13 Ikarim, Rambam P’ Cheilek: Ikar 1 & 2

So the Yesod HaRishon Metziut HaEloah HaRishon.

והוא שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא הממציא כל הנמצאים והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם ובכח מציאותם וממנו התחדש קיומם. ואלו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו הייתה בטלה מציאות כל נמצא ולא יישאר מחמת עצמו במציאותו. ואלו יכולנו לשער סילוק הנמצאים כולם זולתו הייתה מציאותו יתעלה ולא תיגרע כי הוא יתעלה קיים מצד עצמו ואינו זקוק במציאותו בזולתו. כל מה שזולתו מן השכלים כל המלאכים וגם הגלגלים ומה שלמטה מהם הכל נמצא ממציאותו אליו. וזה הYesod

HaRishon הוא שהורה עליו בדיבור Anochi Hashem. So all of existence is from Hashem, because of Hashem, through Hashem. כי עילת מציאות הנמצאים ובכוח מציאותם. Even though that's the case, so why at the end does the Rambam then specify כל מה שזולתו מן השכלים כל המלאכים וגם הגלגלים? Why specify those any more than אדם בהמה חיה ועוף וכולהו? But what you see reflected elsewhere, the Rambam tells us that sort of our prosaic intuition is 180 degrees off. Our common sense intuition is that what's visible, what's tangible is real, and what's invisible, what's intangible, so that's kind of iffy whether it really exists. And the Rambam says the emes is the exact opposite. The emes is that real metzius, real existence, is not physical. Real existence is that which is muvdal min hachomer. And that's why the Rambam is saying the way to emphasize the hava amina that you have to dismiss that there is no metzius which can be sustained, which exists independently of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, you don't have to say that we're not independent of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, that the physical world, that's opgeredt, that's not real metzius. כל מה שזולתו מן השכלים. But when you're talking about, again, what's sichli, what's ruchani, so there, okay, that's a hava amina that I need to, that I'll emphasize. There's something else here which is mamash a peleh at first glance. You have to listen very carefully here rabosai, no, can't skip any sentences or any words, you have to listen carefully here, please. There's something which is mamash the pumya deta peleh atzum in the loshon haRambam here. Let's read:

ואלו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו הייתה בטלה מציאות כל נמצא ולא יישאר מחמת עצמו במציאותו.

So what does the loshon v'ilu yacholnu l'sha'er mean? We can't, right? v'ilu yacholnu l'sha'er is a contrapositive condition, right? If we could, we can't, right? You can't imagine Hakadosh Baruch Hu not existing. Okay, but for reasons we discussed last week, so to make sure that we understand this yesod in as strong and absolute and definitive terms as possible, so you try to do this thought experiment. But how in the world does the Rambam use that same lashon for אילו יכולנו לשער סילוק הנמצאים כולם זולתו? U'mah she'kalo atzo, u'mah she'kalo atzo. So ela mai, if you go ahead to the yesod harvi'i for a moment.

היסוד הרביעי הקדמות והוא שזה האחד באומר הוא הקדמון בהחלט וכל נמצא זולתו בלתי קדמון ביחסו אליו. וההויות על זה בספרים הן רבות והיסוד הרביעי הזה הוא שהורה עליו באומר מעונה אלוקי קדם.

So Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the foundation of all existence, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu always is, he's kadmon, and kadmon again not only that he always is, but he's the foundation of all, right? Kodem means before. So he's the foundation of everything else. Now so the Rambam says again this is I think they point out this is something the Rambam added later to the Peirush Hamishnayis, but it's obvious that he added it later you can tell that he added it later because he references the Moreh. The Moreh was the last thing he wrote. Peirush Hamishnayis was the first thing of the major works that we study that he wrote. So it's clear that the Rambam added this later.

ודעת הרמבם כי היסוד הגדול שתפס משה רבינו הוא שהעולם הוא מחודש. יצרו השם ובראו אחר ההעדר המוחלט.

Says the major principle fundamental foundational everything is that the world was created. The world does not has not existed has not existed eternally. Now says the Rambam

וזה שאתה רואה אותי מקיף את עניין קדמותו לפי דעת הפילוסופים.

Aristotle thought the world was kadmon, that the world has always been here. Rambam says the reason you'll see me sort of circling that issue and not just adopting the Torah's position is

הוא כדי להחליט את המופת על מציאותו יתעלה כמו שביארתי והארכתי במורה.

So what that means is as follows. The Rambam was of the opinion, whether he would think differently based on today's science is a very fair question, but based on the state of affairs logically and scientifically in his day the Rambam was of the opinion that you can't prove logically that the world was created. That logically there's no way of knowing whether or not the world was created or whether or not the world has always been here. He says we know that the world was created because of our tradition. Because of our tradition the miracles in Mitzrayim, because of our tradition that that's what the Torah tells us. That's how we know, but it's not something that Saadia Gaon thought that he could prove that the world was created and that gufo gave you the proof for metzi'us Hashem. And the Rambam was of the opinion that you can't prove either way. Says the logical arguments you can't honestly can't prove that can't prove Aristotle's wrong believe obviously, but he didn't think you could prove the other either. That it wasn't nittan logically, which means that if you want to logically prove metzi'us Hashem, so you shouldn't be assuming that the world is mechudash because otherwise you have a weak link in your chain of reasoning. You with me so far? Okay, yes. So that's what the Rambam says here. Da he says

וזה שאתה רואה אותי מקיף את עניין קדמותו לפי דעת הפילוסופים.

Like why is it that I I sort of humor that position of the philosophers Aristotle you may but given the fact that that's again the kfirah she-be-kfirah according to the Torah so why am I humoring it? Why am I accommodating it? No, it's כדי להחליט את המופת על מציאותו יתעלה because I think as I explain in the Yad that the mitzvah is not only to believe but the mitzvah is to know to the best of one's ability to know metzius Hashem. To know metzius Hashem you can't build that knowledge on the assumption that the world is mechudash because that's not a logically provable... logic as in formal logic, a branch of philosophy, not as in it's logical to wear a coat if it's cold outside, not logical in that sense of the word. It is a good idea though. So so that's what this means here at the end of the yesod ha-revii. So clear, but why did the Rambam need to add that here in Peirush HaMishnayos? Where do you see him in Peirush HaMishnayos? Okay, so maybe that's something he should tell us in the Moreh. Maybe he should tell here, there, but why is he telling us here in Peirush HaMishnayos? Peirush HaMishnayos he ad-draba he said metzius ha-borei yisborach. The yesod ha-rishon he talked about ha-borei. He couldn't have been less accommodating l'chora than that. So so what does he mean זה שאתה רואה אותי? Where did we see the Rambam doing this that he needs to explain why he's doing it? Answer is no, he did it right here in the yesod ha-rishon. When the Rambam said in the same lashon שאלו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו, he said in the same lashon אלו יכולנו לשער סילוק כל הנמצאים כולם. So that was humoring, that was accommodating the view of the philosophers that the world has always existed. According to if Aristotle were to write this... second... he would takeh have to... he would talk that way, right? Because olam kadmon means that the world has always existed so it would also be an ilu yacholnu le-sha-er. ilu yacholnu le-sha-er would be the same contrapositive would be the same thought experiment as אלו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו. And that's what the Rambam did. The Rambam was being makdim. So the Rambam says so you're confused by that right? So let me explain to you why I do that because I don't want in order for your belief in HaKadosh Baruch Hu to be a belief that's capable of the strongest yediya that's possible, your belief in HaKadosh Baruch Hu shouldn't be based on belief in olam being mechudash because again at his point in history the Rambam again contrary to some the Rambam didn't think you could prove that. What if the Rambam wrote this davka to avoid confusion that might have come from reading the Torah? Otherwise why would he have written this just in the original edition? Maybe probably. I don't know. I can guess, but it's a guess. Basically the yesod ha-revii is where agam that we said and not retracting that at all... agam that we said that all yud gimmel ikkarim are about HaKadosh Baruch Hu, so it's not that there are three topics and they're all about HaKadosh Baruch Hu, but that notwithstanding clearly the first four are a subunit in terms of not describing HaKadosh Baruch Hu's relation to the world, not describing how we should relate exclusively to HaKadosh Baruch Hu, but the first four are about HaKadosh Baruch Hu most direct one. So it could be that it's at the end of that that he's making that comment. But right we could have seen him writing this in the yesod ha-rishon also but it's not out of place at the end of the yesod ha-revii either. And the Rambam says it, he seems to think that what he said in the Moreh is clear, כמו שביארתי והרחבתי במאמר. It seems to be that what's unclear maybe is elsewhere. But if anything, it seems like maybe he's writing it up because he obviously not only anticipated but desired that the audience for Perush ha-Mishnayos be a broader audience than the audience for the Moreh. Again, with the preface of I don't know, but you can see it going either way, right? I mean, what he said in the Yesod ha-Rishon, okay, once we point it out, so it seems kind of glaring, but it's also a little bit subtle. One could miss it also. One would venture to guess that they'd have missed it, would have passed, you know, throughout the years also on occasion. So I don't know, so maybe you could go either way on well, anyone who's going to notice it is going to figure out why he did it and the others aren't going to notice it, but maybe not. Maybe there is going to be an intermediate group. So I don't know, maybe this פנים לכאן ופנים לכאן whether to say it. So he mentions Hashem as kadmon. Does that mean the Rambam was saying that Hashem and the world are kind of separate independent kadmon or how would it work as a holistic picture to say that the world always was but Hashem is kadmon? I mean again, for the moment it doesn't make it doesn't make a difference. Again, it makes a difference in the sense that it doesn't make a difference in le-ma'aseh. The Rambam writes in Iggeres Techiyas ha-Meisim. He says, most of, especially once you have Rav Chaim's fundamental insight that the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim are not necessarily foundations of other things but fundamental indispensable elements of emunah without which a person rachmana litzlan is deficient in emunah. So most of these are intuitive. You understand why the Rambam said it. A couple of them are not intuitive. For instance, Techiyas ha-Meisim. Okay, it's true and be-vadai we believe it, but is it real? Let's say a person was never introduced to that. It's not that he's denying it, it's not that you told him and he denies it. He was just never introduced to it, he never heard of it. So vas felt im in not knowing that there's going to be a Techiyas ha-Meisim? So the Rambam writes in Iggeres Techiyas ha-Meisim, so here we don't need to speculate. The Rambam himself says peshat in why he put this in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. He says because Techiyas ha-Meisim is the ultimate miracle. He says the physical process of decay is irreversible. Techiyas ha-Meisim, that the body, the body after death decomposes, that that should ever be reversed and there should be Techiyas ha-Meisim, he says is the ultimate miracle. And he says the only reason that there are people who deny Techiyas ha-Meisim is because really, really they don't believe in miracles. He says they may not come out and explicitly tell you that, but that's the reason that they don't believe in Techiyas ha-Meisim. He says the reason I enumerated Techiyas ha-Meisim in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, the Rambam says, is because basically the yesod of Techiyas ha-Meisim is the yesod of miracles. So le-ma'aseh, le-ma'aseh, I mean practically in terms of being in compliance and having proper one doesn't need to know what kadmon would mean within Aristotle's system. You don't need to know it. It can be explained but you don't really need to know this system. I mean he is really the Rashba he does explain it here in Yesod Revi'i but I don't know how crucial it is for us. Be'emet this is the answer of the Rashba why the Rambam held off to the Yesod Revi'i with this comment is because and it's much more than what I said before. Be'emet this comment of ze she'ata ro'eh relates not only to what he wrote in Yesod Rishon but relates to what he wrote in Yesod Revi'i also. That's why he held off for the comment. That's why he added it there and not in Yesod Rishon. Let's proceed maybe when we get to Yesod Revi'i maybe we'll talk about this second lecture. יסוד השני אחדותו יתעלה. והיינו שזה שהוא עילת הכל meaning that Hakadosh Baruch Hu to whom we were introduced in Yesod Rishon, echad. ולא כאחד שבמיני ולא כאחד של סוג. You can say that the cat family is one family of feline creatures. You can point to a particular cat and say this is one instance of a particular cat of the cat family. ולא כפרט אחד המורכב שמתחלק לאחדים הרבה. We think of ourselves as one. But then again if you process obviously what we recognize that we're made up of cells and atoms vechulu vechulu that we're murkav from many many many smaller constituent parts.

ולא אחד כגוף הפשוט האחד במנין שמקבל הפרדה והחלוקה עד אין סוף.

And even if the something we just think of as a plain block which wasn't murkav chalakim and even if you would conceive of it that way but you would recognize that it is divisible and logically it's infinitely divisible.

אלא הוא יתעלה אחד באחדות שאין כמוה אחדות בשום פנים.

So when we say Hakadosh Baruch Hu is one we don't mean one in any of these senses. We don't mean one like one family in the animal kingdom, one particular animal of this of this type, a one which is made up of parts, a one which is divisible. No. A totally different than all that.

זה היסוד השני הוא שאמר ואמר שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד.

mamash mamash nifla. And in yesod rishon the Rambam in bi-metzius ha-boreh yitbarakh mentions Ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu says yitbarakh. And yesod ha-sheni he mentions Ha-Kadosh Barukh Hu says yis-alleh. So we'd say it's good not to repeat yourself. Variety is the spice of your writing. Yeah, but some could have, could have interchanged it also. So we need to understand, so משל מה הדבר דומה. Let's say you have someone who has a very, very good ear for music and a wonderful voice. So every time that person sings a niggun it's going to be beautiful. So it's not a kasha. How could it be mamash every time he sings the niggun it's beautiful? The answer, that's his metzius. Since his metzius is that he has a great ear for music and a wonderful voice, so mi-meila every time he sings the niggun it's beautiful and it's not a kasha how could it be. It's not a kasha how could it be that mamash in every word, in every line in the Rambam the daikus is so... no, that's his metzius. That's his metzius. And if you think, if you think for a moment, if you think for a moment that Helfgot is singing off-key, be-vaddai there's something wrong with your hearing, you gotta check your hearing. No, because that's his metzius. He doesn't sing off-key. That's his metzius. If you think that the Rambam is stam talking, that it's not duvka that there isn't עומק עומק מי ימצאנו, so then something is off. So what does the word yis-alleh mean? Elevated? Elevated? No, maybe, maybe elevated. Exactly. And maybe, maybe he elevated him. Halakha Zayin, Perek Aleph, Perek Aleph Halakha Zayin.

אלוה זה אחד הוא אינו לא שניים ולא יתר על שניים אלא אחד שאין כיחודו אחד מן האחדים הנמצאים בעולם. לא אחד כמין שהוא כולל אחדים הרבה ולא אחד כגוף שהוא נחלק למחלקות ולקצוות אלא ייחוד שאין ייחוד אחר כמותו בעולם.

So let's say I ask you to go to the store, go to the makkoleh and please buy me one loaf of bread. And then as you're walking down, I start yelling after: Not two! Not three! Not four! One loaf of bread! One loaf of bread! And this isn't like the, what we talked about last week. Here it's not an if-then. In if-then, so the hein va-lav you can say a mechazzek. This is mechazzek. אלוה זה אחד הוא. Obviously, if he's echad, he's not shenayim. He's not shenayim. So what does the Rambam have here?

אלוה זה אחד הוא אינו לא שניים ולא יתר על שניים.

Okay, fine. אלא אחד שאין כיחודו אחד מן האחדים הנמצאים בעולם. So again, it's just a little... I think the point is a little easier to see here, but it's the exact same thing in the Parshas Shenayim and maybe it's because of the barrier of translation.

אלא אחד שאין כיחודו אחד מן האחדים הנמצאים בעולם לא אחד כמין שהוא כולל אחדים הרבה ולא אחד כגוף שהוא נחלק למחלקות ולקצוות אלא ייחוד שאין ייחוד אחר כמותו בעולם.

Now let's go back to that makolet mashal. Let's say I send you to the makolet and I say, please buy me one and then I say, not container of orange juice, not container of milk, not loaf of bread. So all that's fine and good, but what does the end of the sentence have to be? Yes, one banana or yes, one, one of the singular rugelach. One could say one, okay. There has to be some, there has to be some. So the Rambam says lo echad this, lo echad this, lo echad this, lo echad this. Where's the punch line? Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the paradox of all, all human knowledge is this. That on the one hand, He can be known and different people to varying degrees do know absolutely that there's a Ribono Shel Olam. There's a Ribono Shel Olam without whom the world couldn't and therefore wouldn't exist. There's a Ribono Shel Olam who's responsible for all the miracles. And that yediya is absolute and deep and meaningful. But at the end of the day, not just the human mind, the sechel of malachim also, no sechel can define Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So we know, we know there's a Ribono Shel Olam. And we know, again, that without Him, that there wouldn't, there couldn't be a world, that there wouldn't be a world. We know that there's a metaphorical hand guiding a supernatural course of Jewish history. Look kezeh, it defies everything. Most people, not necessarily princes in Saudi Arabia, but most people think there's right and wrong in the world, and most people have a chush for right and wrong in the world. How is there right and wrong in the world? There's only right and wrong in the world if there's a moral arbiter, if there's a Ribono Shel Olam. So there's a Ribono Shel Olam, and and that's, we know it, and we know it in a meaningful way. But if you can't define who or what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, you can define what a person is. A person is a guf and a neshama vechulu vechulu. You can define what a cat is. You can't define what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is. You can just say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu, we know there's a Ribono Shel Olam and again, we know it in a very real and meaningful way. And we know that He's wholly, W-H-O-L-L-Y, unique and singular. And really what the yesod hasheini is, Rav Shachter recently quoted this from the Rav, and Rav Pinkus has this in his, in his shmuessen on the yud gimmel ikkarim as well. That really the yesod hasheini is not, it's not a correct paraphrase to say the yesod hasheini is that there's one Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The yesod hasheini is Hakadosh Baruch Hu is just entirely unique. Entirely unique. He's not a person who lives forever. He's not a person who knows everything. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is entirely, entirely unique. And that's what the Rambam is saying. The reason Rambam says echad and then אינו לא שנים ולא יתר על שנים is the Rambam says that I'm not defining Hakadosh Baruch Hu for you. Again there is one stender in this room. There's one such folding chair in this room. It comes as Rambam says no I'm not that's not how I'm telling you Echad. I'm not telling you Echad in that sense. I'm just telling you that we should understand as part of this uniqueness that what we're told is and what we can also logically understand is that there's no multiplicity. There's no you hear that? Now Nifla Lo says the Rambam Achduso Yis'aleh Yis'aleh Mehakadosh Baruch Hu in our minds and our understanding be elevated from all the categories that we seek to impose upon things because that's what the Yesod Hasheini really is. Yesod Hasheini is not just one Yesod Hasheini is Hakadosh Baruch Hu is holy entirely different unique wholly other Achduso Yis'aleh may we elevate again from the from all the human categories and all the anthropomorphic categories and everything else that people are inclined to impose upon him Achduso Yis'aleh. Only after the Rambam introduces Achduso he couldn't have switched it. He wouldn't have said Mesi'uso Yis'aleh and Achduso Yis'aleh. Now it's when he's telling you Achduso Achduso הוא יתעלה אחד באחדות שאין כמותה אחדות בשום פנים. His existence we don't understand his existence as obvious and overwhelming and compelling as it is that he exists but we don't understand the existence. We can't define Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence Achduso Yis'aleh Vekach Ma'amrosahu it was so and you read the Rambam and if once in your life you understand one Rambam properly if once in your life you understand one Reb Chaim properly so how anyone can have anything other than complete complete Hachna'ah before the Mesorah is unthinkable. To have anything other than complete Hachna'ah before the Mesorah and Chachme Hamesorah means that a person has never in his life come close to being Makir who the who the Chachme Hamesorah are. And this is everything the Rambam said was like this. Everything he said everything he thought was with this Amkus which is Yored Ad Hatehom and a precision in the words. And again it's like the person who has a beautiful voice and an excellent ear so everything he sings is beautiful. Everything that's the Mesi'us everything he sings is going to be beautiful. Hem Hem Hadevarim again there was no other way of saying who or what you're attaching the Echad to. It's not as we know Hakadosh Baruch Hu through his actions. Again first and foremost his action of sustaining the world of giving existence to the world. That's how we know Hakadosh Baruch Hu. We know him through his actions because Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself is Ilu Yedatihu Hevativ. So that's how you have to again the whole point is you can't there's nothing else to attach the Echad to so that's where them say Ilus Ha'ilos that we know with such a... I'm right at the end of Perek Daled where he said the Torah:

בזמן שאדם מתבונן בדברים האלו ומכיר כל הברואים ממלאך וגלגל ואדם וכיוצא בהן ויראה חכמתו של הקדוש ברוך הוא בכל היצורים וכל הברואים מוסיף אהבה למקום תצמא נפשו ויכמה בשרו לאהוב המקום ברוך הוא ויירא ויפחד משפלותו ודלותו וקלותו כשיעריך עצמו לאחד מהגופות הקדושים הגדולים.

The Kochavim, the heavenly bodies, וכל שכן לאחד מהצורות הטהורות הנפרדות מהגלמים המלאכים who are not physical at all, וימצא עצמו שהוא ככלי מלא בושה וכלימה ריק וחסר. So the Rambam to recognize Shiflut ha'adam look at the Malachim, look at the Kochavim. We just have to learn the Rambam. We have to study the Rambam and just put aside the Ga'avah just long enough. ויירא ויפחד משפלותו ודלותו וקלותו כשיעריך עצמו לאחד מה. We have to change this. This doesn't make sense. ויירא ויפחד משפלותו ודלותו וקלותו. That's why it's an unfailing Klal, unfailing Klal that wherever you encounter Ga'avah you encounter Katnut hamochin because any person who really has Gadlut hamochin is an Aniv ushefal ruach. So if you're Mesupak about a person, okay, it could be that what you're seeing is not Ga'avah, it could be that what you're seeing is what the Itzla describes his father when in Inyanei shamayim how his father would Az kanamer and Gibor ka'ari and Ratz katzvi in Inyanei shamayim. A person has to know what he's seeing, but if you know what you're seeing is Ga'avah, then one sees Katnut hamochin. Okay so let's move to the next segment of this shiur. We are going to be discussing the concept of hashovas aveida as it appears in Perek Elu Metziot in Masechet Bava Metzia. The mishna says over there אלו מציאות שלו ואלו חייב להכריז. Which items are yours and which must you announce? The Gemara then explores the halacha of yeush shelo madaat. Is it considered yeush or not? אביי אמר לא הוי ייאוש ורבא אמר הוי ייאוש. This is a fundamental machlokes in the sugya and it's something that we have to understand in terms of lomdus. What exactly is the p'shat according to Abaye and Rava? We see that the halacha follows Rava. הלכתא כוותיה דרבא ביע"ל קג"ם. And therefore yeush shelo madaat is indeed yeush. This has many nafka minas in modern times as well. For example, if you find something in a reshus harabbim, does the owner have yeush immediately? We have to look at the simanim on the object. If there are simanim, then the owner does not have yeush because he expects it to be returned. But if there are no simanim, like scattered coins, מצא פירות מפוזרים מעות מפוזרים, then it belongs to the finder. This is the essence of hashovas aveida. Let's look deeper into the Tosafot on this daf, דף כ"א עמוד א'. The Rishonim deal with many questions here and we will continue this in the next shiur. Yashar koach to everyone.