The Rambam’s opinion on Learning Ta’amei HaMitzvos

Just as I don't know, I was just saying, it was suggested we should talk maybe a little bit about the Inyonei Talmud Torah so maybe just a few He'arot for the most part emerging from the Rambam in Hilchot Talmud Torah. The Gemara in Kiddushin darshans from the phrase Veshinantam levanecha, Tanu rabbanan veshinantam שיהיו דברי תורה מחודדים בפיך. It should be sharp,

שאם ישאלך אדם דבר אל תגמגם ותאמר לו אלא אמור לו מיד.

If the goal in Talmud Torah is that if someone poses a question to us, that the Yidiyah should be at the tip of our tongue. It should be something that we're able to answer crisply on the spot. That that's the type of mastery of Divrei Torah that we aspire to,

שאם ישאלך אדם דבר אל תגמגם ותאמר לו אלא אמור לו מיד.

Agav there's a very interesting Rashi here. Rashi comments on Veyehu mechudadim beficha. So Rashi says חזור עליהם ובדוק בעומקם. So Chazor aleihem, do Chazara, review, and try to discern the depth of the Halakha,

שאם ישאלך אדם לא תצטרך לגמגם אלא שתוכל לומר מיד.

So Rashi seems to be highlighting what I think probably for many of us is a reality, that Chazara accomplishes not only retention, not only because we need to reinforce otherwise we almost inevitably forget, but very often in the course of Chazara so one realizes aspects that he didn't understand the first time around. Rashi says חזור עליהם ובדוק בעומקם. Only in the course of Chazara is a person going to be Bodek beomka. The Mashal maybe to understand this reality which Rashi is sensitizing us to: Let's say you're going for a train ride. The train is at least I don't know going seventy miles an hour through the countryside. And there's a lot of beautiful scenery in the countryside. So there's only so much of that that you can take in as the train's moving. If you'll take that same train a second time, you're going to see lots of things that you didn't see the first time. It's not only going to sort of reinforce what you saw the first time, but having seen certain things the first time, so now your mind and your eye will be free to notice other things. So fascinating, Rashi says that the Chazor aleihem again is not only because again inevitably we forget if we don't Chazor, but to learn properly, to learn La'omek, so that only that only comes about through the Chazara. Okay, so this Din here in the Gemara of שיהיו דברי תורה מחודדים בפיך, again what we should aspire to each one to the best of his ability is to know as much Torah as we can and to know it crisply, to know it sharply, to be able to respond clearly. So perhaps we'll try to explore some less obvious implications or applications of this Din of Mechudadim beficha which Itachen one finds in the Rambam. One of the interesting things if we sort of step back for a minute and reflect on the Rambam's Yad HaChazaka is that the Rambam not only certainly paskened in those areas of Torah which are relevant bazman hazeh but even those which are not going to be relevant until yemos hamashiach. The Rambam paskens that two of the fourteen seforim of the Yad Hachazakah are Avodah and Korbanos, all these halachos which are which are hilchos hamashiach. So the Gemara asks about do you bother paskening hilchos hamashiach? Tosfos suggests that maybe in the Gemara itself it's a machlokes hasugya whether or not one paskens hilchos hamashiach. But what you see in the Rambam, the Rambam clearly does it, right? When you when you learn Zevachim, so you can look up the din in the Rambam the same way when you learn Berachos or Shabbos. It's it's all there. So why does he do it? On the one hand, so we know that that when you have a machlokes tanaim or amoraim, so we assume that אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים. We assume that that both can be equally valid and equally true. Ein hachinami, only one will be halacha l'maaseh, but like the bas kol said about Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel, is אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים. How is it possible אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים? When Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave the Torah, so some things in Torah he gave black and white. And then Hakadosh Baruch Hu intentionally left parts of Torah grey. And that's given to the chachmei hamesorah based on everything that's clear within Torah, everything that's black and white that was given to Moshe miSinai black and white and מדות שהתורה נדרשת בהן and sevara, so then the chachmei hamesorah are supposed to then fill in the grey. So when the Torah says beshachbecha uvekumecha, so what does the Torah mean? Does the Torah mean that at night you have to lie down when you say Krias Shema and in the morning you have to stand up or no, the Torah's just telling us when to lay in Krias Shema? So those two interpretations of Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel can be equally cogent, equally legitimate, equally valid, אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים. Ein hachinami, lehalacha we follow one view. But in terms of in terms of validity, in terms of truth, is אלו ואלו דברי אלוהים חיים. So if that's the case, so then why bother paskening when it's not halacha l'maaseh? So when the Beis Hamikdash, so Moshe Rabbeinu will be and Moshe Rabbeinu will why did the Rambam need to pasken these halachos? So clearly clearly the the the implication is that knowing the psak halacha is part of mitzvas talmud torah. It's not just it's not just something that's practically necessary so that lemaaseh we'll know what to do. So obviously that is as well, but it's more than that. It's just an inherent part of mitzvas talmud torah. Mitzvas talmud torah even without needing to even if I'm not in a position to even if this question isn't relevant to me halacha l'maaseh, but knowing the psak is a part of mitzvas talmud torah. Where does that come from? So itachen that that's part of mehudadim bepicha. That for the Rambam that's that's a shiur in mehudadim bepicha. That mehudadim bepicha is to be able to distill after all is said and done, so what's the bottom line? What's the halacha l'maaseh? That that's a shiur in mehudadim bepicha and itachen that's another aspect of of what this derashas chazal teaches us. Yeah, and maybe just to share something else which I've been thinking about a little bit lately. I'm not sure whether I'm not sure if the pshat we'll discuss is correct but but maybe. The Rambam writes at the end of Hilchos Me'ilah, that's the last Hilchos Me'ilah is the last set of halachos in Sefer Avodah and this is the last halacha in Hilchos Me'ilah. So this is the final halacha in Sefer Avodah. So the Rambam writes as follows:

ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף עניינם כפי כוחו.

It's ra'uy, it's it's fitting that a person should reflect on the mitzvos haTorah hakedoshah and understand what the goal of the mitzvos is to the best of his ability. ודבר שלא ימצא לו טעם ולא ידע לו עילה. And if a person can't find, he can't discover any reason for the mitzvah... אל יהי קל בעיניו that it shouldn't change his attitude towards the mitzvah. So the Rambam here tells us that studying ta'amei mitzvos is part of the mitzvah. ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה to understand ta'amei mitzvos. The Rambam repeats this mandate at the end of Hilchos Temurah. Af al pi, this is the last halacha in Sefer Korbanos,

אף על פי שכל חוקי התורה גזירות הם כמו שביארנו בסוף מעילה ראוי להתבונן בהן וכל מה שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם.

It's ra'uy, it's fitting, it's appropriate to reflect on mitzvos hatorah and whatever you can ascribe a reason to, you should do so.

וכל מה שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם. הרי אמרו חכמים הראשונים

and I'll prove to you from Chazal that this endeavor is one that a person is supposed to undertake, שהמלך שלמה הבין רוב הטעמים של כל חוקי התורה. Right, Chazal tell us that Shlomo Hamelech knew ta'amei mitzvos. And we know that the Rambam writes extensively about ta'amei mitzvos. So first of all, the lashon ra'uy that the Rambam uses in both these places, ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה, ra'uy l'hisbonen bahem. So the lashon ra'uy in the Rambam, so what exactly does that denote? Does it connote something it's a good idea or is it perhaps something stronger? So certainly there are times, I don't know if it's every time he uses the lashon, but there are times when ra'uy certainly implies chiyuv. Fitting in the sense that it's fitting and therefore one is obligated to do that. You see it maybe just to give one or two examples in Perek Beis of הלכות דעות הלכה ג. Right, so you'll recall that in פרק א הלכות דעות so the Rambam teaches us about the mida beinonis, how a person is supposed to sort of blend the two extremes and generally a person is supposed to go along the middle path. And then Halacha Gimel the Rambam tells us of Perek Beis, the Rambam tells us that יש דעות שאסור לו לאדם לנהוג בהם בבינונית, right? There are two character traits where it's assur, notice the lashon rabosai, where it's assur for a person to conduct himself by the middle path, אלא ירחק עד הקצה האחר, but rather he should distance himself all the way to one extreme. Okay, so the Rambam says assur, right? It's assur to go on the middle path. What's the first one? The first one is govah lev. What's the second? The second one is וכן הכעס דעה רעה היא עד מאד. Anger is also an extremely destructive trait. וראוי לאדם שיתרחק ממנה עד הקצה האחר. And it's ra'uy that a person should go all the way to the other extreme in avoiding anger. Ra'uy is just a good idea, it's just a recommendation? He just said at the beginning of the halacha that it's assur to go on the middle path, that a person is absolutely obligated to go to the extreme. So what ra'uy means is ra'uy means mitzad hasvara, mitzad hasechel, it's clear, it's self-evident, it's intuitive, but it's takeh an obligation. It's takeh an obligation. So it's lichora clear that that's what the Rambam has in mind as well by the ta'amei mitzvos. Agam that the Rambam says it b'lashon ra'uy, the Rambam thinks there's a chiyuv for a person to try to understand ta'amei mitzvos. The Sefer Hachinuch does it for every mitzvah, right? For every mitzvah he gives us ta'amei mitzvos. So here's the question I just wanted to explore with you for a moment. In Perek Aleph of Hilchos Talmud Torah. So the Rambam quoting a gemara on that same amud there in Kiddushin, so the Rambam writes as follows. חייב לשלש את זמן למידתו. A person is supposed to divide his learning time into three parts. Shlish b'torah shebichsav, one-third for Tanach, שליש בתורה שבעל פה, one-third Torah Sheba'al Peh, we'll see shortly im yirtzeh Hashem what that term connotes, v'shlish and one-third

יבין וישכיל אחרית דבר מראשיתו. ויוציא דבר מדבר וידמה דבר לדבר וידון במידה שהתורה נדרשת בהן היך שידע היך הן עיקר המידות והיך יוצא האסור והמותר וכיוצא בהן מדברים שלמד מפי השמועה ועניין זה הוא הנקרא תלמוד.

So the Rambam describes that in this halakha that the ikkar of Gemara is building that bridge, reconstructing what the bridge is between the Torah she-be-al peh and the Torah she-bi-ksav. Right when we learn Mishnayos so we don't necessarily see immediately how the Torah she-be-al peh emerges from the Torah she-bi-ksav. You don't necessarily see how it was derived from from the Torah she-bi-ksav. That's that's a a primary maybe even in terms of halakha yod aleph the primary the primary element of Talmud of Gemara is being able to trace back the Torah she-be-al peh to the to the the Torah she-bi-ksav. Okay the yeshivas learning Kiddushin yeah so האשה נקנית בשלוש דרכים so the Gemara asks about each one so how do you know bi-shtar how do you know be-kesef how do you know be-viah that to know how the Torah she-bi-ksav emerges from the Torah she-be-al peh. Then the Rambam tells us in halakha yod beis that ma'aseh bereishis and ma'aseh merkavah also part of of Gemara. Agav the phrase Torah she-be-al peh in the Rambam the Rambam uses it very differently than we do. We use Torah she-be-al peh to refer to the totality of Torah she-be-al peh. The Rambam uses Torah she-be-al peh to mean what we call halakha for what we call psak halakha. That's what my father zichrono livrakha used used to say when you read the Rambam's hakdama so the Rambam was sharply criticized for what he writes in hakdama. The Rambam writes in hakdama he says

לפיכך קראתי שם חיבור זה משנה תורה לפי שאדם קורא תורה שבכתב תחילה

says first you learn Tanakh then ואחר כך קורא בזה then you learn my sefer the Mishneh Torah ויודע ממנה תורה שבעל פה כולה and he'll know gantz Torah she-be-al peh ואינו צריך לקרות ספר אחר ביניהם and you won't need any other sefer. So the Rambam was accused of of looking to displace learning Gemara that there's no need to to learn Gemara the Rambam says explicitly no you learn Tanakh and you learn my sefer and that's it. We've put all the all the people who build bookcases out of business and all the and all the publishers out of business. Everyone's going to out of business. All you have to do is is print Tanakh and print Mishneh Torah. Just my father said and it's mamash amittah shel torah that when you look in פרק א' הלכות תלמוד תורה the way the Rambam uses the term Torah she-be-al peh is not the way we use it. It's not in the broad sense that we use it. For the Rambam Torah she-be-al peh means psak halakha, psak halakha. It's like the Mishnah Berurah saying if you'll learn Mishnah Berurah you don't have to learn you won't have to learn every Magen Avraham and every Taz and every Sha'arei Teshuva and every Teshuvos Chasam Sofer on your own you'll know the psak halakha from the from the Mishnah Berurah. That's what the Rambam is saying in terms of psak halakha you'll be able to get that from my sefer. Al kol panim that was just a digression for a moment nachzor le-inyaneinu. Here's the question rabosai again so the Rambam describes the hekef the the scope of mitzvas talmud torah and and we have to allot time to each area. So we have to spend time on Tanakh, we have to spend time on on halakha, we have to spend time on Gemara and then he defines how the ikkar of Gemara is understanding how the Torah she-bi-ksav the Torah she-be-al peh emerges from the Torah she-bi-ksav but it also includes all the machshava of ma'aseh bereishis ma'aseh merkavah. Where's ta'amei mitzvos? The Rambam is of the opinion that there's a hiyuv to learn ta'amei mitzvos. ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה in hilkhos temurah the lashon

ראוי להתבונן בהן וכל שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם.

So why do you find this only in hilkhos me'ilah and hilkhos temurah? Shouldn't this have been in hilkhos talmud torah? You hear the kasha rabosai? You hear the kasha? It's a good kasha I like the kasha. I was very excited about the kasha when it finally got to me. It's mamash a hak how how can How can it be that something which is an integral part of mitzvas talmud torah, so the Rambam first reminds himself after how many years it was when he got to Hilchos Me'ilah from Hilchos Talmud Torah? In Hilchos Me'ilah also, I forgot to tell you this in Hilchos Talmud Torah, so let me tell you here that there's a mitzvah to also learn ta'amei mitzvos. Again, he certainly thinks it's a mitzvah, that's what he says here, and he himself devoted so much time and energy and wrote so many so many perakim about about ta'amei mitzvos. So how is it that it's nowhere in his definition of talmud torah in Perek Alef of Hilchos Talmud Torah? So here's the suggestion rabosai. When we do learn ta'amei mitzvos, when the Rambam suggests the reason for a mitzvah, when the Sefer HaChinuch suggests the reason for a mitzvah, which any of the the chachmei hamasora, when they suggest, are they claiming to tell us with absoluteness, with absolute certitude, 'this is, I'm telling you what the Ribono Shel Olam had in mind kavyachol'? Do they claim absolute certitude for what they're saying, or are they saying, 'No, it's a pshat. It's a pshat, it's it's a havana.' So there are two maybe maybe two phrases to review in this context. So first of all, when the Rambam says in Hilchos Me'ilah, so let's reread again the mandate for studying ta'amei mitzvos. The Rambam says

ראוי לאדם להתבונן במשפטי התורה הקדושה ולידע סוף עניינם כפי כוחו.

A person should reflect on mitzvos and understand them kefi kocho to the best of his ability. I mean lema'aseh, you're never going to do anything beyond the best of your ability. So kefi kocho is sort of and me'idach gisa, isn't it self-understood that you have to give it your best? And you can't give it more than your best? So what does the Rambam want with that kefi kocho? Why doesn't he say in Perek Alef of Hilchos Talmud Torah that that a person should learn Torah Shebiksav, Torah Sheba'al Peh, and Gemara kefi kocho? You have to give it your best, you can't give it any more than your best, so it's understood. So what does the Rambam want with the kefi kocho? The other other thing that jumps off the page rabosai in Hilchos Temurah, let's reread the way the Rambam gave us the mandate in Hilchos Temurah. Listen to this rabosai:

אע"פ שכל חוקי התורה גזירות הם כמו שביארנו בסוף מעילה ראוי להתבונן בהם.

Now listen to this sentence and help me understand what the insinuation is:

וכל מה שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם.

Again, it's similar to the kefi kocho, but it's even in a way it even grabs your attention even more. יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם. No, whatever you understand. יכול ליתן לו טעם? So yitachen that what both of these phrases point to is that the Rambam is saying that agam that there is a mitzvah to learn ta'amei mitzvos, but a person never has a right to say bevadaius, 'this is the reason or one of the reasons for which the Ribono Shel Olam gave this mitzvah.' There's a mitzvah to try to understand. There's a mitzvah, the Rambam gives that beautiful interpretation of mitzvas shofar, that it's a wake-up call. There's a mitzvah to try to understand, but besofo shel davar a person cannot claim, cannot claim that this is not only the reason, but he can't even claim that with certainty this is a reason. He can say it's a perspective, it's an approach. That's the most a person can say. He can't say... He can't say, maybe we can paraphrase what we just said, he can't say beofen mechudad that this is what the Ribono Shel Olam had in mind. Oh. So now let's revisit our original question rabosai. What did we ask? The Rambam clearly thinks that there's a mitzvah to learn taamei hamitzvos. And yet in פרק א הלכות תלמוד תורה when the Rambam describes the different chelkei hatorah, there's no hint to taamei hamitzvos. You wouldn't know, you absolutely would not know, you can learn beiyun and be'omek רמב"ם הלכות תלמוד תורה you would not know that there's a mitzvah to learn taamei hamitzvos. So what's the pshat, rabosai? What do you say based on what we just discussed now? What do you say? That maybe this is, this is another aspect for the Rambam of mechadadim beficha. Mechadadim beficha is not just, listen to this rabosai, is not just a shiyur in how well we're supposed to try to learn divrei Torah. It's not just a shiyur in the mastery to which we should aspire in divrei Torah, but it also defines what's included in the mitzvah of veshinantam. Only that which is nitpas in being mechudad beficha is included in the mitzvah of veshinantam. Right? Only that which is, which is nitpas, only that which lends itself to being mechudad beficha is included in the mitzvah of veshinantam. A person can, the Rambam, the Sefer Hachinuch, they can remember and on the spot they can tell you what they think the taam of any particular mitzvah is. But it's not mechudad beficha in the sense that they can't tell you bevadus. They can tell you bevadus what zman krias shema is, what zman tefillah is, you can say that bevadus. But you can't say bevadus, you can't say so unequivocally. Right? Part of mechudad beficha is not only the quickness with which one is able to respond, but the fact that a person doesn't equivocate, the fact that a person's able to state things categorically, unequivocally. So the same way for the Rambam psak halacha is part of mechudad beficha, because mechudad beficha means to be able to state and present divrei Torah unequivocally, הוא הדין הוא הטעם, so the taamei hamitzvos, the taamei hamitzvos are also don't lend themselves to being included in the mitzvah of veshinantam levanecha. Oh. So now it comes out it's kapsa deporsha, the Rambam intentionally doesn't tell us about the mitzvah to learn taamei hamitzvos in Hilchos Talmud Torah. Hilchos Talmud Torah is about the mitzvah of veshinantam levanecha. The mitzvah of veshinantam levanecha includes all of Torah which lends itself to being mechudad befi. Then there is a second chiyuv besides veshinantam levanecha, rauy mitzad again, it's just like all mishpatim, even if לא נכתבו דין הוא שיכתבו. It's a chiyuv mitam sevara, the Ribono Shel Olam gives us a mitzvah,

כל מה שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם.

It's going to be, that's what it's going to be, it's going to be ten lo taam. You're not going to say it with absoluteness. You're going to be doing it kefi kochacha. That's a mitzvah, but it's not a part of the mitzvah of veshinantam. Do you hear that rabosai? Clear? Not clear? So is there a connection to the fact that the Rambam speaks about taamei hamitzvos in Kodashim and represents an explanation of why, why the Rambam puts Kodashim as the middle of the Talmud Torah? I'm not sure if there's, I don't know if there's... What are you pointing out? It's inside Hilchos Talmud Torah, so what is, what is the mitzvah there? Okay so, so let me try to... Okay, I'm sorry. I was too mekatzer in the lashon rauy. When the Rambam... Rambam uses the lashon ra’ui, maybe to give another example of where you find the lashon ra’ui. Let me now try to give two, two, two examples, bli neder, im yirtzeh Hashem. In the beginning of Hilchos De’os, right? So in Halacha Alef and Beis, so the Rambam basically maps out different character traits. And he identifies the two extremes, that’s that’s what he does in Halacha Alef, and then in Halacha Beis, he identifies the the middle path. Then he says in Halacha Gimmel, listen to this rabbosai, שני קצוות הרחוקות זו מזו, the two extremes, the two ends of the spectrum, שבכל דעה ודעה אינם דרך טובה. That’s not the good path. ואין ראוי לו לאדם, lashon ra’ui, ואין ראוי לו לאדם ללכת בהן ולא ללמדן לעצמו. A person should not be going on the path of either extreme, that’s not what he should train himself to do. It’s ein ra’ui. Ein ra’ui, fine. Halacha Dalet right continuing Halacha Dalet after that, he says ולפיכך צוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד. A person should constantly be appraising, assessing, right, a shuma is an appraisal.

ולפיכך צוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד ומשער אותן ומכוין אותן בדרך האמצעית כדי שיהא שלם.

We should always be making a cheshbon hanefesh and I should be checking, I should always be checking whether or not my character traits are balanced the way they're supposed to be. Fine. Then the Rambam at the end of Halacha Hei says

ומצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו.

And the mitzvahs asei d’Oraisa v’halachta bidrachav is to go along the derech habeinoni. So what's so so incredible here, I don't know, you have to look and see if there are other examples. There shouldn't be. I can't tell you there aren't, I don't know, but you wouldn't expect to find other other examples of this. The Rambam quotes the din d’Rabbanan before the din d’Oraisa. L’chora, the din d’Rabbanan of being shom dei’osav tamid is a function of the din d’Oraisa that you're obligated, right, there's a din d’Oraisa that your dei’os should be beinoniyos. That your dei’os should be balanced. Then there's a din d’Rabbanan to ensure compliance with that, so you should always be shom dei’osecha tamid. Right, there's a din d’Oraisa to make kiddush. There's a din d’Rabbanan to make kiddush al hayayin, to make kiddush bimkom seudah. The Rambam wouldn't and doesn't tell you first the d’Rabbanan of making al hayayin and seudah and then tell you, oh by the way, there's a d’Oraisa of making kiddush. It’s backwards to do it that way. First you tell me the din d’Oraisa and then you tell me the d’Rabbanan that's there to ensure compliance with the d’Oraisa. So how does the Rambam quote the צוו חכמים הראשונים שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד before he tells you the d’Oraisa of v’halachta bidrachav? Did you hear the kasha? Again, so the Rambam says that we're obligated in almost all our character traits that they should be balanced, right? I shouldn't be so generous that I give away all my money, don't have too many problems with that. I shouldn't be so stingy that I don't give any tzedakah. That's not on the side. That's an avodah. But it should be the middle path. I should give as much tzedakah as as my my resources allow me to give. Okay, I shouldn't eat hedonistically. On the other hand, I shouldn't be an ascetic that my health suffers. No, I should eat a well-balanced diet that I should be nourished, that I should have proper nutrition. Okay, all my character traits are supposed to be balanced. a person should constantly be monitoring himself, he should constantly be checking שיהא אדם שם דעותיו תמיד, right? So the Derabanan clearly is telling us how to ensure that we comply with the De'oraisa. So how does the Rambam tell us the Derabanan before he tells us the De'oraisa? It's a Mamash Venahapoch Hu. So Ela Mai what you see clearly is that when the Rambam said that it's אין ראוי לו לאדם להלך בהן, it's already a De'oraisa. Even before you have the Pasuk of Vehalachta Bidrachov, the fact that Svara tells you to do something is also a Mechayev Mide'oraisa. When something Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave us a intuition, when that intuition tells us something, so even if you don't have a Pasuk, so that intuition is Mechayev. The Ramban, maybe you saw the Ramban at the end of Parshas Bereishis, the beginning of Parshas Noach. Why is it the Dor Hamabul was guilty of many things but when Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells Noach that the Gzar Din, that the world is going to be destroyed, he tells him כי מלאה הארץ חמס, it's because of Gezel. So the Ramban says why does he mention Gezel more than the other Aveiros? Because it's a Mitzvah Muskeles. Because you know Misvara that you're not allowed to do it. So there are no excuses. No one ever taught me, I didn't know, it's a Mitzvah Muskeles. You know it from Svara. What a person can and does know from Svara itself is a Mechayev. So that's why the Rambam he hasn't told you the Pasuk of Vehalachta Bidrachov yet but he already told you Ra'uy, so it's already a Chiyuv Mitzad the fact that it's Ra'uy. So that's what's happening here also, that's what the Mechayev is in Ta'amei Mitzvos. How can it be the Ribono Shel Olam says I'm giving you these Mitzvos לטוב לך כל הימים, and I'm not interested in what the Mitzvah is supposed to accomplish? It's Ra'uy, you don't need a Pasuk. Even without a Pasuk Mitzad the fact that it's Ra'uy there's a Chiyuv to engage in it. And the Rambam's Chiddush is but since again you can suggest an approach to Mitzvos, you suggest a perspective on Mitzvos, that's what Ta'amei Mitzvos are, but you can't state it categorically, so then that can't be included in the Veshinantam. The Mitzvah of Veshinantam is only what you can state categorically. To state categorically is not just a function of how well we know it, of how well we learned it and how much we reviewed it and reinforced it, but it's also a function of the Divrei Torah themselves, of whether or not it's Nitpas, whether or not a person can claim certainty for what he says. In the realm of Ta'amei Mitzvos a person cannot do that. And Shimshon was mentioning Ta'am Hamikra and everything you just said, probably, probably, probably, I guess. That's okay, that's okay, that's a good question. That's okay, yes, probably, yes. Shlomo Hamelech, he says, sounds like no, because when the Rambam, if we're reading the Rambam correctly, if we're reading the Rambam correctly, and that's why it's Dafka here he says Kefi Kocho. Dafka here it's Kefi Kocho means everything you do is Kefi Kocho. No, but here the Divrei Torah themselves are Kefi Kocho. It's not just that you're doing it Kefi Kocho, that we're doing it Kefi Kocho, the Divrei Torah themselves are Kefi Kocho. And then the Rambam says כל שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תן לו טעם. Again, and that phrase again, it suggests there isn't an absoluteness. You're giving Ta'am and then in that context he says

הרי אמרו חכמים ראשונים שהמלך שלמה השיג רוב הטעמים של כל חוקי התורה.

I don't know, did Shlomo Hamelech, is there more? I don't know. Is the Rambam just saying that we can't but Shlomo Hamelech could, or even Shlomo Hamelech couldn't? I don't know. That's a question for another hour, but as for our question, isn't there a Svara to say that Ta'amei Hamikra is actually problematic because the Gemara says in Megillah and Brachos Einam Ela Gezeiros? So if a person's coming up with a Ta'am Hamikra, how can we say it's Ra'uy if there's really a potential problem in saying that there's a Svara behind the Mitzvos? So you're asking a great question. So there's a Machlokes Rishonim. What that means. So the Rambam understands that Gemara actually the way you do, that the man d'amar who says that

עושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים אינו אלא גוזר,

that that man d'amar denies ta'amei hamitzvot. And Rambam says, well, we don't follow that man d'amar. We follow the other man d'amar in the Gemara that there's a different objection for saying על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך. And Ramban says, no, the Rambam shouldn't have made that concession that there's even a view in Chazal that doesn't hold from ta'amei mitzvot. What that line in the Gemara means is that when by saying על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך, so one is suggesting that the mitzvot were intended for the welfare of the animals. And that's not true. עושה מידותיו של הקדוש ברוך הוא רחמים, a person who says על קן ציפור יגיעו רחמיך is suggesting that the mitzvot were given for the welfare of the animals, and that's not true. Einam ela gezeirot, they're laws intended for the welfare of people. They're not intended as rachamim on the on the animal kingdom, but it's rather gezeirot, they're laws intended for the welfare of people, but even that man d'amar certainly agrees that there are ta'amei mitzvot, but the machloket is what type of ta'am a person could could give for. Is there no concern that if you give a ta'am mitzvah it might not be conducive to the mekudadim befecha or oved Hashem? So the and and maybe actually here I should have should have mentioned this before and and maybe this will also respond to the previous question. So Chazal actually say that why did Hakadosh Baruch Hu not reveal ta'amei mitzvot? Because there are a couple of instances where he did, and Shlomo HaMelech chocham mikol adam was nichshal. The Torah says that לא ירבה לו נשים. By a melech there's a mitzvah lo ta'aseh לא ירבה לו נשים ולא יסור לבבו. So Shlomo HaMelech says oh, so the only reason for לא ירבה לו נשים is velo yasur levavo, so אני ארבה ולא אסור. So I can I can have many wives but I'll be careful not to I'll be careful not to that shouldn't cause me to to stray. So the question is how in light of that Gemara, so if Hakadosh Baruch Hu because of that didn't reveal most of the ta'amei mitzvot, so how can the Rambam tell us, how can the Sefer HaChinuch tell us that we should? Hakadosh Baruch Hu said it's imprudent, it's a dangerous thing to do, and we're doing it. Ella mai, no, so lidvareinu is very good. If Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells you the ta'am hamitzvah so then you know that that is the ta'am hamitzvah. You know it with absolutely, you know it categorically. You know it categorically that לא ירבה לו נשים he shouldn't have the king shouldn't have many wives because velo yasur levavo, so then there's a concern that maybe a person will think I can avoid the result and I don't have to adhere to the means that the Torah said. But when we give ta'amei mitzvot there's no such chashash, because we can't say it with that absoluteness. When Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells it to us, so then it's absolute. So then that creates a concern. But when we do it on our own, so then it doesn't create that concern because we don't because again it's an approach, it's a perspective, it's not presumed we don't claim absoluteness for it. Would you suggest that the Rambam's approach for ta'amei hamitzvot and to try to search and find a ta'am is to help in the aspect of mekudadim befecha? That the ta'am that you're able to get after you've studied and pesak halacha, after you've gotten to halicha lehulchasa, so the ta'am that you ascribe in personal toil in ascribing a ta'am for it is allowing you to remember mekudadim befecha? Essentially that the aspects of ta'am also relates to beficha. The ta'am that's experienced in the beficha. So when you've toiled in creating the ta'am, your unique ta'am as to understanding how you arrived to halicha lehulchasa, you are now then reset to be yotzei mekudadim befecha. I don't know, maybe. I don't know. Anyway, just to getting back a little bit maybe just to to review what what we've tried to learn, the Gemara is a din tanna rabanan ושננתם לבניך שיהיו דברי תורה מחודדים בפיך. Divrei Torah as a person is to be able to state Divrei Torah clearly. So the most basic meaning of that, the first and most basic meaning of that is that it's a measurement, it's a standard for mastery of Torah to which we should aspire. It means that to the best of our ability throughout Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, again we should have such a mastery that we can state the Divrei Torah clearly. That's what it means most basically, most primarily. We suggested that within the Rambam that maybe there are two other dimensions or aspects to that halakha of mechukdadim be-fika. Number one, that maybe for the Rambam psak halakha is not just for its practical relevance, but psak halakha is also a shiur in mechukdadim be-fika to be able to state categorically what the bottom line is. So that's also part of mechukdadim be-fika. And then we also suggested maybe that's why despite the fact that the Rambam wholeheartedly thinks and advocates that there's a chiyuv to study Ta'amei ha-Mitzvos, but אף על פי כן it's not included in Hilchos Talmud Torah because the chiyuv can't be part of mechukdadim be-fika because again mechukdadim be-fika is not only how well we have mastered it but how well this aspect of Divrei Torah lends itself to being known. And the Ta'amei ha-Mitzvos a person can't suggest, can't state it categorically. He can תנה טעם כל מה שאתה יכול. This is what I can suggest.

כל מה שאתה יכול ליתן לו טעם תנה לו טעם.

It's k'fi kocho. It's not a presumption, it's not something that's being stated categorically. And re'aya le-kach perhaps from the fact that when the Gemara says that for Hakadosh Baruch Hu to reveal Ta'amei Mitzvos is fraught with danger and michshol, and yet the Rishonim say that we should engage in that. What's the difference? That Hakadosh Baruch Hu's ta'am are absolute and ours are a perspective and approach towards mitzvos.