Shemonah Perakim 3

We're going to pick up from Perek Sheni, a specific point that we left off with. I thought I was ready to discuss but I'm definitely not, so we're going to focus b'ezrat Hashem on a different point here in Perek Sheni. It's actually right after where we left off, על המעלות הריהן שני מינין. That there are two types of virtues that a person can have. מעלות מדותיות ומעלות הגיוניות. A person can have character virtues and intellectual virtues. וכנגדם שני מיני פחיתויות. וזה לעומת זה עשה אלקים. If a person can have two types of virtues, he can have two types of deficiencies. Skipping a few lines where the Rambam now elaborates on ma'alot hamidot. He says, אבל המעלות המדותיות הריהן מצויות בחלק המתעורר לבדו. Of the various dimensions or aspects of the nefesh, of the animating life force, one can speak of virtues only when talking about the cheilek hamisorair. The cheilek hamargish, again which is responsible for the five senses, אינו אלא משמש לחלק המתעורר. Maybe we'll just read a couple of more lines and then hopefully it'll make it a little bit easier to understand the point. ומעלות החלק הזה רבות מאד. There are many, many virtues within that aspect of the nefesh, of the cheilek hamisorair, kegon hapreishus, abstinence, v'hanidivus, generosity, v'hazedek, v'havatronus, v'haanavah, v'hahistapkus b'muat, v'hate'uzah, bravery, v'hahamtza'ut v'zulatam. So the cheilek hamisorair is the part of the nefesh which is responsible for desire and emotion. That's what presumably what the Rambam means that the cheilek hamargish just does the bidding of the cheilek hamisorair. It's the cheilek hamisorair she'bi that wants the chocolate rugelach. Okay, so then it sends the cheilek hamargish to do its bidding, but the driving force is the cheilek hamisorair. And accordingly that's why we speak of the virtues when we talk about character development, character refinement, so that happens in the cheilek hamisorair, in that aspect of the nefesh. The description of this sort of presentation of what ma'alot midotiyot are, that they belong to the cheilek hamisorair, really is echoing something that the Rambam is quite explicit about in Hilchot De'ot.

מצווים אנו בסוף הלכה ה' בפרק א'. מצווים אנו בסוף הלכה ה' בפרק א'. מצווים אנו ללכת בדרכים אלו הבינוניים והם הדרכים הטובים והישרים שנאמר והלכת בדרכיו. כך למדו בפירוש מצווה זו: מה הוא נקרא חנון אף אתה היה חנון, מה הוא נקרא רחום אף אתה היה רחום, מה הוא נקרא קדוש אף אתה היה קדוש.

So already here, it is clear from the Rambam, despite the fact that the Torah describes, formulates the mitzvah belashon halicha in terms of action, the ultimate kiyum hamitzvah is the internalization, right? It's not just אף אתה התנהג ברחמנות ובחנינה ובקדושה, it's

אף אתה היה חנון אף אתה היה רחום אף אתה היה קדוש.

Skipping down to Halacha Zayin where this idea is even more explicit: כיצד ירגיל אדם עצמו בדעות אלו עד שייקבעו בו. How does a person accomplish, how does he effect that these deos, these character traits, these dispositions again become entrenched, become internalized?

יעשה וישנה וישלש במעשים שעושה על פי הדעות הממוצעות ויחזור בהם תמיד עד שיהיו מעשיהם קלים עליו ולא יהיה בהם טורח וייקבעו הדעות בנפשו.

So the goal of the mitzvah, what the mitzvah, the goal, again not goal belashon lechatchila, not goal בלשון מצווה מן המובחר, but goal in the sense of ikar hadin, the goal which the mitzvah sets for us is ויקבעו הדעות בנפשו. It's not only that one should act in a certain way, but that one should reach a madreiga where acting that way is natural, that one acts that way naturally. So it's not only that one should give the right amount of tzedaka, but that generosity should flow naturally. Not only that one should, I don't know, moderate one's diet, but that that moderation should be something which is a natural expression. Not only that one's emotions shouldn't govern him, but that there is a natural equilibrium. Fine. Now when you juxtapose that to what the Rambam tells us in the beginning of the perek when he describes sort of natural types in the beriah, he says:

יש דעות הרבה בכל אחד ואחד מבני אדם וזו רחוקה מזו וחלוקה ממנה ביותר. יש אדם שהוא בעל חמה כועס תמיד ויש אדם שדעתו מיושבת עליו ואינו כועס כלל. ויש אדם שהוא גבה לב ביותר ויש שהוא שפל רוח עד מאוד. ויש שהוא בעל תאווה לא תשבע נפשו מהלוך בתאוותו ויש שהוא טהור גוף ביותר לא יתאווה אפילו לדבר מועט שהגוף צריך לו. יש בעל נפש רחבה שלא תשבע נפשו מכל ממון העולם כעניין שנאמר אוהב כסף לא ישבע כסף ויש קצר שדיו אפילו דבר מועט שלא יספיק לו ולא ירדוף להשיג כל צורכו. יש שהוא מסגף עצמו ברעב וקופץ ידו מן הממון ביותר ואינו אוכל משלו.

So the Rambam describes how some people naturally are born with a temper, a very volatile temper. Some people are born naturally arrogant. Again, in each case just highlighting the one of the two opposites that the Rambam mentions exists naturally. Some people are born, they're born with a temper. They have this very, very strong hedonistic inclination. So when the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav then when you juxtapose these two ideas of that A, naturally in the bria there are different types. There are people again who are born that they naturally have volatile tempers. There are people who are naturally arrogant etc. That's point number one. When you juxtapose that with the Rambam's definition that the mitzvah is not only hisnaheg berachmanus, hisnaheg bechanina, hisnaheg bikedusha, but the mitzvah is heyeh rachum, heyeh chanun, heyeh kadosh. So what emerges is that a person can and is obligated to change in certain respects his basic character. And that what tikkun hamiddos means is not only again that a person and what kovesh es yitzro means within in this framework is not only that a person is kovesh es yitzro in the sense that the yetzer doesn't prevail and get the upper hand in practically charting the course of action and in practically dictating how a person acts. But kovesh es yitzro means that if a person when an army goes and they're kovesh territory, so the territory now belongs to them. It's theirs. It belongs to them. So it's not just the question of suppressing, it's a question of effecting change. I'm not sure to to what extent to what extent we appreciate that capacity. Because there's a much less significant ambitious idea that can easily be mistaken for what the Rambam is telling us. And that's the following. You can have a person ich veis again whether the example is the the volatile temper or the example is the arrogance and sort of within that basic character so you can smooth some of the some of the rough edges. And you can you know maybe lower the volume a little bit on on that arrogance on on on that. That's not what we're talking about. What when the Rambam is saying that the virtues are found in the chelek hamesorer, it means that a person is mesorer differently. It doesn't just mean that there's a shlita that kovesh es yitzro in the sense that more practically, the yetzer is not going to have the last word. It doesn't just mean that if naturally I'm an arrogant person, there's a spectrum of arrogance and I can just lower the volume on it. Kemaduma that sometimes we substitute this second idea for the first idea. Kemaduma that we try to tone the basic trait down, we try to be misgaber on it and not let it chart the course of action. But there's a difference between that and changing the basic trait. And when the Rambam says that the midah is in the chelek hamesorer, it means that if it's just how I govern the hisorerus within me, hisorerus, be it in the form of emotions, be it in the form of physical urges, if it's just in terms of how I govern that, how I deal with it, whether or not I express it, whether or not I suppress it, so it's not really in the chelek hamesorer. Already here the Rambam's anticipating what he says so clearly and forcefully in Hilchos Deos. No, the deos are kavua benafsho. So what that means is that a person who's naturally a בעל חימה וכעס תמיד changes himself, he changes the basic underlying character, the basic underlying techunas hanefesh. And that the nefesh we're given is not a given and that it can be shaped and changed and that's what for the Rambam is identified with the mitzvah of vehalachta bidrachav. But that's what the avodas tikkun hamidos is. Would the Rambam hold of any redeeming qualities to any of these midos raos? I know he has a very adverse view towards being angry, but is there any type of driving positive force that can potentially be elicited from any of these negative traits or are they just to be subjugated completely? I'm not sure whether we've had occasion to. I'm not sure whether we've had occasion to, I think maybe that this point, which is the introduction to the answer to your question, I think maybe that we have previously discussed. The Midda Beinonit for the Rambam, again, isn't the rejection of the two extremes, it's a blending of the two extremes. And what it means is that when those two again, the natural a person can naturally be בעל חמה כל הזמן, but that's what exists within his koach hamisoer. A person can be da'ato meyushevet alav ve eino ko'es klal, later the Rambam describes it as k'meit she-eino margish, that's what's in the koach hamisoer she-bo. The Midda Beinonit is that those two are blended and a person has both. And that's why the answer to your question is that there is something redeeming. Let's say, Rachmana litzlan, if a person is in aveilus, so shlosha yamim livchi. So bechi is not what we would call ordinarily under other circumstances the Midda Beinonit, certainly compared to other circumstances, there's certainly a disruption of the type of equilibrium and the type of composure that a person has. But he's supposed to have that capacity within him for when the situation warrants it. So the rejection of it is when that exists, when that's all that's present in the koach hamisoer she-bo is the extreme. When a person comes, so halacha is that if a person's coming and says he needs two dollars to get something to eat or drink, so ein bodkin l'mezonot, because maybe he's on the brink of starvation Rachmana litzlan. If he comes and says he's asking for other things and you're supposed to be bodek. So truth is when you do that, so sometimes people come and they pull at the heartstrings and if the story is true takka the heartstrings should be affected. But on the other hand, A, the halacha is bodkin and B, even if we didn't know the halacha, so we all know that Rachmana litzlan there are real nitzrachim and Rachmana litzlan there are charlatans and meheicha taisi to know the difference. So the emes is when you tell the person, I need to see hamlatzos, I need to see proof, I need to see documents, it's a bit it's a koach achzariut to say that. The person's coming and he's telling you this story which should pull at the heartstrings, it should pull at the heartstrings and it does pull at the heartstrings. It's a koach achzariut to say I hear that but that's the halacha and not that Chazal need the empirical verification, but unfortunately it's verified ma'aseh b'chol yom, the verification is there. So there is something very redeeming to that to koach achzariut to say, I need to see the letters from the tzedakah committees that they checked it out, that they verified that the story is true. It's a shtikel koach achzariut when you take your checkbook out and you give a check, it's a midas achzariut, it's a hard thing to do, it's a very very hard thing to do. So if a person doesn't have it, so then again the Midda Beinonit isn't that the person doesn't have the extremes, no he has the extremes together, has the extremes together. When should one have extreme gaiva? And again so that's the stira between perek aleph and perek chof beis, perek chof beis, so the meforshim as ever, not even in the biur of the Shaloh but the biur, not a blend. Ayin perek alef where he gives that example. So I don't know whether this is meyashiv the stira, it's probably a little too glib to meyashiv the stira, but lema'aseh if you don't translate gaiva as arrogance, if you translate gaiva as a certain forcefulness, as a certain I'm not going to give in no matter what, so there are times, there are situations that in most situations what we find ourselves so vatranut is the way to go and is the correct should be the guiding midda. But there are sometimes when a person is supposed to stand up for principle and again and not budge and that type of etkifus, a etkifus that with different semantics, with different types of not the negative associations that you can associate with gaiva. That's why because the vort is in Hilchot De'ot that the two are supposed to coexist. And again there are times again when you tell the person that you need to see a to'elet and shicken to the doctor, it's a koach azut. It's a koach azut that a person is supposed to exhibit again that it won't get carried away is because it's blended because it's present within the koach hanitzachon alongside that koach harachmanut. That's why you can even take a midda tova and it can be distorted when the example we just gave in terms of principle and at times when there's a etkifus that's necessary for principle. Sometimes the Rav once said that again it was the same yesod that came up in a different context, said you can make an avoda zara out of anything. You can make an avoda zara if you have something which is a value in Yahadut which is a mitzva and then you promote it disproportionately, it also becomes an avoda zara. It also becomes an avoda zara. Sometimes people make civil discourse into an avoda zara. Sometimes people make respecting other people and their views into an avoda zara because it's not the emes hamida habeinonit. Emes hamida habeinonit again means that you have to know when to be an achzar and the emes hamida habeinonit means you have to know when the so-called civil discourse is itself a distortion. I'm trying to explain what we're talking about. We're not talking about that it's ever a mitzva to engage in gratuitous... But when when when there's משל למה הדבר דומה let's say you have a ninth-grade student, he's so now the end of October, so September, October, so he's had about two months of freshman biology in high school and he undertakes to start doing open heart surgery. So what are you going to say, that there should be civil discourse and and that there should be a respectful exchange of opinions as to whether or not that's a good thing, or maybe it's not a good thing, and he's entitled to his opinion, even though you may have your opinion, and and the the important thing is that that not to say that he's incompetent because that's not civil discourse? But that's the issue. What do you mean that's not civil discourse? If if the issue is you have two great heart surgeons who who have thirty years of experience and they disagree about what the right surgical approach to something is, then the issue is okay so so there should be civil discourse ein hachi nami. But when when you have a ninth-grader who after two months of of biology is now doing open heart surgery, so then it becomes avoda zara to say no there must be civil discourse, you have to respect his opinion, you have to respect your opinion. No, you have to call a spade a spade. You have to say hefkerus is hefkerus. And that's in keeping with the Rambam's Yad HaChazaka because if a person doesn't have the capacity to do that, it's like not having the capacity to take your child to the pediatrician to get a shot. משפטי השם אמת צדקו יחדיו. The the tzedek and mishpat haTorah is only when everything is in the balance which Hakadosh Baruch Hu which Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave to us. But when when you take when you take one mishpat haTorah and and that's not balanced, it's not integrated alongside the other mishpatei haTorah, so a person can make a caricature of that mishpat. You can make make a caricature of of of that value. It could be a tremendous value, a core value, דברים העומדים ברומו של עולם, but it has to be integrated with all the other values of of Torah. Hachnasas orchim is a davar yafeh, a davar yafeh. But if you have to sacrifice your daughters for hachnasas orchim, so it makes a caricature of Parshas Hashavua, it makes it makes a caricature of of the Torah's values. It's not so what was wrong with Lot? Lot learned from Avraham Avinu hachnasas orchim. Okay, but there was six hundred and twelve other mitzvos that Avraham Avinu integrated alongside the hachnasas orchim. If you pick out the hachnasas orchim and that's it, so hachnasas orchim becomes avoda zara. Hachnasas orchim is such a גדולה הכנסת אורחים מהקבלת פני השכינה. But you can also make it into an avoda zara. You can also make it into a davar mechuar, something which is which is repulsive. If a ninth grader is doing open heart surgery, so then you're supposed to say that he's a ninth grader and that he's incompetent and what he's doing is dangerous, and that's a kiyum of לא תעמוד על דם רעך. Hatzlacha inyanenu, Hatzlacha inyanenu. One second. Okay. You know the famous saying from Rav Yisrael Salanter, how to change a midda is a greater challenge than mastering Shas. So Rav Yisrael Salanter was talking about this. He wasn't talking about again toning down my temper, wasn't talking about taking some of the rough edges off my gaiva. No, I'm talking about all-out changing it. That the tipus that a person is naturally is not who he is and it can be done. How to do it is a different story, but it begins with understanding that it is possible. And the reason it is is that that's the way Akadosh Baruch Hu created us, that Akadosh Baruch Hu created us that a person can effect fundamental change. That what a person does, what he does consistently, changes the basic character. In general, what we don't aspire to, so then it obviously goes without saying that we don't accomplish, we don't attain. Okay, achshav merutze.