Philosophy of Halacha

Main chiddushim, if not the main chiddush be-heh hayedi'ah of the Rav zichrono livracha in the realm of machshava, is the notion of philosophy of halacha. What the Rav intended by that term, it's probably fair to say that he coined that term, is that generally, conventionally, we think that if a person wants to study machshava, so he has to look in sources of aggada, be it aggadot in Shas, be it those sefarim of rishonim ve-acharonim that if we were asked to classify them, we would classify them as sifrei aggada rather than sifrei halacha. And what the Rav maintained and illustrated was that if you understand halacha, halacha, mitzvot, issurim, again what we classify as halacha, that an entire hashkafat olam on what we would generally classify as philosophical questions, hashkafa questions, are really embedded within halacha. And that's just a thumbnail sketch and preliminary definition, and I hope that will become more real and more meaningful as we proceed. Perhaps the way we'll try to concretize this and illustrate this is by considering some of the ikarei emuna. Meaning another way in which to present the Rav's basic yesod, his basic thesis, and he himself does formulate it this way, is to say that certain basic ideas, concepts, or hashkafot are embodied within mitzvot and issurim, meaning not simply on the level of ta'amei hamitzvot, not just on the level that a mitzvah is zecher liyetziat Mitzrayim and in that sense the mitzvah is to reinforce again basic hashkafot, religious beliefs, etc., but even in terms of the content of the mitzvah, the essence of the mitzvah, not on the level of ta'amei hamitzvot, on the level of the essence of the mitzvah, the guf hamitzvah embodies again what we would generally classify as ideas in the realm of machshava, aggada, philosophy, etc. I thought what we would try to do together the first couple of, in these first couple of shiurim, is again to try to illustrate that, and as we illustrate it, better understand it by considering expressions in halacha of ikarei emuna. Another way, again another perspective or another way to phrase what we're going to try to demonstrate, is that the distinction between the role of and place of emuna within Yahadut, beliefs, creed, and the place of mitzvot, issurim, deed within Yahadut is an artificial distinction. And that you can't simply assign, well these mitzvot, well this tells you what you eat, what you don't eat, what you do on Shabbos, what you don't do on Shabbos, these are mitzvot ma'asiyot and this tells you... what you believe, what you don't believe, those are Mitzvos which have to do with Emunos Vede'os. Another way again of expressing and illustrating what the Rav was talking about is that that dichotomy doesn't really exist. And Mitzvos which we generally perhaps would perceive again as the dos and don'ts of Yahadus really embody basic and cardinal beliefs of Yahadus. I'd like to begin with, or perhaps we'll begin with an easier example. This is something which I apologize to the Talmidim in my Shiur, we discussed this Thursday so there's overlap. And then we'll continue to a more subtle and less obvious example. The example which we discussed on Thursday was from the famous Ibn Ezra on Aseres Hadibros. The Ibn Ezra has his famous Kasha on the Mitzvah of Lo Sachmod.

אנשים רבים יתמהו על זאת המצוה איך יהיה אדם שלא יחמוד דבר יפה בלבו כל מה שהוא נחמד למראה עיניו.

People wonder, how can the Torah regulate an emotional reaction or an instinctive reaction? It's something which just again, something which is instinctive, which is reflexive, you don't consciously decide but you just react. How can the Torah regulate that kind of instantaneous instinctive reaction? So the Ibn Ezra answers with his famous Mashal.

אתן לך משל דע כי איש כפרי שיש לו דעת נכונה והוא רואה בת מלך שהיא יפה לא יחמוד אותה בלבו שישכב עמה כי ידע כי זה לא יתכן. אל תחשוב זה הכפרי שהוא כאחד מן המשוגעים שיתאוה שיהיה לו כנפים לעוף השמים ולא יתכן להיות.

The Ibn Ezra says that a person is only Chomed, he only covets, he only desires what he thinks is attainable, what he thinks is within the realm of possibility. What he understands, what he perceives to be beyond the realm of possibility, a person is not Chomed, he's not Misaveh. That's what the Ibn Ezra says. Consequently he says, Kocha, similarly, therefore just as the villager doesn't covet the princess, it doesn't occur to him that it's within the realm of possibility that he should marry the princess. A person doesn't desire to sprout wings and be able to fly because he knows it's beyond the realm of possibility. A person is Chomed, he's Misaveh that which he thinks is attainable, that which he thinks could be his. So then human nature is to covet that which he thinks could be his. Says the Ibn Ezra,

ככה כל משכיל צריך שידע כי אשה יפה או ממון לא ימצאנו אדם בעבור חכמתו ודעתו רק כאשר חלק לו השם.

An understanding, a discerning person, Maskil, Tzorach Sheyeida, has to know that a beautiful wife or wealth, a person doesn't attain because of his own cunning, but rather because Hakadosh Baruch Hu decreed that that should be a person's portion in life.

ובעבור זה המשכיל לא יתאוה ולא יחמוד אחר שידע שאשת רעהו אסרה השם לו יותר היא נשגבה בעיניו מבת מלך בלב הכפרי.

If a person realizes that the reason this house belongs to my friend and not to me is a result of a decree, the will of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, then a person would understand that this is a hundred times more unattainable than the prospect of the villager marrying the princess. marrying the princess. For him to imagine that he can overturn rachmana litzlan, the will of Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and acquire that which Hakadosh Boruch Hu willed to his friend, be it eshes rei'ehu, be it beis rei'ehu, עבדו ואמתו שורו וחמורו וכל אשר לרעך. So if a person would think about the fact that what another person has, what any person has, is willed to him by Hakadosh Boruch Hu, and otherwise it couldn't be and never will be, so then he would know that it's unattainable for him to deprive his friend of what Hakadosh Boruch Hu has given him. Now, what's so remarkable about this Ibn Ezra is that, again, I understand if a person stops to think and asks himself, is it logical, should I devise a plan, should I strategize how to acquire eshes rei'ehu, beis rei'ehu, etc. So if a person will reflect, if he'll deliberate, so then he'll realize that no, it's unattainable. But the Ibn Ezra's question was how is a person to control that instinctive reaction, right? How is a person to control that reflexive, instantaneous reaction of chimud, of taiva, of lo sachmod, lo sissaveh. So clearly what the Ibn Ezra here is telling us is that lo sachmod, even more lo sissaveh truthfully, which is purely bleiv, even if it's not mevi lidei ma'aseh, that lo sissaveh means this lo sasei embodies, reflects the basic emuna in hashgacha pratis and demands that we internalize that emuna, meaning that it isn't sufficient that we again believe in hashgacha pratis and therefore if stopped and asked what do you believe, so we give all the right answers. That's not sufficient because if it's only something we believe, if it's only something which upon reflection we will advance this understanding of what happens in life, the Ibn Ezra hasn't answered his question of how is it possible that the Torah should regulate our reactions. It's only if the Torah expects us to internalize this belief in hashgacha pratis ad k'dei kach to the degree that our very reactions are determined by this belief of hashgacha pratis. Only then has the Ibn Ezra satisfactorily answered his initial question. So clearly according to the Ibn Ezra the mitzvos of lo sachmod and again even more so lo sissaveh, again what they represent, what they embody is the belief in hashgacha pratis applied, put into action. How so? By our having internalized this belief in hashgacha pratis so much so that our natural reaction is in light of this belief of hashgacha pratis. So this is one example again of how again if a few minutes ago we would have asked the belief in hashgacha pratis to which cheilek of Torah would you assign it, you would say to emunos of Torah. And yet according to the Ibn Ezra, this emuna of Torah is embodied and expressed and in order to comply with again a basic mitzvas lo sasei, one has to internalize this emuna in order to comply with lo sachmod. A second example, again it's a more More difficult example, but again the first Rama in Shulchan Aruch, we discussed this a couple of times last year as well, where the Rama quotes from the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim. The very first Rama in Shulchan Aruch. The Rama writes:

שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד הוא כלל גדול בתורה ובמעלות הצדיקים אשר הולכים לפני האלוקים.

The fact that a person literally puts Hashem before him constantly is a major principle in Torah. Why?

כי אין ישיבת האדם ותנועתו ועסקיו והוא לבדו בביתו כישיבתו ותנועתו ועסקיו והוא לפני מלך גדול ולא דיבורו והרחבת פיו כרצונו והוא עם אנשי ביתו וקרוביו כדיבורו במושב המלך.

A person conducts himself differently if he thinks he has the luxury of privacy or if he thinks he's standing before a king.

כל שכן כשישים האדם אל לבו שהמלך הגדול הקדוש ברוך הוא אשר מלא כל הארץ כבודו עומד עליו ורואה במעשיו כמו שנאמר אם יסתר איש במסתרים ואני לא אראנו נאם ה' מיד יגיע אליו היראה וההכנעה ופחד השם יתברך ובושתו ממנו תמיד.

If a person will reflect

הקדוש ברוך הוא אשר מלא כל הארץ כבודו עומד עליו,

literally is present figuratively stands before him ve-ro'eh be-ma'asav and observes everything he does, so then immediately a person will act with fear, with submission, etc. Okay. שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד. If you take a look in the Gra, so again the Gra kedarko, basically what the Gra set out to do in his study of niglah is to show how everything in Torah she-ba'al peh is rooted in Chazal. There's no such thing as a minhag, even if the minhag we know from post-Gemara which doesn't have a root in Chazal, and then there's no such thing as anything in Chazal which isn't rooted in Torah she-biksav. That's why the Gra again when the Gra gives tziyunim, he gives mareh mekomos, it's not stam that he's giving mareh mekomos, it's not stam that he's giving as bekiyus. What the Gra is explaining is that everything in Torah she-ba'al peh, again what we know from the Rambam, what we know from the Mechaber, what we know from the Rashba is a Gemara, is a Gemara, and what we know in Chazal everything is, everything is from Torah she-biksav, everything is from Torah she-biksav. So kedarko, the Gra says here on

שויתי ה' כלל גדול בתורה, כמו שכתב בברכות סג דרש בר קפרא.

He refers to a Gemara in Berachos daf samech gimmel. Now if you look, it's a little bit problematic. The Gemara in Berachos which the Gaon is quoting:

דרש בר קפרא איזו היא פרשה קטנה שכל גופי תורה תלויים בה?

Right? klal gadol ba-Torah. What parsha ketana is

כל גופי תורה תלויים בה? בכל דרכיך דעהו והוא יישר אורחותיך.

The pasuk in Mishlei that bechol derachecha, every, in every way you have to know Hakadosh Baruch Hu. What's difficult about this Gra is lechora the makor is incomplete. What the Rama and the Rambam are talking about seems to go beyond the notion of bechol derachecha da'eihu. And again here it's a little bit, a little bit subtle, but let's try to, to understand correctly. Bechol derachecha da'eihu says that everything we do Everything we do should be geared towards Avodas Hashem, right? The Rambam says that the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos of וכל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים is just Chazal's paraphrase of the pasuk in Mishlei Bechol Derachecha Daehu. It means that everything we do, again, הן ברוחניות הן בגשמיות has to be geared towards and motivated by Avodas Hashem. Now that's takeh פרשה קטנה שגופי תורה תלוין בה but lechorah שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד goes further than that. שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד, the primary emphasis here is on, number one, the belief of מלא כל הארץ כבודו, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is עומד עליו ורואה במעשיו, that belief and that awareness. And it's true, the Rema and the Rambam say mimeila that carries over to the level of action, mimeila that influences behavior, but the emphasis is very different than Bechol Derachecha Daehu. The emphasis in Bechol Derachecha Daehu is purely a level of action. That's a משל למה הדבר דומה. Imagine for a minute that the mitzvah of kibbud av va'em were different than it were. Imagine that the mitzvah of kibbud av va'em were that everything you do has to be tied into kibbud av va'em. So that wouldn't necessarily presume that everything you do your parents are aware of. No. But for whatever reason, you have a mitzvah that whatever you do should be, again, geared towards, oriented towards kibbud av va'em. Imagine that that were the definition. So Bechol Derachecha Daehu is emphasizing that, right? The Bechol Derachecha Daehu is emphasizing in terms of the focus or the goal of a person's actions. It's not really implying anything about an awareness of מלא כל הארץ כבודו, of ישים האדם אל לבו that he's constantly omed lifnei hamelech. That's not really, that doesn't seem to be not only emphasized but even reflected in Bechol Derachecha Daehu. And clearly what the Rambam and the and the Rema emphasize, again, is the belief and the awareness. Now ein hachi nami, that belief and that awareness do spur a person to action, but it's a strange source for the Gra to give. It doesn't seem complete. It seems to be inadequate for what the Rema and the Rambam are saying. So you could say, you could say ein hachi nami, the Gra intends it as a partial mokor. He intends it as the mokor for the part of the Rambam and the Rema which describe a person's behavior. However, kimdomani that, again, in light of the previous example we gave and this entire approach, that there's a better and and deeper pshat in here. And that is, what's the mechayev of Bechol Derachecha Daehu? What's the mechayev of Bechol Derachecha Daehu? So we know the Chazal tell us, the Rishonim tell us, let's go backwards. Let's go from the Rishonim to Chazal. You find it in a few places in the Torah. You have it in Aseres Hadibros in pasuk gimmel of לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני. So what does the phrase al panai mean? So here Rashi in parshas Vaeschanan, the Ibn Ezra and the Ramban in parshas Yisro all say the same thing. And that is taam al panai, says the Ibn Ezra, כמו וימת הרן על פני תרח אביו. What does it mean? What does it mean that Haran died על פני תרח אביו? How do you translate that? שהיה נמצא אתו ורואה. So again the semantics of Al Panay is again twofold: shehayu nimtza ito, that he was present with him, number two, v'ra'ah moso, and that he observed, he witnessed the death. V'kacha similarly ויכהן אלעזר ואיתמר על פני אהרן. That says the Ibn Ezra is the pshat,

הנה הטעם אחת שאני אלקיך ואני נמצא תמיד בכל מקום ואני רואה מה תעשה אין ראוי שתשתף עמי אלהים אחרים.

And similarly that's the pshat here. Since I am omnipresent, אני נמצא תמיד בכל מקום, v'ani ro'eh, and I observe everything, so that's the basis for again a universal issur avodah zarah. And again you look in the Ramban, the Ramban here says the same:

על לא תעשה לך אלהים אחרים כי על פני הם שאני מסתכל ומביט בכל עת ובכל מקום בעושם כן כי הדבר העשוי בפניו של אדם והוא עומד עליו יקרא על פני.

Again something done in the presence of a person and he witnesses it is referred to as al panay, and he gives one of the same examples:

וכן וימת נדב ואביהוא ויכהן אלעזר ואיתמר על פני אהרן אביהם.

Basically this yesod is probably what Chazal have in mind in the Midrash Rabbah in Bereishis on vayifga bamakom. So Chazal interpret vayifga bamakom, again that's the pasuk of Yaakov Avinu davening Tefillas Arvis, that vayifga bamakom that Makom is a kinuy for Hashem here. It doesn't mean the peshuto shel mikra is he encountered this place and Chazal say no, on another level what it means is vayifga bamakom that he davened to Hakadosh Baruch Hu and Makom is a kinuy for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So Chazal say in the Midrash how and in what sense what does Makom as a kinuy for Hakadosh Baruch Hu express? So Chazal say

שהוא מקומו של עולם ואין העולם מקומו. שהוא מקומו של עולם.

What does it mean? Again it emphasizes l'chora that same idea of the Ibn Ezra, of the Ramban, of אני נמצא תמיד בכל מקום. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu is שהוא מקומו של עולם, the idea is again omnipresent, omnipresent and v'ani ro'eh meaning omniscient as well, omnipresent and omniscient. That's what it means al panay, that's what it means that הוא מקומו של עולם. So now what the Gra here seems to be saying is as follows: what the Gra seems to be saying is that one of the mechayvim, not the only mechayiv, last year we discussed a different one, also true, that the mechayiv of b'chol drachecha da'ehu is what the Rambam and the Rama are talking about of שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד הוא כלל גדול בתורה. One of the mechayvim, why is it that with everything we do has to be geared and oriented to avodas Hashem? Why is it that b'chol drachecha da'ehu? Because it's inconceivable that when a person is עומד לפני מלך מלכי המלכים הקדוש ברוך הוא that that shouldn't be reflected in his behavior. It's inconceivable that a person should be standing in the royal palace and the king is omed alav and that his behavior shouldn't be totally, totally geared toward that encounter and that his behavior should be... shouldn't be totally dictated by that reality. Or in other words, what the Gra is saying is that the Rambam and the Ramo are here explaining again what the idea is, what the emuna is which underlies and is embodied in the chiyuv of bechol drachecha da'eihu. The chiyuv of bechol drachecha da'eihu of בכל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים points to the fact that at every moment Hakadosh Baruch Hu is omeid aleinu. It points to the fact that שויתי ה' לנגדי תמיד. Because of that reality, that's why there's a chiyuv of bechol drachecha da'eihu. That's what the Gra here would seem to be suggesting. Last year we discussed another again mechayev for this, equally true, equally basic, and again also illustrates what we're talking about of how the basic emunos of Yahadus are not simply something we believe that we subscribe to, but is something which molds our behavior and really dictates what we do every second of the day. And just with this little bit of chazara we'll conclude for tonight. We discussed last year the diyuk which the Rav had in the opening halacha of Mishneh Torah of

יסודי היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון וממציא לכל הנמצאים.

That the basic principle of everything, of all Torah, of all chochma, of everything, is belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu who the Rambam then describes as mamtzi kol nimtza. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the source for everything else that exists. And the Rav pointed out that the Rambam writes this in the present tense. The Rambam writes mamtzi in the present tense, not shebara es haolam in the past tense, but rather mamtzi kol nimtza. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu every second creates, sustains the world. And the same thing, I think we mentioned then, Rav Chaim Volozhiner says in Nefesh HaChaim that that's what it means when the Anshei Knesses Hagedola introduced into davening המחדש בטובו בכל יום תמיד מעשה בראשית. It's the same idea that Hakadosh Baruch Hu again, it's not that He created the world and that it exists based on momentum, based on inertia or anything, but rather every every millisecond Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustains the world. Now in Sefer Hamitzvos in mitzvah beis, the Rambam then says who is this matzui rishon, שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד. He's one. Yichud Hashem, oneness of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, unity of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And then the Rambam says that this mitzvah is also known as קבלת עול מלכות שמים. That this mitzvah is also known as קבלת עול מלכות שמים. And lachora there's a difference between the two. Anochi Hashem Elokecha and שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד are beliefs. Beliefs about that Hashem exists and that Hashem is one. קבלת עול מלכות שמים is a practical commitment. קבלת עול מלכות שמים means that I subordinate myself totally and wholly, W-H, to the Ribono Shel Olam. So what does the Rambam mean that there's an equation between שמע ישראל ה' אלהינו ה' אחד, belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu with קבלת עול מלכות שמים? No, a person can believe in the Ribono Shel Olam, but not but not accept upon himself ol malchus shamayim. So the answer is that it's impossible to separate the two because if a person believes that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mamtzi Mamtzi kol nimtza that every second of our existence is directly due to the fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu sustains us, that He endows us with life bechol rega varega, so then that automatically means that a person recognizes that he's totally beholden to Hakadosh Baruch Hu and that he is nothing other than an Eved Hashem. And that too is mechayev in bechol derachecha da'ehu. So again, both of these basic, basic beliefs, the belief of mamtzi kol nimtza, of Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the present tense sustaining and renewing the world, as well as, as well as al panav, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is mekomo shel olam, omnipresent, are the mechayvim in bechol derachecha da'ehu. And again, the every minute, the way a person behaves and acts, which is what this Rema and Rambam describes, really is an expression of our most basic emunos vede'os about Hakadosh Baruch Hu and about how He creates and sustains the world.