Ikarei Emunah #1

I'd like to begin tonight be'ezrat Hashem a series in the Thursday night shiurim on ikarei emunah. We'll begin apropos of parshat hashavua with anochi Hashem elokecha. The Rambam begins in Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah:

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל נמצא וכל הנמצאים משמים וארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת המצאו.

So the yesod is to know that Hakadosh baruch hu exists eternally, Hakadosh baruch hu gives existence to everything that exists, and nothing exists without him, nothing exists except through him.

אם יעלה על הדעת שהוא אינו מצוי אין דבר אחר יכול להמצא.

Nothing else in the world is self-sufficient, nothing else that exists in the world could exist without Hakadosh baruch hu. Conversely, halacha gimel:

אם יעלה על הדעת שאין כל הנמצאים מלבדו מצויים הוא לבדו יהיה מצוי.

But Hakadosh baruch hu is totally independent, Hakadosh baruch hu, Hakadosh baruch hu exists absolutely independent of everything else.

שכל הנמצאים צריכים לו והוא ברוך הוא אינו צריך להם.

Everything is absolutely dependent upon him and he is absolutely independent of everything.

הוא שהנביא אומר וה' אלוהים אמת הוא לבדו האמת ואין לאחר אמת כאמיתת אמיתו.

When we say that Hakadosh baruch hu is emet, it means that Hakadosh baruch hu genuinely truly exists, meaning on his own, and in that sense nothing else is emet.

והוא שהתורה אומרת אין עוד מלבדו כלומר אין שם מצוי אמת מלבדו כמוצאו.

Nothing else exists on its own, through itself, everything exists from Hakadosh baruch hu through Hakadosh baruch hu. Halacha hei: המצוי הזה הוא אלוהי העולם אדון כל הארץ. Hakadosh baruch hu who exists eternally is sovereign over the world.

והוא המנהיג הגלגל בכח שאין לו קץ ותכלית בכח שאין לו הפסק שהגלגל סובב תמיד ואי אפשר שיסוב בלא מסובב והוא ברוך הוא המסובב אותו בלא יד ובלא גוף.

Hakadosh baruch hu is the one who keeps the universe moving as it does, Hakadosh baruch hu's koach is infinite as is he. וידיעת דבר זה מצוות עשה שנאמר אנכי ה' אלהיך. Fine, ad kan, ad kan divrei haRambam. Now bli neder I don't think we're going to get to it tonight, there are obviously many many devarim yesodiyim ve'amukim in the leshonot haRambam, but for tonight let's begin with something the Rambam doesn't say. Something the Rambam doesn't say in his presentation of the mitzvah of anochi Hashem elokecha. Well, first of all, what elements does the Rambam include in the mitzvah of anochi Hashem elokecha is to know that Hakadosh baruch hu exists eternally and that it's Hakadosh baruch hu who's adon kol ha'aretz. How is that expressed in the pasuk? Hashem, the name יוד קי ואו קי, the shoresh of יוד קי ואו קי, havayah means existence. So when we refer to Hakadosh baruch hu as Hashem it means that Hakadosh baruch hu is hayah hoveh veyihiyeh and in turn Hakadosh baruch hu is mehava hakol and Hakadosh baruch hu gives existence to everything else. That's included, that's what's indicated in Hashem. Elokecha, so the word elohim can be used in a sense of kol re'ini nataticha. ראה נתתיך אלהים לפרעה ואהרן אחיך יהיה נביאך, so Elohim has the sense of being adon, it has sense of serarah, and hence it's used to refer to a dayan as well. So Anochi Hashem Elokecha therefore encapsulates all these yesodos haemunah שיש שם מצוי ראשון Hakadosh Baruch Hu is havaya, haya hove veyiheye, is mahaveh hakol

וכל מה שנמצא בשמים ובארץ ומה שביניהם לא נמצאו אלא מאמיתת הימצאו

and in turn what the Rambam adds in halacha hey that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is אלהי העולם אדון כל הארץ contained in the word Elokecha. So these are the elements which the Rambam includes in the mitzvah of Anochi. What doesn't the Rambam include? So I just want to read you the Ramban's definition of the mitzvah, the Chinuch's definition of the mitzvah, and the Smag's definition of the mitzvah very briefly. So the Ramban in the Perush al Hatorah writes

אנכי ה' אלהיך הדיבור הזה מצות עשה אמר אנכי ה' יורה ויצווה אותם שידעו ויאמינו כי יש ה' והוא אלהים להם,

right, Anochi Hashem and I am Elokecha. Now what does that encapsulate? Klomar hove kadmon, that's the same as motzei rishon, right, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists eternally. מאיתו היה הכל בחפץ ויכולת which for our purposes at the moment is interchangeable with the Rambam's mamtzi kol nimtza. Vehu Elokim lahem. The Ramban then adds shechayavim la'avodaso. We're not going to focus so much on that. Veamar says the Ramban

ואמר אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים כי הוצאתו משם תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ כי בידיעה ובהשגחה ממנו יצאנו משם.

Says the Ramban part of the mitzvah the Rambam forgot the end of the pasuk. The Rambam read Anochi Hashem Elokecha and he forgot the rest of the pasuk אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. That's part of the mitzvah and we're not only supposed to know and believe the historical fact, the historical record of אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים but the implications of that. The implications of that that clearly that reflects Hakadosh Baruch Hu's yedia, it reflects Hakadosh Baruch Hu's omniscience of what happens and Hakadosh Baruch Hu's hashgacha pratis and hashgacha pratis. That's what's indicated, that's what's reflected in asher hotzeisicha and memaila says the Ramban that's included in the mitzvah of Anochi. Similarly the Chinuch in defining the mitzvah says להאמין שיש לעולם אלוה אחד and then I'm skipping several words וכי הוא הוציאנו מארץ מצרים. Chinuch actually adds venasan lanu hatorah. But also אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. The Smag

מצות עשה להאמין כי אותו שנתן לנו את התורה בסיני על ידי משה רבינו הוא ה' אלהינו שהוציאנו ממצרים שנאמר אנכי ה' אלהיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים.

So the other Rishonim all mention that part of the mitzvah is again the fact and the implications of the fact of אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים and it's taka a pelia gedola why does the Rambam sort of cut the pasuk off abruptly at Anochi Hashem Elokecha. Everything the Rambam includes in the mitzvah is contained in the first three words and he doesn't have the rest of the pasuk. Okay, let's leave this kasha for a second. Kayadu'a that the Rambam has in the Hakdama le'perek Chelek the Rambam enumerates the yud gimmel ikkarim: metzius Hashem, yichud Hashem, Hakadosh Baruch Hu... The Rambam's yud gimmel ikkarim. Now which of these yud gimmel ikkarim are included in the minyan hamitzvos? If you if you search through the minyan hamitzvos, you're looking for the yud gimmel ikkarim. So which ones will you find, which ones won't you find? So it's amazing, right? So in in here in Mishneh Torah, so where the Rambam has the yud gimmel ikkarim is he has them, he doesn't really advertise them. He doesn't give them the same the same advertising that he did in Perush Hamishnayos, but you have twelve of the thirteen in perek gimmel of Hilchos Teshuva. It's a big question, the Rambam doesn't doesn't really highlight sachar v'onesh in perek gimmel of Hilchos Teshuva. That's a big big question. But be that as it may, you find twelve of the thirteen in in Hilchos Teshuva and the Rambam writes there about each of them, if a person is a, if a person doesn't believe in this, he's a min, he's a kofer, he's a this, he's a that, he has no chelek l'olam haba. So you would think אין לו חלק לעולם הבא, you'd think that that they'd make it into minyan hamitzvos. But the emes is, when you look through minyan hamitzvos, so most of the yud gimmel ikkarim don't find a place in minyan hamitzvos. The first ones about Hakadosh Baruch Hu do, because basically they're all compressed into the mitzvah of Anochi, into the mitzvah of Shema Yisrael, into the mitzvah of לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists eternally, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is אינו גוף ולא ישיגוהו משיגי הגוף, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is incorporeal, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is echad u'meyuchad, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is one and and totally and absolutely unique. So all these things are included in the mitzvos of Anochi and Shema Yisrael and lo yihyeh lcha, but the chiddush is... but the ich veis, there's no mitzvah in minyan hamitzvos to believe in techiyas hameisim. If a person doesn't believe in techiyas hameisim, he's a kofer, he's a kofer, and it's a mishnah in perek chelek that he has no chelek l'olam haba, but it's not a mitzvah in minyan hamitzvos. If a person doesn't believe in not only yemos hamashiach but melech hamashiach, so then he's he's a kofer, he's אין לו חלק בתורת משה רבנו, but it's not a mitzvah in minyan hamitzvos, not a mitzvah in minyan hamitzvos. Halo davar hu. So what what what's the pshat? Now the Rambam in Sefer Hamitzvos, in the first mitzzvas asei, when he lists Anochi, so the Rambam feels compelled to prove that Anochi is a mitzzvas asei. Not only because it's not formulated in the imperative, it's not the only mitzvah which isn't formulated belashon tzivuy, but because amongst others the Behag does not enumerate Anochi and the Behag's listing of taryag mitzvos he doesn't count Anochi. Again, I'm not sure if we'll we'll get to that tonight, but at some point bli neder. So the Rambam's proof that Anochi is a mitzvah is the famous gemara in Makkos that תרי"ג מצוות נאמרו למשה מסיני. And where do we see a remez to that fact that תרי"ג מצוות נאמרו למשה מסיני? Because the Torah tells us תורה צוה לנו משה מורשה קהלת יעקב. Torah in gematria is 611. Ai says says the gemara, so there's a discrepancy of two, where are the other two? So the gemara says that אנכי ולא יהיה לך מפי הגבורה שמענום. So says the Rambam, so you see meforash that Anochi and lo yihyeh... that Anochi is also a mitzvah. That's what the gemara says, right? That תרי"ג מצוות נאמרו למשה מסיני. תורה צוה לנו משה, 611 were communicated to us via Moshe rabbeinu. The other two we heard directly. So you see that Anochi and lo yihyeh are also mitzvos and they should be counted as such and they should be counted as such. Okay. So the Ramban, who's bending over backwards, because the emes is the Ramban himself really agrees with the Rambam. The Ramban himself really thinks that Anochi is a mitzvah as he says here in the perush al haTorah, as he's going to say in the hasagos in מצוות לא תעשה ה. The emes is the Ramban really agrees with the Rambam here. But אף על פי כן he's bending over backwards to defend the Behag and says on the contrary, he says that gemara... Makkos contradicts the Rambam, because if you look at the first two dibros of Anochi and Lo yihyeh, so you can get as many as five mitzvos. Right after Lo yihyeh, you have a לא תעשה לך פסל, and then you have lo tishtachaveh lahem, and then you have lo ta'ovdem. So adaraba, if anything, if anything tains the Ramban, the Gemara seems to contradict the Rambam, because if Anochi and Lo yihyeh, if those two dibros, if the mitzvos contained in those two dibros we heard directly, so that means that there's only two mitzvos in those two dibros that we heard directly. So Anochi and Lo yihyeh, so says the Ramban, so Anochi can't be a mitzva. So the Ramban says the Bahag learns pshat that Gemara adaraba. He thinks that Gemara proves his position and contradicts the Rambam. Anochi isn't a mitzva. Again, why the Bahag should not count Anochi, bli neder we'll come to. Says the Ramban, so the Bahag learns pshat that Lo yihyeh and לא תעשה לך פסל is one mitzvas lo ta'aseh against having idols, having manufacturing, but it's one mitzva. And לא תשתחוה ולא תעבדם is one mitzva, one issur against avoda zara. But adaraba, says the Ramban, the Gemara the Rambam quotes as a proof contradicts him, because if אנכי ולא יהיה לך מפי הגבורה שמענום, if Anochi is a mitzva, so then there's no way to reduce it to a total of two mitzvos. That's the Ramban's defense of the Bahag, his taina on the Rambam. So רבי שמחה משך חכמה has a teirutz which is emes la-amita. He says as follows. He says that the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim says that when the Gemara says mi-pi ha-gevurah shemanum, אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום, so what the Gemara means is like this. What the Gemara really means is like this. The Gemara doesn't mean that these two dibros we heard, but what the Gemara means is like this. The Gemara means that Anochi and Lo yihyeh. Now what does Lo yihyeh mean? So that's if you'll take a look, it's a machlokes in Chazal and then it's a machlokes Rashi Ramban al haTorah reflecting that machlokes in Chazal. Rashi quotes the de'ah in the Mechilta that לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני means that a person can't have idols in his possession. A person can't keep idols in his possession. The Ramban says that's a da'as yachid, he says it's takeh a Mechilta, what Rashi says is a Mechilta, but it's a da'as yachid, and he says in the main opinion that לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני means not to believe, not to believe in any or to worship malachim or anything in the tzeva ha-shamayim. And that לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים is in the same sense as lihyos lecha le-Elokim. Hakadosh Baruch Hu says in the bris with the Avos lihyos lecha le-Elokim. That's what it means. Lihyos means to have as a, again, doesn't mean an idol, but the sense of belief, of recognition, of acknowledgment, of worship. The Rambam agrees with the Ramban's understanding of lo yihyeh lecha. So Anochi and Lo yihyeh, Anochi is to believe, to know, to believe in Hakadosh Baruch Hu and Lo yihyeh is to disavow, not even to entertain the possibility of something different. Fine. So says the Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim what it means when the Gemara says that אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום means that every Jew is capable of having as direct a knowledge of Anochi and Lo yihyeh as Moshe Rabbeinu. Because you don't need nevuah to know this. Because Anochi and Lo yihyeh the Rambam says is something a person can know be-derech mofes. Be-derech mofes means mofes in medieval Hebrew means a logical proof, a logical demonstration. So the Rambam says that mi-pi ha-gevurah shemanum means again, what's the idea? The idea is that we didn't, we don't know it secondhand through Moshe Rabbeinu, but we know it firsthand directly. Says the Rambam, Chazal aren't referring to that we know it through the auditory nerves, but Chazal mean that we know it in the sense that a person can know, he doesn't need to be told from a navi that Anochi Hashem Elokecha, a person can know that. And that's what the Rambam again be-kitzer nimratz is telling us in in in. in in in the perek aleph of Yesodei HaTorah that the world itself is clearly not self-sufficient. The world itself undergoes changes and the world itself can you can destroy this, you can destroy that. The world clearly isn't self-sufficient, so the world has to have there has to be a Borei Olam, there has to be a mamtzi kol nimtza, and that's Hakadosh Baruch Hu. That's Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So a person can know that. That's what it means mipi hagevurah shema'anum. So according to the Rambam when Chazal say that אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום, it doesn't mean the two dibros of Anochi Velo Yihye. It means those two mitzvos, the yesodos ha'emunah and those two individual mitzvos we can and do know directly. Mimaila says the Meshech Chochma, so the Gemara is saying exactly what the Rambam says, right? It's not saying that Anochi and Lo Yihye, it's not saying that Anochi and Lo Yihye those two dibros, right? What was the Ramban's defense of the Behag in Hassaga on the Rambam that Anochi and Lo Yihye those two dibros according to the Rambam's own minyan hamitzvos contain more than two mitzvos? Comes the Ohr Sameiach and says no, that's not how the Rambam understands the Gemara. When it says אנכי ולא יהיה מפי הגבורה שמענום, it means again Anochi Velo Yihye we know directly. We know directly because something which is a davar muskal, something which a person can understand and know and know with his seichel, so a person anon navi and a navi hashaveh, they're equal, they have equal standing, they're on level ground because we don't know it second hand because we know it bederech mofes the same way Moshe Rabbeinu knows it. And that's what it means mipi hagevurah shema'anum. That taka applies only to the mitzvos of Anochi Velo Yihye. The fact that the Torah says that you shouldn't be in the business of manufacturing idols, that we only know because Hakadosh Baruch Hu told it to Moshe Rabbeinu and Moshe Rabbeinu transmitted that nevuah to to us. Okay. Fine. So just to recap recap where we are. The Rambam counts Anochi as a mitzvah but omits the end of the pasuk אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. The other Rishonim read the whole pasuk and in their delineation of what's included in the mitzvah of Anochi all mention about hashgacha, about and the fact of yetzias mitzrayim and especially the Ramban emphasizes the implications of that fact. Why does the Rambam omit it? Question one. Question two: What's the what's the rule for which mitzvos the Rambam includes in which of the yud gimmel ikkarim constitute mitzvos, which don't? The fact that you don't find bilshon tzivuy, the Rambam could have found a pasuk. The Rambam in yud gimmel ikkarim gives pesukim for all for the ikkarim. The fact that they're not bilshon tzivuy is not a problem. Anochi's not bilshon tzivuy either. So that obviously isn't the me'akev. So why is it that Anochi is in minyan hamitzvos and the indications of hashgacha and are not in minyan hamitzvos? Okay. And then we have this machlokes the Rambam and the Ramban, how to understand the Gemara in Makkos. Okay. So based on all this what would appear is the following. The shitas harambam is that you can only count as a mitzvah something which belongs to the realm of yediah. Something which belongs to the realm of emunah, that the Rambam doesn't count as a mitzvah. Now again yediah in this context we're using in a very narrow sense. We're using yediah again in the sense of derech mofes, something which can be logically logically proven. Now we're not talking about we generally use yediah in a broader sense and and that's also very valid, but in the sense we're using it now it means in the very narrow sense again of logically, like the Rambam says that every every effect has to have a cause, something material, something physical can't be its own cause. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is self-sufficient, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is the cause of what exists. Yediah. So what belongs in the realm of yediah. you can't logically you can't make a syllogism that proves Torah min HaShamayim. You can show why the belief is so compelling, why you can show why why we believe and why the the indications for hashgacha pratis are overwhelming, but you can't you can't give a logical proof the same way you give a logical proof for metzias Hashem. It's a different type of proof, it's a different type of yediyah, it's a different sug yediyah. The Rambam's opinion is apparently in contrast to the other Rishonim that what's to be nitfas in a mitzvah assei it has to be b'tchum hayediyah. What's b'tchum haemunah or we would probably call it a different type of yediyah, that for the Rambam is not nitfas in in a mitzvah assei. Oh, so now so now let's go back to the yud-gimel ikkarim. Let's go back to the yud-gimel ikkarim. So can you prove to someone again logically, scientifically that there's going to be a Melech HaMashiach? Of course not. But what you can do is, what you can do is the belief is is absolutely emes and and we believe it without without a shemetz of sofek because again because because of our messorah, because of everything which is so compelling in in establishing the truth of Torah, and the Torah tells us to believe that there's going to be a Melech HaMashiach, that there's going to be techiyas hamaysim. But you can't construct a a logical a logical a syllogistic proof for techiyas hamaysim. So mimaila it's an emunah again which is one of the ikkarei hadas. אין לאדם חלק בתורת משה רבנו if he doesn't believe it, but it's not something that we give a logical proof for. It's something that the Torah tells us. And again we know the truth of Torah because of messorah. We know the truth of of Torah because everything that that happens in the world is consistent with Torah and follows the blueprint of Torah. It's well-grounded, it's deeply profoundly rooted, but a logical demonstration you can't give. It's a different type of yediyah and that type of yediyah the Rambam says is not nitfas in being counted as a mitzvah. It's not nitfas in being counted as a mitzvah. Mimaila Anochi which the Rambam says can be proved, and Shema Yisrael where the Rambam also in פרק א' הלכות יסודי התורה tells us what the logical proof what the logical demonstration is, so those the Rambam counts as mitzvos. The other ikkarei emunah the Rambam says again they're they're foundational beliefs, a person's emunah is lacking if he doesn't know them. Not only rachmana litzlan he denies them, if he doesn't know them his emunah is lacking, but it's not nitfas in being considered a mitzvah assei. Oh, so now nachzor l'inyaneinu so the Rambam didn't forget the end of the pasuk. Rambam knew the whole pasuk: אנכי ה' אלוהיך אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים מבית עבדים. I, we asked the kasha, so when the Rambam tells us what the components what the elements of the mitzvah are, so how come he ignores the end of the pasuk? So the teretz is because what's included in the mitzvah, the part of the pasuk that's included in the mitzvah is only that which belongs to the realm of yediyah, only that again which lends itself to the sug yediyah, to the type of knowledge again of logical scientific demonstration. That the Rambam says I'm going to tell you those elements. The rest avada it's emes and avada you have to believe it, and and we know that it's true, but it's a different type of yediyah. It's more a yediyah that we describe with the term emunah. And that the shittas HaRambam is is not nitfas in being considered a mitzvah assei. Puk chazi that there's another difference between the Rambam and the other Rishonim we mentioned. Right, we we mentioned how the other Rishonim, the Ramban, the Chinuch, the Smag all include the end of the pasuk in mitzvas Anochi. But there's another difference between them and the Rambam and that is again, listen to the Ramban.

הדיבור הזה מצות עשה אמר אנכי השם יורה ויצווה אותם שידעו ויאמינו כי יש השם והוא אלקים להם והוא אלקים להם ואמר אשר הוצאתיך מארץ מצרים כי הוצאתם משם תורה על המציאות ועל החפץ כי בידיעתו ובהשגחה ממנו יצאנו משם.

says the Ramban, the mitzvah is not only leida, but the mitzvah is leha'amin as well. Listen to the Chinuch, and the Sefer Chinuch's lashon was להאמין שיש לעולם אלקים. The lashon of the Smag was

מצות עשה להאמין כי אותו שנתן לנו את התורה בסיני על ידי משה רבינו הוא השם אלקינו שהוציאנו ממצרים.

So the all the other Rishonim, the nekudas hamachlokes between the Rambam and the other Rishonim is this: that the Rambam says the only thing which is again nitpas in being a mitzvah, which is nitpas in being a mitzvah, is that again which belongs to the realm of yediah, or again since we generally use the term yediah more broadly, the sug yediah of logical demonstration, not other types of yediah. And the other Rishonim say no, even something which the Rambam would call leha'amin, which is a different type of yediah, that's also nitpas in a mitzvas asei. So mimeila, so the Rambam says the part of the pasuk which is bichlal the mitzvah is only Anochi Hashem Elokecha. And the other Rishonim say no, leha'amin is also nitpas in a mitzvah. If leha'amin is also nitpas in a mitzvas asei, so then in delineating what's included in the mitzvah of Anochi Hashem Elokecha, you have to explain asher hotzeisicha and the implications of that as well. Now what does it mean? Let's just, there's a lot to digest here, so I just want one, add one more point for tonight. What does it mean that the Ramban and the other Rishonim say that emunah is also nitpas in a mitzvah? Either a person believes or he doesn't believe. Now a person, no isn't that sort of something you can't really dictate belief? A person believes or he doesn't believe. So what's pshat that it's a mitzvah? So as follows. There is a profound, profound vort from Rav Yisrael Salanter. Rav Yisrael Salanter commented as follows. The Ramban quotes Chazal in saying that Paroh only lost his bechira chofshis after dever. But for the first five makkos, Paroh retained his bechira chofshis. And if you look it's very meduyak in the psukim. It doesn't say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu was maksheh or mechazeik lev Paroh until you get up to shchin. Until that point it always says that Paroh did it on his own. It's very meduyak in the psukim. So through dever Paroh had his bechira chofshis. By dever it was quite clear, the handwriting was on the wall, that the Mitzrim were contending with someone far greater and far more powerful than they were. Etzba Elokim hi. The chartumim had already acknowledged that fact. So how can it be, you didn't have to have, you could be the biggest rasha in the world, but if you're wrestling someone, right? And he weighs 300 pounds, you weigh 100 pounds, he's on top of you, and he's twisting your arm and he's saying say uncle, you don't have to have too much affection for him, eventually it gets into your head that you should say uncle. No? Just the instinct for self-survival. So heitechun? How could it be Paroh has his bechira chofshis through makkas dever? How can it be that Paroh just for self-preservation, for self-survival, doesn't acknowledge, doesn't acknowledge? So Rav Yisrael Salanter says kedarko bakodesh with tremendous insight. He says if a person doesn't want to believe, no matter how overwhelming the basis for belief is, he won't believe. You can't force someone to believe. There has to be a willingness, there has to be a receptivity. Again, the basis for belief can be compelling, it can be can be overwhelming but you can't force a person to believe. You can't force a person to believe. Sometimes why is that takeh? Why can't you force a person to believe? If the basis for belief, for emuna is so overwhelming, so why can't you be, why can't you just, you hold the person and you make him look outside, you make him look outside and say look, it's night, it's nighttime outside. So what it mean that you can't force him to believe? So the teretz is like this. Hakadosh Baruch Hu created us that we should have bechira chofshis. Should have bechira chofshis. In order for us to have bechira chofshis, it means that we have a capacity to engage in all kinds of denial, in all kinds of delusion if we so desire, and we can choose not to believe. השמים מספרים כבוד אל ומעשה ידיו מגיד הרקיע. Rachmana litzlan, a person wants to be kofer, so a person has a capacity rachmana litzlan to be kofer. If a person didn't have that capacity, of course the basis for belief is so overwhelming, totally, totally and literally overwhelming. Ela mai, but we have a capacity not to believe because if we didn't have a capacity not to believe, then fundamentally we wouldn't have bechira chofshis. We wouldn't have bechira chofshis. So says Rav Yisrael Salanter, how is it that Pharaoh didn't believe? Pharaoh didn't want to believe. And if a person doesn't want, so then again no matter how compelling, no matter how overwhelming, if there's no willingness, if there's no receptivity, the person is not going to believe. So the answer to our question is, how can the Ramban and the early Rishonim say that there's a mitzva to believe? Either you believe or you don't believe. I mean what am I supposed to do? Either I believe or I don't believe. So the teretz is that a person is commanded to make himself open to believe. A person is commanded to prepare himself that there should be a receptivity and an openness to emuna. If only the person again prepares himself that there is this receptivity, that there is this openness, so then the emuna, the basis for emuna is overwhelming and a person will not have any speikos. But a person has to prepare himself, he has to be receptive. That preparation, that receptivity, we'll just mention three points that a person has to work on. First of all, a person has to think. A person has to go through life thinking, reflecting, being misbonen. If a person goes through life: I got to get a job so I'll have money, I have to have money so I can, so I can satisfy my needs, my wants, my desires and just gets caught up in that rat race and never thinks, never thinks. A person has to think. There's not going to be an ability to believe, a willingness or a receptivity to believe if a person is not thinking. If a person is not thinking, השמים מספרים כבוד אל ומעשה ידיו מגיד הרקיע, but a person has to be looking and thinking in order to hear that story which the shamayim have to tell. Closely related to that, and this is something which Rav Elchonon talks about, is that a person has to rise above, a person has to transcend his negias, specifically in the form of his taivos chomriyos which can skew his perception and which can make him inclined not to believe. If a person is meshubad to his taivos, a person wants to be able to cater to his taivos, he wants to be able to accommodate his taivos, so then Rav Elchonon says, כי השחד יעור עיני חכמים ויסלף דברי צדיקים. Even divrei chachamim, even divrei tzaddikim, chachamim, tzaddikim are going to be affected by shochad, so an ordinary... So we're certainly going to be affected by shochas and the type of negiah, the type of having a vested interest, because a person wants, he's aduk in the taivos is certainly something which prevents, prevents and inhibits the ability, the openness, and the receptivity to believe. And one final nekuda to think about, again, the first one is a person has to go through life living reflectively. Not just living on automatic pilot, but thinking, living reflectively. A person has to obviously very closely related, maybe just the other side of the coin, a person has to transcend taivos chumriyos so that he can have an accurate perception and not have a perception which is skewed by the shochas of his shibud to taivos chumriyos. And finally, a person has to uproot if he finds within himself a cynicism about people, about life. So cynicism, even if a person feels it just bein adam lachaveiro, if a person is cynical about other people, so you can't compartmentalize a mida. If a person is cynical about other people, so ultimately that cynicism affects and colors everything he sees. And cynicism is the antithesis of emuna. Davar vehippucho. Davar vehippucho. So a person has that within him also, it prevents, no matter how overwhelming and no matter how compelling the basis to believe is, a person won't believe if he's infected with cynicism. So mimmela the Ramban's answer to us is no, a person doesn't simply believe or not believe. You can talk about a mitzvah, make yourself open to believe and then the Ribbono Shel Olam says אתם עשו שלכם ואני אעשה שלי. You make yourself open to believe and I'll show you that it's overwhelming, that it's compelling even if it's not bederech mofes. I don't think the Rambam disagrees with an iota of that. The Rambam says אף על פי כן, you have to think about it to understand, אף על פי כן the Rambam says all that's true but not everything that's true can formally constitute a mitzvah. And that's why the Rambam says at the end of the day to be nitfas in a mitzvah, everything we said is the way the Ramban, Rav Yisroel Salanter would present it, emes le'amito says the Rambam. אף על פי כן it's not nitfas in a mitzvah, yedia is the equivalent of an asiyah. There's what to do. Here the asiyah is more begeder the hechsher. So the Rambam would say אף על פי כן at the end of the day it's not nichnas, it's not nitfas begeder asiyah. Bli neder the next time we'll perhaps backtrack and maybe it's hard to say that in discussing ikrei emuna it will be lighter but maybe a little bit easier and a little bit more accessible.