13 Ikarim – Yesod 5 and 12

I'm not exactly where we left off but within the Yesod haHamishi so at least partially review and maybe entirely review.

יסוד החמישי שהוא ראוי לעבדו ולרוממו ולהודיע גדולתו ועבודתו ולבלתי עשות כן למי שלמטה ממנו במציאות.

So acts of worship, words of exaltation to publicize that exalted attitude to publicize His service His worship all that should be reserved exclusively for Hakadosh Baruch Hu. The way the Rambam writes in Perek Gimmel of Hilchos Teshuva when he talks about חמישה הם הנקראים מינים and again the חמישה הם הנקראים מינים in Gimmel Zayin here in Hilchos Teshuva the Rambam lists the first five of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim.

האומר שאין שם אלוה ואין לעולם מנהיג והאומר שיש שם מנהיג אלא שהם שניים או יותר והאומר שיש שם ריבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה וכן האומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור לכל וכן העובד אלוה זולתו כדי להיות מליץ בינו ובין ריבון העולמים כל אחד מחמישה אלו הוא מין.

So it's the difference in the leshonos is glaring, right? The first four of the five is Ha'omer meaning someone who professes or entertains the possibility of such a belief. It's kfira, it's minus by virtue of the belief, by virtue of the thought. האומר שאין שם אלוה doesn't mean that if a person thinks that and doesn't say so that he's not a kofer ולא יעלה על הדעת. So why does the Rambam use the lashon Ha'omer? Why doesn't he say HaMa'amin or HaChoshev because obviously ולא יעלה על הדעת that if a person inwardly is a kofer but never says so that that means that he's not a kofer ולא יעלה על הדעת. So why does the Rambam say Ha'omer? I don't know. Either amira in Hebrew maybe Ha'omer doesn't necessarily mean speech or maybe the chiddush is Ha'omer is that on the contrary a person can say something tentatively not that he's mesupak about it and that even that it would be the minus. The fact that a person is even mesupak about it. And that's why the Rambam doesn't say maybe on the contrary maybe it's really intended as a weaker term than saying המאמין או החושב שאין שם אלוה. But be that as it may either way the first four of the five the Rambam all describes as Ha'omer. The fifth the Rambam describes as Ha'oved. That the minus consists in acting on it. Why? Because again the Rambam again leshitoso in the way he presents the whole history of avoda zara and what it was initially that even if the person is a monotheist in the sense that he doesn't even think Hakadosh Baruch Hu delegated discretionary powers to any intermediaries but he thinks the way to be oved Hashem is to the way to curry favor with Hakadosh Baruch Hu as he describes in Perek Aleph of Hilchos Avoda Zara is by directing acts of worship and having this reverence vis-a-vis dvarim hanivra'im that that action again even though on the level of belief right in a certain sense... Af al pi chen, that's considered minos. That's why the Rambam makes a kal vachomer of sorts. And when the Rambam says, again in the context of what happens if a person thinks things through and, again, not seeking guidance, instruction, illumination from those who know better and can guide and instruct him and erroneously comes to the wrong conclusion about, let's say, any of the first four, such as

האומר שיש שם רבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה,

so the Rambam makes a kal vachomer of sorts. He says, which is the more egregious error, which is the more egregious distortion: avodah zarah or, let's say, a belief in corporeality of Ribono Shel Olam? So the Rambam says, clearly, the avodah zarah is, again, absolutely wrong and prohibited way of approaching Hakadosh Baruch Hu, but the misconception, the error, doesn't touch upon his conception of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, mah she'ein kein a person who believes that Ribono Shel Olam is a baal guf, so there the error goes to the core. There the error affects who Hakadosh Baruch Hu is. He says: No oved avodah zarah—unless they think they're going to get a good job in the hierarchy—no oved avodah zarah is in it because they think it's because they know it's false. By definition, the ovdei avodah zarah believe in it. That's why they've signed up; that's why they're participating. And the Torah doesn't give them a pass on that. So the Rambam says: So what do you think that I'm not being mechadesh anything? Because when I tell you or when I classify someone as a min for belief, so it's the same way the Torah doesn't accept the defense of, well, they're sincere, they're mistaken, but sincerely mistaken. The Torah doesn't accept that defense for avodah zarah because those who hapo'er atzmo l'Pe'or and who hazoreik even l'Markulis etc., so they obviously believed in it. Otherwise, hazoreik even l'Markulis wasn't one of the Olympic sports. They weren't in it for any other reason; it wasn't one of the Olympic sports. So they obviously believed in it and the Torah doesn't accept that as a defense. So the Rambam says no, because the Torah expects a person—that's what we discussed previously—the Torah expects not every person to be a philosopher, but the Torah does expect us all to have the self-awareness and the self-knowledge of our own limitations and to seek instruction, enlightenment from those who know some of it better than we do. So that's, again, what's unique about the yesod hachamishi here is that it's not a yesod which relates to belief, it's a yesod which relates to action. A person is, the Gemara says—it's a Gemara towards the end of the first perek in Kiddushin—a person is nitpas on machsheves avodah zarah but not that it makes him a min, because the Rambam doesn't say that if a person contemplates, yeah, I think that would be a good way to be oved Hashem, but if he never does it and he believes in Hashem Echad and he doesn't believe that Ribono Shel Olam delegated discretionary powers to any d'varim hanivraim, the fact that he has this very, very wrong notion of, oh, I think that would be a good idea, so he's nitpas on that, the Gemara says that even though ordinarily

מחשבה טובה הקדוש ברוך הוא מצרפה למעשה ומחשבה רעה לא,

but when about avodah zarah it's different, but minos it isn't. I also mentioned or we commented on the fact that the Rambam seemingly digresses to talk about the fact that malachim are programmed, that they're non-baalei bechirah. And suggested that that's the Rambam's way of answering the question for us, why is it worth the turn to a malach and say do me a favor, intercede for me with the Ribbono shel Olam? Why is it worth to do that than it is to when we ask each other or when we go to a tzaddik that he should davven on our behalf? So the answer is, if you're going to someone who's a baal bechirah, so then you're not asking that person to serve as an intermediary, but you're asking that person to, whatever zechuyos his tefillah will generate, you're asking that person that he should do so. But there is no intimation necessarily that you're elevating that person and making him an intermediary between yourself and Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Mah she’ein kein if you're addressing something whose mutba b'tefuloso, something which is programmed, something which is not a baal bechirah, so obviously you're not asking that person, so the only pshat in what you're doing is that somehow or other you think that that's the way to relate to Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not to engage and not to direct oneself to Hakadosh Baruch Hu directly. And based on that we suggested that maybe if you take a look, there's a funny thing. The Chatam Sofer has a teshuvah where he talks about I think he talks about Machnisei Rachamim at the end of Selichot, as well as I think you'll take a look as well as the stanza in one of the selichos of

מלאכי רחמים משרתי עליון חלו נא פני אל במיטב הגיון.

So you would think that the Chatam Sofer says that what he does with Machnisei Rachamim is he's ma'arich in the tachnun, in the selichos, so that lemaiseh when the tzibbur is up to Machnisei Rachamim, so he's lagging behind and then he skips and catches up to them with Shomer Yisrael and that solves that problem. He says that doesn't really work for Malachei Rachamim, so I think he writes, double check this please, that not to be poresh min hatzibbur he does say it. So obviously as supreme a value as not being poresh min hatzibbur is, you don't join the tzibbur in anything which has a chashash minus. And the Chatam Sofer does say that he's, so itachen that the pshat is as follows, itachen is that if you disagree with the Rambam's conception of malachim and you would think that malachim are baalei bechirah, so then given what the Rambam would classify as that error, the concomitant according to the Rambam error of addressing malachim maybe even for the Rambam then doesn't become kfira anymore. Because what's kfira is the fact that well you can't be talking to a malach the way you're talking to ve-yispallel be-adcha ve-chayei, you can't be talking to the malach the way you talk to a navi, כי נביא הוא ויתפלל בעדך וחיה, you can't be talking to him in that, so the only pshat in what you're doing is that's how you relate to Ribbono shel Olam, so that's kfira. But if one has again what for the Rambam is... a mistake, and for others I'm not sure if it is, but but for for the Rambam is a mistake, but by assuming that that one would think that Malochim are ba'alei bechira and would be asking the Malochim, you know, you know, get on my team and help me out, so then it's not a shayla, yitachen that it's not a shayla kfira, and then you can still think that that it's that it's not right, you can still think that that a person should address himself directly to the Ribono Shel Olom, but then yitachen that it wouldn't be a shayla kfira. Maybe that's the pshat in the Chasam Sofer Ayin Vav. What what are the correct kavanos? People people daven, Kalev Ben Yefuneh when השתטח על קבר אבות. So what what is the the correct pshat in what what is the correct kavannah that a person can, should have in such a context? So either or both of two. One is that going to the to kevar tzadikim is a way of trying to invoke their zchus. So the same way we invoke the zchus avos in davening, and that's entirely legitimate. There's nothing avoda zara-dik about that. It's one of the middos of the Hakadosh Baruch Hu, le'alafim dor, that that zchus avos is relevant. So going to to kevar tzadikim is a way of invoking zchus avos. Sacks told the story that the Chafetz Chaim le'eis ziknuso was prohibited for health reasons from even chrein, which was what his kabbala was for maror. Apparently he didn't have the kabbala for romaine, he only had the kabbala for chrein. So the Chafetz Chaim was so bothered with missing out on the mitzvah of of achilas maror that he sent a shliach, he he was not able to go himself to do to the same due to the same infirmities of age, he sent a shliach to be mispallel at the kevar haGra that bizchus that he had published the Biur HaGra with the Hagahos HaGra, so bizchus that he he should be sufficiently healthy that he should be able to eat maror by the by the Seder. So that's one kavannah in in davening at at kevar tzadikim, it's a way of of invoking the the zchus. The other kavannah is what we mentioned that the Chasam Sofer elaborates from the Maharal is that he says the meisim, unlike malochim, are ohavei Yisroel. And the meisim when when one goes to the to the beis hakevaros are become aware and they mis'chabrim el hachayim and then they daven on our behalf. So it's not that we're davening to them Rachmana litzlan as intermediaries, as links in a in a chain, but it's comparable according to to this approach of Maharal of the same way that we ask living people to daven on our behalf. In the same way again as we explained, there's nothing, that doesn't mean that you go to a tzadik and you ask him to daven, it doesn't mean, it certainly shouldn't mean that one is making him an intermediary between oneself and and the Ribono Shel Olom, but it means that one is asking for his koach hatfilla to be applied as well. So that's the same thing that happens when a person goes out to the to the beis olam to daven there. The same way again, Machnisei Rachamim and Malachei Rachamim are controversial. The big two, I think the lashon that's quoted is not a lashon of objection to kefira. He doesn't think it's right. And he doesn't like that stanza. But I forget the leshonos now, but if I forget the leshonos that are quoted, that leshonos of kefira and maybe the explanation is the same as we said before in context of Chasam Sofer. We're going to go a little bit shelo k'seder now. We're going to skip to the yesod hashemne esrei and hopefully bli neder we'll have a chance to come back and fill in what's in between as well. So the yesod hashemne esrei of course is dealing with Mashiach. Here too there is a Teshuvos Chasam Sofer where the Chasam Sofer was asked about why this is included in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. And he writes that the truth is that he doesn't really understand why it is listed in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. He says, if you would tell us, lu yetzuyar that you would tell us that there is no assurance of the geula ha'asida and that there is no Melech HaMashiach waiting in the wings, so he said nothing would change. He said if we knew that it was guaranteed, if we knew that it was guaranteed that we'd be stuck in Pressburg for the rest of our lives, he said nothing would change an iota. He said we'd still even if we knew that we had to live in hagalus hamar hazeh without any assurance of it being an end, so he said nothing would change, avoda v'halacha, and we'd continue to be מדקדק במצוה קלה כבחמורה and we'd continue to learn Torah, nothing would change. So he takeh doesn't know why the Rambam listed it in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Ella mai, he says avada if a person's kofer, so then he's being kofer b'divrei Torah and avada he would be a kofer. He says but he doesn't takeh doesn't really know why the Rambam lists it in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. And that's what the Chasam Sofer writes. Okay, so some not necessarily everything we're going to discuss is perhaps relevant to trying to piece together the answer to the Chasam Sofer's question. Not everything, but we're going to talk about at least some of it, be'ezras Hashem. If you take a look, if you have the Rambam in perek yud aleph of Hilchos Melachim, so the Rambam writes as follows: וכל מי שאינו מאמין בו referring to Hamelech HaMashiach of whom he spoke about the three lines earlier in the beginning of the halacha

וכל מי שאינו מאמין בו או מי שאינו מחכה לביאתו לא בשאר נביאים בלבד הוא כופר אלא בתורה ובמשה רבנו שהרי תורה העידה עליו שנאמר ושב ה' אלקיך את שבותך ורחמך ושב וקבצך מכל העמים וכולי אם יהיה נדחך בקצה השמים משם יקבצך ה' אלקיך. משם יקבצך ה' אלוהיך ומשם יקחך והביאך ה' אלוהיך וכולו ואלו הדברים המפורשים בתורה הם כוללים כל הדברים שנאמרו על ידי כל הנביאים.

Just to read it again,

שהרי תורה העידה עליו שנאמר ושב ה' אלוהיך את שבותך ורחמך ושב וקבצך מכל העמים וכולו אם יהיה נדחך בקצה השמים משם יקבצך ה' אלוהיך ומשם יקחך והביאך ה' אלוהיך וכולו ואלו הדברים המפורשים בתורה הם כוללים כל הדברים שנאמרו על ידי כל הנביאים.

Skipping now to Halacha Bet:

אף בפרשת מקלט הוא אומר כי ירחיב ה' אלוהיך את גבולך וכולו ויספת לך עוד שלש ערים על השלש האלו מעולם לא היה דבר זה ולא צוה הקדוש ברוך הוא לתוהו אבל בדברי הנביאים אין הדבר צריך ראיה שכל הספרים מלאים מזה.

What a pela azum in this first Halacha on the Rambam. What does he want with these psukim in Nitzavim-Vayeilech?

ושב ה' אלוהיך את שבותך ושב וקבצך אם יהיה נדחך משם יקבצך.

So where does it say anything about the Melech HaMashiach? And the Rambam, he doesn't, he doesn't give us any parshanus to tell us where there's a reference here to the Melech HaMashiach. He takeh does when he quotes the psukim from Parshas Balak. So there the Rambam gives us the parshanus. After Parshas Bilaam this is the part of Halacha Aleph that we skipped:

אף בפרשת בלעם נאמר ושם ניבא בשני המשיחים במשיח הראשון שהוא דוד שהושיע את ישראל מיד צריהם ובמשיח האחרון שעומד מבניו שמושיע את ישראל מיד בני עשו ושם הוא אומר אראנו ולא עתה זה דוד אשורנו ולא קרוב זה המלך המשיח דרך כוכב מיעקב זה דוד וקם שבט מישראל זה המלך המשיח.

So here the Rambam recognizes that we may not know what he's referring to, so he spells out the parshanus where the reference is to the Melech HaMashiach. So where is it in the psukim that he's quoting, ושב ה' אלוהיך את שבותך? And if the question didn't hit us in Halacha Aleph, in Halacha Bet it surely does. He quotes the raya from Arei Miklat. He says that originally we had three in Ever HaYarden and three in Eretz Yisrael and then the Torah says כי ירחיב ה' אלוהיך את גבולך, you'll have another three. That has yet to materialize. ולא צוה הקדוש ברוך הוא לתוהו. So obviously, obviously what? So how do you know that that means there's a Melech HaMashiach? So it's klar, it's klar, it's klar that the pshat according to the Rambam, the Yesod HaDas is Yemos HaMashiach. Within that, an indispensable element and therefore it's also part of the Yesod HaDas, it's part of the ikar as well. But within that, central to that, looming very, very prominent within that is the figure of the Melech HaMashiach, is the, is the Melech HaMashiach. But the Yesod HaDas is not, is not the Melech HaMashiach. The Yesod HaDas is much broader than that. The Yesod HaDas is that there's a, that there's a Yemos HaMashiach, that there's going to be a Messianic age, that the world is going to reach its goal and there will be a Messianic age. Now again, that doesn't in any way diminish the, in terms of yesodei hadas, the status of the Melech HaMashiach. He is central to that vision of Yemos HaMashiach. But the ikar hadas, what we generally think of the ikar hadas as being, as being the Mashiach, the Melech HaMashiach. And that is an overly narrow understanding of what the Yesod HaDas is. And that's what the Rambam is saying. And by the way, that's what this line otherwise is a pela:

ואלו הדברים המפורשים בתורה הם כוללים כל הדברים שנאמרו על ידי כל הנביאים.

What is that? Mah pshat? Eilu hadevarim, this is after he quoted the psukim in Nitzavim-Vayeilech, ושב ה' אלוהיך את שבותך וכולו. So then the Rambam says,

ואלו הדברים המפורשים בתורה הם כוללים כל הדברים שנאמרו על ידי כל הנביאים.

How? What does he mean? It doesn't say here ויצא חוטר מגזע ישי ונצר משרשיו יפרה. It doesn't say anything we just read the acharon shel Pesach in the Haftarah or in any of the nevuos. So what does the Rambam mean that kol hadevarim ha'eileh? So I'm saying, no, what the Torah's telling us is that there's going to be a geula, there's going to be a Moshiach. The Nevi'im tell us more pratim about what that they fill in more the pratim of that vision, of that chazon of acharis hayamim. The Torah tells us there's going to be an acharis hayamim and then the Nevi'im tell us more about about that chazon of the acharis hayamim. So it's clear that that's that's what he means. So the yesod and then when you look here in Perush Hamishnayos, see again this is one of the ways in which the lich'ora the the Ani Ma'amin summary that that we say every day, I don't know maybe doesn't I don't know the Ani Ma'amin is the bi'as hamoshiach but the lashon what the Rambam writes is hayesod hashnayim asar is yemos hamoshiach. It doesn't say hayesod hashnayim asar is is the person the of the Melech HaMoshiach. No again Moshiach, yemos hamoshiach, then again Moshiach refers to the Melech HaMoshiach, right, the anointed one refers to the Melech HaMoshiach, but the point is that the yesod hadas is not simply that there's going to be this person a Melech HaMoshiach, the yesod hadas is that there's going to be a Messianic age. In Halacha Gimmel here in Perek Yud Aleph, so the Rambam writes

אל יעלה על דעתך שהמלך המשיח צריך לעשות אותות ומופתים ומחדש דברים בעולם או מחיה מתים וכיוצא בדברים האלו שהטיפשים אומרים.

The Melech HaMoshiach what he does and and the way we are able to recognize him who he is doesn't involve his performing miracles. That's not at all the case. And אל יעלה על דעתך. It's interesting the the same or similar parallel phrase the Rambam has at the beginning of Perek Yud Bais, here not talking about again the Melech HaMoshiach himself but talking about the nature of life b'yemos hamoshiach,

אל יעלה על הלב שבימות המשיח יבטל דבר ממנהגו של עולם או יהיה שם חידוש במעשה בראשית אלא עולם כמנהגו נוהג. אמרו חכמים אין בין העולם הזה לימות המשיח אלא שיעבוד מלכויות בלבד.

So the Rambam again kayadu'a and and he identifies that as this opinion within Chazal has a totally natural conception of of yemos hamoshiach, of the Melech HaMoshiach as well as the it doesn't doesn't have to be about osos u'moftim as well as yemos hamoshiach. What's what's really remarkable just in terms of how how consistent and how everything the Rambam has everything so fully thought out in פרק ט הלכות תשובה, the Rambam writes as follows. The end of Halacha Aleph in Perek Tes is

בזמן שאדם טרוד בעולם הזה בחולי ובמלחמה וברעבון אינו מתעסק לא בחכמה ולא במצווה שבהן זוכין לחיי העולם הבא.

If a person is beset by all types of consuming adversity be it rachmana litzlan illness, be it rachmana litzlan milchama, be it rachmana litzlan famine, so then that doesn't allow him to be

מתעסק בחכמה ובמצווה שבהן זוכין לחיי העולם הבא. ומפני זה התאוו כל ישראל נביאיהם וחכמיהם לימות המלך המשיח.

Again here too the emphasis his'avu l'yemos hamoshiach

כדי שינוחו ממלכויות הרשעה שאינה מנחת להם לישראל לעסוק בתורה ובמצוות כהוגן וימצאו להם מרגוע וירבו בחכמה כדי שיזכו לחיי העולם הבא.

l'fi she'ba'osam hayamim. tarbe hadeia, tarbe hadeia, v'hachochma v'ha'emes,

שנאמר כי מלאה הארץ דעה את ה' ונאמר ולא ילמדו איש את רעהו ואיש את אחיו וגו' ונאמר והסירותי את לב האבן מבשרכם. מפני שאותו המלך שיעמוד מזרע דוד בעל חכמה יהיה יתר משלמה ונביא גדול הוא קרוב ממשה רבינו. ולפיכך ילמד כל העם ויורה אותם דרך ה' ויבאו כל הגוים לשומעו שנאמר והיה באחרית הימים נכון יהיה הר בית ה' בראש ההרים וגו'.

So what's so remarkable here is that the Rambam even explains how the vision of כי מלאה הארץ דעה את ה' unfolds naturally. That the Melech Hamashiach is going to be just such a towering Torah personality by virtue of his chochmas hatorah, by virtue of his level of nevuah that he will exert such an influence on his generation that naturally he will uplift them and elevate them so that the vision of כי מלאה הארץ דעה את ה' will be mikuyam. Right? Ulfichach, because of who he is,

ילמד כל העם ויורה אותם דרך ה' ויבאו כל הגוים לשומעו.

And that's how even this aspect of the yemos hamashiach for the Rambam unfolds in a natural way. In terms of the Chasam Sofer's kasha, so lich'ora one very compelling, at least beginning of an answer, is based on Rav Chaim. We spoke about this when we began the limud of this perek. That Rav Chaim said that the Rambam didn't intend to list thirteen foundational beliefs, but he intended to list those beliefs which are fundamental, not necessarily foundational. Again, foundation when you if you pull the foundation out from the building, so the building collapses. Until Rav Chaim came along, so it was generally understood that that's what the Rambam's ikkarei hadas purported to be, foundational beliefs. And that's what the Chasam Sofer says, that the belief in the Melech Hamashiach doesn't uphold anything. He says it doesn't affect anything else. You can do a thought experiment and pull that out and nothing else is affected. So how is that a yesod hadas? And Rav Chaim says that what the Rambam was listing for us is thirteen fundamental beliefs. Dahinu, if a person doesn't know that Noach had three sons, he doesn't know that the names were Shem, Cham and Yaphes, so he's lacking in yedias hatorah but he's not deficient in emunah. If a person, rachmana litzlan, doesn't know הקדוש ברוך הוא אינו בעל גוף, so then he's not just lacking in yedias hatorah but he's deficient in emunah. So where's the line? What things in Torah are part of yedias hatorah and if a person doesn't know it, so then he's lacking in yedias hatorah, and what things in Torah if a person doesn't know it, so not only is he lacking in yedias hatorah but he's deficient in emunah? That's what the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim represent. So if that's the case, according to Rav Chaim, what has to be understood is not how belief in Melech Hamashiach or more correctly yemos hamashiach is foundational, it just needs to be understood how it's fundamental. Okay, that doesn't finish the explanation, but it points in an entirely different direction. So in what sense is it fundamental? So maybe we'll begin and bli neder continue this bli neder im yirtzeh Hashem next week. I think that for the first the first idea or the first part of the idea I saw also in the the sefer Even Shetiyah which is based on on talks that the Yaakov Weinberg of Yeshivat Ner Yisrael gave over on on Rambam. Atzot tamim po'alo, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is perfect, whatever Hakadosh Baruch Hu does is is perfect. If if there's no geulah, olam hazah remains forever imperfect. The the perfection of olam hazah is is realized biymos hamashiach, biymos melech hamashiach. If if one makes the mistake of of reading the newspaper or or listening to the news and so one is fully aware of the fact that the the world as as we know it, as it's populated, as it's as it's conducted itself is is not a is not a perfect place. Inachanamay due to to our bechirah, but אף על פי כן the world is not perfect. It's not a it's not a venue of of of of perfection. So so that's sort of one approach as to why it's so fundamental that there is yemos hamashiach, that there is a time when

וגר זאב עם כבש ונמר עם גדי ירבץ ומלאה הארץ דעה את ה' כמים לים מכסים.

Maybe it's an elaboration of this, maybe it's a different perspective. משל למה הדבר דומה: imagine that that that that you would be interviewing a set of parents and and asking them how they see their role as parents. They'd tell you that as parents, when our child or children behave well, we reward them. And when they misbehave, so then we appropriately discipline them. And and that's that's our goal as that's our function, that's our that's how we see our job and responsibility as parents. So what's what's one's reaction to that? So obviously, it's terribly, terribly inadequate. I mean that policy is an indispensable part of of parenting. But but that conception of what the role of a parent is is is terribly inadequate. The the parent's role is to have a certain vision of what they're trying to raise their children to become. To to transmit to them beliefs, to help instill with them certain middos. Now, the way that's done obviously is is good behavior has to be encouraged and rewarded and and misbehavior has to has to with with chochmah and and composure, has to be also has to be appropriately responded to. But there has to be a vision, right? It's not just no, things can just go sort of drift. Because for that view of parenting is aimless. It's pointless. It's just okay, the do something good, so then etc. Do something bad and no dessert. But with no no desired tachlis that you're trying to bring the children to, so that's not... the the correct antithesis of of the kefirah of עזב ה' את הארץ, the phrase that the Ramban quotes from Navi Yechezkel, the correct antithesis of עזב ה' את הארץ is not only that the schar ve'onesh and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu rewards good behavior and rachmana litzlan if we misbehave, so so that's punished. But without a yemos hamashiach, so then it's just analogous to the mashal again. Without a Yemos Hamashiach, so then it depicts Hakadosh Baruch Hu as rachmana litzlan as the analog to the parents in the mashal. It's not just the antithesis of עזב ה׳ את הארץ is not only לית דין ולית דיין. The antithesis of עזב ה׳ את הארץ is יש דין ויש דיין and that the entire briyah is שהבטיחה תורה שסוף ישראל לעשות תשובה ומיד הן נגאלין. That the entire briyah is moving towards, again going back to the mashal, towards shepherding the children into becoming adults who have emunah and are ovdei Hashem. That's what Yemos Hamashiach represents and that takeh is very very fundamental. Without that, the s'char va'onesh alone, the yesod hayod aleph, is not a sufficient counterpoint to that again egregious error of עזב ה׳ את הארץ, rachmana litzlan.