו לשער? I mean he's made the point already and he's made the point pretty emphatically that

הוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם ובו קיום מציאותם וממנו התמדת קיומם.

So ella mai, lichora the pshat is as follows. Again at the end of the yod gimmel ikkarim and it's kedai to obviously the Rambam wrote it in Mishneh Torah. If you don't have access, then it's kedai to xerox it and have it in front of you for Thursday. At the conclusion so the Rambam writes

וכאשר יהיו ביד האדם כל אלו היסודות ואמונתו נכונה בהם. הרי הוא נכנס בכלל ישראל וכולי.

If on the other hand rachmana litzlan

אם נתרופף לאדם יסוד מאלו היסודות הרי יצא מן הכלל וכפר בעיקר

etcetera. So the Rambam says that what a person is supposed to achieve is a level of understanding, yedi'ah, belief, that gives him the strongest conviction possible, the most absolute belief possible in the ikkar. Emunato nechona. if that's somewhat what the original says in in what really, but Nachon kisocha me-oz. Nachon means kiyuv ve-kiyum. Means means something which is well-founded, something which is which is grounded, something which is which is rooted, not something which is sort of shaky, right? That's what the Seforno says. Hen ve-lav of משפט בני גד ובני ראובן. Ve-yiten lecha riffyum. ויפח בו ולא יעזבך. Actually ve-yiten lecha riffyum. There won't be any any weakness, that that the level of emunoh that a person is supposed to cultivate is one which is as absolute as possible. That's emunoh nechonoh bohem. That's that's why the antithesis I I don't know why he he chose the formulation that he did in Hilchos Teshuvah, but the antithesis of it is im nispofek lo-adam. Not not davka that that he that he's makchish, not davka that he's an atheist, he's an agnostic. אם נסתפק לאדם יסוד מאלה היסודות. So in light of that yitachen again as a as a zecher le-davar, right, in mishpat tanai, mishpat tanai requires kefel hatnai. We have to say it both bi-leshon hen as well as bi-leshon lav.

אם תתנו לי מאתים זוז הרי את מקודשת לי ואם לא תתנו לי מאתים זוז אינך מקודשת לי.

Okay, so it's a gezeiras hakasuv from בני גד ובני ראובן. But what's the gezeiras hakasuv? The gezeiras hakasuv is to just repeat yourself and and we don't understand why the Torah insists on saying it once bi-leshon hen and once bi-leshon lav. So it's poshut, it's poshut that what you see from mishpat tanai is that there's a chizuk that a person is further reinforcing and further underscoring and and making the statement more absolute by saying it both bi-leshon hen and bi-leshon lav. It's svarah that that's what the peshat in the gezeiras hakasuv of mishpat tanai is poshut and that's what the Rambam says over here. That's what the Rambam says over here, so this is something a person's emunah is supposed to be as as reinforced as possible, as absolute as possible, the conviction as to do that a person has to say hen ve-lav both bi-leshon hen as well as as well as bi-leshon lav.