Ikar #2, Ikar #3

Hi, good evening. Shalom aleichem. I hope everyone is well. Thank you. Well, let's take a look at the yesod hasheni, the second of the Rambam's thirteen fundamental principles of belief. Achduso yisaleh, His oneness, may He be exalted. Vehaynu, what is that one word achduso? What does it encapsulate? Shezeh, shehu ilas hakol, Hakadosh Baruch Hu, whom we were introduced to, as it were, in the yesod harishon, in the first fundamental of belief, who's the cause and the source of all existence. Echad. He's one. לא כאחד של מין, not like one of a species, ולא כאחד של סוג, not like one of a genus, ולא כפרט האחד המורכב, and not a composite one, shemis-chalek leachadim rabim, that can be broken down into individual constituent components. ולא אחד כגוף הפשוט, nor is it one single constituent, one single ingredient, but ha’echad b’minyan is one numerically, שמקבל הפרדה וחלוקה עד אין סוף, but you could subdivide it. You could have a single piece of wood, but you could subdivide that piece of wood more or less ad infinitum. Ela hu yisaleh, Hakadosh Baruch Hu, may He be exalted,

אחד באחדות שאין כמוה אחדות בשום פנים. וזה היסוד השני הוא שהורה עליו באומר,

and this second fundamental principle of belief is what the Torah teaches us in the pasuk שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד. So generally, generally we summarize the yesod hasheni as Hakadosh Baruch Hu's oneness, His unity. And that's certainly correct, but it doesn't capture everything that we just read here in the Rambam. To sort of help us elicit and recognize what the Rambam taught us in this yesod, so let's just read a line or two together again from the beginning of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, where the Rambam also presents this fundamental belief. Eloka zeh, again, if you happen to have a Rambam on hand, I'm reading in פרק א הלכה ז. If you don't, that's okay, we're only reading a couple of lines.

אלוקה זה אחד הוא, אינו לא שנים ולא יותר על שנים.

He's neither two nor is He more than two. Ela echad, rather an אחד שאין כיחודו אחד מן האחדים הנמצאים בעולם, but an echad that there's nothing comparable, there's nothing else of which you can predicate one or oneness the way it's predicated of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Nothing else can be described as one in the same way that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is described as one. Now the clue here that the Rambam provides, that again, that there's to make sure we recognize that there's that there's a depth here. When the Rambam says again I'm re-reading this first line again the first line that we just read here from Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah

אלוק זה אחד הוא אינו לא שנים ולא יתר על שנים משל למה הדבר דומה

to sort of help us recognize the seeming strangeness of that formulation. What would it be if I asked you to go to the grocery store and I say please buy me one quart of milk? And then I say not two quarts of milk and not more than two quarts of milk one quart of milk. So you'll rightfully suspect me of being a little bit I don't know obsessive or heavy-handed. If I say one so then obviously by definition I mean not two and I certainly mean not more than two. So you said one it's clear that you don't mean two or more than two. But listen to the way the Rambam describes this. Eloka zeh this God this Ribbono shel Olam of Anochi Hashem Elokecha in the Peirush Hamishnayos of the first fundamental principle of belief

אלוק זה אחד הוא אינו לא שנים ולא יתר על שנים

Hapeleh! I want one quart of milk not two quarts of milk not more than two quarts of milk. Okay you said one quart of milk relax one quart of milk means one quart of milk. What's the Rambam telling us? It's at the risk of a tautology the Rambam's telling us something profound. Okay that's always the case. The Rambam is telling us something profound. In the mashal that we gave with the one quart of milk the reason it's totally superfluous to say not two not more than two is that it's clear what was said. I want one quart of milk. That's a totally complete defined coherent thought and it's totally totally unnecessary once I've said one to say not two. The Rambam here is alluding to the fact that our knowledge of HaKadosh Baruch Hu is in the following sense. On the one hand we have the most absolute clearest knowledge and grasp of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. We know there's Ribbono shel Olam who created the world who exercises a hashgacha in general in particular. We see it in the miraculous course of Jewish history. We know there's HaKadosh Baruch Hu who gave us the Torah. We know him we know of his existence. There's nothing a person can know with greater clarity. There's no truth that a person can grasp more clearly. So on the one hand we know absolutely. On the other hand and we need to try to grasp this on the other hand if you think about it everything we just said were descriptions of what HaKadosh Baruch Hu does. They were descriptions of his actions. If someone will ask us to define his capital H essence so then the answer is silence. The only correct answer is silence. You know there's the joke about the little kid so he's coloring at home. So his mother asks him what's he doing. So he says he's coloring a picture of God. So she says but no one knows what God looks like. He says when I finish they will. So leaving the joke aside the only correct answer that our other answers that people give as in the joke but the only correct answer we don't know HaKadosh Baruch Hu's essence. We can't define his essence. As clearly and compellingly as we see his handiwork, as we're surrounded by his handiwork, and as clearly and as compellingly we know and experience his hashgacha, his divine providence, but that doesn't allow us to know him in terms of being able to describe his essence. A human being you can describe, you can define the human being, what it means biologically. You can define what it means in terms of the human being has a soul. You can define what a human being is. You can define what vegetation is. You can give a definition. A definition and which family of plant, etcetera, not just sort of what it does, not just how it grows, but you can define the essence. Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the one thing we know about Hakadosh Baruch Hu is that he's above and beyond our categories of thought. And and and this this is a key point, rabbosai. Too often we're prone, it's tempting, it's it's understandable, but too often we're prone to to the following mistake: to conceive of Hakadosh Baruch Hu in superhuman terms. Too often we sort of extrapolate from ourselves and our own existence, and in terms of that we we think of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So we are mortal, ימי שנותינו בהם שבעים שנה ואם בגבורות שמונים שנה, we live so many years. We live so many years. But Hakadosh Baruch Hu lives forever. We know, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows everything. He's omniscient. We have certain abilities, certain capacities, but Hakadosh Baruch Hu is omnipotent. He can do anything and and everything. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is a superman. That's albeit we don't necessarily associate the cape, but but that's how we are tempted and and perhaps at times do think of him. The Rambam makes a point of of underscoring again, just to read a little bit from the beginning of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah if you happen to have it on hand, you can take a look at the very beginning of Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah. יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות, the foundation of all foundations, the pillar which upholds all wisdom, all disciplines, all branches of knowledge, לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון, to know that there is again this eternal existent being, והוא ממציא כל נמצא, he is the source of existence for everything else that exists. He in his absolute independent existence, he gives existence to everything else which is contingent and dependent. And then the Rambam says, I'm skipping a couple of halachos, but at the end of halacha gimmel, the Rambam says, lefichach, because Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence is his own absolute independent, and what we have is some kind of dependent, contingent existence, one which doesn't have to be here, one which wouldn't impact or detract from Hakadosh Baruch Hu if it weren't present, lefichach, here let's hear the next five words: אין אמיתתו כאמיתת אחד מהן. The reality of Hakadosh Baruch Hu is unlike the reality of anything else. So it's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is, we live for 70 or 80 or or God willing longer, but there is a terminus ad quem and Hakadosh Baruch Hu lives forever. And we know so much and Hakadosh Baruch Hu is omniscient. No, all of that is again thinking of Hakadosh Baruch Hu as a superman, as superhuman. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is totally sui generis, totally unique, unlike anything else, and as clearly and compellingly and absolutely... Totally as we know him through his actions, that's how to the same degree we are clueless in terms of his essence. Now we asked, well what does the Rambam mean when he tells us

אלוקה זה אחד הוא לא שניים ולא יתר על שניים.

The answer is if you say one but you don't have a noun after the one that defines it, so what does one mean? And the difference between what the Rambam says and the mashal we gave is the following: In the mashal, so the mashal is please buy me one quart of milk. So I defined the one. I didn't say please buy me one. That doesn't tell you anything. I said please buy me one quart of milk. But Hakadosh Baruch Hu, again so we have these words that we use to refer to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, God, whatever in whatever language, but at the end of the day in terms of his essence he remains unknowable and undefined. We know of him, we know his actions, we experience his actions, and we know of him in the most absolute, primary, compelling, clear sense imaginable, but to know him, his essence, we don't. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu is one, he's one, he's one what? It's you can't finish that sentence. So the Rambam says by saying one, we can't even say one what. What we mean is that in Hakadosh Baruch Hu there's no multiplicity. That's what we mean by saying one. In other words, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's oneness, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's oneness doesn't just mean let's say when you have a desktop. So you say the desktop is made out of one piece of wood. It's not two pieces of wood together, it's one piece of wood. But sometimes we use, again this is just no mashal is an adequate mashal. Sometimes we use the word one and we say, "Oh, so-and-so is one of a kind. He's in a class by himself." When you use one in that context, so it means something more than just one when you say, "Oh, the desktop is one piece of wood." When you say someone is one of a kind in the sense that he's in a class by himself, what you're saying is that he's unique. The oneness and uniqueness, those two concepts are intertwined and they're blended together. And the correct summation of the Yesod Hasheni is not just that Hakadosh Baruch Hu's oneness or unity, the correct summation of the Yesod Hasheni is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's uniqueness, Hakadosh Baruch Hu's absolute uniqueness. Now the truth is the Rambam did spell this out in the Peirush Hamishnayos also. The Rambam says at the end, after you make your way through the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, the Rambam says if you learned this once, I think he says even if you learned it ten times and you think you understood it adequately, so you're fooling yourself. So we read it once, but we read it once. But towards the end of this paragraph, the Rambam says

אלוק הוא יתעלה אחד באחדות שאין כמוה אחדות בשום פנים.

He's one in a unique, absolutely unique and singular sense. So the second Yesod, again, is not only Hakadosh Baruch Hu is one, but is unique, echad yachid u'meyuchad. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is unique. Chazal say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu says kavyachol that when we affirm the pasuk שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu kavyachol says אתם עשיתוני חטיבה אחת בעולם. You have made me unique, chativa achas ba'olam. You've made me something unique through that affirmation. שמע ישראל ה' אלוקינו ה' אחד, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is echad yachid u'meyuchad. He's one and unique, unique and therefore one. Now, if you want to see something of just the incredible wisdom and precision in the Rambam. This is unbelievable, mamash unbelievable. But take a look at this. Go back to the Yesod Harishon, if you have the text in front of you, rabosai, take a look at the Yesod Harishon. The first line, היסוד הראשון מציאות הבורא, the existence of the creator, and then the Rambam adds the honorific or the tefilla Yishtabach. May he be praised. The Yesod Hasheni is achduso, Yisaleh, may he be exalted. Why did the Rambam change it? Because in English comp 101, he was told you don't use the same word too often, people are gonna get bored, so you have to spice things up. Maybe, maybe, if he had the same English comp teacher, but maybe, so it's haflei vafeleh. When we first are introduced to Hakadosh Baruch Hu in the Yesod Harishon, we're being told Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists, as we discussed last week, that he is existence. The only what's appropriate at that point is Yishtabach. What does the Yesod Hasheni teach us? The Yesod Hasheni teaches us that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is unique, so the Rambam's tefilla is Yisaleh, may he be exalted, may we recognize that uniqueness, and may he be exalted above all human categories of thought that are adequate for everything else but totally inadequate for him. In the context of talking about Hakadosh Baruch Hu's uniqueness, there you can say Yisaleh. That's the appropriate thing. May he be exalted. May he be exalted above all the, above any comparison, above any rachmana litzlan straitjacketing within other human categories of thought. That's why even within the Yesod Harishon, the Rambam shifted. In the Yesod Harishon, in the opening line, metzias haborei yishtabach. When you read that line, so all we understand at that point is Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence. It's premature to talk about may he be exalted. But after the Rambam explains to us that what Hakadosh Baruch Hu's existence means is not just that he exists, but that he alone exists, because he is existence, and everything else he exists with a capital E and everything else exists with a lowercase e, so even though he hasn't yet again underscored uniqueness as he's going to in Yesod Hasheni, but once he tells you that already he says that אילו יכולנו לשער סילוק הנמצאים כולם זולתו, this is in the Yesod Harishon. If we could imagine that everything else in the world would cease to exist, לא הייתה בטילה מציאותו, his existence would be unaffected, Yisaleh. May he be exalted, because already here, even though the Rambam is going to spell this out with specificity as its own yesod, but already here the kernel of the uniqueness is there. Just haflei vafeleh the precision of the leshonos in the Rambam. And that's why achduso Yisaleh, may he be exalted above again that those anthropomorphic limitations that we impose rachmana litzlan on him. Let's begin at least the Yesod Hashlishi. היסוד השלישי שלילת הגשמות ממנו. When speaking of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, to negate any type of corporeality. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is incorporeal, he's not physical. Vehu, what does that mean? Sheha'echad hazeh, Hakadosh Baruch Hu, this one God whom we've met as it were in the first two yesodos, the first two fundamental principles of belief, אינו גוף ולא כוח בגוף. He's not a body nor is he some kind of physical force which inheres in a body. And as such, since Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical in any sense whatsoever, lo ye'oru. Anything which is a function of physicality doesn't relate, doesn't pertain to him. K'gon, what are some examples of things that are a function of physicality? K'gon hatnuah vehamenucha, to be motion or at rest. A physical body can be described as either at motion or at rest. לא מצד העצם ולא במקרה. Neither is it sort of an essential trait that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is always at rest or always at motion, nor is it accidental that he's at rest or at motion. The whole category doesn't apply. Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't physical. You can't ask, if you're not talking about a color, you can't say what color is it. What color is only if you're talking about an idea. I had an idea to solve one of the riddles of physics and someone asks you, well what color is it? Is it blue or green? Ideas are not physical. They're not blue, they're not green. What's not physical, so anything which is a function of physicality doesn't apply. לכן שללו ממנו עליהם השלום החיבור והפירוד. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not connected to anything, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not separated from anything. Connection and separation again are physical states. ואמרו לא ישיבה ולא עמידה. Hakadosh Baruch Hu one can't talk about posture. Posture again is a predicate of physicality. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is neither sitting nor is he standing. לא עורף ולא עיפוי. What does oref and ipui mean in this context? So the way the Rambam understands it is klomar lo pirod, not separation, והוא עורף ולא חיבור, not connection,

כי עיפוי מן אמרו ועפו בכתף פלשתים. כלומר ידחף אותם בכתף מחמת התחברותם בהם. ואמר הנביא ואל מי תדמיון אל.

The Navi Yeshayahu says, to whom, to what can you compare Hakadosh Baruch Hu? And then the Navi says speaking in the voice of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, ואל מי תדמיוני ואשוה. To whom can you compare me that I would resemble in any sense? Says the Rambam, ואילו היה גוף היה דומה לגופים. If Hakadosh Baruch Hu were physical, there would be resemblance. וכל מה שבא בכתוב, don't we find in Chumash anthropomorphic descriptions? These descriptions which the Rambam tells us do not pertain to Hakadosh Baruch Hu, don't we find such descriptions in the Chumash? וכל מה שבא בכתובים בתואר מתוארי הגופים, and whatever you'll find in Tanach describing Hakadosh Baruch Hu again in physical terms, כגון ההליכה ממקום למקום, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is described as going from one place to another.

וירד השם לראות את העיר ואת המגדל אשר בנו בני אדם.

Hashem descending. Vaya'al me'alav Elokim, Hakadosh Baruch Hu ascending. והעמידה והישיבה והדיבור וכיוצא בו זה, speech means with the vocal cords, with a larynx.

כולם הן דרך השאלה וכמו שאמרו דיברה תורה כלשון בני אדם.

They're all metaphoric usages. None of them are intended literal, they're all intended metaphoric. Okay, that's the yesod hashelishi. Let's begin, maybe we'll have time to complete it, I'm not sure. But the yesod hashelishi again Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is incorporeal. In the context of the yesod hashelishi there is a very very famous dispute again, not about the yesod hashelishi, in the context of the yesod hashelishi. Let's try to be very precise here. Again, the dispute that we're about to review is not about the yesod hashelishi, it's in the context of the yesod hashelishi. The Rambam in perek gimel of Hilchos Teshuva... describes in halacha zayin that חמשה הן הנקראים מינים. There are five people who should be identified and referred to as heretics. The first one is האומר שאין שם אלוה ואין לעולם מנהיג, an atheist. The second is האומר שיש שם מנהיג אבל הם שנים או יותר, a polytheist. The third is האומר שיש רבון אחד, no, he's a monotheist on some level, אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה. But he believes in a corporeal God. He believes that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical. So on this the Ra'avad comments, I'm sorry I forgot to take it out just excuse me one second. On this the Ra'avad comments, ולמה קרא לזה מין? Why did the Rambam designate this individual who thinks Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical as a heretic? וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה, many prominent good people amongst us erroneously believed this, לפי מה שראו במקראות, they were misled by the literal translation of pesukim, ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות, the aggados of Chazal, which when a person doesn't understand what the metaphor's intended to convey and a person just reads aggadta and understands it literally, so then ha'aggados amshabshas hadaios, which confuse belief. So let's try to clarify here what exactly is the dispute between the Rambam and the Ra'avad. So the first, again, on all the points that we're going to discuss here are very, very crucial rabosai. The first point is that the Ra'avad does not disagree in terms of belief with what the Rambam is saying. The Ra'avad is not chas veshalom putting forth a corporeal conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The Ra'avad is not telling us that he rachmana litzlan believes Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical. What the Ra'avad says is of course you Rabbeinu Moshe are correct that it's minus, that it's heresy. The belief is a heretical belief to think Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical but if the person innocently stumbles into that belief why do you brand him a heretic? So the belief is as wrong as can be. The belief is heretical but the person who stumbles innocently into that belief because he looks at Chumash and it says vayelech Hashem, Hashem went, so he imagines a physical God moving from one from one location to another location. And then he looks at all these aggadata in Chazal, he opens his Ein Yaakov, he looks at all the aggadata in Chazal and he gets himself all famisht, he gets himself all confused. The fact that he stumbles into a heretical belief shouldn't brand him a heretic. So the first point to be clearly, clearly understood is that there's no absolutely no difference of opinion as to what the correct belief is. There's a consensus omnium as to what the correct traditional Jewish belief is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical, he's not incorporeal. The question is if someone erroneously believes Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical because he took pesukim Chumash literally, he took aggadata in Chazal literally, does that brand him a heretic? Okay. Point number one. Now, popularly this dispute between the Rambam and the Ra'avad... And the Ra'avad is described and summarized as follows: That the Rambam says even if a person is mistaken about one of the yesodos ha'emunah, he's a heretic. And the Ra'avad says no. If it's an honest mistake, even though the belief is heresy, he's not to be classified as a heretic. And this is the dispute. This is the point of contention between the Rambam and the Ra'avad: What happens if a person subscribes to heretical beliefs b'shogeg? So this is actually wrong on both counts, on both scores. You know there's an old Yiddish joke about the person who was so ingenious that he knew how to spell Noach mit shiva grayzen. He knew how to spell the name Noach with seven mistakes. That's takeh a challenge. Maybe see if you can figure that one out. How can you make seven mistakes in spelling a two-word name? Okay, so mamash there's gaonis in all in all areas. So the emes is that this is not quite the this doesn't quite rise to the same level, but it's not a correct summation of either the Rambam or the Ra'avad. Let's begin with the Ra'avad. In this very Halacha, the Rambam lists five people who are classified as heretics. Of the five, the Ra'avad only commented on one of the five. The Ra'avad has no defense and is not looking to somehow or other remove that designation as heretic from any of the other four. The Rambam began with the person who Rachmana litzlan's an atheist. And then the Rambam said the person who's a polytheist. Then he has the person who's a corporealist who believes Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical. And then he says a person who אומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור לכל, Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't the source of everything else that exists. And then the idolater. Of these five, the Ra'avad only registered a disagreement about one of the five. So it's not accurate to say that the Ra'avad thinks that every example of heresy, if the person says it just because he's mistaken, the belief is heresy but he's not a heretic. No, the Ra'avad said it about this one isolated case. On the other hand, the Rambam himself also concedes that sometimes there is a defense and a person can subscribe to a heretical belief and yet not be classified as a heretic. My grandfather zichrono livracha called attention to this. If you take a look in Perek Daled of Hilchos Shechita. So the Rambam has two halachos almost back-to-back with the one intervening halacha. In the first of the two halachos, the Rambam says if a person is a min, a heretic, והוא הכופר בתורה ובמשה רבנו, he denies the Torah, which means again, either the Written Torah or the Oral Torah, either Torah she'bichtav or Torah she'ba'al peh, denies that Moshe Rabbeinu was the faithful go-between, the faithful messenger who faithfully, without adding or detracting anything, just communicated dvar Hashem to us. If a person is a min

והוא הכופר בתורה ובמשה רבנו כמו שביארנו בהלכות תשובה, הרי הוא כגוי ושחיטתו נבלה.

So categorically, l'chumra, that person is treated as a non-Jew and the same way if a non-Jew shechts, the shechita doesn't allow one to eat from it, the same is true for a kofer ba'Torah. Okay, that's Halacha Yud Daled. Right around the corner in Halacha Tes Zayin, the Rambam says elu hatzdukim v'habaysussim, Karaites, right? Bi-ymei Chazal they were referred to as Tzdukim and Baysussim and then at a later point in history they were referred to as Karoyim, as Karaites. Says the Rambam, I'm skipping a line, im shachtu b'fanenu, if they shecht, if they performed the... the shechita in our presence, so that we can see whether or not the shechita was executed properly. harei zu muteres. What do you mean harei zu muteres? It's still a Tzedoki and a Baisusi, kopher ba-Torah. And you, Rabbeinu Moshe, just told us that if a person is kopher ba-Torah, harei hu ke-goy by virtue of the fact that he's a min, that he's a heretic. It's as if le-chumra, it's as if he's a non-Jew and that therefore his shechita automatically is totally categorically invalid even if technically it was executed perfectly. And now you're telling us that if we saw the Tzedoki, the Karaites, if we see a Karaite do shechita, we can't trust him to shecht if we're not there because he doesn't really believe in hilchos shechita. But if we oversee the shechita and we see that it was executed technically properly, so then the shechita is ksheira. How are those two statements to be reconciled? Where's the consistency? So my grandfather says the Tzedokim and Baisusim the Rambam is talking about, they're not first generation heretics, they were people who were brought up and brainwashed on that belief. And clearly this is the Rambam, right, this is the Rambam who didn't cut any slack for the person who thinks Hakadosh Baruch Hu is corporeal, he is cutting slack for those who innocently make a mistake about the fundamentals of belief regarding to the Torah. So that's what we said before: the statement that the Ra'avad says a mistake in emuna doesn't make someone a kofer and the Rambam says that a mistake in emuna does make someone a kofer, there's not seven mistakes in that statement but there are two mistakes compressed into that statement. The Ra'avad doesn't justify everything. He says this specific error which a person can be lulled into by learning Chumash and Agadata literally, he meant well, he meant well and he sat down and he learned Chumash and he meant well and he opened his Ein Yaakov, the person sincerely stumbled into this because that literal erroneous understanding led him into it. That the Ra'avad says even though the belief is heresy, but he's not a heretic. And the Rambam doesn't disagree with that in other contexts, but in this context he doesn't subscribe to it. Why not? Why doesn't he accept the Ra'avad's defense? We see that he accepted the defense of the Karaites who are brainwashed. The Rambam says their belief is heresy but they're not heretics. So why didn't he accept the Ra'avad here? So the emes is that the Rambam himself tells us in the Moreh. And what he says is absolutely remarkable. I'm just going to read you a couple of lines. Lachen, again the Rambam wrote this in Judeo-Arabic, my Judeo-Arabic is a little bit rusty at the moment, so I'm reading it from a Hebrew translation.

לכן אין צידוק למי שאינו מקבל מבעלי האמת בעלי העיון אם אינו מסוגל לעיון.

The Rambam's talking here not again both about the mistake of idolatry as well as the mistake of thinking that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical, that he's corporeal. He says and now listen to this, this is incredible,

כי איני רואה כופר במי שאינו מוכיח הוכחה מופתת שלילת הגשמות אבל אני רואה כופר במי שאינו מאמין בשלילתה.

The Rambam says something which is so incredibly powerful. The Rambam says, I have no expectation, the Torah had no expectation that every Jew is going to be a philosopher. He says, I have no expectation because the Torah had no expectation that every Jew can necessarily reason for himself or herself that it cannot be that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical. And he says no one is going to be criticized for not having Greater abilities than they actually have. No one if a person doesn't have the philosophical acumen or temperament, he's not going to be held accountable for lacking that. But you know what the Rambam says there's no defense for? The Rambam says there's no defense for a person not recognizing his or her own limitations and deferring to those who know better. And the reason the Rambam rejects the Raavad's defense of the person who learned Chumash and decided for himself, well, the Torah's clearly describing a physical God, so apparently the Ribbono shel Olam is physical. The reason and Chazal, aren't they certainly doing that? The reason the Rambam rejects that defense is the Rambam says a person is not obligated to be a philosopher. He's not obligated to have philosophical acumen or to have a philosophical temperament. But a person is obligated to know his or her own limitations. And a person should know what he's capable of knowing and figuring out for himself or herself as opposed to what's beyond one's ability. And that's why there's no defense. It's no defense to say I learned the Chumash and I understood such and such. Because the answer that'll be addressed to me is: Well, you should have been aware of your own limitations. You're not being held responsible for having limitations. Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave each of us his or her own abilities, skillset. No one's being held responsible for having more than they're given. But we are held responsible for not recognizing our own limitations. And that's the Rambam's response to the Raavad. You know why I don't give this person a pass? Because this person should have sought out those who know better. So just to summarize as we conclude, so the third of the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikarim is that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is incorporeal. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not physical. And as such, again, anything which is a function of physicality doesn't pertain to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The Raavad agrees one thousand percent. The Raavad does disagree that if a person innocently subscribes to that heretical belief, we should not brand him as an individual heretic. And the Rambam says: But if that person could have availed himself of correct instruction and correct guidance, then we do hold a person responsible for not being aware and cognizant of his or her own limitations. Okay, so we'll stop here for tonight Rabosai. Thank you very much, everyone should be well, be safe. Rabbi Lipshutz, may I ask a question? Please. What do we mean when we say Chalak michochmato liyreyav or Chelek eloka mimaal in the context given the Yesod Hasheni? I didn't hear the first phrase. The first one was Chelek eloka mimaal. I'm sorry, I didn't hear the first phrase. Chalak michochmato liyreyav. Can you translate? There is a phrase that describes the Neshama as Chelek eloka mimaal, which part of the question and answer, part of the discussion is how to translate it. But sometimes it's literally erroneously translated as a part of God from above, which it clearly doesn't mean. It's not as if, you know, the popular misconception associated with that phrase, it's not as if Hakadosh Baruch Hu sort of is cutting off little parts of himself and distributing it like Chanukah gelt. I mean, that isn't what's happening. What Chelek Eloka mima'al expresses is the in terms of what Hakadosh Baruch Hu created. So let's see, there are in logic, in philosophy, one speaks of a first cause and then immediate cause. What does that mean? That in nature, for instance, things are the result of a whole causal sequence. So before the apple emerges on the apple tree, there's been a whole long process for that to happen, the way the tree strikes root, the way the roots get nurtured, the way the tree grows, etc., until eventually you have the apple. So there are first causes, there are intermediate causes, and then there's the final immediate cause. And when Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, He created the world that way also. Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't create everything directly. The way He created some things was as it were, kavyachol He pressed the button which set a causal sequence into motion, the end result of which was whatever was created. The neshama in us, Hakadosh Baruch Hu as it were created directly. That's not removed from Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not only the first cause for that, He's the immediate cause. And that's what the again a little bit what the pasuk is describing in ויפח באפיו נשמת חיים that kavyachol Hakadosh Baruch Hu himself infused into Adam this soul of life. And that's a little bit perhaps of what that phrase Chelek Eloka mima'al means. But the neshama isn't physical, and על אחת כמה וכמה Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't physical and He's not giving out little pieces of himself. And even in preschool, children should not be told that we all have a little bit of God in us. There's no reason to raise children on kfira. If halevai that we should all reach the level someday where we're worthy of understanding what Chelek Eloka mima'al means. But it doesn't mean this. In fact, if I could presume to make one small anecdotal contribution to your presentation. I recall the Rav a number of times recounting... I'm sorry, I'm not hearing. I'm sorry, this is Sam Bergman. You're not hearing? Shalom aleichem. You're not muted. Let me try again. I recall the Rav many times recounting how Reb Chaim refrained from reciting Echad mi yodea at the conclusion of his Seder. And he explained that, are you hearing me? Yes, I am, thank you. Because it recited that implicitly compared the oneness of Hashem, אחד מי יודע אחד אלקינו שבשמים ובארץ, to the twoness of the Luchos and the threeness of the Avos, when the monolithicness of Hashem makes Him unique and therefore it's kfira to compare His oneness to the twoness, threeness which are, of course, as you explained, have component parts. So he said Reb Chaim would not recite Echad mi yodea at the conclusion of his sedarim. And so I heard a few times from the... if you didn't hear it from the Rav, I'm wondering, but I heard it a few times in shiurim in Boston that he said he never... a few things he would not... I'm not familiar with that. I know that he used to say that Reb Chaim didn't like the piyut that some have the minhag of singing on Simchas Torah during hakafos, or I think the Ein Adir k'Hashem, אין ברוך כבן עמרם, etc., for that reason, that one can't describe the uniqueness of anything else in the same breath as Hakadosh Baruch Hu's uniqueness. But I'm not familiar with that in terms of... I heard it more than once, but I wouldn't presume to present. There are a few things Reb Chaim didn't say for other reasons, but this was I thought apropos of your shiur. Yasher koach, thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you rabbosai. Have a good night, be well.