Q&A (Dec. 6, 2021)

I apologize for my Thursday no-show rabosai, but just
wanted to see who would come lishmah for the Q&A without the without
the pizza, without the doughnuts. Okay, so some of the some questions were
pre-submitted. I'll begin with a couple of those, but they're not meant to
preclude either follow-up or other questions that weren't that weren't
submitted ahead of time. It wasn't intended to censor anyone's questions, but
just to be able to have a little bit of momentum initially.

Maybe to begin with two totally different questions but
relating more narrowly to shiur and then בלי
נדר בעזרת השם
move on to other things. One question relates to the the pace of shiur,
the the way it was conveyed about learning iyun at such a fast pace. One
of the developments or one of the practice, contemporary practices in yeshivas
which has been decried, lamented, and bemoaned by numerous numerous gedolim
is the tortuously slow pace at which at which learning happens. You know, you
can meet someone and and this clearly is not singling out any particular yeshiva,
unfortunately.

It's not, you know, it's not that, "Oh, that means yeshiva
X." Unfortunately, that's not the case. You know, you can meet someone Hanukkah
time at the beginning of Tevet and ask them where they're holding, and
the answer can be daf daled or something when they began the zman
learning Rif and beginning of the zman in Gemara,
beginning of the zman on daf bet. You know, countless gedolim,
you know, have and continue to bemoan that fact. For whatever reason, maybe
it's important to know what the reasons are in order to be able to remove
whatever obstacles exist, but for now let's not let's not look to identify any
reasons.

But for whatever reasons, those calls, those wake-up calls,
those pleas have fallen on deaf ears. And it's a major major problem. I think
we're learning too slowly, I don't think we're learning too too quickly. I I
feel I I feel remiss.

I feel having let you down and that we're not further. Not
that we're not that we haven't been learning more slowly. It just doesn't the
math of learning so slowly just doesn't add up. One needn't be an actuary and
have passed multiple exams to to recognize that fact.

The math of learning so slowly doesn't add up. And what's
more, there's only so much iyun we're capable of in any given sugya.
So I don't think we're learning quickly. I think we're learning a little bit
too slowly.

And I don't know, my brother sheyichye k'mo domo used
to used to say that that a person has to train himself. to learn what what what
he experiences as quickly. But maybe initially it seems quick, a person the
same way, you know, a person can build up the stamina, the physical stamina and
the focus to train himself to walk quickly and it doesn't mean that he's going
to be tripping over himself, tripping over his own feet all the time. No, a
person can develop the muscles, develop the leg muscles, develop the the have
have the aerobic exercise and and the respiratory capacity to be able to walk
quickly and then a person doesn't mean a person will trip, aderaba he'll
just he'll get places, he'll cover he'll cover more ground.

So the same way the physical, the leg muscles and the lung
capacity need to be need to be developed, the brain muscles need to be
developed also. And wherever you turn, this lament is heard. You look in the Steipler,
the Steipler has for instance in his letters, igros hadracha, kol
hagedolim, peh echad, that we're all learning much too slowly and
not covering enough ground. A very different question about shiur is the
why we're wearing masks in shiur.

So as as we all know officially, as far as I know, I haven't
heard that it's been rescinded officially, the last email I got that dealt with
it, at least the last email that I saw that that dealt with it, reiterated that
the university still has a mask policy in all buildings, in all common spaces.
Now, bepoel obviously that isn't true. And it's one big sheker to
say that there is a mandate. There's no such thing as a mandate which is not
very very heavily encouraged and if necessary enforced.

Otherwise, it's not a mandate. Maybe it's a wish, maybe it's a
chalom, maybe all of those but but it isn't it isn't a mandate. So it's
a sheker. It's a sheker to say that there's that there's a
mandate.

There isn't a mandate. Now I don't think that the talmidim
are the ones who are purveying the sheker. They're neither the ones who
have adopted or announced this policy. So it's not as if I think that anyone
here is actively engaged in sheker by not complying with a so-called
mandate because it isn't a mandate because it's not even encouraged, על אחת כמה
וכמה enforced.

But lemaise, you know when we were learning the Tosafos
about Shabbos, so we saw the distinction, you know you can have
something which is what the gavra does in the mitzvah and then
you can have the cheftza shel mitzvah. One's sensitivity to sheker
should be, Dovid Hamelech says, sheker sonesi v'asoeva in תהלים קיט. Dovid Hamelech doesn't just say,
you know, I tell the truth at all times, the whole truth and nothing but the
truth. It's not only that I, Dovid Hamelech, will not speak sheker,
I, Dovid Hamelech, won't engage in sheker.

No, I, Dovid Hamelech, detest and abhor sheker.
That's what Dovid Hamelech says. So I don't know, and I I I raise the
the question for your consideration. I don't know, a person walks into the
building and there's the sign, I don't know, they still have the signs when you
when you enter the building or not, I haven't noticed lately.

But a person walks into the building and there's the sign:
mask mandate. And he's not wearing a mask. Is he guilty of sheker? No.
But is he somehow or other part of a play and a facade of sheker? Yes,
he is.

Is he guilty of sheker? No. Is he speaking sheker?
Is he acting in a way that that is sheker? No. Is there some association
with an institution institutional fraud and an institutional sheker. I
don't know.

I don't know. I don't know. I don't think any individual Rebbe
is entitled to suggest what happens anywhere other than in his own classroom,
but in his own classroom, that is the individual Rebbe's responsibility.
So as a Shiur, I don't think we should...

we should not only avoid propagating sheker, we should
avoid having any association with it even if we're not the ones who are
responsible for the sheker. Why should a person be associated with sheker?
Nothing to do with whatever the medical and public health merits are or are
not. Just on purely... on these, on these, on these other grounds.

Again, at any point if people questions, comments, people
should not hesitate. There's one of the questions that was submitted: If one
feels more connected to a different community, should they strongly reconsider
or should they go with their heart? Is the YU hashkafa undeniable emes
and therefore correct for everyone, or can one belong to a different community
and grow more elsewhere? So as is often the case with good questions that can't
be answered with one word, the answer is not yes, the answer is not no, and
there are distinctions that need to be drawn. There are certainly elements of
the YU hashkafa where there are very legitimate and valid alternatives.
There are elements of the YU hashkafa which taka are emes
and one should not be abandoning them for the sociological alternatives which
are not really Torah alternatives.

So maybe we'll begin by talking about some of the things which
fall into that second class, that second category. One pillar of Torah,
of Torah living, that we try to transmit in the Yeshiva is that Torah
demands balance. It demands balance in so many different pivotal areas. It
demands balance, it demands integrating different elements, different
components.

So for instance, Bitochon and Hishtadlus, person
has to know how how the two are integrated and what's an authentic integration
and balance between Bitochon and Hishtadlus and what isn't. Bitochon
doesn't, Bitochon never relieves a person of obligations that the Torah
imposes upon the person. The Torah says V'nishmartem Meod
L'nafshoseichem. The Torah says רק
השמר לך ושמר
נפשך מאד which the Rambam
in הלכות
רוצח ושמירת
נפש and then the Mechaber after him in Shulchan
Aruch quote as referring to avoiding danger, safeguarding life.

The Torah doesn't say have Bitochon. The Torah
doesn't say ignore what doctors say, ignore ignore I'm not talking about now,
I'm talking about the earlier in the pandemic more than now Torah
doesn't say ignore doctors, the Torah doesn't say ignore public health
protocols and have Bitochon. When you do that, all you do is arrange for
more Levayas than would have otherwise happened. That's not Bitochon
and it's not Torah.

That that's what what results and resulted from from that.
Person has to know what the balance is between between Bitochon and Hishtadlus
in the area of Pikuach Nefesh in the context of a pandemic, especially
the first spring of the pandemic, spring 2020 in the in the tri-state area.
There's nothing what which is particularistic about YU or YU Hashkafa in
trying to teach and transmit that type of balance. There's certainly a a range
of opinions of what - and there already was in the Rishonim - what one's
attitude towards Chochma is.

And there there are legitimate different Drachim and Mahalachim.
It isn't, it isn't a legitimate Derech in Torah to have such
indiscriminate total Bittul for the outside world that one can ignore
medical consensus. It threatens lives and it makes a Chillul Hashem.
There's no eival v'eival in in that type of of imbalance.

So there has to be a balance between obviously there's so much
in the outside world which is so wrong and so crazy, literally crazy, literally
crazy. Society back in the 1960s began denying the reality of traditional
values, of moral law. And now society just denies facts. Everyone makes up
their own facts.

People don't have genders anymore. It's insane. It's not just
wrong. It's literally crazy.

Should one in an unfiltered sense be open to the outside
world? Of course not. Of course not. Is רובא
דרובא דרובא
דרובא just so mekulkal? Of course
it is. But אף על פי
כן, a person can't
be indiscriminate.

If the bitul becomes such that when one acts contrary
to halacha and ignores, again talking about the early stages of COVID,
and ignores medical consensus even if it's true that 99%, 99.9% needs to be
rejected, it's a dangerous imbalance to inflate 99.9% into a hundred percent.
That's not a YU hashkafa. That's Torah and the alternative is not Torah.
It's nothing to do with YU.

It has something to do with YU in the sense that we try to
teach and transmit that, but there's nothing particularistic about that.
There's a stress on honesty, on yosher, which is Torah. It's not any
particular version of Torah. It's not a particular derech within Torah.

It's Torah. To posture to secular authorities that a school or
a camp is masking because you have kids put on masks when there's an
investigation and they don't wear masks the rest of the time, it's not a
particular version of Torah. It's not a particular shita within Torah.
Torah says that a person has to be straight, has to be yosher, has to be
honest.

A person has to be straight. A person can't dray and
look to deceive and that's not Torah. It's not a question of hashkafa A
versus hashkafa B. So there certainly is a range of drachim and
there are certainly things that a person will see here which are correct which
is not to say we don't have our problems and we don't have our chesronos.

We obviously do. We have our problems, we have our chesronos,
we have our inconsistencies. That's all obviously painfully very true. But in
terms of what's right, a person needs to distinguish between what's right which
is Torah and there is no alternative even if one doesn't always find it
universally, as opposed to what's right where there's a machlokes on it.

And a person needs to, in terms of this question, a person
needs to distinguish. And when it's clear what the emes is, it's not. I
think that there's a famous maise with Rav Yonason Eibeschütz
that I guess it was a priest, I don't remember who the one who asked him, but
it said it says in the Torah achray rabim lehatos. So the adherents of
our religion far outnumber the adherents of your religion, so achray rabim
lehatos.

So the Rebbe Yonason answered, he said achray rabim
lehatos is when something is mutar besafek, so then you follow the rov.
When there's no safek, there's no achray rabim lehatos. Certain
things which are emes, it doesn't make a difference how popular that emes
may be at any given point, it doesn't matter where one does or doesn't find
that emes, if it's emes, it's emes. And there's nothing
that is a counterforce to that.

I guess the Oberishter should feel free to considering
that it is emes, so then what does it say about other communities or
individuals that did not end up seeing this as emes? It requires a
no-holds-barred cheshbon hanefesh and it also has implications as to
whom one can look for for psak and hadracha in many areas. It
does have implications. It's not something that didn't happen and it's not
something that didn't make us aware of very painful realities. No, there's no
triumphalism associated with that statement.

That statement, there's only pain that's associated with that
statement. But that is the reality. It's not something that should be
forgotten. It's not just that Baruch Hashem we have vaccines and halevai
that we have turned the corner here and there aren't going to be any
developments which there are issues which need to be recognized and contended
with and there are implications, there are definitely implications.

Rabbi, maybe say some of the bigger issues that are into the eileh
v'eileh cheshbon and how to make that cheshbon if we should
go achray rabim on those issues? It's not technically achray rabim.
Technically achray rabim is when you have a body such as the Sanhedrin
that is omaid leminyan. That's what achray rabim is. But it's not
technically achray rabim to sort of let's say, I mean this comment has
been made, if a person makes an intergenerational study and comes up with,
well, seven Rishonim say like this, four Rishonim say like that,
technically achray rabim lehatos doesn't apply here.

Okay, one may or may not non-technically look to that, but
it's not automatic because technically achray rabim is when it's within
a body such as the Sanhedrin which is omaid leminyan. So since
it's not technically achray rabim, it's also not automatically achray
rabim either way. There were lots of, let's say, issues in chinuch
where there are legitimate differences of opinion. We mentioned one: what what
should the attitude towards chochma be? And and and there's legitimate
differences of of opinion there.

And yitachen that, you know, not only should that
should those legitimate differences of opinion as it were be tolerated, but
it's enriching that those differences of opinion. When the differences are
legitimate, so again, it's not just something that we sort of begrudgingly
acknowledge, but it's something that is is enriching. I don't know that there's
the same way there's no there isn't necessarily one institution which is the
best yeshiva for everyone to to learn in. Lav davka that there's
one particular derech which is which is the best derech for
everyone.

Post the Chofetz Chaim, the famous Chofetz Chaim
on Likkutei Halachos in Sotah, דף
כה עמוד ב. There obviously isn't a a consensus as exactly how to
translate that. So there's different... okay, so some...

that's not to say that... the fact that there are legitimate
differences means that every view that's espoused is automatically legitimate;
that certainly isn't the case. But there are there are legitimate differences
and legitimate differences in in approach. So there are, especially in inyanei
chinuch, there are many such many such things.

Another, sort of shifting gears majorly, one of the questions
here is, what's an appropriate question to ask during shiur? So that in
fact is an appropriate question to ask. There's so I think there are two
considerations to have. The first one is is easy to assess, relatively
speaking, or easier to to assess. The second one is is probably more more
challenging, more difficult to assess.

First one is that a question which which one asks during shiur,
one's sense should be that it's of interest and relevance and importance to the
ulam, not not just to to oneself. The other question is, the second
consideration is that asking questions is is a very very important integral...
part of learning but it shouldn't substitute for the yegia v'amala of
thinking through what was said. And sometimes, and again this is obviously not
so easy to assess and the judgment call isn't always so easy to make, but
sometimes what's needed is to chazar the shiur, look up the marei
mekomos, try to think through at one's own pace what was said, and to ask a
question and have it repeated in lieu of doing that, one shortchanges oneself.

Because the growth in learning happens from being challenged
to think and rethink and walk it through, walk through the mahalach for
oneself, not just very sort of passively receive it. And if the question is one
that wouldn't be necessary if the person would first chazor and then
look up, maybe I hadn't seen the Ramban that we were discussing
beforehand, or if I had seen it maybe I hadn't noticed the diyuk, or
maybe I hadn't thought about this mahalach, maybe I just need to think
through what the question was, what the ra'aya was, so to ask that
question shortchanges oneself. Because it means that the growth in learning
comes from, again, not just passively receiving, but from then sort of actively
rethinking and reconstructing and reenacting the mahalach. And questions
asked prematurely can abort that process, and then one is shortchanged.

So that is a very, very weighty consideration in terms of
whether to ask a question or not. And then you should never ask a question if
I'm not going to know the answer; I mean, that's a comfortable place. I'm
kidding, so that wasn't that serious now, okay. Any - how important, if at all,
is interfaith dialogue, especially after the recent Abraham Accords? So I'm
obviously aware of the Abraham Accords.

I'm not aware of what's going on in terms of interfaith
dialogue after that, so I can't relate to that specifically. In general, the Rav's
seforim are treasures that we should try to take full advantage of. One of
those treasures is his essay, Confrontation, where he talks about the question
of interfaith dialogue and the short. Summation of his position is no.

People, a lot of, a lot of. People like to ask certain
questions about confrontation. Well, how is it that the Rav's essay
Lonely Man of Faith, which was originally an oral presentation, was made in
front of a non-Jewish audience? So that is factually accurate, that that is
true. It has zero bearing on the essay Confrontation, because what interfaith
dialogue means, the either explicitly stated or implicitly albeit unstated
premise of dialogue is that through dialogue on religious matters, so then
we'll learn to overcome, we'll learn to sort of find common ground.

Sort of the same way that there should be, the Torah is emes,
Yiddishkeit is emes, and there's no need and no justification for
making the Torah, Toras emes, Toras Hashem, a one voice of many
in terms of talking about what is or isn't true, what is or isn't correct. When
the Rav gave that drasha, which later was written up as Lonely
Man of Faith, he wasn't dialoguing with anyone. He wasn't saying, you tell me
what your conception of faith is and I'll tell you what my conception of faith
is and then you give in to me on this and I'll give in to you on that, and you
recognize the church for whatever it is and then maybe we'll consider stopping
to launch pogroms as we've been doing for the past two millennia, that will be
the quid pro quo. Dialogue means quid pro quo.

It means splitting differences. There's no room for interfaith
dialogue. Are there elements of Torah and Toras emes which are universal
and which someone can share meaningfully and appropriately with a non-Jew? Yes,
non-Jews are supposed to have emunah. They're supposed to have faith.

They're supposed to know what it means to have faith. That's
not interfaith dialogue. That's teaching universal elements of truth. So did
the Rav do that? He absolutely did that.

But when it came to interfaith dialogue, he understood that
interfaith dialogue is based on a very different premise. It's based on again,
dialogue means you engage in dialogue to learn how to get along with each other
and you split differences. Torah doesn't negotiate with any other, lehavdil,
lehavdil, lehavdil system of belief. So interfaith dialogue is not a good
thing.

It's not a good thing. The Abraham Accords in terms of just
the recognition of Medinas Yisrael, that there shouldn't be a state of
war, that there should be a political understanding and that there should be
political dialogue and there should be political and economic cooperation are
all very big positives. But not interfaith dialogue. And if you read
Confrontation carefully, he says it between the lines.

He says it between the lines. He actually says it in the lines
if you read it. He says the community of the many, let us not deceive
ourselves, the community of the many, that refers to the Catholic Church, the
community of the many will not be satisfied with any halfway measures from the
community of the few. Interfaith dialogue was a way to shmad Jews.

That's what the point of interfaith dialogue was. It was a way
to shmad Jews and he saw it for what it was. How does Rebbi
Soloveitchik's shiur differ from that of the Rav? And why is Rebbi
able to give a shiur differently if at all? I apologize, but I can't
even respond. There's no, I can't mention them in the same breath even to
explain what the differences are.

They're not, they're not in the same universe. Is it moral or
correct for some Jews to subtly try to be mekarev people who we think
are not as affiliated, if we're not willing to, we don't want anyone to try to
be mekarev us to their way? In the workplace or with neighbors, things
like that, that are unaffiliated? Sure it is. If let's leave religion aside. If
you don't smoke and you have a coworker who does smoke, so it's a medically
established fact how dangerous smoking is.

So it's totally appropriate that you should want to be mashpia
on them, but you shouldn't want him to be mashpia on you. If you're
right and he's wrong, so then it should be a one-way street. You're looking to
be mashpia on him, but not that he should be mashpia on you.
Sometimes in life, yes, there are lots of things in life which are gray, but
there's also lots of things in life which are black and white.

And when we're dealing with black and white and we believe in
absolute truth. Not every disagreement you have with your chavrusa is a
question of absolute truth on one side or the other. But of course there's
absolute truth. And in many things in life you're right and the other person is
wrong.

And when that is the case, so then yes, you want to be mashpia
on him letovato. It's not a power grab, it's not a power play. You want
to be mashpia on him, but you don't want him to be mashpia on
you. It's 100% appropriate.

In different sects of Jews I guess there's some areas where
they rely on their rebbeim as da'as Torah much more and other
areas where just discuss things with rebbeim to a lesser extent. What
does Rebbi think is the right amount or what topics should specifically,
what's the line for when you should be discussing with a rebbe as
opposed to when you should be deciding for ourselves and other things? So let's
maybe initially talk about if the question is something which is a shaila
in halacha, not a question where a person's looking for hadracha.
You know, is this the right young lady for the yeshiva bachur to be
marrying is not a purely halachic shaila, but it requires hadracha.
So let's leave that aside for a moment and talk about things which really are
questions where ultimately the answer is muttar, assur, chiyuv,
not chiyuv, etc. A person needs to be aware and hopefully the rav
to whom he goes is even more aware and hasn't been misled by anyone, needs to
be aware of what elements are relevant other than the mastery of Shulchan
Aruch.

There's a letter from Rav Chaim Ozer where Rav Chaim
Ozer said how was it that in 19th-century Germany there was a major dispute
between Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch and the Wurtzburger Rav, Rav
Bamberger. as to whether or not the Orthodox should break off and form
their own Kehilla or whether they should remain a part of the general Kehilla.
So Chaim Ozer writes they were both very very great individuals but they
weren't mammash the two greatest gedolim of their day. They were
both very very great, both mishichmo vamala, but they weren't mammash
the two greatest.

So how is it that they didn't send the shaila? Like why
is it that each one sort of followed his understanding? Why didn't they? Why
didn't they? Each one was aware of the other, why didn't they submit the shaila
to to someone whom they both would have agreed upon and and there certainly
were such individuals you know who towered even above them. So Chaim Ozer
writes because some shailos you have to have a first hand grasp of the metzius
in order to have to be able to give an answer. It's not something which is an
explicit case in Shulchan Aruch, it's a question of applying Shulchan
Aruch to a metzius. When the question is not just a machat
b'kurkavan, which is what the case itself is in Shulchan Aruch, but
it's a question of applying Shulchan Aruch, so then so much of what the
answer hinges on is how you understand and grasp and analyze the metzius.

And by definition you can't provide that to someone else
because you're just providing what you see. So anyone to whom Rav Samson
Raphael Hirsch would have presented the question would have obviously you know
been likely to agree with Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, not because he
wouldn't have been totally honest and ehrlich about it, but just because
that's how he grasped and understood and analyzed the metzius and the
pros and cons etc. That's what Chaim Ozer said they didn't send the shaila
because they couldn't send the shaila because you have to be there in
Germany in the trenches to have an opinion. The metzius in Eastern
Europe was different than the metzius was in in Western Europe. They
couldn't, they couldn't export that shaila to the gedolim of of
Eastern Europe.

So a person has to know in asking a shaila is is this a
question of applying a Shulchan Aruch, a Gemara to a metzius
which isn't in the Shulchan Aruch, which isn't in the Gemara and
so much of what the ultimate psak is depends upon understanding that metzius,
knowing what to see in the metzius, what to accentuate, what not to
mention. And and a person has to go to to the right address. Then related to
that, sometimes in in some shailos there there's an expertise outside of
Torah that's needed to answer the shaila also. To go to a rav
and ask should I or should I not get vaccinated, a person has to know what that
rav's sources of medical information are in terms of vaccines and the
question of of vaccination.

Because the rav can be adam gadol me'od, but but
if he doesn't have, if he's not being given the the accurate medical expertise,
so then he he's not going to be able to give you the the right psak
also. So a person can't ask too much from the rav. Da'as Torah
doesn't mean that rabbanim are omniscient. They're not omniscient.

Ribono shel Olam's omniscient. Human beings are not
omniscient. Ribono shel Olam's infallible, human beings are not
infallible. There's no such thing as because someone is an adam gadol me'od
it doesn't make him omniscient, it doesn't make him infallible.

And if we ask shailos that shouldn't be going to a
certain address, so we distort the shaila as though I'm telling you
everything you need to know to answer the shaila. So then the onus is on
us if if the answer forthcoming isn't the right one. So a person has to know
what type of shaila it is and and is it a shaila that is it a shaila
not every shaila can be sent from America to Eretz Yisrael. Not
talking about Covid, not talking about etc., etc. Not every shaila can
be can be sent from America to Eretz Yisrael.

The same way that Chaim Ozer explained that they couldn't send
the shaila from Germany to to Eastern Europe. Other shailos can
be sent from from America to Eretz Yisrael. A person has to know what
the what the type of shaila it is. You can't have a rav going
back even pre-Covid times now you can't have a rav who doesn't have
medical credentials and by credentials I don't mean a diploma.

I mean the yedios who has his own shitta about
medical matters. There's no such thing. He can't have a shitta that
again pre-Covid, pre-Covid times don't vaccinate because of such and such if he
doesn't have the medical credentials. And again I'm not talking about diplomas.

I'm talking about the the knowledge the the firsthand personal
expertise. He can't have his own opinion on that. And there's no daas Torah
there. There's no daas Torah.

So a person has to know what what type of question he's
dealing with and then he knows what the what the address is. Then what when a
person moves away from from what's pure psak halacha ultimately,
ultimately all these medical shailos they are pure psak halacha.
The point is that there's expertise that's needed before the psak halacha
can happen. Ultimately what they were doing in Germany was a question of psak
halacha.

But but there was a grasp of the metzius that was
needed in order to to pasken. Other areas again where it's a question of
an eitza should I go into this profession, should I go into that
profession, should I marry her, shouldn't I marry her? Other things which are
not psak halacha. It's appropriate to seek hadracha. It's
appropriate to seek hadracha when when things are not clear.

Generally we we assume that the rabbanim have a certain
clarity of thought, a certain depth, a certain perception which can be helpful.
But even there it's a question of of being enriched by that depth, by that
perception, by that clarity, ultimately for the person to make his own
decision. And if a person has to decide whether to you know does he marry her,
doesn't he marry her is not something that the rav is going to tell him.
I think the rav can help him, give him context and perspective and
vantage point on his sfeikos, on on what the various issues are, what
the various considerations are.

But those decisions a person ultimately makes for himself. Is
it possible that there's so many people who would consider an adam gadol
in terms of Torah but they have incredibly skewed sources of metzius?
If they're really an adam gadol shouldn't they realize like what an
accurate source of metzius is? Sometimes if a question is not presented
properly the onus and the fault is on the shoel, not on the person
answering the question. A lot of that happens unfortunately. A lot of that
happens.

What other cheshbonos should go into besides financial
should go into when a person decides to start dating or get married and and
those different things when it's it's. So in theory, so we should all be
married by age 20. In practice, in many, many circles, I was included, we don't
do that. But there needs to be a reason why we're not doing it.

It's not that the Gemara is being rewritten rachmana
litzlan. There needs to be a reason why we're not doing it. There are many
legitimate reasons why we're not doing it, but a person has to weigh whether or
not those any of those reasons is applicable. A person can not be ready to date
and get married.

A person in terms of one's maturation, probably due to
societal influence rather than any kind of nishtanu hateva'im, we mature
at a later age than the earlier doros did. There's a level of maturity
that's necessary to have the responsibility of being married. A person has to
have a sense of religious identity and direction in order to get married. A
husband and wife need to be on the same page.

They don't have to be on the same line on the page, but they
need to be on the same page in terms of religious direction in life, in terms
of religious identity. Sometimes a person is still figuring that out, sometimes
a person is still searching, sometimes a person it's still he doesn't yet have
enough of that identity, enough of that sense of that direction. Doesn't mean
that a person feels like he's perfected himself. A person never feels that way,
otherwise we would not get married.

But there's a difference between feeling that a person has
perfected himself, feeling that he's reached the destination as opposed to
feeling that he has a sense of direction in terms of where he's going and what
his values are and what the lifestyle is that he's looking to live. So that
core identity needs to be achieved also before a person can get married. If
getting married earlier means that there's going to be if getting married at
age 20 means that the reichayim al tzavaro, the responsibility for parnassa
is something that will therefore come earlier and the person wants to postpone
a couple of years so that he'll be able to learn more, so that's also, as long
as the person is not beset by hirhurim, that's also a legitimate reason
to be postponing, not postponing until he puts himself at a disadvantage in
finding a shidduch, but it's certainly legitimate for a certain period.
But if the person is emotionally ready, religiously ready, it won't have
implications in terms of ol haparnassa being something he has to assume
at a younger age accordingly, so it's not really a question of having to
postpone in order to allow for more Torah growth, so then a person
should be getting married younger.

But often, you know, one of these other considerations is very
relevant. Is very relevant. Okay, I think we have to have to stop for Mincha.
Thank you.