13 Ikarei Emunah #4

So as I started, the metzius of the world is she-yesh sham matzui. You can see, this is the sham that the Kesef Mishneh points out in the beginning of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, it's an Arabic idiom that the Rambam then introduced into Loshon Hakodesh as well. Sham doesn't have a spatial connotation. In the same way when let's say we can say over there and then there's an English when you use there in that context there's a spatial association with the word there. Right, over there implies in a certain in a certain place. But you can say there is, right, there is such a thing as, there's no spatial connotation in that second usage. So when the Rambam writes יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון so that's what the Kesef Mishneh points out, it's an Arabic usage and that's again, this the Rambam wrote in Arabic so that's what it means also she-yesh sham, it doesn't mean there's no spatial, no spatial connotation. There is

שיש שם מצוי בשלימות היותר שבכל פני המציאות והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם ובו קיום מציאותם וממנו התמדת קיומם.

So we tried a little superficially to understand that the Rambam is telling us that it's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu when He created the world infused existence into the beriah and the beriah can then continue by inertia because of that infusion of existence. No. Ein od milvado. Existence is Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The difference between what happened in Sheshes Yemei Bereishis and what happens now is that in Sheshes Yemei Bereishis so Hakadosh Baruch Hu created new forms of life. He created the laws of nature. And now Hakadosh Baruch Hu recreates, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mechadesh the same beriah. During Sheshes Yemei Bereishis there was chiddush in the sense that what the beriah is was being nis-chadesh, what the laws of physics are were being created and now there's chiddush in the sense that it's being renewed. Right? So then it was as it were innovated, but every moment it's renewed in the sense that it's not that any one or anything has its own existence, has its own kiyum. Everything, everything feeds parasitically off the existence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Exists through Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Lechora that's what that's the underpinning of what otherwise is a either way is a really staggering formulation. The Rambam writes in Hilchos De'os when he talks about the two exceptions of midas ha-beinonis. So the Rambam writes that of the two exceptions govah lev, ga'avah is the first, and then he quotes ועוד אמרו שכל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר. It's a Gemara in Sotah. The way the Rambam quotes it here, שכל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר. To again just highlight the chiddush of how the Rambam al kol panim here quotes it. You have many many ma'amarim which suggest equivalences, but when you have an equivalence Chazal say it, for instance, the Rambam quotes in the second half of this halacha that כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. It doesn't say כל הכועס עובד עבודה זרה, there's a ke-ilu. There's a chaf hadimyon. There's a certain equivalence. Equivalence. On a certain level there's an equivalence, but it's not mamash. Kaas is not mamash; it's not mamash avoda zara, but on a certain level there's a certain equivalence. When it comes to gaiva, so the Rambam doesn't have that caveat, he doesn't have that modifier. The Rambam says כל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר. You're not k'ilu, no chaf hadimyon. Mamash. כל המגביה לבו כפר בעיקר. So what's the pshat? The pshat is as follows. I think we've mentioned this on occasion, had occasion to mention it. So Rav Shach zichrono l'vracha used to say that the correct definition of anav and gaiva is not that a baal gaiva is someone who knows three blatt Gemara and thinks he's a baki in Shas v'chol hatorah kulo. He used to say he's not a baal gaiva, he's a meshugeneh. He's out of touch with reality. It has nothing to do with gaiva. He's out of touch with reality. And it's not the pshat that an anav who does know kol hatorah kulo says, no, I only learned, I only learned three blatt. That's denying, that's not owning up to the truth. So what's the difference? The difference is that a baal gaiva has the attitude of kochi v'otzem yadi. Why is he so proud and why is he so arrogant and why is he so boastful? It's kochi v'otzem yadi. He credits himself as though he were autonomous for what he has. And an anav realizes that his existence is not his own, his abilities are not his own, all the opportunities he had are not his own, the chiyuv to be ameil v'yageiah notwithstanding, but that doesn't translate into proprietorship, it doesn't translate into thinking that that that it belongs to him. So the definition of a baal gaiva is kochi v'otzem yadi. So l'maiseh, l'maiseh, that's takeh kfira, because the yesod hayesodos is that ein od milvado. The yesod hayesodos is there's no such thing as kochi v'otzem yadi. The yesod hayesodos is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is baal hakochos kulam. Everything, everything, from his very existence, ואל אחת כמה וכמה for whatever abilities a person is blessed with, for whatever opportunities he's blessed with. Nothing is a person's own. Again, the chiyuv and the imperative and the indispensability of yegia, amal, hasmada, all that without understating that for a second, it's mamash, it's mamash kafar b'ikar. It's not only a k'ilu kafar b'ikar. What's the line between a bit of lack of shiflus and magbia libo? Obviously there's a whole spectrum, right? At one end of the spectrum is מאוד מאוד הוי שפל רוח. And at the end, the other end of the spectrum, rachmana litzlan, is magbia libo. So clearly the rest of humanity who don't match Moshe Rabbeinu's anava, so it doesn't mean, doesn't mean rachmana litzlan, that we're all be-geder magbia magbia libenu. One thing, rachmana litzlan, is clearly be-geder magbia libo, when a if rachmana litzlan a person challenges something in the Torah. He says דברים אשר ישתקעו ולא יאמרו, whether it's about the akeida, whether it's about a mitzvah such as mechiyas Amalek. That ke'ilu that person's moral sense is trumped what you have in the Torah. That's not just a lack of the shiflus haruach. A person can become greater than malachim. But the source and the secret to human greatness begins with vanachnu mah. The more a person realizes the objective reality of his bittul to Hakadosh Baruch Hu and lives that way, so the greater a person can become. That's the source and the springwell for human greatness. ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו, says the Rambam,

היתה בטלה מציאות כל נמצא ולא ישאר מחמת עצמו במציאותו.

Again, the Rambam has this same, as it were, thought experiment that he tells us to try to in the beginning of the Yad as well, and the reason the Rambam does it is because it's necessary to understand fully what it means ein od milvado. Without the Ribbono Shel Olam nothing else, again, the mashal we gave, perhaps if it's helpful, is if you compare our existence to the functioning of appliances, so there has to be that, if you would imagine for a moment that the charge disappears from the battery, if you imagine for a moment that the generator in the power plant isn't there, doesn't work, so then there is no functioning of the appliances. ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק הנמצאים כולם זולתו, if you would imagine the contrary, לא היתה בטלה מציאותו יתעלה ולא תיגרע, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence would be unaffected.

כי הוא יתעלה קיים מצד עצמו ואינו זקוק ואינו נזקק במציאותו לזולתו. וכל מה שזולתו מן השכלים,

intelligences, intellects,

וכל המלאכים וגרמי הגלגלים ומה שלמטה מהם הכל נצרך במציאותו אליו. וזהו היסוד הראשון שהורה עליו בדיבור אנוכי ה,

because the name יהוה, the Shem Havayah is derived from the shoresh that means existence. So that's what Anochi Hashem Elokecha means, that I am Hashem. So again, tartei mashma, that I am, the I exist, but I am the exclusive I am existence. That means Hakadosh Baruch Hu is chai mitzad atzmo, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu is exclusively existence, which means that everything else is again dependent on Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. We mentioned already that the Rambam points out in one of the Igros that in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim he only delineates the emuna that's required. He doesn't go into all aspects of a mitzvah, dahinu, some not all of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim are also mitzvos in the Minyan Taryag. It's an amazing thing, and lemaise most of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim you don't find in the Minyan Taryag. If you go through the Rambam's Minyan Hamitzvos and you walk through. look to identify the yud gimmel ikarim, you're not going to find them all. You're not going to find a mitzvah to believe in yemos hamashiach or the melech hamashiach. You're not going to find a mitzvah to believe in techiyas hameisim. You're not going to find a mitzvah to believe in schar ve'onesh. So how is that possible? If a person, rachmana litzlan, is mefakpek in it, so אין לו חלק באלקי ישראל and he loses his chelek in olam haba. And there's nothing more basic, nothing more fundamental, but it's not in minyan hamitzvos. So the teretz is it's a very, very important yesod. We have an erroneous conception. We think that taryag mitzvos represent the everything that a person has to do as a Jew. And lemaaseh, according to all the monei hamitzvos, in different ways, that's not true. According to all the monei hamitzvos, there are certain formal rules or certain delineations of which chiyuvim were included in the minyan hamitzvos, but no one, no one ever contemplates that what you find in the taryag is all-encompassing. Before we come to the Rambam, to give a different example, there is a very famous passage of the Chafetz Chaim and others many, many quote from Rav Chaim Vital in the Sha'arei Kedusha. Rav Chaim Vital says, how is it—he has a different understanding of the mitzvos hatorah than the Rambam—how is it he says that you don't find any mitzvos in the Torah dealing with midos? We just mentioned the maamar chazal that כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה. So why isn't there a lo sa'aseh in the Torah that it's assur to get angry? It should have been one of the shasa lavin. There should have been a lav in the Torah not to intentionally incite one's taivos, not to be a baal taiva. All these things should have been distinct lavin in minyan hamitzvos and they're not. And conversely, there should have been distinct aseh in the minyan aseh. So says the Sha'arei Kedusha, and again this is an illustration of what for Rav Chaim Vital is sort of the delineation of what's included in taryag mitzvos. So he talks about that there are two different nefashos, there's a nefesh hasichlis, a nefesh habehemis. But leaving aside sort of that Kabbalah framework, basically he says that משל למה הדבר דומה if you open a catalog for medical school, so there's no—you don't take basic biology and you don't take basic physics and you don't take basic organic chemistry. So what's pshat that all of that is irrelevant to going to medical school? So the pshat is just the opposite, right? That it's so basic and that it's so fundamental that you're not even—you don't even have a chance of being admitted to medical school unless you demonstrate proficiency in all those areas. So the Sha'arei Kedusha, Rav Chaim Vital says the same thing about midos. He says the midos are prerequisites for Torah. The reason they're not in the Torah is because they're so basic that they're axiomatic, that they're the foundations of the taryag mitzvos. The taryag mitzvos are assuming a certain baseline of midos. So that's an illustration, again, of how the minyan taryag is not understood—again, and no one understands it as such—as the all-encompassing list of obligations that a person has. Now, the Rambam has a different type of circumscription of what's included in minyan taryag. The only mitzvos of belief that the Rambam counts formally as mitzva are those beliefs which can be logically demonstrated. So then those beliefs you can't logically demonstrate that there's going to be a yemos hamashiach and a melech hamashiach. We know it because the Torah tells us Tanakh tells us we know it but it's not something that can be logically demonstrated. You can't logically demonstrate that there has to be a techiyas hameisim. We know it we know it we have such a tradition we have the pesukim in Daniel says the Rambam the Gemara in Sanhedrin suggests all kinds of remazim for it. We know it but you can't logically logically in terms of formal logic in terms of syllogisms not that type of logic not something which is demonstratable. You can't you can't logically you can't logically demonstrate it. The Rambam's rule of what's formally called a mitzva not of what can be an obligation upon a person of what formally is called a mitzva only includes those beliefs which can be logically demonstrated. So hence the first four of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim which the Rambam says can be logically demonstrated so those you find in Minyan Hamitzvos. They basically include between Anochi and השם אלוקינו השם אחד those two encompass the first four of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. But the other beliefs again which are so fundamental and so categorically imperative Torah min hashamayim s'char va'onesh etcetera which can't be formally logically proven so those again given the formal parameters of what is included in the Minyan Taryag and what not so those you takeh don't find in the Minyan Taryag. It's a very very big yesod it's not that if you can't find it in Minyan Hamitzvos so weiss doist that it's a middas chasidus it's not important vechulu vechulu. It's not that way at all. So al kol panim. Even those of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim which are mitzvos so the Rambam mentions in the Iggeres that not everything which is not all elements which are included in the mitzva are necessary to comply with a Yud Gimmel Ikkar. So for instance he says that the mitzva is leida but in terms of complying with the Yud Gimmel Ikkar it's enough that a person believes even if he doesn't have the leida. The mitzva is leida. So what exactly is the definition of the mitzva let's say of Anochi Hashem Elokecha? What's the definition of the mitzva? So in Sefer Hamitzvos the Rambam famously again his translator Sefer Hamitzvos the Rambam didn't write in Loshon Hakodesh. So the Rambam's translator is saying that

המצוה הראשונה היא הציווי שציוונו להאמין האלוהות והוא שנאמין שיש שם עילה וסיבה והוא פועל לכל הנמצאות.

So the question is what does lehaamin mean here as employed by Ibn Tibbon? So mitzva shniyah so Ibn Tibbon uses it again

המצוה השנייה היא הציווי שציוונו באמונת היחוד והוא שנאמין כי פועל המציאות וסיבתו הראשונה אחד

again and we'll give the third example just one just to be aware of those who are yodei davar point out that Ibn Tibbon translated with remarkable consistency. Dehainu he always translated the same Judeo-Arabic word with the same Hebrew word. So when you have the same word in Ibn Tibbon's translation it means that the Rambam in the original used the same word also. Which is a tremendous a tremendous virtue of a translation not all translations have that virtue but by Ibn Tibbon you have it. Ve-hamitzva ha-revi'is now listen to this rabosai היא שציוונו להאמין יראתו יתעלה ולהיפחד ממנו. So the mitzva revi'is is Yiras Hashem but Ibn Tibbon says lehaamin yiraso. It literally means it doesn't have words, which means a word is a unit that makes sense, so האט קיין ווערט ניט means it doesn't... what? You can't believe... you can't believe... so what does it mean? So the pshat is what Ibn Tibbon... I don't know if there's really one, there is, and that's why he adapted leha'amin to serve this certainly isn't in Medieval... I don't know if there's in modern Hebrew either, one verb that expresses this idea, but it's quite clear. So leha'amin is the verb for the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha. It's the verb for the mitzvah of שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד. And it's the verb for the mitzvah of yiras shamayim. So what does it mean? So the pshat is that the common denominator for the three again, we would say you can believe in Anochi Hashem Elokecha, you can know Anochi Hashem Elokecha. The same thing for שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד and yiras shamayim. But what's the verb that's the common denominator of the three? So it seems clear that the pshat is that this is what the original Arabic their Arabic word means. It means to have an awareness. It means a knowledge which is an awareness. Dehainu, we know lots of things but it's not an awareness. Right? If it's we know that two plus two is four but lav davka that that's an awareness that we have. Whatever. If you go to the store, your mother sends you to the store, tells you buy four oranges and you already bought two oranges, so then you pull that up from your memory bank. I already bought two, I need another two to have four oranges. But it's not necessarily an awareness that you walk around with 24/7 that two plus two is four. The mitzvah, again, what leha'amin means in Ibn Tibbon's lashon hakodesh is to have an awareness. It means not only to believe Anochi Hashem Elokecha, not only to intellectually know that Anochi Hashem Elokecha, but to have such an awareness that the person has that awareness. That taka plugs in in all three contexts. A person is supposed to have an awareness of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, a person is supposed to have an awareness of שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד and yiras shamayim to have an awareness of. That's what the Rambam taka says by yiras shamayim, right?

המצוה השמינית היא שצונו להאמין יראתו יתעלה ולהיפחד ממנו ושנהיה כפופים ופוחדין בכל עת על יראת ה'.

It means to have an awareness. If you take a look, he's not nachos to these leshonos and the common denominator of the three mitzvos. But the Rov has it toward the beginning of Meveser Yerushalayim. He says that that's what the pshat he has that later he has me'ein zeh in one of the Tshuva Drashas as well. Another tshuva. He says that's what the Rambam's yedia means also in the Yad Hachazaka when he talks about ידיעה שיש מצוי ראשון. It doesn't just mean sort of this cold intellectual yedia with all of its associations for possible detachment. It means an awareness. In the Tshuva Drashas he again. Rhetorically develops it very very beautifully. There's a story of the Baal Shem Tov. One of the contemporary Gedolim was very skeptical about the stories they tell about the Baal Shem Tov. And he arranged to meet him. And he says to the Baal Shem Tov, "They say about you that you can read people's minds. Tell me what I'm thinking about right now." He says, "No. Pasuk in Tehillim? Pasuk in Tehillim? Pasuk in Tehillim?" He says, "No. Pasuk in Tehillim?" He says, "No."

יסוד השני אחדותו יתברכא. והיינו שזה שהוא עילת הכל הקדוש ברוך הוא שבו התחלנו ביסוד הראשון

again who's the cause, the source, the שוב הוא עילת המקור היסוד של כל הקיום. Echad.

לא כאחד של מין ולא כאחד של סוג ולא כפרט אחד המורכב שמתחלק לאחדים רבים ולא אחד כגוף הפשוט האחד במניין שמקבל הפרדה וחלוקה עד אין סוף אלא הוא יתעלה.

It doesn't mean, it doesn't mean so we're all echad but our body is made up of parts. Even where you've even got part made up of parts, you could have something which is not made up of parts but is divisible. You can have an echad that this is a unique type of fruit, but there are other types of fruits. The echad of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a unique echad. You can't compare it to any other usage of echad.

אלא הוא יתעלה אחד ואחדות שאין כמוהו אחדות בשום פנים. וזה היסוד השני שהורה לו באמרו שמע ישראל השם אלוקינו השם אחד.

And then the Pachad Yitzchak has in his shmuzen on the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, he underscores a very very very very fundamental point. Ultimately what the Yesod Hasheini is when the Rambam says that again we translate it as unity of Hashem. I think that's the way we usually translate it. Really what the Yesod Hasheini is a more complete expression of the Yesod Hasheini is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's absolute uniqueness. Part of which is again that there's no that when we talk about Echad, it's an Echad again שאין כמוה אחדות בשום פנים. But that fact that it's an Achdus שאין כמוה אחדות בשום פנים means that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, his existence is, again, it means Pashuto Kemashma'o, not Rachmana Litzlan, to associate any multiplicity, any duality Rachmana Litzlan with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. But what it means is also that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is entirely unique. All the categories that we have from looking at things that exist in the Bria, you can't transpose those onto Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And that's all part of

ולא כאחד של מין ולא כאחד של סוג ולא כפרט האחד המורכב שיחלק לאחדים הרבה,

the absolute singularity and uniqueness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. One aspect of which is that the Achdus is an Achdus שאין כמוה אחדות בשום פנים. So you find the Lashon Echad Yachid Umeyuchad. Yachid also Yachid Umeyuchad again captures that or tries to capture that idea again of when you say that someone is, ich veis, say that someone is single, that's one thing. You say singularity, right, there's a different, there's an added sense to the word. So Echad Yachid Umeyuchad, it doesn't just mean single, one God, it means Echad Yachid Umeyuchad, singularity, uniqueness. All right, so we'll leave it at the Yesod Hasheini.