Learning and Living Emunah

We're done with Maariv after both Shiurim and it's a very pleasant to welcome you all here, especially recognize Rabbi Erlebach, Rabbi Weinberger, Rabbi Tuchman, and Rabbi Gershonbaum and the joinings of the people preparing for the Yom Hakadosh this evening of Yom Kippur. We're very grateful to Torahweb for bringing to our community our Rosh Yeshiva, and first presentation by Rabbi Meir Twersky known to all of us the famous Shalsheles HaMesorah known for both his clarity and the accuracy with which he develops. His deep and personal concern for Talmidim and for the Yeshiva runs very, very deep and with that combination that endears him to so many of the Talmidim of the Yeshiva both when they are Talmidim and for many years after. It's a great Kavod for us to host Rabbi Twersky and we're very grateful for his time in helping us prepare for Yom Kippur. Shavuah Tov. Shavuah Tov, Shavuah Tov, Shavuah Tov, Shavuah Tov, Be'ezrat Hashem, we'll try Be'ezrat Hashem to have a little bit of an overview of Emunah far Ma'amin, the role of Emunah in the life of a Ma'amin. That there are two aspects, two dimensions to Mitzvas Emunah. First of all is the element of Yedi'ah, of knowledge and understanding, Veyadata Hayom, the Torah says

כי ה' הוא האלהים בשמים ממעל ועל הארץ מתחת אין עוד.

The Rambam when he codifies the obligations of Emunah speaks of ידיעת דבר זה מצות עשה when he talks both about the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha as well as the mitzvah שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד which encapsulate the first four of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. So the first aspect or dimension of Emunah is its intellectual content. But there is a second dimension and an existential dimension: to live a life of Emunah, to experience life through the prism of Emunah. That's על ראשון ראשון ועל אחרון אחרון. So let's begin to discuss a little bit briefly the intellectual content of Emunah. On this level, Emunah is not simply a Mitzvah or a discrete Chiyuv. It's not even adequate to describe it as a central or even indispensable Mitzvah, but the Emunah is simply the basis of everything, everything we do in life. A Jew davens daily, a Jew keeps Shabbos, a Jew observes Taharas Hamishpacha, he keeps Kosher, is careful to avoid speaking Loshon Hara. What all Mitzvos have in common is that all Mitzvos are a gesture, a recognition, an expression of קבלת עול מלכות שמים, Kabbalas Ol Mitzvos. Why do we keep Shabbos? Why do we keep Kosher? Why do we observe Taharas Hamishpacha? Why do we avoid talking Loshon Hara? Ve-khulu Ve-khulu. the same for each and every mitzvah because Hakadosh Baruch Hu said so. Every mitzvah, the axiom, the basis, the foundation for every mitzvah is that it's an expression of קבלת עול מלכות שמים, Kabbalas Ol Mitzvos. But but whose malchus is one recognizing and acknowledging through Shmiras Shabbos v'chulu? Whose whose mitzvos, whose ol mitzvos is one accepting through the meticulous observance of mitzvos through dikduk b'mitzvos? It's the intellectual content of emuna that answers this question. If a person keeps Shabbos because of some distorted image Rachmana Litzlan of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, some theological caricature Rachmana Litzlan of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, then it renders the Shmiras Shabbos and everything religiously meaningless and insignificant. Those who those who share my affinity for Charlie Brown, if a person keeps Shabbos because he thinks the Great Pumpkin said that a person should keep Shabbos, so he can be nizar b'kal v'chamura in terms of lamed tes melachos and in terms of muktza and can wait till Rabbeinu Tam's zman motzei Shabbos, but it's it's not Shabbos. Shabbos is כי ששת ימים עשה השם את השמים ואת הארץ. It's the intellectual content as as as traditionally formulated for us by the Rambam in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, which provides the underlying basis and foundation for everything, literally everything, everything we do, every moment of our lives. And the truth is that this is equally true, this holds equally true for Bnei Noach. When when the Rambam speaks of what's expected of a Ben Noach, how a Ben Noach qualifies to be classified as a Ger Toshav, so he has to be mekabel sheva mitzvos, he has to accept the seven basic Noachide mitzvos, and he has to be nizar la'asosem and then has to be very scrupulous about implementing that kabbala. And then the Rambam says,

והוא שיעשה אותן מפני שצוה בהם הקדוש ברוך הוא בתורה והודיענו על ידי משה רבינו.

So for the Ben Noach also, the Noachide code also is rooted in and is an expression of his recognition of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's the intellectual content of emuna which is the basis for everything, everything we do. Klal Yisrael has for the past 800 so years accepted the Rambam's systematic presentation and exposition of emuna in the form of his Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. What did the Rambam set out to do in in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim? So to get a grasp on that, let's just very quickly, and unfortunately everything we're doing is too quick, too brief, too superficial, let's review questions that were asked from two opposite ends on the Rambam's identification of Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Rav Yosef Albo, the talmid of the Rashba, the author of the Sefer Ikkarim, so he asks on the Rambam that the Rambam should have should have organized things better, and he could have simplified the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim into three ikkarim. He could have had one ikkar about Hakadosh Baruch Hu, one ikkar about Torah, and one ikkar about schar v'onesh. And then Rav Yosef Albo says, as a matter of fact, if you'll look in the ראש השנה שמונה עשרה, so you'll see that the brachos of Malchiyos, Zichronos, and Shofros correspond to these three ikkarim that I, Rav Yosef Albo, just identified for you. Malchiyos about the Ribbono Shel Olam, Zichronos, schar v'onesh. and Shofros about about Torah. אתה נגלית בענן כבודך. So why did the Rambam then within that first ikkar, okay, so there are details, but but why did the Rambam sort of make the details into independent ikkarim, into independent fundamental principles? Again, he should have done a better job of organizing and simplifying. Others criticize the Rambam from the opposite end of the spectrum. How can you within Torah draw lines and say that some things are ikkar in Torah and some things are not ikkar in Torah? Everything, every word in Torah is mi'pi hagevurah. So how the how does one, how does one discriminate between and how does one delineate, "No, this in Torah is an ikkar and and this isn't"? So there is a very, very, very important answer from Rav Chaim on on both of these both of these questions in one fell swoop. Let's say let's say a person doesn't know how many sons Noach had or what their names were. So what's what's he lacking? So he's lacking yediyah baTorah. He's deficient as a yediyah in Torah. It's a pasuk in Chumash, more than one pasuk in Chumash. And if a person doesn't know it, so that does represent that something's missing, there is a deficiency, it's a deficiency in that person's yedias haTorah. What happens if you ask a person whether Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a baal goof or not? Is Hakadosh Baruch Hu corporeal or is Hakadosh Baruch Hu incorporeal? And he says he doesn't know. So similarly the only thing missing is that he's he's lacking a yediyah in Torah, he's deficient in his knowledge of Torah. Says Rav Chaim, no. What the Rambam identified in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is those things where if a person rachmana litzlan doesn't know them, he's not just deficient in his yedias haTorah, but he's deficient in emunah. And if a person doesn't know Shem, Cham, and Yafes, he's not deficient in emunah. He's deficient in in yedias haTorah, okay? That's nothing to be complacent about either, but but that is the correct description. Mashehein kein, if a person doesn't know whether Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a baal goof or not a baal goof, so then the deficiency is not a deficiency only which is limited to yedias haTorah, it's a deficiency in emunah. And that's the difference between these things in the Torah and everything else. That's why not everything in that sense is an ikkar. If a person rachmana litzlan denies the pasuk, so then he's a kofer baTorah. But if he's just ignorant of the pasuk of אלה תולדות נח שם חם ויפת, so then he's just lacking in yedias haTorah. Mashehein kein, a person is is ignorant rachmana litzlan of כי לא ראיתם כל תמונה, that a person is ignorant of the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is incorporeal, so then what he's lacking is not only in yedias haTorah but he's lacking in emunah. And that's why, that's the answer to the Sefer HaIkkarim's question as well. That's why the Rambam couldn't simplify it into three categories. Because the whole point of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is to spell out explicitly and to articulate which elements are indispensable to have baseline emunah. If if the Rambam would have said simply that there's one ikkar metzius Hashem and then it would have been relegated to a detail that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eino baal goof, so then we wouldn't have known that that understanding is indispensable for baseline minimal emunah. It's also lichora important to understand, often perhaps inspired by the Sefer HaIkkarim, maybe maybe independently, we sort of break down the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim into three groups and and we say that one group is about Hakadosh Baruch Hu, one group is about Torah, and one group is about s'char v'onesh. Albeit again that the Rambam formulated them as thirteen, not as three. And while on one level that's true, but there are many indications that for the Rambam it's not that the ikkarim cover three different areas. All Yud Gimmel Ikkarim are about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The Yud Gimmel Ikkarim define... Our belief of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, who He is and how He relates to and interacts with and governs the world. And the yud gimmel ikkarim are all about Hakadosh Baruch Hu. There's one focus, one and by the way, that's probably why those who are viewing Hilchos Teshuva over the course of Aseres Yemei Teshuva, sort of are reminded of one of the glaring questions on the Rambam's yud gimmel ikkarim. The Rambam in the Yad in Hilchos Teshuva in perek hey and perek vav, when he talks about bechira chofshis, so the Rambam says דבר זה עיקר גדול, that this is something which is so fundamental and so foundational and without it, the whole enterprise of Torah u'mitzvos and s'char va'onesh doesn't make any sense. If we don't have bechira chofshis, so what's Hakadosh Baruch Hu telling us, do this, don't do this? If we don't have bechira chofshis, so what's Hakadosh Baruch Hu rewarding and punishing? None of it makes any sense unless there is bechira chofshis. And yet bechira chofshis is very conspicuously missing from the Rambam's yud gimmel ikkarim. Once we recognize that yud gimmel ikkarim, the Rambam isn't listing all ikkarim. He's defining, again, who is it that we believe in and that we're testifying to when we keep Shabbos? Whose Malchus Shamayim, whose ol mitzvos are we accepting and recognizing through shemiras kol hamitzvos? So then that question is not such an acute question anymore because bechira chofshis is again, it's something very, very fundamental, but it's not part of the fundamental conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. I think we're most familiar with the Rambam's yud gimmel ikkarim from the two popular summations, the Ani Ma'amins printed in the Siddur at the end of davening and Yigdal at the beginning of davening. Summaries are very, very valuable and it's a very sacred and well-established minhag to say the Ani Ma'amins, but they're not intended to substitute for studying the original. And perhaps just to illustrate for a moment some of what isn't captured in the summary, some of what isn't encapsulated in the summary. So in Yigdal, נמצא ואין עת אל מציאותו, the way we summarize the first of the yud gimmel ikkarim is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists, נמצא ואין עת אל מציאותו, and He's always existed. You can't, He exists outside of time, beyond time. The Rambam when he writes the yud gimmel ikkarim, so the Rambam writes the ikkar harishon, the yesod harishon as follows: היסוד הראשון מציאות הבורא ישתבח. The existence of the Creator, may He be praised. Ve'hu, this yesod, what this yesod entails, what's encapsulated in this yesod is the following: שיש שם מצוי בשלמות ביותר שבאופני המציאות. There's a perfect being, every conceivable perfection, there's a perfect being. והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם, and He's the cause of the existence of everything else. ובו קיום מציאותם וממנו התמדת קיומם. Now that line is absolutely crucial for what the yesod harishon is, what our belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, is that not only is Hakadosh Baruch Hu the source of existence in the sense that ה' תשע"ט years ago, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu... to press the button and yesh me-ayin brought the world into existence but there is no existence independent of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Every moment the entire briyah continues to exist through Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu infused existence into the briyah and now the briyah exists on its own by virtue of inertia, by virtue of that original ma'aseh bereishit so many millennia ago. No, ובו קיום מציאותם וממנו התמדת קיומם. The Rav used to point out the Rambam is emphasizing the same thing in the beginning of the Yad when he famously writes

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון וממציא כל נמצא.

That the Rambam writes he employs the present tense. He doesn't say himtzi kol nimtza, he doesn't say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the past brought into existence everything that exists, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu every moment is mamtzi kol nimtza. Rav Chaim Volozhin discusses this, this is not only the Rambam, this is Yahadut, this is Torah, this is reality. Rav Chaim Volozhin at the beginning of Nefesh Hachaim talks about that's what it means when we say in davening every day it's striking we say we repeat the phrase in the first beracha birkat krias shma המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית that the world doesn't nothing exists again by virtue of just by virtue of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's original existence because what the shem Havayah teaches us Yud-Kei-Vav-Kei so it's assumed that that reflects the idea of existence is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the exclusive existence and that's what the Rambam quotes ein od milvado. We exist, everything exists only because every moment, every instant we exist uvo kiyum mitsiusam. We exist through him, we exist from him, we exist because of him, through his existence every moment. So that's an example of something which is very very fundamental to our belief. The Rambam in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim doesn't include everything that he has to say on the topic. He distilled what he thinks is absolutely critical, pivotal to know. There's many things when in the second the second yesod about Hashem echad there's an awful lot that the Rambam has to say elsewhere about it which is not even reflected in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. What is in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, so the Rambam quotes things he thinks is very very crucial for having again adequate emunah. It's impossible, this isn't chas v'shalom a criticism of Yigdal, it isn't chas v'shalom a criticism of the Yud-Gimmel Ani Ma'amins by definition an abridgement can't capture everything that the original does and there's no substitute for studying the original. To give another example of something which lo-choreh again isn't the twelfth of the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim ישלח לקץ ימין משיחנו לפדות מחכי קץ ישועתו. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is going to send the Melech Hamashiach and that will usher in the geulah ha'asida.

אני מאמין באמונה שלמה בביאת המשיח ואף על פי שיתמהמה עם כל זה אחכה לו בכל יום שיבוא.

When you look in the again in the Rambam himself in the Peirush Hamishnayos so there are a couple of other elements which again it just isn't possible to poetically condense and represent in an abridgement. So first of all the Rambam says something quite extraordinary Umichlal hayesod hazeh, part of this yesod, part of this fundamental of faith, part of this yesod ha'emunah שאין מלך לישראל אלא מדוד ומזרע שלמה בלבד that there was a bechirah that Hakadosh Baruch Hu chose David Hamelech and specifically that the chain of Malchus Beis David continues. through Shlomo Hamelech and that Malchus was promised to Beis David and that the Melech Hamashiach is going to be the progeny of David and Shlomo and then the Rambam writes וכל החולק על דבר המשפחה הזאת. If a person challenges that, a person subscribes to there's going to be a Melech Hamashiach, there's going to be a Yemos Hamashiach, he subscribes to all that, but he's חולק על דבר המשפחה הזאת, כפר בהשם ובדברי נביאיו. He says that he's guilty of denying Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So there's a lot in terms of content in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim which just couldn't be condensed into the summaries. One is tempted to say that one should at least learn the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim in the Peirush Hamishnayos itself at least once, but it's not clear that the Rambam would even endorse that statement. The Rambam says ואספתי לך דברים רבים מועילים המפוזרים בחיבורים חשובים. He says I gathered to you, I systematized for you many things. הצלח בהם וחזור על דברי אלו פעמים רבות. He says you have to review this many times. The Rambam is not inviting us just to learn the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim once.

חזור על דברי אלו פעמים רבות והתבונן בהם התבוננות טובה

and reflect, think. It's not something which is easily, quickly, superficially grasped.

ואם הטעך רצונך או חריצותך שהבנת את עניינם מפעם אחת או מעשר.

And if your diligence misleads you into thinking that you understand what I've presented to you from learning once or even ten times, Harei yodeia Hashem, says the Ribbono Shel Olam knows, הרי יודע השם שהטעה אותך לשווא that you're just being misled. One last comment about the intellectual content about this aspect, this dimension of emuna. How do we know the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim? So obviously this is a topic for hours and hours of careful in-depth learning, but specifically with regard to the first four yesodos, again those which define our emuna about Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself. So it's well known that there is a fundamental dispute amongst the Avos Haolam, the Gedolei Harishonim. For the Rambam the highest form of knowledge is logical, is deductive. Rambam thinks that this is even more powerful and more compelling than sensory experience. If you know something is true logically, for the Rambam that's more powerful than seeing it or witnessing it. And the Ramban, again mentioning each of these Avos Haolam as representative of schools of thought. And the Ramban disagrees and the Ramban says on the contrary that the most vivid and most powerful and highest form of knowledge is based on experience, historical, personal experience which is transmitted throughout the generations. That the Ramban famously, as you know, says is pshat in the pasuk אנכי השם אלקיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. The Ramban implicitly is answering a question: how come there's no imperative in this pasuk? This pasuk according to the Ramban and so many others is a mitzvas asei. So why doesn't the Torah say de'u? Why isn't there an imperative? The Torah just has a statement of fact of Anochi Hashem Elokecha without any imperative. Most mitzvos come with an imperative and here it's just presented as a statement of fact. So the The Maharal gives a very beautiful answer. The Maharal says it's because every mitzvos, there's a mitzvah to put on tefillin. It's a mitzvah. If rachmana litzlan a person doesn't comply with a mitzvah, there's no reality. If rachmana litzlan he didn't put tefillin on, so takeh no tefillin on his arm. If rachmana litzlan a person doesn't observe Shabbos, so takeh Shabbos was not observed by this person. It's a mitzvah. Anochi Hashem elokecha lest a person think that it's a mitzvah and he can opt out. No, comes the Torah and says it's a fact. Anochi Hashem elokecha. Whether rachmana litzlan a person acknowledges or doesn't acknowledge, whether or not a person fulfills the mitzvah of knowing that fact and living accordingly, a person should know that this is not only a mitzvah, this is a fact. It's a reality of Anochi Hashem elokecha. So that's how the Maharal deals with it. The Ramban doesn't ask the question, but clearly implicitly is answering the question. And the Ramban writes in anochi an idea which reverberates elsewhere in the perush al ha-Torah as well, that yoreh ve-yitzaveh. Yoreh ve-yitzaveh means the pasuk of anochi. If the Torah would have had an imperative, so it would have misled us into thinking that this is only a mitzvah, when in fact the pasuk of anochi is both mitzvah as well as guide. It's a mitzvah which commands, which mandates belief, but it's simultaneously a guide to how to develop and cultivate and sustain that belief. So the mitzvah is Anochi Hashem elokecha. That's the yitzaveh. And the yoreh, the hora'ah, the guidance, the instruction is and how do you know that? How do you know Anochi Hashem elokecha? How do you know there's a ribono shel olam? The shem Havayah again, the source of all metzius. And how do you know that he's elokecha? How do you know that he's sovereign over the world and that he's sovereign over you and that you're his subject and that you're chayav la-avodo? All of that is compressed into the word elokecha. How do you know all that? How do you know the reality of all that? Just look. Look to what we experienced in Mitzrayim אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. And for the Ramban, the Torah is telling us that this is the highest form of knowledge and the basis for emunah. As different as the Rambam and the Ramban are conceptually, practically, the gap is much smaller. The Rambam writes אילו לא ניתנה לנו שום דעה בדרך המסורת reading obviously in translation, if we hadn't received correct belief via tradition again, based on historical experience, based on ma'amad Har Sinai

ולא היינו מודרכים על שום דבר באמצעות משל אלא היינו מחויבים לתפוס תפיסה שלמה באמצעות הגדרות עצמיות ולאמת באמצעות הוכחה מופתית את מה שמבקשים לאמת.

The Rambam says if we would have been all just charged with the task of figuring things out with our own reason and logic, which can be done, but the Rambam says it would have caused

שכל בני אדם ימותו מבלי לדעת אם יש אלוקה לעולם או אין אלוקה לעולם.

If we hadn't received the tradition of belief and correct beliefs, he says almost everyone would have died before getting even ascertaining, is there a ribono shel olam? Isn't there a ribono shel olam? He says רק אחד מעיר ושנים ממשפחה היו נחלצים מכיליון זה. That there would have been maybe one or two elite individuals who would have been able to figure everything out on their own. Practically, practically the Rambam also tells us that the Torah relies very heavily for our sake on the tradition of the historical experience and ma'amad Har Sinai. The Rambam very interestingly, when he talks about the מצות סיפור יציאת מצרים, so we generally translate that the definition is to tell the story of the yetzias Mitzrayim. But when you look in the Rambam, the Rambam says מצות עשה לספר בניסים ונפלאות שנעשו לאבותינו. It's not the whole story of yetzias Mitzrayim. It's the nissim. it's the miracles because it's the miracles, like the Ramban explains, which establish the basis for Emunah and then the logical part is to reconstruct rather than to have to figure things out on one's own. Let's talk a little bit about the second dimension of Emunah. The Posuk in Chavakuk says V'tzaddik be'emunaso yichyeh. Clearly Emunah isn't just a question of the intellectually subscribing and endorsing certain basic beliefs. It's not just a question of intellectually knowing, but V'tzaddik be'emunaso yichyeh. The Tzaddik lives with his Emunah, through his Emunah. His whole life is based upon Emunah, reflects Emunah. Everything he experiences, he experiences through the prism of Emunah. What does that mean? So let's maybe try to just flesh it out a little bit. In the Rambam's Sefer Hamitzvos as translated by Ibn Tibbon, so Hamitzvah Harevi'is which is the Mitzvah of Yiras Hashem, so Ibn Tibbon translates what the Rambam wrote in Judeo-Arabic as follows: היא שצונו להאמין יראתו יתעלה. Again, the phrase is Leha'amin yir'aso. So Rav Kapach in his translation of Sefer Hamitzvos, Rav Kapach was very candid in sharing what he thought about earlier translations. So Rav Kapach says he doesn't know what the idiom Leha'amin yir'aso means. What does it mean to believe fear? What does Leha'amin yir'aso mean? But the emphasis, there's something tremendously profound which is reflected in Ibn Tibbon's translation here. Yodei davar point out that Ibn Tibbon did something absolutely essential and which is a remarkable feat for any translator, that he consistently translated the same Judeo-Arabic word the Rambam used with the same Hebrew word. So when you study Ibn Tibbon's translation, you can be Medayek if he has the same word in two places, it means that the Rambam used the same word in those two places. So what Ibn Tibbon was struggling to capture is the following. Hamitzvah Harishona, היא הצווי שצונו להאמין האלהות. So the Rambam used the first Mitzvah Anochi Hashem Elokecha to believe, to know there's a Ribbono Shel Olam. So the Rambam used again what Ibn Tibbon translates as Leha'amin. The Rambam uses that same word, that same verb, for the second Mitzvah of ה' אלקינו ה' אחד, to believe in Emunas Hayichud שנאמין כי פועל המציאות וסבתו הראשונה אחד. And then he used that same verb by Yiras Hashem. So you hear that Rabosai? The Rambam uses the same verb for what we wouldn't, how can it be the same verb? The first two are cognitive Mitzvos, right? They're Mitzvos again to intellectually grasp and comprehend and accept. To intellectually grasp and comprehend that there's a Borei Olam, to intellectually grasp and comprehend the Hashem Echad, that there's no multiplicity in Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And then Yiras Hashem is to have this sense of awe and fear for the Ribbono Shel Olam. That's what Ibn Tibbon was struggling with. And it's clear, it's clear and Ein hachi nami, Ibn Tibbon is using Leha'amin not in the sense, it doesn't translate as to believe. It's clear that Ibn Tibbon says that the word that the Rambam was using in Judeo-Arabic doesn't just mean to know. It means to have a knowledge-based awareness. Again, it doesn't simply mean to know, but it means to have a knowledge-based awareness. Now that plugs in to all three. The mitzvah's not only to know the Ribbono Shel Olam but to have that knowledge-based awareness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The mitzvah is not only to know Hashem echad, but to have a knowledge-based awareness of Hashem echad. And there's also part of that awareness, part of that existential state that a person's in to have Yiras Hashem. That takeh plugs in to all three. So the mitzvah, what one realizes from Ibn Tibbon's translation is that the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, again, is really שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד. It's not just to intellectually know and subscribe when the next time they do a poll about beliefs among Americans and beliefs among American Jews, so which box do we check off if we're polled? Yes, we believe in Ribbono Shel Olam. Yes, we believe Hashem echad. No, that doesn't exhaust the mitzvah. The mitzvah is to have an awareness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, to have an awareness of Hashem echad, to have an awareness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, which engenders this sense of awe and fear within a person. Or in other words, this experiential dimension of the mitzvah of Emunah. And the truth is, initially we sort of resorted to quoting two different pesukim. We said, no, there are some pesukim that talk about yediyah, v'yadata hayom. And there's some pesukim that talk about, again, Tzaddik be'emunaso yichyeh. But the truth is that according to the Rambam, it's all inheres in the yediyah, because a yediyah, again, has this sense of an awareness, not just משל למה הדבר דומה, a very weak and pale mashal. משל למה הדבר דומה, let's say you have a person who's highly, highly allergic to peanuts. So that person doesn't only know that he's allergic to peanuts, but there's a constant awareness of that fact. It's ingrained within him. If he's at a wedding, he's at a simcha, it's ingrained within him. He's a guest at someone's Shabbos table. He has to ascertain whether or not there are peanuts in this food. It's not just a knowledge; it's a knowledge-based awareness. Ani choshev, this is the paraphrase of what the Rav said in a teshuvah drashah. He has it in his own words in U'vikashtem Misham as well. Ani choshev

אני חושב שהרמב"ם מתכוון שעל יהודי להיות פילוסוף או במינוח מודרני תיאולוג. פירושו של לדעת הוא לדעתי כי אמונתנו במציאות השם,

our faith in the existence of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, te'aseh, should be converted l'hakaras tamid to a constant awareness, masmedes bimtzias Elokim, something which is constant, הכרה שאין בה לעולם היסח הדעת, a recognition which doesn't allow for hesach hadaas, which doesn't allow for any distraction. Another expression of this aspect, this dimension of Emunah. The Tzaddik be'emunaso yichyeh dimension. Mishpatim are something that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us a natural intuitive feel. So when we engage in ma'aseh chesed, so we naturally, intuitively feel that it's the right thing, and we should feel that way. And if we don't, then we should work on cultivating that feel. But sometimes the, as it were, the potential downside to that is that a person doesn't associate ma'aseh chesed with a mitzvas HaBorei, doesn't associate it with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. You see an oni and nichmeru rachamecha and your compassion is aroused, and of course you respond to the person's suffering and to the person's plight. And there's no association of that instinct and moral intuition with Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The instinct should be there, the moral intuition should be there, but it should be recognized as one given. given by Hakadosh Baruch Hu, which is valid because it comes from the Ribono Shel Olam. And there should be the Chofetz Chaim writes about this, I think in Ahavas Chessed, that a person should be consciously thinking the same way before Hanachas tefillin, הנני מכוין בהנחת תפילין לקיים מצות בוראי, so the same thing, the same thought should accompany our מצות בין אדם לחבירו. It's much trickier there for two reasons: A, because there again we have this moral intuition; and B, because we don't have Birkas hamitzvah on מצות בין אדם לחבירו. The Avudraham says that the purpose of Birkas hamitzvah is that a person should stop to be מקבל עול מלכות שמים before he's mekayem the Mitzvah. So we don't have that reminder built in for whatever reason or reasons by מצות בין אדם לחבירו. But that's what the Chofetz Chaim says: no, that's also part of living through the prism of Emunah. Again is to recognize and associate that moral intuition and instinct to engage in Maaseh chessed with Hakadosh Baruch Hu and to know that it's because it comes from Hakadosh Baruch Hu that's what validates it and that הנני מכוין בנתינת צדקה לקיים מצות בוראי. There's much, much more to talk about, but maybe just to end Me’inyana deyoma. Consider the following snapshot: a person Yom Kippur or approaching the Yom Hakadosh, a person's being Misvadeh, whatever the Cheit may be, I don't know, Lashon hara, and feels and expresses genuine profound remorse. He recognizes that the Avodah zarah, that the Lashon hara is cheap, it's gossip; has a genuine, genuine conviction and determination of לעולם איני חוזר לדבר זה, bent over while he's thinking and saying these things. So Lichora that's a perfect snapshot of Teshuvah. But in truth there's something missing. It will sound foolish, even absurd when I say it, but Kimedumeh that often it's reality. Sometimes our identification of Cheit as it were gets spun off, it takes on a life of its own. Lashon hara is a Shlechte zach, and that's the... it's something bad, corrupt, destructive Middah, reflective, expressive of a destructive Middah. And I feel that and I'm confessing that and I'm determined to uproot it and not to repeat it. What's missing? It's skipping the fourth word in Al Cheit. There's no Lefanacha. Sometimes it's possible to be engaged in Teshuvah and to forget the Ribono Shel Olam. I'm doing Teshuvah because it's a terrible Middah, because the Middah of Redifas hamamon is a terrible Middah and Redifah achar hakavod is a terrible Middah and Kaas is a terrible Middah, Kinah is a terrible Middah, and Cheit is a terrible Middah and Nichamti uvoshti about the Kaas, about the Kinah and לעולם איני חוזר לדבר זה. Everything, everything is there except the Ribono Shel Olam. The Cheit takes on a life of its own and we don't trace it back to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The Emes is that's how Cheit happens in the first place. The Rambam in more than one place tells us there's an equation between Teshuvah and Zechora boreicha. The famous Rambam by Tkias shofar that we all review every year.

עורו עורו ישנים משנתכם והקיצו נרדמים מתרדמתכם חפשו במעשיכם חזרו בתשובה וזכרו בוראכם. הRambam

says that the pasuk that tells us to do teshuva on a person who's still young, when he's still at the same stage of life, not to wait till a person gets older when he's at a different stage of life, that teshuva's also accepted, a person should do teshuva then also, but ideally optimally he should do teshuva at the same stage of life. What's the pasuk that expresses this idea? וזכור את בוראך בימי בחורותיך. Remember your creator when you're still young. So who's where's teshuva? The essence of teshuva is zchor es borecha. Why? Because what that equation implies is a prior equation, there's an equation between chet and shichchas haborei. How does chet happen? Not referring to a tinok shenishba case, how does chet happen? How does chet happen? I believe in Ribono Shel Olam, I believe in schar v'onesh, and I know I shouldn't do this, so how does chet happen? How does chet happen? How does chet happen? So there's only one answer to that. The answer to that is that a person is masiach daas from the fact that the Ribono Shel Olam is watching. Chet happens. We all have different weaknesses, different yeitzer horas, different vulnerabilities, different susceptibilities, but there is one common denominator and that is whatever the weakness is, whatever the vulnerability is, whatever that susceptibility is, if a person would know that the Ribono Shel Olam is watching, he'd be inhibited from the chet. That would be a stronger force than whatever my weakness is, whatever my taiva is. A person, he's taking the MCAT, it's his dream to go to medical school, but he didn't prepare adequately. So he wants to cheat, he's going to cheat, and he'll rationalize it for himself. The only thing is, the proctor's staring at him the whole time. It doesn't matter how much of a yeitzer hara he has to cheat, it doesn't matter if the proctor is staring at him the whole time, it's going to inhibit him from, it will inhibit him from cheating. Chet is because again we intellectually know, we have the first dimension, the first aspect of mitzvas emuna, but we lack the second aspect of mitzvas emuna, of Hakadosh Baruch Hu as a living reality in our lives. L'haamin, l'haamin metzias Hashem. Again as Ibn Tibbon is using the word, not just to know, not just to believe, but it should be part of one's awareness. L'haamin Hashem echad, l'haamin yiraso. When a person has that and that's what a person is looking to regain, to recapture in על חטא שחטאנו לפניך, so then that inhibits chet, it allows a person to be chozer b'teshuva sheleima. We should all be zoiche, a gut yoira, gmar chasima toiva.