Ikar 5, 6

v'ha'yesod ha'chamishi שהוא יתעלה והוא שוה לעבדו u'l'romemo u'l'hodia rommuto v'avodato ולא לעשות כן למי שהוא למטה ממנו במציאות k'gon hamalachim v'hakochavim v'hagalgalim v'hayesodot

ומה שהורכב מהם לפי שכולם הם מוטבעים בפעולותיהם אין להם יכולת ולא בחירה

ela l'ratzono yit'aleh

ואין לעשות אותם אמצעים להגיע אליו אלא לעומתו יתעלה יכוונו המחשבות ומניחים כל מה שזולתו

v'zeh ha'yesod ha'chamishi

היא האזהרה על עבודה זרה ורוב התורה היא באזהרה עליה.

So any act of worship should be exclusively directed to Hakadosh Baruch Hu. As an act of worship, it should be exclusively reserved for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Now there are some acts which contextually sometimes they're acts of worship, sometimes they're not. Let's say hishtachavaya. So hishtachavaya, I don't know, it's part of the Kohen Gadol's avoda. It's part of the avoda. הכהנים והעם היו משתחוים again, the response to the Kohen Gadol's avoda. כהנים והעם היו כורעים ומשתחוים ונופלים על פניהם. On the other hand, you find in Tanach hishtachavaya to people. So that's because משל למה הדבר דומה, you can have Elokim bilshon kodesh, you can have elohim bilshon chol. So there's some actions which, again, contextually, they can be understood that they're either acts of worship or they're not acts of worship. They're acts of acknowledgment of authority or something. So the melech is an absolute monarch, so it's an acknowledgment of monarchy. It's not an act of worship in that context. But when it's clearly an act of worship, so then it has to be reserved exclusively for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Why does the Rambam seemingly digress and tell us that the nature of malachim, kochavim, galgalim is that kulam mutba'im bif'ulotei-hem, that they're all programmed? That they have no bechira, they have no discretion? Why is it relevant that this is the nature of malachim? So lichora the pshat is as follows. Let's say we find, we just read it where in Parshat Vayeira, right, Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells Avimelech,

ועתה השב אשת האיש כי נביא הוא ויתפלל בעדך וחיה.

Avraham Avinu will daven for you. And not only can a person sort of initiate davening on someone else's behalf, you can ask someone to daven for you. So why is it so terrible if I'm asking the, why is that acceptable, but to turn to the malach and petition the malach that he should daven on my behalf, the Rambam very, very adamantly rules that out? Oh, so that's what the Rambam says. Lu yehei that the malach were a ba'al bechira, so ein hachi nami. Maybe there would be no difference between asking a malach to daven on your behalf, between addressing yourself to the malach or addressing yourself to a tzaddik. You go to a tzaddik and you ask him. to please be mispalel. But heyos that everything to which, you know, to which which people to which people would address themselves, malachim, kochavim, etc., that are all mutba befoolosom, so then the only pshat in what a person is doing is that he's making them intermediaries. It's not, it's not analogous to asking a person to davven on one's behalf. When you ask a person to davven on one's behalf, so you're saying, "No, I recognize that that that that you're a tzaddik and therefore I, I want that your koach hatfillah should be should be applied on my behalf. So I'm asking you to please exercise your bechirah and davven on my behalf. I'm not worshipping you. I'm not making you an an intermediary." But the more people who davven and the, the, the, the more zechuyos that the people davvening have, so then the, the greater the chances that the tfillah will be answered. So that's entirely legitimate. That's entirely legitimate. However, that isn't what's happening if you, if you address yourself to a malach, because a malach can't respond. A malach can't respond. He's, he's mutba befoolosov. So then it's just making the malach—no, so then it's the person is—not, I can't—Rachmana litzlan—then it's, it's insinuating that he can't address the Ribono shel Olam directly, or it's insinuating that the Ribono shel Olam wants us, like dor shel Enosh said, to direct acts of worship to malachim, to to the shemesh, yareiach, etc. That's why it could be, could be, again, keyaduah based on on this, so many object to saying, let's say at the end of selichos, Machnisei Rachamim, הכניסו רחמינו לפני בעל הרחמים, machnisei tfillah, etc. And, and it lichora it certainly is correct that that the Rambam would object. Or or let's say the selichah of malachei rachamim, משרתי עליון חלו נא פני קל, פני קל, I forget how it goes, dar elyon or something. So the Chasam Sofer has a tshuvah about it. Earlier, the Maharal in, in Nesivos Olam, I think in Nesiv Haavodah, talks about it. And and they both are not in favor of it, but their objection is kind of softer than one would expect. One would expect them to say, you know, it's a shaalah of avodah zarah according to the Rambam's yud-gimmel ikkarim. So the Chasam Sofer says, "No, my kuntz with Machnisei Rachamim is," he says, "I say the rest of it more slowly. So then, then, you know, I have to skip to, to catch up with the tzibbur to finish selichos in time, so dilugo alai ahavah," he says. And, and so, so that, that gives me an opening to, to skip the Machnisei Rachamim at the, at the end. Apparently, the going beyond the speed limit for the, for the end of selichos is not a, not a new development; apparently Chasam Sofer had his issues with it as well. And then he says, and about things like malachei rachamim, so you know, not to be poreish min hatzibbur. But I don't know, those aren't—that's not the type of of reaction. And even the Maharal who says yafeh shelo lomar—he says you shouldn't say it. He doesn't, doesn't say it with with the, the forcefulness that one would expect. So he talks as follows: let's say even according to the Rambam, if a person says these again, malachei rachamim, that stanza—it's also in the shlos-esrei middos which we have on the last Monday or Thursday before Yom Kippur and then in Neilah, מידת הרחמים עלינו התגלגלי ולפני קונך. Let's say a person says, maybe that's, maybe that's even more of a problem. Let's say a person says מלאכי רחמים משרתי עליון, but he says it having in mind that malachim are ba'alei bechirah. Again, if you ask the Rambam should I say it, the answer is a resounding no. Okay. If and bediavad if a person said it, does it make any sense according to the Rambam, the answer is a resounding no. But let's say a person did say it, but he said it al da'as that malachim, that malachim have bechirah. So then the pshat is that as wrong and problematic as it is according to the Rambam, even according to the Rambam it wouldn't violate the yesod hachamishi because the person thinks in saying Malachei Rachamim it's no different than going to a tzaddik and asking the tzaddik to daven on his behalf. Again, that is totally mistaken, right? That's a total mistake according to the Rambam. But heyos that it's al da'as kein that the person is saying it, so yitachen that even if a person says it according to the Rambam, it wouldn't be against the yesod hachamishi if he says it based on a mistaken understanding of malachim. If he doesn't have a mistaken understanding of malachim and he says it, I don't know, so then according to the Rambam it's gornisht geferlach. But if, if he says it but with a mistaken understanding of the nature of malachim, so yitachen that that's 100 percent wrong, but it wouldn't violate the yesod hachamishi, and that's why the Maharal and the Chasam Sofer sort of toned down their objection because they recognized that it's being said al da'as kein. That it's being said al da'as that that malachim somehow or other have some kind of bechirah. The Maharal has a line which is very cryptic that the Chasam Sofer in that teshuvah explains. The Maharal has a line where he says that where he questions, he has sh'tei dei'os whether or not you're allowed to daven for someone else. He says afilu, even if you'll say that you can daven for someone else, so what do you mean he has sh'tei dei'os? Moshe Rabbeinu davens for Miriam, אל נא רפא נא לה. Avraham Avinu davens for Avimelech. So what do you mean the Maharal has sh'tei dei'os? So the Chasam Sofer explains very beautifully. Chasam Sofer says it's really meforash in the Maharal, I'm just telling you what it's there. Almost meforash, he says. But but the Chasam Sofer explains very beautifully. The sh'tei dei'os in the Maharal are like this. The first dei'ah which says that there's no such thing as davening for someone else, the Maharal is assuming, hear this rabosai, the Maharal is assuming that before you can daven for someone else you have to feel the tzarah so that you're also a ba'al davar. That when we daven, let's say there's a choleh and someone says can you please daven for, my relative is undergoing surgery, Rachmana litzlan or something. So the first dei'ah in the Maharal is that with detachment, just to do a favor, a person can't daven. There's no such thing as davening for someone else. If a person sufficiently identifies with the choleh, with the tzaras hacholeh, that he feels a need, out of the empathy, that his empathy is such that he feels a need, so that's what allows him to daven. Right, the famous story with Reb Aryeh Levin, right, when he takes his wife to the doctor, "our knee hurts." So according to the first dei'ah in the Maharal it has to be "our knee hurts" before a person can daven for someone else. Then Maharal says אפילו אם תמצא לומר, even if you'll say that you can daven for someone else, okay, no, there is such a thing, but even so it's not making the person an intermediary, it's saying you know, can you please, I want to marshal your koach hatfilah as well. Is the Rambam talking about just being mevakesh from malachim or is he talking about addressing them at all? Like let's say Shalom Aleichem, so some people have a minhag they don't say borchuni leshalom. Does the Rambam say like a piyut like that shouldn't be said at all just because it addresses malachim? So some some say that based on this Rambam one should skip that stanza borchuni leshalom, and others say, again, the background keyadu'a to Shalom Aleichem is the Gemara in Shabbos, right? That when a person comes home from shul he's accompanied by two malachim. And if, and if Shulchan Aruch and mitaso mutzaas, so then the malach, one malach gives the bracha that it should be like that way the Shabbos haba and if it's not, then the other malach says it should be like that way the Shabbos haba. So some say based on this Rambam that one should skip the boachem l'shalom and others say no, you're not asking the malach, you're telling him. Sort of like telling the delivery man, you know, put the, you know, put the boxes down here. Right, you should say it with please, whatever, you know, it should be polite, but l'ma'aseh, you're not, you're not asking for a tovah, right? You're, you know, you're telling him to do his job. So others say, no, that even according to the Rambam, you have in mind that you're not making a bakasha of the malach, you're, you're telling the malach, you know, Ribbono Shel Olam said you're supposed to do it so now, so now do it. What's the point of that? What's the point of the whole, the whole thing? You know, the malachim are not going to be insulted if you don't say shalom aleichem either. So the point of the whole thing is to, you know, is to sort of dramatize that Gemara. השתא דאתינא להכי, that's the point of the, of the piyut to dramatize that Gemara and you know, to make that Gemara real, so then you can say boachem l'shalom balashon tzivui osa. What would the Rambam say to davening at like kivrei tzadikim? Or like, if one were to daven at like kevar avos? So the Maharal, that Maharal there talks about it. The Gemara says that on a ta'anis you go out to the beis hakvaros, optimally to a Jewish beis olam. So how is that different? So the Maharal says that I think the, the lashon is something along these lines, this isn't verbatim but something along these lines: He says המתים מתחברים אל החיים. That there is some al pi nistar there is some connection between the neshamah and where a person's buried. That there is some connection between the neshamah of the niftar and where, where he's buried. So when, when we go out to the beis hakvaros, so the המתים מתחברים אל החיים, he says. And then it's basically the same as asking a live person to daven. Meaning, it's not that you're, you're not and it's very, very important that, that, that we should understand, in going to kivrei tzadikim or kevar avos, it's very, very important that we should understand what we're doing and even more importantly what we're not doing. We're not davening to the meis. That's an avodah zarah-dik thing, that, you know, the meis dies and then you, you know, and then he becomes, and then he becomes a saint and then he's some kind of intermediary and, you know, rachmana litzlan, between people and, and the Ribbono Shel Olam and that you're davening to the meis. So with that kavanah, it's avodah zarah. To go out to kivrei tzadikim with that kavanah is avodah zarah. To go out to kivrei tzadikim, but but it's a Gemara to go out to kivrei tzadikim. Kalev ben Yefunneh, who was very frum, you know, went to kivrei tzadikim to, to daven. But it's with the kavanah, with the understanding that since, again, there is this connection between the meis, the neshamah of the meis and the makom hakevurah, so the המתים מתחברים אל החיים and they identify with the tzara and then, then it's fundamentally the same as asking a live person to daven on one's behalf. What about the person who authored Machnishei Rachamim? Like was he not aware of the fact that malachim are not ba'alei bechirah or? I don't know that, maybe not everyone agrees with the Rambam. You know, the Rashash points out it sounds like Rashi in Sanhedrin doesn't agree, which is why there are people who are yirei v'shaleim who do say it. Not everyone skips it. There are people who are yirei v'shaleim who do say it. But the point is, even if one says it, one has to say it al da'as kein. You know, I guess you could say it balashon tzivui if you want but, but you know, but you can't mix and match, you know, to have the Rambam's understanding of malachim and to say it. So mistama the person who authored that piyut, even the way Rashi quotes certain aggados in Chazal, it’s always very, very difficult if at all possible to know how Rashi understands aggadah because he just presents it and he doesn’t really tell you what it means. But let’s say we just had in Parshas Vayeira that Rashi says that the malachim punished... they said כמשחיתים אנחנו את המקום הזה, they attributed it to themselves and then later they have to concede no, כי לא נוכל לעשות דבר עד בואך שמה, I’m helpless, I can’t do anything. And it could be there is a correlation between that and the Rashi in Sanhedrin לעולם יתפלל אדם שלא יחלו צרים מלמעלה. So there are presumably those who had a different understanding of malachim than the Rambam’s. Again, what exactly it is, I’m not sure if that’s known and presumably that’s the basis for those piyutim that do address malachim, because if a malach is a ba’al bechirah, so then again, the same way you can ask someone who’s alive to daven, and the same way you can go out to the beis hachvaros and ask the meisim to daven, and all that is perfectly acceptable and even recommended. Even recommended, again on a taanis you’re supposed to go out to the beis hachvaros. So if you think malachim are ba’alei bechirah, so then that would be the justification, which is what we’re saying that lichora if a person does it al da’as kein, the Rambam would say it’s 100 percent wrong, and the Rambam would strongly, strongly, strongly discourage it, but at the end of the day I don’t think the Rambam would say that that person was a min for so doing. Does Rebbe think there is a nafka mina between the lashon of the Maharal and the lashon of the Gemara that צדיקים במיתתם קרויים חיים? The Gemara isn’t talking in the context of tefillah. The Gemara reflects the nitzchiyus of the neshamah. Whether that has implications for going out to beis hachvaros and asking them to daven, I don’t know that one would know that from the Gemara. And what the Maharal is explaining the Gemara in Taanis that on a taanis you go out to the beis hachvaros, so he’s explaining the fact that yes, the fact that the neshamah is eternal and that therefore albeit in a different way than we currently exist, niftarim are still alive, is a basis for why the same way I could have asked, the same way Avimelech can ask Avraham Avinu when Avraham Avinu was alive in this world, so he can ask Avraham Avinu, so we can ask Avraham Avinu, Kaleiv ben Yefunneh can ask Avraham Avinu when he’s in the olam haneshamos, olam haba, wherever. That’s why when we’re obviously doing it now, at least three times a day, but now it’s understood, but in other contexts when we’re asked to daven for someone, it’s helpful... in theory and there are some people who have such wonderful Jewish hearts that it’s true in practice also, you tell them a Jew is undergoing surgery, they feel it, and it’s a weh hartz. But I don’t know if I know that not everyone has that. I can’t claim to react that way. If when you give some details and you bring the person to life, it’s easier to identify. You give some details: someone’s father, someone’s child, someone’s grandfather, someone’s... you give some details, it becomes easier for the person davening to identify as opposed to when it’s just we’re saying Tehillim for Reuven ben Leah, we’re saying Tehillim for Yosef ben Rochel. In theory, and again, there are people for whom this is true in practice, and Yisrael kedoshim heim. It's helpful if we're asking people to daven. So again, if it's a name that's known to them, so you just tell them, you know, for whom the tefillos are. But as is often the case in that kind of situation, it isn't necessarily someone who's known to the tzibbur who's being asked to daven. It's appropriate to give a sentence or two to bring the person to life. That person shouldn't be a name. You shouldn't just be Reuven ben Leah. You should be a real person that makes it easier to feel the pain and to identify. And obviously you highlight what's most conducive to generate that sense of empathetic need and pain.

והיסוד השישי הנבואה והוא לידע שבמין האנושי הזה אפשר שימצאו בני אדם שיש להם תכונות מעולות מאוד ושלמות רבה וכוננו נפשם עד כדי קבלת צורת השכל ואותו השכל האנושי מסתבק בשכל הפועל ונאצל ממנו עליהם אצילות נכבדת ואלו הם הנביאים וזו היא הנבואה וזה הוא עניינה וביאור יסוד זה על בוריו יאריך מאוד ואין בכוונתנו להביא מופת על כל יסוד מהם וביאור אופן השגתם לפי שזהו כלל החכמות כולם אלא אזכירם דרך הודעה בלבד וכתבי התורה מעידים על נבואת נביאים הרבה.

The Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, the Ramchal says, is not to give a full explanation, exposition. It's to list the Ikkarim, to list and to give a bare bones definition. So what's very interesting here, the Rav, zecher tzaddik livracha, calls attention to this, is that the Rambam includes within, and again, given how streamlined and how minimalist the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim are intended to be, that אף על פי כן the Rambam includes in the Yesod Hashishi a description, a profile of the Navi. So we would have thought, given again this streamlined approach, the Rambam would have said there's such a thing as nevuah, such a thing as a person receiving a communication. Okay, and then he would have said the sechel hapoel, vechulu. And but the Rambam doesn't do that, right? The Yesod Hashishi, he includes the profile of the Navi. And the same thing is when he presents it in the Yad in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, it's the same thing. מיסודי הדת לידע שהאל מנבא בני אדם. Perek Zayin of Yesodei HaTorah,

מיסודי הדת לידע שהאל מנבא בני אדם ואין הנבואה חלה אלא על חכם גדול בחכמה גיבור במידותיו ולא יהא יצרו מתגבר עליו בדבר בעולם אלא הוא מתגבר בדעתו על יצרו תמיד בעל דעה רחבה נכונה עד מאוד

etcetera. Here too, again, the Yesod includes the profile of the Navi. Because the definition of nevuah according to the Rambam, the definition of nevuah according to the Rambam is this communication, again, derech malach, with the exception of Moshe Rabbeinu, where it's from Hakadosh Baruch Hu, is the communication with an Adam ha-Mushlam. That's what the definition of nevuah is. So this isn't just sort of a, you know, an important element of a full-blown discussion of nevuah, but even the most compact, essential definition of nevuah has to reference the profile of the Navi, because the definition of nevuah is, again, it's a communication that Hakadosh Baruch Hu... which also has the effect as the Rav points out all this is in the beginning of the second half of Ish HaHalachah which also has the effect of basically it then incorporates within the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim the incredible capacity of a human being, right, it's part of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim that a human being can rise to that level of nevuah. That's why the Rambam leshitato unlike others disagree with this, but the Rambam leshitato thinks that Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't make exceptions to this rule. There's no such thing as Hakadosh Baruch Hu granting nevuah to someone who isn't an adam hamushlam. Ay, ויבא אלהים אל לבן and Hagar? So the Rambam says not every time let's say Hakadosh Baruch Hu wants to make a person hear a doorbell, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu will make the sound of a doorbell and the person will hear the doorbell. Does that elevate the person to the level of a navi? No. For whatever reason Hakadosh Baruch Hu wanted the person to hear a doorbell, so the person hears a doorbell. So nevuah is a metaphysical experience; Hakadosh Baruch Hu can miraculously make someone hear a voice which isn't that metaphysical experience of nevuah. So yes, Hagar hears something and Lavan hears something, but they're not being mitnabe; they're being made to hear something. Again, Hakadosh Baruch Hu can make a person hear the doorbell chiming. So instead of making Lavan and Hagar or Avimelech hear the doorbell chiming, so he makes Avimelech hear a voice of hashev eshet haish and he makes Hagar hear a voice of mah lach hagar, but it's not nevuah. The Rambam thinks that Billam wasn't a navi either because there are no exceptions to this rule. What happened in Matan Torah? What happened in Matan Torah? So the Rambam says those who were rauy le'nevuah, what they experienced was nevuah, and וכל העם רואים את הקולות ואת הלפידים etcetera, but for some it was derech nevuah and for some no, it was that again Hakadosh Baruch Hu made this miracle that they physically saw and heard things associated with Ma'amad Har Sinai, but only even by Ma'amad Har Sinai the Rambam says only those who were rauy le'nevuah actually had nevuah. Others hold for instance the Malbim has like this, I think maybe the Drashot HaRan has like this also, that generally the rule is like the Rambam, but by Ma'amad Har Sinai Hakadosh Baruch Hu made an exception and there everyone was takke mitnabe. And for the Rambam there is no such thing. For the Rambam again the definition of nevuah is that it's something that the adam hashalem experiences. Okay, we'll stop there for today.