Rambam Teshuva Perek 5

רשות כל אדם נתונה לו. אם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך טובה ולהיות צדיק הרשות בידו. ואם רצה להטות עצמו לדרך רעה ולהיות רשע הרשות בידו.

Right, so reshus in this context doesn't mean permission. It means the ability, the capacity. Same way in Pirkei Avos, when reshus means the authorities, it means someone who has the ability. So that's what reshus means here as well, that everyone is given, everyone is endowed with the ability, the capacity to steer himself lederech tovah or to steer himself lederech raah.

הוא שכתוב בתורה: הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. כלומר, הן מין זה של אדם היה אחד בעולם ואין לו מין שני דומה לו בזה העניין שיהיה הוא מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ, ואין לו מי שייעכב על ידו מלעשות הטוב או הרע. כיוון שכן הוא, וכיוון שכן הוא פן ישלח ידו.

So the Rambam says that the yesod of Bechira is expressed in this pasuk of הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו. So it's clear, and the truth is the Rambam himself in Shemonah Perakim... Is this supposed to be a different question? I think so. At what time? 9:55. Okay. All right. So how exactly, how does the Rambam read the pasuk? So again, just for purposes of contrast, if you take a look at Rashi in Chumash on this pasuk, so Rashi says as follows:

היה כאחד ממנו: הרי הוא יחיד בתחתונים כמו שאני יחיד בעליונים. ומה היא יחידתו? לדעת טוב ורע.

So how does Rashi get that from the pasuk again? הרי הוא יחיד בתחתונים, right, yachid in the sense of unique, an individual, in the sense of unique, הרי הוא יחיד בתחתונים כמו שאני יחיד בעליונים. So I think the meforshei Rashi, I forget whom, meforshei Rashi explain as follows: that ke’achad here, I don’t know if they give this moshal or not, but let’s say Rashi says later when Avimelech says to Avraham Avinu: כמעט שכב אחד העם את אשתך והבאת עלינו אשם. That כמעט שכב אחד העם doesn’t mean any one person, but the meyuchad sheba’am. And that Avimelech is talking about himself in the third person. That I was almost nichshal in issur eishes ish because you misrepresented who Sarah was. So achad doesn't necessarily doesn't only mean anyone, but it can mean the unique one, the special one. And that's what how Rashi taitches the pasuk: הן האדם, right, bechol ha'adam, hayah, is like the unique one amongst us, meaning Hakadosh Baruch Hu kavyachol is talking to the malachim, right, so mimenu means amongst us. So meaning we who kavyachol so we we inhabit the kavyachol, Hakadosh Baruch Hu is everywhere, but we kavyachol we inhabit Elyonim. So הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו, behold Adam is like the unique one amongst us, meaning with Hakadosh Baruch Hu speaking, like me, right, הן האדם היה כאחד ממנו. Umahi yechidaso? And what is his in what does his uniqueness consist? Lada’at tov vara, right, a behemah doesn’t know tov vara, vegetation doesn’t know tov vara, kol sheken inanimate doesn’t know tov vara. So ha’adam is is hen ha’adam hayah, he beTachtonim. like the unique one amongst us those ba'elyonim. Now, ומה יחידתו לדעת טוב ורע? Now, if in addition to the fact that he'll be unique in that respect amongst the tachtonim lodaas tov vora, he'll then live eternally, so then people will think that he's... people will make him into, he'll be made into an avoda zara.

ועתה פן ישלח ידו ולקח גם מעץ החיים ואכל וחי לעולם.

Umisheyichye le'olam, says Rashi,

הרי הוא קרוב להטות הבריות אחריו ולומר אף הוא אלוה. ויש מדרש אגדה אבל אין מיושבין על פשוטו.

Right, so according to Rashi, this pasuk has nothing to do with bechira chofshis. It's not stating the yesod implicitly in saying ועתה פן ישלח ידו, but it's clearly not the way the Rambam was reading it. So how did the Rambam read it? So it's clear and again the Rambam himself in Shmona Perakim tells you it, that the Rambam is reading the pasuk like Onkelos. So listen to what Onkelos says, if you have a Chumash you can take a look, listen to what Onkelos says:

ואמר ה' אלהים האדם הוה יחידי בעלמא מניה למידע טב וביש וכען דלמא יושיט ידיה ויסב אף מאילן חיי ויכול וייחי לעולם.

So the crucial word here in Onkelos is ואמר ה' אלהים האדם הוה יחידי בעלמא. Onkelos puts in, he says that understood in the Chumash is the word be'alma. Vekeachad against the trop, keachad doesn't go with mimenu according to Onkelos, but the pshat in the pasuk is הן האדם היה כאחד בעלמא. Adam is unique in the world, not like the unique one amongst us, right? Rashi taitches with the trop, Onkelos taitches against the trop. הן האדם היה כאחד, that Adam is keachad, understood be'alma. What is his uniqueness? His uniqueness is ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. That in Yiddish you say fun zich, that mimenu, that's what the Rambam says, מעצמו בדעתו ומחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע. That's what the Rambam is saying, that umahi yichidaso again, umahi yichidaso hen ha'adam, so according to Onkelos again, with the Rambam following in Onkelos's footsteps. הן האדם היה כאחד understood keachad be'alma. So that the that is understood and then what is the uniqueness? The uniqueness is that ממנו לדעת טוב ורע. And the ועתה פן ישלח ידו is heyos, that he has this capacity that

מעצמו בדעתו ומחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע ועושה כל מה שהוא חפץ,

now maybe he will abuse that gift, that endowment that he has. That's how Onkelos reads it. You take a look, the Radak here, he doesn't quote the Rambam, he doesn't have to. The Radak quotes in Bereishis Rabba as follows:

ובבראשית רבה דרש רבי פפוס, כאחד ממנו כאחד ממלאכי השרת. אמר לו רבי עקיבא דייך פפוס,

which means you said enough, which means you said enough.

אלא מה אני מקיים כאחד ממנו, שנתן הקדוש ברוך הוא לפניו שתי דרכים, דרך חיים ודרך אחרת. הניח החיים ובירר לו דרך אחרת.

Then he quotes another two lines from the Midrash, and then the Radak writes:

ודעת המתרגם כדעת רבי עקיבא, שתרגם הוה יחידי בעלמא מניה למידע טב וביש רצה לומר ממנו הוא לדעת טוב ורע כי האל נתן לו הבחירה.

So it's clear just in terms of how the Rambam is reading the pasuk. But there's not just in parshanus here, but there's a fundamental perspective on bechira chofshis. Dehainu, if if we would leave this Rambam aside, right, and we would and we would sort of try to... The third floor beis medrash still exists or was it done up something else? Looks like there was a shiur over there. So I think if we would be asked to sort of describe, define what it means that a person has bechirah chofshis, so we would say a person has free will. A person has free will. No one, a person is not programmed to do anything. He acts voluntarily, right? I think that that would be our description, definition of what bechirah chofshis means, that a person isn't programmed, he's not programmed biologically, he's not programmed socially, he's not programmed in any on any level. What the Rambam says is that it's much deeper than that. What the Rambam says is that l'maiseh, and again, Onkelos and and Rebbi Akiva beforehand say it, is that really the ikkar bechirah chofshis is that a person also has the capacity to recognize on his own me'atzmo mimenu, he has the capacity to recognize, to discern, to discriminate tov va'ra. Sorry. D'hainu, without this Rambam, we we would have thought, I think, and we would have said that bechirah chofshis doesn't mean that I can figure out what's right or wrong. Just means that I can choose what to do. If you'll then add to the mix that you'll instruct me as to what is right or wrong, so then given the fact that I've bechirah chofshis, I can now choose whether to do right or wrong. And and Onkelos says, Rebbi Akiva says, the Rambam says, no, it means more than that, that part of the ikkar bechirah chofshis is not only that once instructed, once told what's tov va'ra, a person now acts voluntarily. I think 370 is over. Thank you. Again, so the chiddush then emerges from from this understanding of the posuk is that that part of the capacity of bechirah chofshis is not just to act voluntarily and if spoon-fed and if told what's right and what's wrong, one then has the the ability to act voluntarily and to do what's right, but

ממנו לדעת טוב ורע, מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע.

Okay, now obviously tov va'ra have to have to be defined. There obviously the Rambam presumably doesn't mean that that a person is supposed to be able to ich veis intuit every chok and every prat in halacha, but but there is but pending that sort of crucial definition of of how much is subsumed in tov va'ra, it's it's an amazing, amazing again delineation of what it means to have bechirah chofshis and and the responsibility that that capacity places upon a person, you know, the the you know the the argument that no one ever told me, you know, is is certainly not automatically a a defense. It's

ממנו לדעת טוב ורע, מעצמו בדעתו ובמחשבתו יודע הטוב והרע.

Halacha bais:

אל יעלה במחשבתך דבר זה שאומרים טפשי האומות ורוב גולמי בני ישראל שהקדוש ברוך הוא גוזר על האדם מתחלת ברייתו להיות צדיק או רשע.

Don't let that even cross your your mind. Predestination is something that shouldn't even cross your mind. Ein hadavar kein.

אלא כל אדם ואדם ראוי להיות צדיק כמשה רבנו או רשע כירבעם.

See that the simple pshat in ראוי להיות צדיק כמשה רבנו או רשע כירבעם is that the Rambam doesn't say that he's ראוי להיות נביא כמשה רבנו, that he's ראוי להיות חכם כמשה רבנו, but ראוי להיות צדיק כמשה רבנו, that one doesn't have to, one can be a Tzaddik k'Moshe Rabbeinu even without the, even if one doesn't have the endowment to be a Chochom or Novi k'Moshe Rabbeinu, but the Tzaddik k'Moshe Rabbeinu one can be. או חכם או סכל. See the meforshim talk about the chochom o sochol, so clearly the Rambam is not using the terms to denote whether a person has a high IQ or a low IQ because that's not, a chochom is someone who acts wisely and a sochol is someone who acts foolishly. So like the phrase, like Chazal say about Korach, that מה ראה פיקח לשטות זו. A person can have a high IQ and he can act foolishly. He can have a relatively speaking lower IQ and he can act wisely. So chochom and sochol here doesn't mean raw or innate intelligence.

או רחמן או אכזרי או כילי או שוע וכן שאר כל הדעות. ואין לו מי שיכפהו,

no one coerces him, v'lo gozeir olov, and no one decrees, ולא מי שמושכו באחד משני הדרכים. Again,

אלא הוא מעצמו ומדעתו נוטה לאיזה דרך שיחפוץ. הוא שירמיהו אומר מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. כלומר אין הבורא גוזר על האדם לא להיות טוב ולא להיות רע. וכיוון שכן הוא נמצא זה החוטא הוא הפסיד עצמו.

So according to the Rambam, the pshat in the pasuk in Eichah, מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב, it's b'nichusa, it's not b'timya. I think Rashi in Eichah reads it b'timya, means don't think that what happened to you is accidental. Don't think the churban is because of the geopolitics, מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. According to Rashi, it's a rhetorical statement, a rhetorical question referring to hashgacha in the world. And according to the Rambam, no, it's b'nichusa. It's a declarative statement, not a rhetorical question, that meaning don't look to blame, don't look to shift or assign blame for whatever bad you've done, you've perpetrated because מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. Hakadosh Baruch Hu doesn't, He doesn't, He doesn't decree, there's no predestination. And then the, then Rav Chaim Volozhiner has yet a third understanding in מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. Like the Rambam, he says the pasuk is b'nichusa. It's not a rhetorical question. But he doesn't interpret it as referring to the ra'os and tov of a person's actions. He takeh has it referring to sachar v'onesh and he says that Hakadosh Baruch Hu created the briah in such a way, משל למה הדבר דומה. Let's say a person, Rachmana Litzlan, he smokes and because of that there's lung damage. So we wouldn't describe that as that Hakadosh Baruch Hu necessarily, we wouldn't describe it as Hakadosh Baruch Hu actively intervening and actively punishing the person for smoking. We'd say no, Hakadosh Baruch Hu created a world, He created the world in such a way that smoking is a carcinogen, that smoking damages the lungs. So the person smoked, so Rachmana Litzlan, he incurred lung damage. And we wouldn't look to say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu actively, immediately, directly is inflicting punishment on this person. We just say that's the, those are the chukkei hateva of Hakadosh Baruch Hu's world. If a person sticks his finger in the fire and he gets burned, again, we're not going to say that Hakadosh Baruch Hu. Hakadosh Baruch Hu actively, immediately intervened to make this person get burned. We'll say Hakadosh Baruch Hu created a world in which if you stick your finger in the fire you get burned and this person stuck his finger in the fire. So Chaim Volozhin says the same thing, the same way we recognize that in the physical laws of the universe, so there are also spiritual laws of the universe, and that an aveira the same way, ich veis, fire burns in the physical universe and smoking rachmana litzlan damages lungs in the physical universe, so too on a spiritual level aveiros have a destructive, corrosive effect and mitzvos have a salutary and productive effect and that's programmed into the beriah and that's what it means מפי עליון לא תצא הרעות והטוב. So according to Chaim Volozhin it's also a statement, not a rhetorical question, but a statement of bechira chofshis, but again a statement of how Hakadosh Baruch Hu programmed the sachar va'onesh into the beriah that again the same way we understand that about the physical chukei hateva, so it's also true on an invisible level in terms of the spiritual chukei ha'havayah. Rambam continues and says וכיוון שכן הוא נמצא זה החוטא הוא הפסיד עצמו. He engaged in self-destructive behavior.

ולפיכך ראוי לו לבכות ולקונן על כל מה שעשה לנפשו וגמלה רעה.

That's the continuity within the pesukim מה יתאונן אדם חי גבר על חטאו. Again not ma as a question, but again as ich veis מה נורא המקום הזה. Right? So when Yaakov Avinu says מה נורא המקום הזה, he's not asking a question, he's not asking what, but it's with an exclamation point. So too מה יתאונן אדם חי גבר על חטאו, how much reason is there, how much cause is there for a person to bemoan his own sins because he's responsible for what happens to himself in this world. וחזר ואמר, and that's what Yirmiyahu Hanavi now continues and he concludes Ho'il verushuteinu beyadeinu. Again we have the ability

ומדעתנו עשינו כל הרעות ראוי לנו לחזור בתשובה ולעזוב רשענו שהרשות עתה בידינו.

The same way we had the capacity initially to sin, we have that same capacity now to do teshuva. הוא שכתוב אחריו נחפשה דרכינו ונחקורה ונשובה עד השם. Rambam continues עיקר זה עיקר גדול הוא והוא עמוד התורה והמצווה. He says all of Torah and mitzvos rests on this pillar.

שנאמר ראה נתתי לפניך היום את החיים ואת הטוב ואת המוות ואת הרע וכתיב ראה אנכי נותן לפניכם היום ברכה וקללה. כלומר שהרשות בידכם וכל שיחפוץ האדם לעשות ממעשה בני האדם עושה בין טובים בין רעים. ומפני זה העניין נאמר מי ייתן והיה לבבם זה להם.

Like Hakadosh Baruch Hu is wishing kavyachol. What does Hakadosh Baruch Hu have to wish? Can't Hakadosh Baruch Hu just implement? No.

כלומר שאין הבורא כופה בני האדם ולא גוזר עליהם לעשות טובה או רעה אלא ליבם מסור להם. אילו היה הא-ל גוזר על האדם להיות צדיק או רשע או אילו היה שם דבר שמושך את האדם בעיקר תולדתו לדרך מן הדרכים או למדע מן המדעות או לדעה מן הדעות או למעשה מן המעשים.

So the Lechem Mishneh I think explains: so l'derech min haderachim again different paths of life, l'madda min hamadda'os what a person believes, l'de'ah min hade'os character dispositions, or l'ma'aseh min hama'asim a particular ma'aseh. If Hakadosh Baruch Hu would have again if there would have been something preordained, there would have been some irresistible force dictating any of these things כמו שבודים מליבם הטיפשים הוברי שמים as those who believe in astrology invent such a belief

היך מצווה לנו על ידי הנביאים עשה כך ואל תעשה כך הטיבו דרכיכם ואל תלכו אחרי רשעכם.

So then it makes a farce out of all of the mitzvos.

והוא מתחלת בריאתו כבר נגזר עליו או תולדתו תמשכהו לדבר שאי אפשר לזוז ממנו ומה מקום היה לכל התורה כולה ובאיזה דין ובאיזה משפט נפרע מן הרשע ומשלם שכר לצדיק השופט כל הארץ לא יעשה משפט?

See, itachein and this is a longer a longer diyon than than we have time for, but but itachein that that again the Rambam's presentation of of what the ikar bechira chofshis is that that that we've that we discussed with the posuk of ממנו לדעת טוב ורע, itachein it has very practical implications as well, again, not only in terms of a person's accountability when he wasn't taught, but but practical applications in the sense that, and again, this is not as it's more nuanced than than we're about to say, but itachein according to the Rambam that if a person wants to be mechazek himself, so the chizuk should begin not just on the level of willpower, but the chizuk should begin on the level of the lada'as, and that a person has to work on on having a more clear and deeper and more profound and more vivid understanding of tov and ra, and and that it's not simply being mechazek oneself not to be lazy and to learn, but itachein that according to the Rambam the chizuk has to begin with having a less skewed a a more correct a more vivid understanding of what the opportunity, what the mitzvah is of of of learning and and what it offers, like the Rambam writes in Hilchos Mezuzah that the only thing that that endures is yedias tzur olamim, and that in turn the more vivid that understanding, again, things are more nuanced than than I'm saying now and maybe we'll talk a little bit about it some more next time, but this is at least certainly partially the case according to the Rambam, that the more vivid one's understanding, that itself is a major factor in in translating into the into the willpower and into the drive to and and generating the chefetz to to do to do what's right and it's not only sort of a you know a philosophical abstract take on bechira chofshis but but again in a more nuanced way than than was just said it has practical implications as well.