Rambam Hilchos Teshuva, Perek 5, part 2

שמא תאמר והלא הקדוש ברוך הוא יודע כל מה שיהיה קודם שיהיה ידע שזה צדיק או רשע או לא ידע אם ידע שיהיה צדיק אי אפשר שלא יהיה צדיק ואם תאמר שידע שיהיה צדיק ואפשר שיהיה רשע הרי לא ידע הדבר על בוריו דע שתשובת שאלה זו ארוכה מארץ מדה ורחבה מני ים וכמה עיקרים גדולים והררים רמים תלויים בה אבל צריך אתה לידע ולהבין בדבר זה שאני אומר כבר בארנו בפרק שני מהלכות יסודי התורה שהקדוש ברוך הוא אינו יודע בדעה שהיא חוץ ממנו כבני אדם שהן ודעתם שנים אלא הוא יתברך שמו ודעתו אחד ואין דעתו של אדם יכולה להשיג דבר זה על בוריו כשם שאין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא אמיתת הבורא שנאמר כי לא יראני האדם וחי כך אין כח באדם להשיג ולמצוא דעתו של בורא הוא שנאמר כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי נאום ה' וכיון שכן הוא אין בנו כח לידע היאך ידע הקדוש ברוך הוא כל הברואים והמעשים אבל נודע בלי ספק שמעשה האדם ביד האדם ואין הקדוש ברוך הוא מושכו ולא גוזר עליו לעשות כך ולא שלא לעשות כך ולא מפני קבלת הדת בלבד נודע דבר זה אלא בראיות ברורות מדברי החכמה ומפני זה נאמר בנבואה שדנים את האדם על כל מעשיו כפי מעשיו אם טוב ואם רע וזה העיקר שכל דברי הנבואה תלויים בו אמר אברהם לא נהג זה המחבר מנהג החכמים שאין אדם מתחיל בדבר ולא ידע להשלימו והוא החל בשאלות וקושיות והניח הדבר בקושיא והחזירו לאמונה וטוב היה לו להניח הדבר בתמימות התמימים ולא יעורר לבם ויניח דעתם בספק ואולי שעה אחת יבא הרהור בלבם על זה.

So we're only going to talk about part of what the Rambam is saying here. So what's the perspective that the Rambam is giving us here on the seeming tension between הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה? So the Rambam is telling us as follows. And again, this is part of what he's saying. Why do we think it's a question? Why do we think that the הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה, that those two are mutually exclusive? Because for the following reason. Let's say I know that there's a desk here. We know that there's a desk here. How do we know that there's a desk here? There's a desk, it's sitting right there. It's a desk and my eyes are open, I'm looking, and it registers that there's a desk. How do I know that it's daylight now? That it's not raining? Because I look out the window and I see the light and I see that there's no rain. Or in other words, we know what is, right? To know something means to be aware of what is. Right, so I know that there's a desk in front of me because there's a desk in front of me. I know that yesterday when we were in this room, there was a desk because there was a desk. If I know betorat vadai with absolute certainty, not high, high, high, high probability, but if I know with absolute certainty that there's going to be a desk tomorrow, so then that means that the future is already determined. It means that the future is, the future is already determined, because otherwise how could I know that? So that's why we can't understand or, more than that, that's why at first glance what we think that the הכל צפוי והרשות נתונה are mutually exclusive. So what is the Rambam telling us about that? The Rambam is telling us that there's a major, major fallacy in that thinking because we're making an assumption that Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows the same way we know. existence is different than our existence. Everything about Hakadosh Baruch Hu is different. And part of that is that what knowledge means and how knowledge works and how Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows is not the way we know. Hakadosh Baruch Hu isn't a person and it's it's a complete fallacy to project upon Him that He knows the way we know. How does Hakadosh Baruch Hu know? We don't understand that because because to understand that you'd have to understand Hakadosh Baruch Hu. So mimela the Rambam says you have to withdraw the question. To say that two things are contradictory, you have to be able to understand both things. You have to be able to understand both things. If a person doesn't know what the word square means and he doesn't know what the word circle means, so he can't give an opinion as to whether or not square and circle are contradictory. If he knows what the two words mean, so then he can have an opinion that they are that they're compatible or or they're incompatible. But if a person doesn't know he doesn't know what the word means, so then how does he know whether it's potentially consistent or inconsistent? He doesn't know anything. And that's what I think the Avodas Hamelech explains. That's the answer to the Ra'avad's question. The Ra'avad is massig on the Rambam. What are you asking a question for if you're not going to answer it? So the Avodas Hamelech says because what the Rambam is it's not that the Rambam is not answering the question. The Rambam is undercutting the question. The Rambam is showing how the whole question is totally wrong and inappropriate and and based on a fallacy in the first place. It is true that at the end of the day the Rambam is telling us that we don't understand. That that is true, but but it's not that he's leaving the question intact and and saying that we don't understand the answer to the question. The Rambam is erasing the question. He's showing how the whole question is presumptuous. The whole question is based on on that fallacy. Okay, now that's a a little bit of of what the Rambam is is telling us here. Okay. Agav, agav, there's a remarkable, I think, pshat in the psukim in in Yeshayahu that that emerges from the Rambam. Right? The haftarah that that we lein on on a ta'anis. Right?

דרשו ה' בהמצאו קראהו בהיותו קרוב. יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבתיו וישוב אל ה' וירחמהו ואל אלהינו כי ירבה לסלוח. כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי נאום ה'.

So what's what's the the flow of the psukim again? So the navi is exhorting us to do teshuvah. יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבתיו. Right, the Rambam quotes that in פרק ב הלכה א as guiding us in in what teshuvah means. Teshuvah means

יעזוב החוטא חטאו ויסירנו ממחשבתו ויגמור בלבו שלא יעשהו שנאמר יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבתיו.

Fine. וישוב אל ה' וירחמהו ואל אלהינו כי ירבה לסלוח. Then comes ki, right? ki. So presumably, again, ki has different meanings but it seems here to mean because. So what's the because? So meforshim, if you take a look in in Yeshayahu, so the meforshim say more or less along these lines: You're wondering, how can it be that that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is really going to forgive us for a cheit? Why should He? Why should He? Shouldn't shouldn't we have to, rachmana litzlan, pay the price for our actions? Shouldn't we have to assume the consequences of our actions? So does it really make sense this offer of amnesty? And again, how's the end of the pasuk?

יעזוב רשע דרכו ואיש און מחשבתיו וישוב אל ה' וירחמהו. ואל אלהינו כי ירבה לסלוח.

Does it really make sense that the is it really realistic וירחמהו כי ירבה לסלוח? The answer's yeah, כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי. Yeah, you, so you, you, you probably hold grudges and you're not so forgiving and on your level, so you can't be massig that, but you should know Hakadosh Baruch Hu operates differently, כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי. Going according to the Rambam the pshat is different, going according to the Rambam the pshat is different. Because again the Rambam quotes here כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי not as referring to middas haslicha and middas harachamim of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. It says it refers to this yesod that the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu knows is not the way we know. So how do you plug that in? According to the Rambam is an extraordinary pshat in the psukim. Comes Yeshayahu Hanavi and he's telling us to do teshuva. So we're wondering again you can ask the same question in two ways: either can I do teshuva, do I really have any bechira, or you can wonder the same question of what do I have to do teshuva for, what was beyond beyond my control? Whatever rishus happened is beyond my control. V'haraya Hakadosh Baruch Hu knew it was going to happen so what are you telling me to do teshuva? So comes the Navi and says no you can do you have to do you can do teshuva and you have to do teshuva why? Because כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי. The fact that Hakadosh Baruch Hu knew that it was going to happen doesn't that didn't encroach k'hu zeh, it didn't encroach an iota on your bechira. You had full and absolute bechira and that's why you can with that bechira do teshuva and that's why you have to do bechira because you exercised your bechira in the past. Aye, how can that be, Hakadosh Baruch Hu knew the future? So what's it all about? No, it's no stira, כי לא מחשבותי מחשבותיכם ולא דרכיכם דרכי. Okay, let's see it a little bit here in perek hey.

פסוקים הרבה יש בתורה ובדברי הנביאים שהן נראין כסותרין עיקר זה ונכשלין בהן רוב אדם ויעלה על דעתן מהן שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על אדם לעשות טוב או רע ושאין לבו של אדם מסור לו להטותו לכל אשר ירצה. והריני מבאר עיקר גדול שממנו תדע פירוש כל אותן הפסוקים. בזמן שאדם אחד או אנשי מדינה חוטאים ועושה החוטא חטא שעשה מדעתו וברצונו כמו שהודענו ראוי להפרע ממנו והקדוש ברוך הוא יודע היך יפרע.

Right again so the Rambam mentions either adam echad or anshei medina because as he said earlier in perek gimmel a person is not only judged individually but he's also judged as part of whatever collective he belongs to. If a person lives in a particular medina, so then there's a din on that medina as well and the person is is judged as as part of that collective is judged collectively and everyone who belongs to it is included in that judgment.

יש חטא שהדין נותן שנפרעין ממנו על חטאו בעולם הזה בגופו או בממונו או בבניו הקטנים שבניו של אדם הקטנים שאין בהן דעת ולא הגיעו לכל המצות כקניינו הן. כתוב איש בחטאו יומת עד שיעשה איש. ויש חטא שהדין נותן שנפרעין ממנו לעולם הבא ואינו עובר עליו שום נזק בעולם הזה. ויש חטא שנפרעין ממנו עליו בעולם הזה ובעולם הבא.

Right, so we we understand that, right? That doesn't pose any any conceptual difficulties and Hakadosh Baruch Hu bechochmaso knows that again rachmana litzlan absent teshuva what the appropriate punishment and and the appropriate timing should be. Halacha Beis:

במה דברים אמורים בזמן שלא עשה תשובה אבל אם עשה תשובה התשובה כתריס לפני הפורענות.

It's like a shield.

וכשם שהאדם חוטא ברצונו ומדעתו כך הוא עושה תשובה ברצונו ומדעתו.

Again the same bechira that a person exercised rachmana litzlan to be choteh, that same bechira allows him to do teshuva. Halacha Gimmel: ואפשר שיחטא האדם חטא גדול. O chata'im harbeh. It could even be a single cheit. Wow.

או חטאים הרבה עד שיתן הדין בפני דיין האמת שיהיה הפירעון מזה החוטא על חטאים אלו שעשה ברצונו ומדעתו שמונעים ממנו התשובה ואין מניחים לו רשות לשוב מרשעו כדי שימות ויאבד בחטאים שעשה. הוא שהקדוש ברוך הוא אמר על ידי ישעיה השמן לב העם הזה ואזניו הכבד ועיניו השע פן יראה בעיניו ובאזניו ישמע ולבבו יבין ושב ורפא לו. וכן הוא אומר ויהיו מלעיבים במלאכי האלוקים ובוזים דבריו ומתעתעים בנביאיו עד עלות חמת ה' בעמו עד לאין מרפא כלומר חטאו ברצונם והרבו לפשוע עד שנתחייבו למנוע מהם התשובה שהיא המרפא.

So here's the Rambam's famous yesod that it can happen that the onesh or part of the onesh that Hakadosh Baruch Hu imposes upon egregious chote'im is that he removes the possibility of teshuvah. I think the Rambam in Shemonah Perakim when he has the same discussion, so he gives a mashal like this. He says the same way Rachmana l'tzlan Hakadosh Baruch Hu can punish a person with paralysis of a specific limb. So Rachmana l'tzlan a person's arm, his leg, a limb can become paralyzed, meaning that the normal state of the body is that a person is baruch Hashem able to move all his limbs. And we know that Rachmana l'tzlan there is such a phenomenon that there can be paralysis of a particular limb in the body. So the same way again that we recognize, we're aware of that physical phenomenon, so there's also a spiritual phenomenon where as it were the bechirah chofshis is paralyzed. That the same way Hakadosh Baruch Hu removes again at times Rachmana l'tzlan the possibility of motion from a limb, so too cheit Rachmana l'tzlan if it's terrible enough can dictate and Hakadosh Baruch Hu says this person doesn't deserve the possibility for teshuvah. So how does Hakadosh Baruch Hu close the door to teshuvah? By again by paralyzing the bechirah. And the emes says that the mashal is not stam mashal. It's not stam mashal because the Rambam explains as follows. He says and as he's about to say over here:

לפיכך כתוב בתורה ואני אחזק את לב פרעה לפי שחטא מעצמו תחילה והרע לישראל הגרים בארצו שנאמר הבה נתחכמה לו וגו' נתן הדין למנוע ממנו התשובה עד שנפרעו ממנו לפיכך חזק הקדוש ברוך הוא את ליבו. ולמה היה שולח לו ביד משה ואומר שלח ועשה תשובה וכבר אמר הקדוש ברוך הוא שאין אתה משלח שנאמר ואתה ודעתי ידעתי אולם בעבור זאת כדי להודיע לבאי עולם שבזמן שמונע הקדוש ברוך הוא התשובה לחוטא אינו יכול לשוב אלא ימות ברשעו שעשה בתחילה ברצונו.

So the Rambam says, so what was the point of sending Moshe Rabbeinu and to demand from Paroh if Paroh couldn't comply at that point? So the Rambam says to impress, to show, to teach a lesson to all generations that this too can happen, that there is such a middah, there is such a middat hadin that Hakadosh Baruch Hu will not allow the chotei to do teshuvah. The Rambam says it in Shemonah Perakim, I'm not sure whether you see this nuance over here in the Yad, I'm not sure why not. But in Shemonah Perakim he says it with an extra nuance.

ואם תאמר מדוע דרש ממנו לשלח את ישראל פעם אחר פעם באותו זמן שהוא מנוע מכך והיו באות לו המכות והוא עומד בסירובו כמו שאמרנו שהוא נענש שיעמוד בסירובו ולא היה לו לבקש ממנו לחינם דבר שלא יכול לעשותו הנה גם זה היה חכמה מלפניו יתעלה כדי להודיעו כי אם ירצה השם לבטל בחירתו הרי הוא מבטלה ולפיכך אמר לו אני דורש ממך לשלחם ואילו שלחתם היית ניצול אלא שאינך משלח עד שתאבד והיה הוא רוצה להסכים כדי שיבוא כאילו היפר דברי הנביא שהוא מנוע מלהסכים ולא יכול.

Rambam says over here that the way the bechira was removed from Paroh, what was that? And that's the part of the omek of the mashal to paralysis. Again, Rachmana litzlan, if a person is, their arm is paralyzed. So a person thinks to himself, right, the same way a healthy person does, he thinks to himself that he wants to move the arm, and then but he can't, he can't implement it, right? He thinks that he wants. The way Paroh's bechira was taken is not that Paroh doesn't realize that what he's doing is suicidal. No, Paroh realizes what he's doing is suicidal. He wants to say yes. In his mind, Paroh hears the demand, in his mind Paroh wants to say yes, Paroh wants to comply, and then he hears himself saying no and אל תוסף ראות פני כי ביום ראותך פני תמות. That it's not only the, the lesson is so remarkable, it's not only that sort of circumstantially, circumstantially all the spectators assume that he must have lost his bechira. Paroh himself is aware of it, the same way the Rachmana litzlan, the person with paralysis is aware of it. The ratzon to act is there and he can't implement it. He can't make good on it. So Paroh, the ratzon to exercise his bechira is there and he can't implement it. Paroh's driving towards a cliff, all he has to do is put his foot on the brake, and his mind, his mind engages that that's what he needs to do, and he can't put his foot on the brake. And that's lekhorah part of what the Rambam has in mind with the paralysis mashal. למען ספר שמי בכל הארץ, you Paroh will be able to attest to the fact that your bechira was taken away. That's how the Rambam peshat in the pesukim, not that everyone will surmise that that's what happened. You Paroh will be able to give edus

שיש השם מעניש אותו אדם במה שמונע ממנו בחירת פעולה מסוימת וידע הוא בכך ולא יוכל למשוך את נפשו להחזירה לאותה הבחירה.

Lema'an saper shmi means that you yourself will experience the loss of bechira.

וכן שכלו לפי הבנה שהיה לו נתחייב למנוע הבחירה. שנאמר כי מאת ה' היתה לחזק את לבם לקראת המלחמה את ישראל למען החרימם. וכן ישראל בימי אליהו לפי שהרבו לפשוע מנע מאותן המרבים לפשוע תשובה שנאמר ואתה הסבות את לבם אחורנית כלומר

manas mehem hateshuva.

נמצאת אומר שאין הקל גוזר על פרעה להרע לישראל ולא על סיחון לחטוא בארצו ולא על הכנענים להסתאב ולא על ישראל לעבוד עבודה זרה אלא כולם חטאו מעצמם ונתחייבו כולם למנוע מהם התשובה.

Even the side of the Tiferes Yonasan is metzayen, you take a look in the Sefer Ikrim, so the Sefer Ikrim disagrees and he thinks that this never happens. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu does not ever, no matter how evil the person, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is never moneia mimenu teshuva. Not Paroh, not Hitler, not Stalin yimach shemam, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is never moneia mehem teshuva. So what do the pesukim mean that כי אני הכבדתי את לבו etcetera? So the Sefer Ikrim says as follows: Hakadosh Baruch Hu counteracts. Paroh could have and would have complied without any charata lesha'avar, without any kabbala lehaba, without any busha. Paroh would have complied, again just out of his instinct that everyone has for self-preservation. Paroh would have complied. So what did Hakadosh Baruch Hu do? So what Hakadosh Baruch Hu did is Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave him, he provided Paroh an alternate understanding, he saw to it that Paroh wouldn't comply for that reason. Had Paroh even legodel risho, had Sichon, had Paroh wanted to do a genuine teshuva, even a genuine teshuva miyiras ha'onesh, again but a genuine teshuva where yiras ha'onesh does prompt charata and kabbala lehaba, so Paroh could have done such a teshuva, that possibility was never ever denied him. What Hakadosh Baruch Hu did deny him was, Hakadosh Baruch Hu saw to it that Paroh would have the opportunity by giving him respite between makkos, so Hakadosh Baruch Hu saw to it that Paroh had the opportunity not to comply just out of his preservation for self-instinct. That Paroh would be able to as soon as the makka was removed, so then Paroh could go back and reason, well obviously it was just a fluke or whatever. So Hakadosh Baruch Hu gave him that opening, again not to succumb without charata, without kabbala lehaba out of fear. And that's what the va'ani aksheh, the va'ani achazek is. That Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't interfere with his bechira and Hakadosh Baruch Hu didn't remove the possibility of teshuva, just Hakadosh Baruch Hu allowed him to, Hakadosh Baruch Hu saw to it that he would have the opening to deny the reality of the earlier makkos by giving him respite. And the Ikrim goes on to say that that's pshat why is it that Hakadosh Baruch Hu tells that Moshe Rabbeinu sends shluchim to Edom asking to pass through the land and then Edom says no and then they have to detour and vayet Yisrael me'alov, so what's that about? Hakadosh Baruch Hu sort of sets them up just to be humiliated? So he says no, it's all part of the. do a real teshuvah.

הלכה ד' ובעניין זה שואלים הנביאים והצדיקים בתפילותיהם מהשם לעוזרם על דרך האמת. כמו שאמר דוד הורני ה' דרכך כלומר אל ימנעוני חטאיי דרך האמת שממנה אדע דרכך וייחוד שמך. וכן זה שאמר ורוח נדיבה תסמכני כלומר תניח רוחי לעשות חפצה ואל יגרמו לי חטאיי למנוע ממני התשובה אלא תהיה הרשות בידי עד שאחזור ואבין ואדע דרך האמת ועל דרך זו כל הדומה לפסוקים אלו.

So this too is extraordinary. So the Rambam here is far-fronting. He doesn't pose the problem, he just solves it without posing it as a problem. Given bechiras, so what does it mean, what does it mean when the psukim seem to be asking that Hashem should He should propel us along the path of teshuvah? So what does that mean? The same way there's no bechira, there's no encroachment upon bechira that Hakadosh Baruch Hu forces us to do cheit, so there's also no encroachment upon bechira, Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't force us to do mitzvos and bichlal that He doesn't force us to do teshuvah. So what does it mean v'ruach nedivah tismacheini? You should support me. So the Rambam says no, what the psukim mean is that adaraba, we're asking for preservation of bechira. Hayos that rachmana litzlan there is a state, there is a situation in which a person can be denied bechira as an onesh, so that's what the nevi'im what the tzaddikim are davening for. Hakadosh Baruch Hu whatever you do, don't impose that punishment, leave my bechira intact that I should have the option of doing teshuvah. Right, maybe we'll just introduce the question from halacha hey and discuss it more fully next week bli neder.

ומהו זה שאמר דוד טוב וישר השם על כן יורה חטאים בדרך ידרך ענוים במשפט וילמד ענוים דרכו. וזה ששלח להם נביאים מודיעים להם דרכי השם ומחזירים אותם בתשובה ועוד שנתן בהם כוח ללמוד ולהבין שמידה זו בכל אדם שכל זמן שהוא נמשך בדרכי החכמה והצדק מתאווה להן ורודף אותן והוא שאמרו חכמים בא לטהר מסייעין אותו כלומר ימצא עצמו נעזר על הדבר.

Again same question that the Rambam was deflecting in halacha daled. So you know, what does it mean when the psukim or the maamarei Chazal talk about assistance in doing teshuvah? Again but there has to be a person has to exercise the bechira. So the Rambam says what it means is that it's a it's commenting, it's depicting human nature. Human nature Nature is such that a person will respond to chochma, he'll respond to tzedek. And that's what it means that the the the the Torah Chazal are telling us that that you should know that that if you only begin so then the momentum will increase very quickly because teva ha'adam is such that if he'll expose himself to darkei chochma so then he's going to be attracted. There's going to be a magnetic attraction. If he'll expose himself to tzedek so then there's going to again there's going to be an attraction and and and he will find himself again so taken with with Torah, so taken with with the lifestyle that it will generate momentum and and it will be easier for him to to continue. Meaning משל למה הדבר דומה, right, let's say certain foods stimulate the appetite. So we wouldn't say that that's an encroachment upon bechira. We would say no, that's the way the world works. The fact that if I walk into a wall that it's going to hurt, that's not an encroachment upon bechira. I know that. So that's just the the consequences of what I'm going to do. Certain foods stimulate appetite, so it's not that after eating this food so now now my bechira is being encroached upon. No, it's my bechira whether or not I should expose myself to that and I should know, I'm being told, look, these are the consequences. Maybe it's good for you, maybe it's not good for you, depending upon the situation, but that food is going to is going to stimulate the the appetite. So so too that's what the psukim say that טוב וישר ה׳ על כן יורה חטאים בדרך, that Hashem created the world in such a way that if a person will only embark upon the path, a person will take the first few steps, so then he'll be stimulated. That's what the teva ha'adam, the teva ha'adam is. Okay, in in halacha hey, so then the balance of halacha hey, so the Rambam deals with the question of ועבדום וענו אותם ארבע מאות שנה, so if if that was nigzar, so why are the Mitzrayim held accountable? So it's an arichus devarim, so maybe we'll we'll leave that for for next week, the the specific question.