Rambam Hil. Teshuva: 13 Ikarei Emunah

Rosh Hashana

דף ט"ז עמוד ב' תניא אמר רבי יצחק ארבעה דברים מקרעין גזר דינו של אדם

Elu Hen Tzedaka, Tze'aka, Shinui Hashem, VeShinui Ma'aseh. Tzedaka d'ketiv וצדקה תציל ממות. Tze'aka d'ketiv ויצעקו אל ה' בצר להם וממצוקותיהם יוציאם. Shinui Hashem d'ketiv

שרי אשתך לא תקרא את שמה שרי כי שרה שמה וכתיב וברכתי אותה וגם נתתי ממנה לך בן.

Shinui Ma'aseh d'ketiv

וירא האלקים את מעשיהם וכתיב וינחם האלקים על הרעה אשר דבר לעשות להם ולא עשה.

So these Arba Devarim that each of them has the koach to be מקרע גזר דינו של אדם. And Rashi says what does Shinui Ma'aseh mean? Again, Tzedaka, Tze'aka, Shinui Hashem are pretty straightforward. Rashi says Shinui Ma'aseh, shav mera'ato. That's what Shinui Ma'aseh means, that he shav mera'ato. So the Ridvash asks

פירוש רש"י שב מרעתו ולא נהירא דהא פשיטא שאם אינו שב מדרכיו כטובל ושרץ בידו הוא שאין מועיל לו שום תשובה.

It's mashma that each of these things is something I don't know, something more than teshuva or it's a very deep form of teshuva. Just being shav mera'ato is the most elementary form of teshuva. The person, whatever the cheit was, he was guilty of cheit A, so now he's no longer guilty of cheit A. Each of these things sounds like we're talking about something which enhances the teshuva or something that the teshuva is really something unusual, something extra about it. So he says

הנכון שאפילו מעשים של רשות שאינם הגונים קצת הוא משנה.

So Shinui Ma'aseh means in addition to ceasing and desisting from whatever the aveira was, lo aleinu, he's meshaneh יתר מעשיו לטובה מעשים של רשות שאינם הגונים קצת. A tashpasht. Things that are tashpasht.

כלומר שהוא אדם אחר לגמרי ומדי מייתי ברייתא דתלמודא דכתיב וירא האלקים את מעשיהם וכי שבו מדרכם הרעה.

That Chazal are saying that the pasuk is saying two things by the anshei Nineveh. It wasn't only shavu midarkam hara'ah but the וירא האלקים את מעשיהם means in addition to the shavu midarkam hara'ah. That's how the Ridvash understands. So it's tzarich iyun to understand what Rashi has in mind in the Gemara. Take a look in the Rambam.

מדרכי התשובה בפרק ב' הלכה ד' מדרכי התשובה להיות השב צועק תמיד לפני ה' בבכיה ותחנונים ועושה צדקה כפי כחו.

Okay, so first he's quoting tze'aka, that was one of the four. ועושה צדקה כפי כחו, that's the second of the four. ומתרחק הרבה מן הדבר שחטא בו, okay where exactly did that come from, that's not the dalet devarim of our Gemara.

ומשנה שמו כלומר שאני אחר ואיני אותו האיש שעשה אותם המעשים.

And now ומשנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה. So lichora it's clear, as far as the Ridvash is concerned, he used to comment that the Rambam is either actually or ka'ein, he's certainly on the Ridvash's wavelength that Shinui Ma'aseh doesn't mean the shav mera'ato. That's what the Rambam says very unequivocally משנה מעשיו כולם לטובה ולדרך ישרה. He doesn't mean, certainly not just. So le'chora as follows I think we spoke before Rosh Hashana no we spoke about we did about nichanti uvoshti be'ma'asai we talked about that right but why loshon rabbim? So we said that the yesod is that the impetus and even the focus for teshuva is going to be an individual cheit and yet it's supposed to trigger associations. It triggers associations so even though it's כל מצוה שבתורה אם עבר אדם על אחת מהן he's doing teshuva for a specific aveira but nevertheless it's supposed to trigger an association of nichanti uvoshti be'ma'asai and we said that's certainly one way to explain what the Chatasi Avisi Pashati is when if you're talking about one instance of one cheit presumably it was either cheit or avon or pesha it wasn't all of them. So we said no what we gave the mashal that when a person reflects on cheit so then feelings of nechomo and busho should there should be associations of that a person makes. So closely related to this is that the sense of hachna'ah that goes along or that is at the heart of doing teshuva the mindset the overall feeling that a person has in doing teshuva is also not something that can be compartmentalized. Try to think how to explain that a little bit better. The koved rosh which a person feels which a person looks to sustain to do teshuva is a koved rosh that again has to spill over in terms of if a person recognizes deficiency in his avodas Hashem so what it means is that there's been a certain laxity and the teshuva for that is that a person becomes more serious that there's a greater degree of koved rosh about his avodas Hashem. Now it can't be even if the aveira for which I'm doing teshuva now is loshon hora is whatever but the koved rosh of realizing that there's been a laxity with regard to avodas Hashem. Shmiras hamitzvos, that koved rosh can't be compartmentalized any more than the sense of nechama u-vusha, which is also triggered by a specific aveirah. Same way again, the nechama u-vusha as in the mashal we gave of the guest who offends his host in so many different ways, that there too there should be an association. There too, teshuvah is a mindset. Again, it's not just what the Rambam—the whole thrust of this Rambam in פרק ב הלכה ד is that teshuvah is not something that a person is supposed to think of as a sort of discrete action. Okay, so I'm clapping Al Cheit and I'm thinking that I'm misnacheim u-misbayesh and that I'm mekabel le-haba not to do it. Okay, teshuvah's done. It's a discrete Darkei Ha-Teshuvah. Darkei Ha-Teshuvah means it's a lifestyle. So it means that part of teshuvah is a certain mindset, a certain approach. So that's what the Rambam says. So once you recognize again that the teshuvah isn't, again, just simply some—forgetting the question now whether the mitzvah is viduy, the mitzvah is teshuvah, whatever it is, however you want to define it, but even if the mitzvah is teshuvah, the teshuvah isn't—it's not like ich veis netilas lulav. You pick it up and you shake it and you're finished. Done. Mitzvah's done. Check it off. And then Chanukah, you light the Ner Chanukah, it burns, it burns out, finished. Teshuvah is a—again, it's a mindset. There's a different mindset. If it translates into איני אותו האיש שעשה אותם המעשים, so then the same way איני אותו האיש שדיבר לשון הרע or whatever else the aveirah was, it's also going to be what the Radvaz talks about the ma'asim she-bi-reshus also. The person now has a different mindset, a different approach, so it's not only going to affect his ich veis משל למה הדבר דומה. A person has a sort of casual approach to his studies. And then he flunks a course. Flunks a course. Okay, so that's a wake-up call. Now he's going to get more serious. So he's not only going to get more serious in the class that he flunked and he has to take again. So that's going to carry over and he's going to be more serious about all his classes. It's going to carry over because when something is a question of a mindset, so it can't be compartmentalized because it's not just the mindset about this aveirah. No, because again the mindset is that there was a laxity in terms of dealing with Dvar Hashem. If that's the case, so then the same way when I recognize this laxity, so I realize again my association that, you know, this isn't the only thing I've done. So so too in terms of the tikkun, the tikkun is not only going to be in terms of that specific aveirah, it's going to be משנה מעשיו כולם לטובה. Maybe we wanted to ha'aros in perek gimmel. And perek gimmel today is perek in Hilchos Teshuvah for learning a perek a day of Hilchos Teshuvah. There is a chiddush atzum in the Rambam here. It's basically when you read carefully it's basically meforash, but a chiddush atzum me'od in the Rambam here in perek gimmel Hilchos Teshuvah. You have the Rambam, maybe take a look. Which one? We're going to begin in vav maybe. Gimmel vav. The Rambam here lists

אלו שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא אלא נכרתין. והכופרים בתחיית המתים והכופרים בביאת הגואל המשומדים ומחטיאי הרבים והפורשין מדרכי ציבור והעושה עבירות ביד רמה בפרהסיא כיהויקים והמסורות ומטילי אימה על הציבור שלא לשם שמיים ושופכי דמים ובעלי לשון הרע והמושך ערלתו.

Okay.

חמישה הן הנקראים מינים האומר שאין שם אלוה ואין לעולם מנהיג האומר שיש שם מנהיג אבל הם שניים או יותר האומר שיש שם ריבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה וכן האומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור הכל וכן העובד אלוה זולתו כדי להיות מליץ בינו ובין ריבון העולמים כל אחד מחמישה אלו מין.

So basically what the Rambam calls minim here corresponds to the first five of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, correct? The first one, right, the first of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is metziut Hashem, so the first one is haomer she-ein sham. The second is Yichud Hashem: האומר שיש שם מנהיג אבל הם שניים או יותר. The third is שאינו גוף ולא ישיגוהו משיגי הגוף, so this is

האומר שיש שם ריבון אחד אלא שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה.

The fourth is הוא ראשון והוא אחרון, meaning that Hashem alone is eternal and nothing else has existed eternally alongside him, right, the Ravad quotes or the midrash quotes what Plato thought, that's what Plato thought, right, la'afokei Plato. וכן האומר שאינו לבדו ראשון וצור הכל, so that's the fourth of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim.

וכן העובד אלוה זולתו, שהבורא יתברך שמו לו לבדו ראוי להתפלל ואין לזולתו ראוי להתפלל.

So that's the first five of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Okay. Now:

שלושה הן הנקראים אפיקורסין האומר שאין שם נבואה ואין שם מדע שמגיע מהבורא ללב בני האדם המכחיש נבואתו של משה רבינו והאומר שאין הבורא יודע מעשה בני האדם.

Okay, so here now we're not going entirely in order anymore, but these also are three more of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim. Number six is divrei neviim emet. Number seven is nevuat Moshe Rabbeinu. Then the Rambam for the moment has skipped over the two about Torah and he skipped to number, he skipped over

שזאת התורה המצויה בידינו היא הנתונה למשה רבינו עליו השלום

and וזאת התורה לא תהא מוחלפת. He's going to come to those soon. He skipped over those for the moment and he went to שהבורא יתברך שמו יודע כל מעשה בני אדם, which is number ten. Right? So we have numbers one through seven and number ten so far for just helping cop on the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim.

שלושה הן הכופרים בתורה האומר שאין התורה מן השמים אפילו פסוק אחד אפילו תיבה אחת אם אמר משה אמרו מפי עצמו זהו כופר בתורה וכן הכופר בפירושה והיא תורה שבעל פה והכחיש מגידיה כגון צדוק ובייתוס.

So in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, the Rambam puts that as one ikar, to be kofer whether Torah shebikhtav or Torah sheba'al peh, that's number eight.

והאומר שהבורא החליף מצוה זו במצוה אחרת וכבר בטלה תורה זו אף על פי שהיתה מן השמים כגון הנוצרים וההגרים כל אחד משלושה אלו כופר בתורה.

So that's already number nine, right? That's eight and nine in terms of

שכל התורה המצויה בידינו היא הנתונה למשה רבינו עליו השלום

and number ten, excuse me, number nine, and number ten we already had, which is שהבורא יתברך שמו יודע כל מעשה בני אדם. Then twelve and thirteen the Rambam listed individually, right, because he listed kofrim beviyat hagoel and kofrim bitchiyat hametim. So first of all, one question is, where's sachar va'onesh? That's one of the big mysteries. Where's sachar va'onesh, why didn't the Rambam list it here in פרק ג' הלכות תשובה? He's listed twelve of the thirteen Yud Gimmel Ikkarim here. This is the only place where the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, of course, are listed in the hakdamah to perek chelek. In Mishneh Torah, the closest you have to the list in one place is right here in פרק ג' הלכות תשובה, and the sixty-four thousand dollar question is why doesn't the Rambam here have an explicit mention of sachar va'onesh? Right? The eleventh of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is גומל טוב לשומרי מצוותיו and veonish leovrei mitzvotav. It should have been, it should have been a form of Apikorsus. Should have been one more, one more in the list of Apikorsus. That's a, that's a big question and maybe we'll come back to it. I'm not sure. Okay. It's funny that when the Rambam wants to give an example of the Apikorsus that Torah is not eternal,

שהאומר שהחליף מצוה זו במצוה אחרת וכבר בטלה תורה זו,

so he gives the example of HaNotzrim V'HaYishmelim. Not funny in the sense that it doesn't illustrate the point. Obviously, it does, it does illustrate the point. But you would have thought that the Rambam would give an example of Jews who sort of illustrate the violation of the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. Why is he giving examples from Goyim of a violation of the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim? So Ella Mai? You go back, you see something unbelievable. Go back and read, what was the end of Halacha Hei? Before we started reading. The end of Halacha Hei was וכן חסידי אומות העולם יש להם חלק לעולם הבא. Meaning that, right, the Rambam said that

כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא, שכל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא אף על פי שחטאו,

and וכן חסידי אומות העולם יש להם חלק לעולם הבא. Then Rambam says ואלו הן שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא. When you read the Rambam consecutively, which we, which we often don't because we, we just come to Rambams through the Ein Mishpat, so we don't necessarily read them consecutively and get the sense that he wanted us to get. The simple reading of the Rambam is that אלו שאין להם חלק... now obviously, some of these are, only make sense about Jews. I mean, someone who Moser, we're talking about a Jew. And someone who's Moshech Orlaso, we're talking about, I guess we're talking about a Jew. But those which are not Parosh MiDarchei Tzibbur, Meshumadim, but those which are not transparently and self-evidently limited to Jews, the simple reading of the Rambam is that he says that Bnei Noach have to believe in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim also. And that's the Pshat. כל ישראל יש להם חלק לעולם הבא and חסידי אומות העולם יש להם חלק לעולם הבא. Eilu of those two groups I told you, despite that he's a Yisrael, despite that he's a Chassid Umos HaOlam who very carefully and scrupulously observes the

שבע מצוות בני נח, אלו שאין להם חלק לעולם הבא.

Rambam thought that Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim were universal. And that's why, that's the Pshat, K'gon HaNotzrim V'HaYishmelim, it's not just there for polemics and it's not just there because that's an excellent illustration L'Maise. It wouldn't be an excellent illustration if the Notzrim and the Yishmelim weren't Mechuyavim in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. It wouldn't be an excellent... its polemical value notwithstanding and its importance in explaining to us why, why it's so categorically heretical. But L'Maise, K'gon HaNotzrim V'HaYishmelim, the simple Pshat is, no, they're people who forfeit their חלק לעולם הבא because they're going against, against the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. There are implications for Hashgacha Peratis with their whole Ma'aseh HaAdam and what flows, so if, if the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim are also for Bnei Noach, does that mean that there's Hashgacha Peratis from Goyim also? Again, that's another question. The Rambam didn't say, the Rambam here didn't, didn't translate it into Hashgacha. Right? He just said שאינו בורא יודע מעשה בני אדם. You know, what, the Rambam doesn't spell out here what it is that, that follows from that. You know, that's sort of part of the same thing that, that he doesn't explicitly have a S'char V'Onesh over here. So I'm not sure if there's any implication. I'm not sure if there's any implication. I don't mean to—I don't mean this as a diversion and I don't mean it tangentially either. I mean it very seriously. But first let's backtrack to a more fundamental question. Be-khlal where did the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim come from? They're not listed in Chazal in any one place. Okay, so you can—you have a Mishnah in Perek Chelek, you have this, you have that, you have—but—and the Rambam—the Rambam says, you know, I worked hard, I worked hard on this list, you know, he writes in the Hakdamah to Perek Chelek. And then he says, if you have any kashas, he says, don't be so quick to ask kashas. He says, first go over it again and again and again and again, and says, then maybe you'll understand what I'm talking about. So, what I mean to say is that... Okay, so, I don't know if the Rambam is saying that there's a line in Chazal which says it. I don't know the answer to that. But I think that what it does say—well, this is independently true, but I think it also offers a perspective on your question. See, generally, we sort of break the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim down into three groups, right? The first group of the first five ikkarim about Hashem, the second basically about Torah, Torah and nevuah, and the third is again we sort of summarize it as sechar ve-onesh. Mashiach, techiyas ha-meisim, all pertain to sechar ve-onesh and so does yedi'as Hashem. So we sort of break it down into three, ad kedei kakh that yadu'a that the Sefer Ikkarim says he doesn't know why the Rambam counted Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, he should have just counted Gimmel Ikkarim, should have said metzi'as Hashem, תורה מן השמים, and sechar ve-onesh ve-idakh zil gemor. But part of the sechar ve-onesh will be techiyas ha-meisim, that it'll be yemos ha-mashiach, all those are peratim ve-idakh zil gemor. And he says me-inyana de-yoma, the Ikkarim says and the raya is that there are Gimmel Ikkarim, what's the raya that there are Gimmel Ikkarim? The ראש השנה שמונה עשרה. That the ראש השנה שמונה עשרה malchiyos, zichronos, and shofaros are keneged these Gimmel Ikkarim. That the malchiyos is keneged Hashem, and shofaros is תורה מן השמים, and the zichronos is sechar ve-onesh. That's what the Sefer Ikkarim writes. But le-ma'aseh that sort of breakdown, you know, notwithstanding, the impression you have in the Rambam is that for the Rambam, the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim, it's not just that they're all fundamental beliefs, but they all define emunah ba-Hashem. It's not only that they're fundamental beliefs. Believing in תורה מן השמים is not just a fundamental belief, it's part of emunah ba-Hashem, because part of emunah ba-Hashem is what Hashem's relationship with this world is. That's part of emunah ba-Hashem. And that, kimedumah, is the deeper and more correct understanding of what the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim are. Again, not just fundamental beliefs, but fundamental beliefs, all of which define our emunah ba-Hashem. And therefore, the same way we understand clearly, clearly that the first five are all about emunah ba-Hashem, that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eino guf certainly defines what our emunah in Hashem is. The fact that there's such a thing as nevuah also defines our emunah ba-Hashem. It defines, again, who, what Hakadosh Baruch Hu is in relation, in connection to the world. And that's true for all the ikkarim. Once you say like that, so then it becomes a very natural thing. If it defines emunah ba-Hashem, so then it's not such a surprising thing that the Rambam thinks that the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim are universal and that Bnei Noach are also supposed to believe in the Yud-Gimmel Ikkarim. They certainly have to they certainly have to believe in Hakadosh Baruch Hu, so once you say that the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim is, it becomes a more natural, it's less of a chiddush, it remains a chiddush, but conceptually it becomes less of a chiddush if if you understand the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim as defining our Emunah b'Hashem. Because if you take a look, one of the things which which suggests this is the seventh ikkar and let me just see the... I need with a Perush Hamishnayos, although that little one won't have it. I'm going to find the Perush Hamishnayos, hold on a second. And it could be that it doesn't... can I ask you a favor? Do you know if they have the Kappach? Do you know what it is? The small, it's directly opposite us, second shelf from the bottom, I think it's the Kappach Perush Hamishnayos. Let's see. Yeah, thank you very much. Sure. היסוד השמיני נבואת משה רבינו. See this this one phrase he has here. Let's see the... it's not quite... it's not... you don't really have it so much in the the older translation.

והוא שנאמין שהוא אביהן של כל הנביאים שקדמו לפניו והבאים אחריו הכל הם למטה ממנו במעלה.

And here it is: והוא בחיר השם מכל המין האנושי. So the Rambam makes the point of describing Moshe Rabbeinu as bechir Hashem, the Hashem's choice creation.

אשר השיג ממנו יתעלה יותר ממה שהשיג וישיג כל אדם שנמצא ושיימצא.

So lichora what that phrase does is it it it emphasizes that it's an ikkar not just because believing in the uniqueness of nevuas Moshe Rabbeinu is an ikkar, but that also is an ikkar in our Emunah b'Hashem because again part of the Emunah b'Hashem is not just the theological beliefs that eino guf and kadmon and yachid, but also how Hakadosh Baruch Hu relates to the world. And this is is bechir Hashem. Look at this he has another interesting lashon this is stama as a is m'dosheini in the yisod ha-shneim-asar about Moshiach

להאמין ולאמת שיבוא ואין לומר שאם נתאחר יתמהמה חכה לו את עת

Moshiach's coming

ומי שנסתפק בו או זלזל בעניינו הרי זה מכחיש התורה שהבטיחה בו בפירוש בפרשת בלעם ואתם נצבים

now u-miklal ha-yisod ha-zeh this is stama so interesting שאין מלך לישראל אלא מדוד ומזרע שלמה דווקא the Rambam is very sparing on details in the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim the one place where he goes into a lot of details about nevuas Moshe Rabbeinu but otherwise he's very sparing he doesn't when he talks about achdus Hashem the Rambam has an awful lot to say about that he doesn't say it here just השם אלוקינו השם אחד that's one of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim he's not the Rambam is not saying everything he has to say on the subject he's saying hardly anything he has to say on the subject although here he sees fit to include to mention the detail of bechiras Beis Dovid halo davar hu

ומכלל היסוד הזה שאין מלך לישראל אלא מדוד ומזרע שלמה דווקא

but then listen to this concluding sentence

וכל החולק בעניין המשפחה הזו הרי זה כופר בהשם ובדברי נביאיו וכל החולק בעניין המשפחה הזו

one who questions the bechiras Beis Dovid הרי זה כופר בהשם it's a kefira ba-Shem here too the Rambam is taking pains to show you that this emunah is not just a basic emunah because it's central but it's an ikkar because again it defines what our belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu is and that our belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu is not only again understanding that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is infinite and that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is eternal but it's also understanding certain basic points about how Hakadosh Baruch Hu relates to the world that he relates to the world directly not through an intermediary number five that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is menabei benei adam six that Moshe Rabbeinu was bechir Hashem all these are ikkarim in our belief about Hakadosh Baruch Hu but for the goyim not like they're doing an aveirah or like we have a positive mitzvah to believe in השם על פי הרמב"ם right but for the goyim they don't have you're asking very well so Chesky Chesky so no no I hear your question question is an excellent question so let's say a Jew rachmana litzlan doesn't believe in Torah min ha-shamayim which of the taryag mitzvos did they violate right so I understand that it's all part of the belief of Hashem that he violates but according to the goyim I don't understand why what they're violating that they would therefore lose olam ha-ba understanding how Hashem relates to the world for a Jew of course the Rebbe is explaining it's part of his belief in Hashem to understand what Hashem is you have to but for a goy he doesn't have that mitzvah so what's the goy doing wrong but how do you know that well I thought like I mean my understanding it was one of the seven no no so that's what the Rambam writes in Hilchos Melachim and the Rambam writes in Hilchos Melachim that what's axiomatic to a mitzvah is belief in Hakadosh Baruch Hu giving the mitzvah and that's the Rambam who says that someone who keeps the שבע מצוות בני נח because he thinks eiver min ha-chai is not a nice thing he's an animal rights activist so he thinks eiver min ha-chai is not a good thing and he thinks shfichas damim is not a good thing v'chulu but it's not because הקדוש ברוך הוא ציווה אותם על ידי משה רבינו he says he's not from chasidei umos ha-olam meaning that emunah ba-Shem a mitzvah every mitzvah is only a kiyum in ultimately every mitzvah is a kiyum in קבלת עול מלכות שמים in recognizing Hakadosh Baruch Hu because otherwise there is no notion of mitzvah otherwise a person and an atheist doesn't have a kiyum ha-mitzvah the mitzvah is not defined as you know either an action or an inaction for aseh or lo sa'aseh it's defined as Hakadosh Baruch Hu's commandment so axiomatic to having שבע מצוות בני נח means to have an emunah ba-Shem by them not being an atheist No but again but I don't think you see the point is that you'd be doing a mitzvah that according to the Rambam. But according to the Rambam without you don't have to be able to find a mitzvah I mean even without what we said this morning about how it all defines we will be then anyway probably but the shmuess at 1 o'clock was postponed. Yeah not the apparently the shmuess that was scheduled for 1 o'clock has been postponed it's not happening today. So Ari, they told me earlier this morning. We'll probably be done by then anyway but see even without what we said that it defines emunah baHashem you don't need to shtup it all into Anochi Hashem Elokecha. One of the things you see there's another profound point here that I think we often make a mistake about. We and and it's on many you can sort of disprove this on many levels we sort of identify what we're obligated to do with the list of taryag mitzvos and that if something is not in taryag mitzvos then maybe it's a nice thing to do but it's not an obligation and and that's a very very basic misunderstanding that we have. It's not at all true just to give a couple of examples. First of all again if it's it's very very enlightening to go through minyan hamitzvos and try to find the yud gimmel ikkarim that you don't find all of them. You don't find torah min hashamayim you don't find nevuas moshe rabbeinu. Maybe you find nevua eloheish yeshurun but even not so so but a shtickel po you don't you don't really find that either. You don't find זאת התורה לא תהא מוחלפת. You don't find mashiach you don't find techiyas hameisim you don't find any of these emunos in. So apparently that's one thing. Then according to Rav Chaim Vital there's a very very famous and yesodosh-dikke passage in Shaarei Kedusha much quoted by later mechabrim. Rav Chaim Vital writes he says halo davar hu you have maamarei chazal כפי כל הכועס כאילו עובד עבודה זרה and and you have the baal gaiva that Hakadosh Baruch Hu says אין אני והוא יכול לדור בכפיפה אחת and and you see that that the that we have droshes that that equate middos raos with sometimes with kol hatorah kullah and he says halo davar hu there's no mitzvah not to get angry. So are you going to say the Rambam's holeich bederech Rav Chaim Vital's not going al pi halacha. He's not going al pi halacha. So Rav Chaim Vital again he answers al pi kabbalah he says that sort of there's two levels of the nefesh and torah is pitched to the higher level and middos have their root in the lower level and middos are all or at least a certain measure of the middos they're all tnai kodem lemaiseh they're all the sine qua non for torah and that's why you don't have them in the torah. And so it's not correct that you have to find something in minyan hamitzvos for it to be absolutely basic fundamental obligatory. According to Rav Chaim Vital all middos are not in minyan hamitzvos and the reason for that is not because there's anything optional about them it's even more basic than mitzvos he says meforash. And the same or the same point emerges from the Rambam's yud gimmel ikkarim. He doesn't have all the yud gimmel ikkarim so it's there's a certain there's a certain parameters for what we call a mitzvah and those parameters don't include everything that Hakadosh Baruch Hu expects of them. According to Rav Chaim Vital those parameters are that the torah's assuming a certain starting point. למשל למה הדבר דומה let's say you go to a medical school right? You open a catalog and see that in the catalog for medical school they don't teach by logy, they don't teach chemistry, they don't teach physics. They'll say, "Aha! So apparently you don't need biology, chemistry, and physics to go to med school." Adraba! It's so basic that you you can't even apply to medical school unless you've taken those classes. So the same thing you can't necessarily infer what's in Minyan Hamitzvos is. First you have to define what's what's what's the Minyan Hamitzvos intended to to include. So for Chaim Vital there's one constraint on what it's intended to include, for the Rambam there's a different constraint. For the Rambam it seems to be a different constraint. Which of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim are in Minyan Hamitzvos? I would think the first five, but it depends on your perspective of what's the Minyan Hamitzvos. Right. The first five are definitely there. Right? The first five. The fifth is Avodah Zarah. Okay, the first, the first five are there. Correct. The Rambam says that it's part of, if you take the Rambam in Yesodei Hatorah where he explains Anochi and Shema Yisrael, so he mentions there that Eino Guf is part of that. Because Hashem can't really be Echad if he's Guf and he can't, it's part of Anochi and Shema Yisrael. So between Anochi and Shema Yisrael and לא יהיה לך אלהים אחרים על פני, between all that you have the first four and then all the Issur Avodah Zarah you have you have you have the fifth as well. What's the difference between those and Ikh veys, Moshiach, Tcheiyas Hameisim, Torah Min Hashamayim? So there's no difference in terms of the absolute truth of it. There's no difference in terms of the absolute Chiyuv to believe. There's no difference in terms of the absolute basis we have for belief in it. But there is a difference in the following respect: You can't give a logical, by logical I mean in a very formal sense, let's call it Aristotelian, you can't give a logical proof that there's going to be Tcheiyas Hameisim. We know there's going to be Tcheiyas Hameisim because we have a we have an impeccable Mesorah and and which which which tells us to believe in Torah Min Hashamayim and the Torah tells us there's going to be there's going to be Tcheiyas Hameisim. But you can't construct a logical, scientific proof that there's going to be Tcheiyas Hameisim. You can, in the Rambam's opinion, construct a logical, scientific proof for Metzius Hashem. You can, in the Rambam's opinion, construct a logical, scientific proof that Hakadosh Baruch Hu is He alone is eternal and that He's Eino Guf and that He's Echad. And the Rambam does it, he tells us what he thinks the he outlines what what he thinks the the proofs are for us. So when when the Emunah is Nitpas in this type of Yediyah, Yediyah again in a formal, logical, scientific sense, then the Rambam counts it as a Mitzvah. When the Emunah is Nitpas more in a Yediyah through Mesorah, through the teachings of Torah, so then the Rambam doesn't call that a Mitzvah. Not because, Chas Veshalom, not because it's any less true, not because we don't have overwhelming, compelling basis for that belief, not because it isn't as absolute and as obligatory, but again it has to do with what the Rambam's conception of a Mitzvah is. The same way Chaim Vital not counting the fact that Ka'as doesn't appear in Minyan Hamitzvos doesn't mean that Chaim Vital thinks it's okay to to, you know, have a temper tantrum, it's just not a Middas Chasidus or whatever. No, he thinks it's absolutely basic, but that's not what the word Mitzvah means. The word Mitzvah doesn't, it's our fallacy to think that the word Mitzvah is this catch-all word for everything that you have to do, believe, say, think, everything is is compressed into Mitzvos. It's not true. That's not the way, that's not the way the Monei Hamitzvos counted the Taryag Mitzvos. That's not the way Hakadosh Baruch Hu wrote the Torah. There's another proof for this also besides Chaim Vital and the Rambam. So Heiyos Hadavar Kein, so you can't be Medayek from what's not in שבע מצוות בני נח because it's not in Taryag Mitzvos either. So once it's not in the Taryag, Lu Yehi that it had to be in the Taryag Mitzvos and that it's not in Sheva Mitzvos, so then so then so then your Kushya is the two reasons why they weren't counted which is I guess my understanding, Rabbi, is that these thirteen were all within that. No, they're all not that they're in the Mitzvah, they're all connected to those 613. Yes, they all they all define Emunah BaHashem. Again, partially, or even entirely because of this distinction we're just drawing, because they're not all mitzvos in that type of yediyah that the Rambam is talking about there. And it's actually side by side, I guess, as I guess to say, that cheit doesn't refer to like cheit in terms of a violation of a lo sa'aseh or even the lack of fulfilling an aseh, right? It means doing something bad, and that includes even mistake too, right? Right. Right. Right. Anyway, so does the Rambam think in addition, coming back to Eliezer's innocent question half an hour ago that I rambled on about that. But does the Rambam think in addition to this that there is a, would he point to a specific maimar Chazal? I don't know. But I think he would also, whatever the answer to that question is, I think he also was very comfortable with the sevarah shebo that, that it defines emunah, and I think it's quite clear that that's what you see here in perek gimmel. He thinks that they were, they were universal, that they are universal. Okay, so we'll continue tomorrow. Hopefully we'll have more time. We'll go back to the בבא מציעא פרק ג.