Introduction. Ikar #1.

Thursday morning, zman, and the Rambam's hakdama to Perek Chelek, beginning with yud-gimmel ikkarim and then we'll see where it goes from there. The Rambam writes that עיקרי תורתנו ויסודותיה הם שלושה עשר יסודות, the fundamental beliefs, there are 13 fundamental beliefs of Torah. Questions were raised against the Rambam from two opposite sides. On the one hand, the Sefer Ha'Ikkarim, Rav Yosef Albo, says that the Rambam should have condensed it into really three ikkarim because when you look at the yud-gimmel ikkarim, the first group deals with Hakadosh Baruch Hu, the second group deals with Torah min Hashamayim, and the third one deals with schar v'onesh. Okay, so then there are details under belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu that he's eino guf and that he's echad, etc. But why did the Rambam count it as 13? He should have organized it as three. And similarly, Torah min Hashamayim, yes, there's nevuah, there's the uniqueness of nevuas Moshe Rabbeinu, and then there's the fact that Torah is immutable, but okay, so those are pratim. The Rambam should have said that there's metzius Hashem, that there's Torah, and then schar v'onesh. Okay, the ikkar of schar v'onesh is, again, part of schar v'onesh is yemos hamashiach and techiyas hamaysim v'chulu. And the Ikkarim bolsters his scheme by saying that if you look at the mussaf shemoneh esrei on Rosh Hashanah, the three brachos of malchiyos, zichronos, and shofros correspond to his alternate scheme: that malchiyos is the first group of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, and zichronos of hashgacha, schar v'onesh, and shofros is אתה נגלית בענן כבודך is Torah. That was one question that's raised against the Rambam. Now the opposite question is raised against the Rambam: that heyos that one of the yud-gimmel ikkarim is that if a person denies any part of Torah, if a person denies one word in Torah, then that makes him, then he's considered a kofer. So what's the difference between the yud-gimmel ikkarim and everything else in Torah? Doesn't that ikkar of Torah min Hashamayim that everything in Torah shebichtav and Torah sheba'al peh, so doesn't that ikkar elevate everything to a level of an ikkar? Those two opposite... then other questions that are raised. The Chasam Sofer asks the question in his tshuvos that he doesn't understand why the Rambam included Mashiach, yemos hamashiach in the yud-gimmel ikkarim. He says it's not really the foundation upon which anything is built. He says lu yehi, he says that there wasn't a havtacha in the Torah of Mashiach and yemos hamashiach. Lu yehi. And lu yehi Rachmana litzlan, this is all contrapositive. And lu yehi Rachmana litzlan that it could be that we'd be in galus forever. So he says, so what? Nothing else in Torah would change. This isn't a foundation for anything else in Torah. If there's no Ribono shel Olam Rachmana litzlan, there's no Torah. If there's no Torah min Hashamayim, there's no Torah. But if there's no Mashiach, so there's no Mashiach. Why then is it something which is foundational? Reb Chaim answered all these questions with just one again profound insight and explanation. Maybe to give a hakdama. Let's say you ask someone how many sons did Noach have and what were their names, and the person doesn't know. So what's he lacking? He's lacking yedias hatorah. Let's say it's a din in Shulchan Aruch that we don't know. So what are we lacking? We're lacking in yedias hatorah. We then rachmana litzlan might be lacking also in observance, but we're lacking in yedias hatorah. What happens if you ask a person you know is Hashem one or is he or is there a multiplicity in Hashem? So is he only lacking in yedias hatorah? That's the she'eila albeit maybe it's a chashuva yedia? No, he's not only lacking in yedias hatorah, he's lacking in emunah. And Reb Chaim says that's what distinguishes and differentiates the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim from everything else in Torah. Everything else in Torah again is Torah and if a person doesn't know it so then he's again he's missing in his yedias hatorah again which may or may not have implications in terms of in terms of shemiras hatorah but he's missing in terms of yedias hatorah. The Yud Gimmel Ikkarim if if you ask a person is there going to be a Melech HaMoshiach Yemos HaMoshiach and he says I don't know so then the person is not only lacking in yedias hatorah he's lacking in basic emunah. Let's say you ask a person are malachim physical or are malachim just intelligences? And he doesn't know. So he's lacking in yedias hatorah. That's not an ikkar emunah to know that malachim are not physical. And when Nevi'im have a nevuah so what they're seeing is not seeing it's not like when we see each other you're seeing the actual person because the person is physical. No they're seeing a mareh they're seeing a chazon. Person doesn't know that he doesn't know that. So he's lacking in yedias hatorah. That's nothing to celebrate but but on the other hand it it that's what it is he's lacking in yedias hatorah it's not more than that. But the Yud Gimmel so where's the line between what's again it's not only questions of what's halacha lema'aseh it's questions again of of understanding belief again are malachim physical or not physical? So where's the line between what's yedias hatorah and what's yedias hatorah but more than yedias hatorah? It's also just so fundamental that a person is considered lacking in emunah so that's where the Rambam identified the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. And that basically answers all the questions. A in terms of the Chasam Sofer's question well maybe that was C. But in terms of the Chasam Sofer's question the Chasam Sofer and others he wasn't the first one to to assume this understood that by ikkarim the Rambam meant things which are foundations. The Ikkarim also understood the Rambam that way. And Reb Chaim said no the Rambam doesn't mean foundations he means fundamental. Again a foundation is is what holds something up right? The foundation of the building is that which supports the whole building. Something can be fundamental in its own right even if it's not foundational to something else. So the Rambam is listing those things which are fundamental to emunah not davka that they're foundational that they're that they're supporting something else. So therefore the test for again you still need to understand what's so fundamental about Melech HaMoshiach Yemos HaMoshiach eini hachi nami but but it's not a question. The fact that that it's not foundational the fact that even if if a person even if there were no Melech HaMoshiach we we would continue to be avdei Hashem eini hachi nami so it's not foundational. But the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim represent what's fundamental because what the Rambam was doing is the Rambam was delineating that which is an intrinsic part of emunah as opposed to that which doesn't which isn't an intrinsic part of emunah but is in the realm of yedias hatorah. That's also the answer to the Ikkarim's question. The Ikkarim says why not say three? Because the whole point is what about Hakadosh Baruch Hu does a person have to know that's so fundamental that if he's lacking it's considered a chisaron in emunah? If the Rambam would have gone with the Ikkarim's scheme so then you wouldn't have known that that thinking that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is physical is such a is so fundamental to emunah. The whole point is that the Rambam does need to specify and he does need to to give the detail because the whole point is to delineate what's what's fundamental that a person is not just considered lacking in deeper understanding or in yedias hatorah no he's lacking in the most elementary and basic emunah. It's not just that he's lacking in a deeper understanding of emunah or that he's lacking not even in emunah but just in yedias hatorah. No he's lacking in the most basic and elementary emunah. whether the Rambam does have to specify that that's, that's, that's absolutely necessary. It would, it wouldn't've achieved the Rambam's purpose if he would've packaged this as three as opposed to thirteen. And that's also the answer to the opposite question on the Rambam, I think maybe the Abarbanel quotes that opposite question on the Rambam of isn't everything an ikar? So ein hachi nami, everything is an ikar if a person denies it. If a person knows that it says in Chumash

ויולד נח שלשה בנים את שם את חם ואת יפת

and he says no, I did my historical research and the names weren't Shem, Cham, and Yaphes. They had different names. So ein hachi nami, so that would be if he's denying what it says in Chumash so that takeh would be kofer. But let's say the person's just ignorant of it. If a person's just ignorant of it, so then there's a difference between ignorance of anything else and ignorance of yud gimmel ikarim. Ignorance of yud gimmel ikarim is again is a deficiency in the most basic emunah mashe-ein kein ignorance of something else is just is ignorance is a shortcoming in yedias hatorah. So that's what when the Rambam says ikarei torasenu v'yesodoseha, he's not takeh talking about foundational, but he's talking about fundamental. Okay. Why isn't this a Chazal? The yud gimmel ikarim, why isn't it a Chazal? Why isn't this so fundamental that I don't know, why isn't this... this should be a Mishna somewhere, no? Why is it... why is it the Rambam a thousand years later? Why isn't there a Mishna? So משל למה הדבר דומה as follows. Let's say you have... you have someone who, you know, unfortunately didn't enjoy the blessing of growing up in a religious home and having any kind of chinuch, much less a proper chinuch. And at age 40, for the first time in his life, he's going to go to shul on Shabbos. So to... that he should know how to behave, you're going to give him a whole systematic list. First you're going to tell him how he should dress, he should know how to dress, and you're going to tell him to make sure that he doesn't have his wallet in his pocket and his cell phone in his pocket and he shouldn't have a pen in his shirt pocket v'chulu. And then you're going to tell him, you know, when you come in, you know, there's going to be two sections, there's going to be a men's section and a women's section, so just be aware of that and make sure you identify the right section and then maybe you'll give him the page numbers in the siddur so he has a sense for, you know, at what juncture where the tefillah is going to be up to etc. etc. etc. etc. And then let's say you have someone else, he's also 40 years old, but he enjoyed the blessing of growing up in a home of Torah and received a proper chinuch. So not only doesn't he need that guide, but even growing up, I don't know whether he was ever told, you know, on Shabbos you have to wear Shabbos clothes. He just saw that, growing up, he just saw that, you know, that his parents put out the Shabbos clothes for him every Shabbos and he saw that his parents and his siblings, everyone was dressed differently. So it was never presented to him systematically, but he just absorbed it all very naturally through exposure, through osmosis. Which ideally, right, it shouldn't, right, ideally in an ideal world where every every Jew would enjoy the blessing of growing up in a Torah-dikke home, so you wouldn't need such a... or you wouldn't need, you know, such a manual, such a systematic list of rules and a guide, and you wouldn't have to have a beginner's service in an ideal world where everyone had enjoyed the blessing of a proper chinuch. So the need for the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim reflects a yeridas hadoros. It wasn't that that that that bimai Chazal, you know, that these beliefs weren't recognized and understood, but with yeridas hadoros, so then one needs a more systematic and we need the guide, you know, we need it. And that's what the Rambam recognized that that need had developed post-Chazal. If Chazal would have seen the same, so then אינמי הכי נמי מסתמא this would have been a... this would have been a Mishna. Maybe it would have been the first Mishna. But the need for for this kind of systematic approach is a reflection of a yeridas hadoros. It's true of a lot of the, you know, you know, it's true in very different contexts than the Rambam's Yud Gimmel Ikkarim also. You know, you read the Mishnah Berurah's hakdama to why he wrote Mishnah Berurah. He wrote Mishnah Berurah because I don't know, if if everyone was a very big talmid chacham, so we wouldn't need a Mishnah Berurah. So everyone would be a big baki in Masechet Shabbos with the Rishonim and Tur and Shulchan Aruch, you wouldn't have a Mishnah Berurah. But l'ma'aseh it's it's not like that. It's not like that. A lot a lot a lot of sefarim are, you know, represent a need in a less than ideal world. And therefore, you know, the fact that that you find something, you know, relatively late, it's no kasha why why you didn't have it earlier. Why didn't the Rambam tell us what the criteria for the ikkarim are? I think for the most part the Rambam... most of them are self-evident, right? The the ones that are a little tricky are when you get to the twelfth and the thirteenth, probably Moshiach and Techiyas HaMeisim. Why are those so fundamental? But the Techiyas HaMeisim is is so fundamental as the first mishna in Perek Chelek, so it's not you know,

הכופר בתחיית המתים מן התורה אין לו חלק לעולם הבא.

So and there the Rambam takeh does tell us why. He doesn't tell us in Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, but in his Ma'amar Techiyas HaMeisim that the Rambam wrote towards the end of his life, he he takeh explains why he put them in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Ke-midumeh that's the only one of the thirteen that that we have sort of the commentary from the Rambam himself. And the Rambam says the Rambam wrote Iggeres Techiyas HaMeisim, he was accused, obviously falsely maligned, of not believing in physical resurrection, of not believing in Techiyas HaMeisim pshuto k'mashmao, physical resurrection, you know, despite the fact that that he writes it in Perek Yud of Hilchos Teshuva. And the Rambam says, you know, the fact that you say something once doesn't doesn't create doesn't raise any questions about whether it's true or fundamental. It's שמע ישראל ה' אלקינו ה' אחד only once in the Chumash, you know, the fact that that something is said once doesn't create any any doubt as to you know whether it's fundamental, whether it's something that that one, you know, subscribes to b'lev vanefesh. And the Rambam says, you know, this whole thing is so absurd. He says but if I have to write anyway, so let let me write a little bit and you know besides just dispelling this hotza'as shem ra, so let let me explain a little bit to you. So the Rambam says that the... Source for techiyas hameisim, the pesukim in Daniel where רבים מישני אדמת עפר, the pesukim describe how those who, I think that's where we get the ve'emunaso liyishenei afar, so that phrase in the Shemoneh Esrei comes from Daniel, yashenei afar as a depiction of those who have been niftar. And it says yakitzu that they're going to wake up. So the Rambam says the only reason maybe it should be understood metaphorically, maybe this shouldn't be understood literally, there are things in Tanakh which are intended to be understood figuratively, so maybe that possuk in Daniel is supposed to be understood. So the Rambam says that the only time you take something and don't take it at face value, again, if you just sort of piecing things together, if you have such a tradition from Moshe Rabbeinu, we have such a tradition that ayin tachas ayin is not supposed to be understood literally, that ayin tachas ayin means mamon. Okay, so you have a tradition which says that it's not to be understood literally, you don't understand it literally. But otherwise, absent such a tradition, and there is no such tradition about the pesukim in Daniel, so the only time you take something literally is if it can't be understood literally. If it can't, you don't need a tradition that when the Torah talks about Yad Hashem or Einei Hashem that it's not literal because it can't be understood literally. But the pesukim of techiyas hameisim can be understood literally and the only reason not to understand them literally is if a person doesn't believe in miracles. The Rambam says basically techiyas hameisim is the ultimate miracle, the ultimate miracle because when the body dies and when the person dies and the body decomposes, so that's something which is an irreversible, naturally on a natural level that's an irreversible process. So he says the only reason that people, people who deny techiyas hameisim, he says they don't have any, it's not whatever however they posture, it's not techiyas hameisim per se that they're objecting to, they don't believe in miracles. The Rambam says and that's why I put it in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. So basically techiyas hameisim, the Rambam tells us in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim represents the belief in miracles, that things happen in the world which are supernatural. Right, when does the Rambam believe techiyas hameisim is going to happen? Because at least as it's listed in that ein bein between yemos hamashiach and malkhus beis david. It happens then in yemos hamashiach. So why isn't it listed in that ein bein? Ein bein means in terms of how the, in terms of what daily life is. As daily life for the Rambam, yemos hamashiach, according to that memra d'chazal, is it's still olam hazeh. Again, it's olam hazeh with the techiyas hameisim that people have a second, a second go round. But again, then the other thing which the one, the only one I think of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim which is kind of not intuitive or not entirely intuitive is yemos hamashiach. So that I don't know if the Rambam himself explains why. Again, you do see intimations in the Gemara. The Gemara says that the Amora Hillel believed in a yemos hamashiach but didn't think there was necessarily a Melech Hamashiach. He believed in a yemos hamashiach but didn't necessarily believe that at the center of that acharis hayamim stood a Melech Hamashiach. And the Gemara says שרי ליה מריה להו, may the Lord forgive him, meaning. So the Amoraim, one Amora will counter what another Amora says all the time. But it doesn't say shrei lei, may the person be forgiven. So you get again this doesn't explain the sevara but you sort of do get intimations that that is sort of more than the typical mistake or something, that there's much more at stake there than in other areas. When Rabbeinu Hakadosh was writing down Mishnayos, so wasn't he thinking l'doros, meaning not just what people need to hear right now that they're going to forget Torah, but also generation after generation after generation? So is it just such a yemida that Rabbeinu Hakadosh couldn't even fathom Again, it's not, the Rambam says that everything the Rambam comments, I think, after the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, he says, everything I got is in Chazal, so it's not that it's out there, it's just that it's not presented as such because, again, the same way the child who grew up, I don't know, I don't know. Everything we need is there. I don't think there's an expectation that everything is there in the tzurah that we need it. Was there supposed to be a Mishna about electrical lights or something? Everything is there. Lav davka. The Yesod HaRishon the Rambam writes, Metzius HaBorei Yisborach,

והוא שיש שם מצוי בשלמות ביותר שבכל אופני המציאות, והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם,

u'vo kiyum metziusam, u'mimenu hasmadas kiyumam. It goes without saying, the precision with which the Rambam wrote is extraordinary, and, again, sometimes the barrier of translation doesn't really makes it more difficult for us to see it, but here it, again, as a tribute to the translation, it actually comes across pretty clearly. But the Rambam has three phrases here, right? That והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם, u'vo kiyum metziusam, u'mimenu hasmadas kiyumam. Right? Three different phrases which seem all to be talking about the same basic thing. But what's quite clear what the Rambam is telling us is the following. The Rav zichrono l'vracha used to point out that in the very beginning of Yesodei HaTorah, the Rambam writes

יסוד היסודות ועמוד החכמות לידע שיש שם מצוי ראשון והוא ממציא כל הנמצא.

So mamtzi is lashon hoveh, right? It's not himtzi, which would be the past tense. The way we say it is Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world. And the Rambam says that Hakadosh Baruch Hu gives existence to everything that exists. And that's the translation of mamtzi kol hanimtza. He gives existence to everything that exists. Which means, and again this is, we'll often say the Rambam is saying this, the Rambam is saying this, but there's nothing singularly Rambam about this. The Nefesh HaChaim begins by talking about the same point in the beginning of Nefesh HaChaim, that it's part of the Yesod HaRishon that there is no existence independent of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. And even when Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world, the world remains dependent upon Hakadosh Baruch Hu for its continued existence. It's not that once Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the world ה' תשפ"ד years ago, so then now we exist, the world exists by virtue of inertia because we were brought into existence and then mimaila, okay, so now there's a new status quo and by virtue of inertia we continue to exist. No, that's what the Rambam says, mamtzi kol nimtza. It's not that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created something which now has an independent existence. The world doesn't have an independent existence. The world... always feeds off of, exists through HaKadosh Baruch Hu. And nothing ever exists in any other way. Everything exists through HaKadosh Baruch Hu. And if you look at the three phrases, basically the three phrases are avar hoveh ve'atid, right? That והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם, so ila means the cause, right? So והוא עילת מציאות הנמצאים כולם if you're looking in the past, uvo kiyum metziusom means in the present and right now, there what sustains their existence is bo, is in him, is that's what sustains kiyum metziusom. That's what sustains their, referring to everything, everything that exists. Uvo kiyum metziusom and umimenno hasmodas kiyumom, again looking towards the future and what will sustain beyond right now, what will sustain their existence is mimenno, is from him. Again avar hoveh ve'atid, again reflecting what the Rambam says, mamtzi kol nimtza, that there is no existence outside of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. Even when HaKadosh Baruch Hu created the world, there's no existence outside of HaKadosh Baruch Hu. That existence is His, existence is exclusively His and therefore everything that exists, again exists because of him, through him, and from him. That's what the Rambam then again to impress this point says do the following thought experiment. ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו, do the following thought experiment: if you could imagine that there's no Ribbono Shel Olam, so הייתה בטלה מציאות כל נמצא. To understand again the complete contingency and dependence of our existence, again the moshal, there are no adequate meshalim obviously, but the partial moshal would be as follows: let's say you have someone who sees a ventriloquist perform or goes to a puppet show and they've never seen a ventriloquist before, they've never been to a puppet show before, and you want to explain to him what was really happening, what he saw. So you'll say if you imagine that the puppeteer hadn't been there, so then the puppets wouldn't be able to move. Okay, using the moshal of puppets moving, the nimshal being our very existence, not just our motion, but our very existence. Or with a ventriloquist, if the ventriloquist hadn't been there, so then you wouldn't have heard sounds, there couldn't have been sounds coming from any place else and anything else. Because ultimately, again, everything was the puppeteer, everything was the ventriloquist. And the way to make the person understand what the puppet show was all about is to tell him do this thought experiment, and if you imagine that you had the puppets without the puppeteer, so nothing would have happened. If you had the other objects, whatever it is, but you didn't have the ventriloquist, so there wouldn't have been any sounds.

ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק מציאותו, הייתה בטלה מציאות כל נמצא, לא יישאר מחמת עצמו במציאותו.

Again using the motion, the movement of the puppets as the moshal to existence, that absent the puppeteer, so then the puppets wouldn't move. On the other hand, again, and this also just to fully understand what the relationship is between the puppeteer and the puppets, ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק הנמצאים כולם זולתו, let's say imagine that there were no puppets. So there still would have been a puppeteer. Okay, he wouldn't have been performing, but there still would have been a puppeteer, right? Removing the puppets, it's not there's nothing reciprocal about this relationship. ואילו יכולנו לשער סילוק הנמצאים כולם זולתו, imagine that you had been here and there hadn't been puppets, it wouldn't have affected the puppeteer. והייתה מציאותו יתעלה ולא תיגרע, it wouldn't have in any way affected the puppeteer.

כי הוא יתעלה קיים מצד עצמו ואינו נצרך במציאותו לזולתו.

HaKadosh Baruch Hu is absolutely independent in terms of His existence

וכל מה שזולתו מהתחלת עולם וכל המלאכים וגם הגלגלים ומה שלמטה מהם.

He's not dependent upon anything, even the highest most. spiritual things, intellectual things that he created. He doesn't need any of it, he's independent of all of it. And certainly Mah shelemata mehem, הכל נצרך ממציאותו אליו. Everything depends for its existence, again, having coming into existence, its continued existence, and looking to the future, its ongoing existence. Again, those three phrases, הכל נצרך ממציאותו אליו. Vezah haysod harishon הוא שהורה עליו בדיבור אנכי ה'. So basically, when you summarize the first Ikar, the first Ikar is not only that—only in quotation marks—is not only that Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists. It's not only that there is a Ribono Shel Olam, that there is Hakadosh Baruch Hu; it's that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is existence. There's no existence without him, right? So it goes much deeper than just Hakadosh Baruch Hu exists; it's that there is no existence independent of him, even post Berias Haolam, again, הוא ממציא כל נמצא. Again, maybe another mashal: your electrical appliance is never independent of its battery or its electrical cord which is plugged into the outlet. The fact that you have this fan or this air conditioner or this refrigerator, but it doesn't, again, using the functioning as the mashal for the very existence in terms of the entire beriah, it always remains just totally dependent upon the battery, upon the electrical current. If people's schedule allows, even though the Tehillim has been spun off to a separate slot, as much as possible that there should be one main Mincha is still very significant during these times. So if people can make davka the 2:30 Mincha in the Beis Medrash, so that's certainly most preferable.