Nefesh Hachaim: Shaar 1, perek 8

Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Nefesh Hachaim: Shaar 1, perek 8
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Continuing here in Nefesh Hachaim, I think we were more or less around the Perek Chet. Perek Chet, at the end of Perek Zayin, Nefesh Hachaim writes that the idea which Chazal express in the Midrash on Hashem Tzilcha that our actions really determine what happens and elicits a commensurate reaction. So this is reflected in the Keruvim as well. So he begins in Perek Chet as follows:

הנה רבותינו ז"ל אמרו בענין הכרובים כיצד הן עומדין. רבי יוחנן ורבי אלעזר חד אמר פני איש אל אחיו וחד אמר פניהם לבית

that the two Keruvim faced each other and the other one says no, they looked out. ולמאן דאמר פני איש אל אחיו הכתיב ופניהם לבית what does he do with the other Pasuk?

לא קשיא כאן בזמן שישראל עושין רצונו של מקום כאן בזמן שאין ישראל עושין רצונו של מקום ועיין רשב"ם.

So when ישראל עושין רצונו של מקום so they're looking at each other Derech Chiba V'Re'us reflecting the relationship between Klal Yisrael and Hakadosh Baruch Hu. כאן בזמן שאין ישראל עושין רצונו של מקום so then they're looking outward, they're not looking at each other. ולמאן דאמר פניהם לבית הכתיב ופניהם איש אל אחיו D'Matzdidai Atzdudai meaning that it's at an angle, it's neither directly outward nor directly to each other, but it's at an angle, it's inclined. רוצה לומר קצת לבית וקצת זה לזה. So what's the Pshat?

ולכאורה תקישי למה העמידו מתחילה כרובי שלמה פניהם מצודדים ולא איש אל אחיו ממש.

If why are the Keruvim not positioned initially according to this opinion facing each other head on if the original position of the Keruvim should reflect when ישראל עושין רצונו של מקום. So how do you understand that second opinion? So now the Nefesh Hachaim says that you have to first we have to look in the famous Sugya.

והיינו כמה שאמרו פרק כיצד מברכין תנו רבנן ואספת דגנך לפי שנאמר לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך יכול דברים ככתבן תלמוד לומר ואספת דגנך הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ דברי רבי ישמעאל. רבי שמעון בר יוחאי אומר אפשר אדם חורש בשעת חרישה וכולי תורה מה תהא עליה אלא בזמן שישראל עושין רצונו של מקום מלאכתן נעשית על ידי אחרים ובזמן שאין ישראל עושין רצונו של מקום מלאכתן נעשית על ידי עצמן שנאמר ואספת דגנך.

Fine. That's a

מחלוקת רבי ישמעאל ורבי שמעון בר יוחאי. ולכאורה תמוה עשה זה

Nefesh Hachaim

דמוקי לקרא דואספת דגנך כשאין ישראל עושין רצונו של מקום.

And V'ha Le'eil Mina what's the context of the Pasuk?

כתיב והיה אם שמוע תשמעו מצותי לאהבה ולעבדו בכל לבבכם ועל דא אמר ואספת דגנך.

The Pasuk Ve'asafata Deganecha appears in the Parshah of V'hayah Im Shamo'a. So how can Rashbi Pshat in the Pasuk Ve'asafata Deganecha reflect when it's אין עושין רצונו של מקום? Aval Ha'inyan

כי וודאי שאין דעת רבי ישמעאל שתהיה הרשות נתונה לאדם לפרוש חס ושלום אף זמן מועט מעסק התורה ולעסוק בפרנסה ויהיה בטל אותה העת מעסק התורה לגמרי חס ושלום. אמנם רמזה רבי ישמעאל בלשון הקודש הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ. רוצה לומר עמהן עם דברי תורה היינו שגם באותה העת ושעה מועטת שאתה עוסק בפרנסה כדי הצורך וההכרח לחיות נפש על כל פנים ברעיון מחשבתך תהיה מהרהר רק בדברי תורה.

Okay, so before we get back to how this answers his questions, the Nefesh Hachaim has an incredible, incredible interpretation of Rabbi Yishmael that when Rabbi Yishmael says הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ it doesn't mean that a person works, ich veis, three hours a day and learns nine hours a day. What it means is even during the three hours a day that he's learning, that he's working, simultaneously he's supposed to be thinking in learning, he's supposed to be Chazering Mishnayos, Chazering Parshah, whatever he's doing. And the Nefesh Hachaim thinks that's what the words הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ. He also thinks וכן רבא אמר לתלמידיו beyomei Nisan vetishrei

לא תתחזו קמאי דיקא שלא לבוא לבי מדרש אודאי שתלמידי רבא לא היו בטלים חס ושלום לגמרי מעסק התורה גם בביתם באלו הימים.

He seems to be emphasizing that Rava just tells them don't come to the beis medrash. But he's not telling them don't be learning. Okay. Not clear at all whether the rishonim agree with this hagdarah of the Nefesh Hachayim. I mean, the standard is a very, very, very high one. For instance, if you look in Rashi in the sugya in Keitzad Mevarchin there's a very interesting Rashi. So when Rabbi Yishmael says הנהג בהם מנהג דרך ארץ. So Rashi says, again so derech eretz means here what it means in many contexts in Chazal, it means parnassah, right? It means parnassah, יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ, it means the same thing, it means parnassah. Fine. So Rashi says minhag derech eretz שאם תבוא לידי צורך הבריות סופך ליבטל מדברי תורה. Because if you don't have a job and you're gonna be dependent upon other people, so you're gonna end up there's gonna be more bittul torah than if you'll have a job. So you're gonna have to go around constantly looking for money, trying to raise funds, there's gonna be more bittul torah than if you'll have a job. שאם תבוא לידי צורך הבריות סופך ליבטל מדברי תורה. Okay. Now the truth of this notwithstanding, but what does Rashi need it for? When you learn the sugya, it would seem to be that Rashi doesn't need to volunteer that perspective. Dehainu, what's Rabbi Yishmael, how does Rabbi Yishmael present his view? Tanu rabanan ve'asafta deganecha mah talmud lomar לפי שנאמר לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך yachol devarim kichsavan תלמוד לומר ואספת דגנך הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ. So I would have thought if not for Rashi, that Rabbi Yishmael is saying ve'asafta deganecha is a gezeiras hakasuv that a person is supposed to make hishtadlus for parnassah, and you don't have to give ta'amei dikra why that is. Maybe it's because otherwise סופך ליבטל מדברי תורה, maybe it's for a hundred other reasons, it's gezeiras hakasuv ve'asafta deganecha. Why does Rashi have to give ta'amei dikra, why does Rashi have to give ta'amei dikra שאם תצטרך לבריות סופך ליבטל מדברי תורה? So yitachen the pshat in Rashi is as follows. Yitachen the pshat in Rashi is as follows. Rabbi Yishmael says

לפי שנאמר לא ימוש ספר התורה מפיך יכול דברים ככתבן.

Meaning devarim kichsavan would imply that every waking hour that's humanly possible a person should be learning. That's what devarim kichsavan would imply. So תלמוד לומר ואספת דגנך that obviously the pasuk doesn't mean devarim kichsavan. Well. So then the shailah is after the gezeiras hakasuv, after we recognize the gezeiras hakasuv ve'asafta deganecha, so what takeh does the pasuk lo yamush mean? If Rabbi Yishmael doesn't explicitly come back and tell us in light of ve'asafta deganecha, so what does lo yamush mean? If הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ, if so many hours a day a person's making hishtadlus for his parnassah, so lemaskana what... So the pasuk doesn't mean devarim kichsavan, so what does it mean? And how is a person in fulfillment of that pasuk? So yitachen that that's why Rashi. volunteers שאם תבא לידי צרכי הבריות סופך ליבטל מדברי תורה, that what Rashi means is the following: that in light of ve'asafta deganecha, so the way a person is mekayem לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך is everything he's doing is takeh geared towards לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך. He's takeh preoccupied with לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך constantly, but not that he's preoccupied with it constantly in the sense that he's always learning, but that he's preoccupied with it constantly that he's either learning or he's ensuring that he won't be סופו ליבטל מדברי תורה because of aniyus rachmana litzlan, because he's going to be mitztarech labriyos. Lichora that's the pshat in Rashi and that's why Rashi says I'm not giving you tam dekarah, I'm telling you how Rabbi Yishmael is implicitly saying pshat in lo yamush in light of ve'asafta deganecha because otherwise without Rashi you're left with, okay, so you told me what lo yamush doesn't mean, what does it mean? How are you mekayem lo yamush? Okay, so lichora that's pshat in Rashi. So then the shaileh is, if he said like the Nefesh Hachayim, so would Rashi have ever had his question? Assuming that this pshat in Rashi is correct, according to the Nefesh Hachayim, so the answer should have been a different answer. The answer of lo yamush should have been that even during ve'asafta deganecha, a person is still learning, so the devarim keshivsum would have meant that a person only learns and in light of ve'asafta deganecha, what it means is that sometimes he's learning with 100 percent of his kochos and other times he's learning with he's dividing his kochos simultaneously between the derech eretz and the learning. But you wouldn't need to introduce the סופו ליבטל מדברי תורה. The סופו ליבטל מדברי תורה is mashma that Rashi's bothered with there are x hours a day when a person is not involved in talmud torah. So in light of that, what does lo yamush mean? So Rashi farent, okay, I'm not directly involved in talmud torah, but if I'm making my hishtadlus for parnassah to avoid סופו ליבטל מדברי תורה, that's a kiyum in lo yamush. But lichora according to the Nefesh Hachayim, the reinterpretation of lo yamush should have been that I would have thought devarim keshivsum means that 100 percent of my kochos 100 percent of the time are invested in talmud torah. And the answer is no, in light of ve'asafta deganecha, so whatever, fill in the values, x percent of the time, so it's all my it's 100 percent of my kochos and y percent of the time, it's only half my kochos. My kochos are going to be divided simultaneously. I'm going to be choresh and as I'm being choresh I'm going to be chozer אלו דברים שאין להם שיעור or whatever the mishnayos I happen to know by heart. Okay, so lichora that's pshat in Rashi. Tosafos earlier in yud-alef amud-beis has the famous question: so we make one birchas hatorah and that carries us through the day even though we're not learning continuously all day, but that birchas hatorah carries us throughout the day. When it comes to the bracha of layshev basukkah, so we go in for breakfast, again assuming that what we're eating warrants it, we make a layshev basukkah, we go in for lunch, we make a layshev basukkah, we go in for supper, we make a layshev basukkah. So how come by sukkah you make a bracha each time and and here not? And originally the way Tosafos again presents the metzius is

כגון אנו שאין אנו לומדים מיד לאחר תפילת השחר שאנו טרודים והולכים כך בלא לימוד עד אמצע היום או יותר אמאי אין אנו מברכין פעם אחרת?

Then Tosafos says

מאי שנא מסוכה שצריך לברך על כל סעודה וסעודה לישב בסוכה?

So why don't you so it should be morning seder, afternoon seder, night seder, the same way it should be.

ויש לומר דשאני תורה שאינו מייאש דעתו דכל שעה אדם מחוייב ללמוד דכתיב והגית בו יומם ולילה והוי כמו יושב כל היום בלא הפסק אבל אכילה בסוכה יש שעה קבועה.

Noch amol,

ויש לומר דשאני תורה שאינו מייאש דעתו דכל שעה אדם מחוייב ללמוד דכתיב והגית בו יומם ולילה והוי כמו יושב כל היום בלא הפסק אבל אכילה בסוכה יש שעה קבועה.

So what is Tosfos's lemaiseh answer on on the kasha? So the pshat is that what Tosfos means is the following. That in Talmud Torah a person, yeah it's true that we we stop to go to work, we stop to go to class, we stop to eat, we stop to do whatever, but it's always a it's always al menas lachzor. It's always it's always da'ato to resume resume learning. He's not meyayeish da'ato in that it's not that okay the learning is over, no, it's that I have to go attend to something. I have to go to work, I have to go to class, I have to whatever. Mah she'ein kein, it's not the pshat that we have to I'd like to continue continuously from breakfast to lunch and lunch to supper, but ela mai I have to go into the Beis Medrash for morning seder or I have to go to work for a few hours, so I have to I have to take a break. No, I finished breakfast, gamarnu, finished, tam venishlam and the the lunch bell rings, so then then I'll go eat lunch. And when that's finished again, it's tam venishlam. So it's not it's not the da'ato lachzor, it's ended. It's finished. So that's why then you're beginning anew, you're not when you're when you're eat supper you're beginning anew, when you come back to the Beis Medrash you're resuming, you're not beginning anew, you're resuming. That's the pshat in what Tosfos is answering. Meaning what they don't say is that is that optimally what's supposed to be happening is that even during the work hours that you continued learning. Okay, so you could say that על פי דרכו של הנפש החיים, it's because you should be doing it but they're assuming people are not doing it. So they're giving a teretz to okay, but there should have been a little bit at least a sort of an acknowledgement of what what should be happening instead of just assuming that what happens is not what should be happening. So the simple you wouldn't know the Nefesh HaChaim from from reading this Tosfos. Again, you could על פי דרכו של הנפש החיים you could say that Tosfos is just assuming that people are not doing what they're supposed to be doing and they're saying af al pi kein you still wouldn't make a new birchas hatorah because even if you weren't thinking about learning when you were at work it was da'ato lachzor. So because of that the pshat is conceptually you're not beginning again but you're just resuming. Okay, you could be ma'atcha that way, but I don't know. I don't know if it's the simplest the simplest reading. In the Rambam also in Hilchos Talmud Torah, the Rambam never hints, you know, when when he in the context of חייב אדם לשלש את זמן למידתו and the Rambam says

כיצד היה עוסק במלאכתו שלש שעות ביום ועוסק בתורה תשע שעות ביום,

there's no hint that during those three hours that there's anything a person's doing, anything that he's mechuyav even optimally to be doing in terms of Talmud Torah. So you don't really get this impression in in the Rishonim what the Nefesh HaChaim says. Again, none none of this is intended as a kasha on the Nefesh HaChaim. Lechora you see a Nefesh HaChaim the same thing Reb Chaim Volozhiner writes very famously in his tshuvos. Reb Chaim Volozhiner has in his tshuvos, we don't have too many of his tshuvos, but those that we have, so in one of them Reb Chaim Volozhiner writes, he wrote lots lots of tshuvos, Reb Itzele writes in in the hakdama, he was the he was the address for for shailos from from all over. So he writes that his kabbalah from the from the Gra is that in in psak halacha, so again, meaning for someone of the Gra stature or Reb Chaim Volozhiner stature, he says not to be nosei panim to anyone, even to the Shulchan Aruch. Dehainu that that so lechora the Nefesh HaChaim reflects that as well. Meaning even if even if he were to agree with us I'm saying, I'm saying differently. That was a big, big machlokes amongst the gedolei olam after the Shulchan Aruch is whether or not the gedolei hador can disagree with a psak in Shulchan Aruch. Rabbi Yonasan Eibshitz has in the Tumim, he writes the following. There is a din by in Choshen Mishpat that a nisbach can taina kimlei. What does that mean? There's a machlokes Rav and Shmuel whether

הולכים בממון אחר הרוב או אין הולכים בממון אחר הרוב.

So we pasken like Shmuel that אין הולכים בממון אחר הרוב. I think they asked the story is that they asked the Chofetz Chaim why he didn't write a Mishna Berura on the other three chelkei Shulchan Aruch. So if the story is true, then the Chofetz Chaim allegedly answered as follows. He said that in Choshen Mishpat he says what are you going to be machria he says. He says in a din Torah a nisbach since אין הולכים בממון אחר הרוב can always say kimlei, I hold like this miyut opinion. Kimlei, I hold I hold like this opinion. He says what what are you going to be machria? You can always taina kimlei. He says on Yoreh Deah he says that's the rabbonim's bread. He says I'm going to put them all out of business by having all the hachraos? And he says in Even HaEzer he says you give me another thirty years of life so I'll write a Mishna Berura. I don't know whether the story's true but that's the story that's told. So there is a din of kimlei that a nisbach can say I hold like the miyut and since and you can't tell me but the rov haposkim are against it, the rov harishonim are against it because אין הולכים בממון אחר הרוב. That's the principle of kimlei. So the shaila is after the Shulchan Aruch can you say kimlei against the psak of the Shulchan Aruch? Let's say there's a hachra'ah in the Shulchan Aruch that the Mechaber and the Rema agree upon, that the Mechaber and the Rema agree upon. So I think Rabbi Yonasan Eibshitz writes in the Tumim that he thinks you can't say kimlei against the Shulchan Aruch. So that was a big, big machlokes amongst the gedolei olam of, you know, just how absolute—again, it's zicher absolute for us—the question is how absolute the Shulchan Aruch is vis-a-vis Rabbi Yonasan Eibshitz, vis-a-vis Gaon Hechasid MiVilna, not how absolute it is vis-a-vis us. So that was—so the Nefesh HaChaim, his tradition from the Vilna Gaon, I mean that's what the whole Biur HaGra is about, is that so yitachen that even if he would agree with with these inferences from Rashi, from Tosafos, the Rambam, it wouldn't, I don't think it would've it would've deterred the Nefesh HaChaim. Okay, that's the pashtus. Okay, so al kol panim that's his understanding of Rebbe Meishe. Again, so continuing here, how does that how does that come back to what we're talking about?

ואומנם שם הרבה עשו כרבי ישמעאל ועלתה בידם והרבה עשו כרשב"י ולא עלתה בידם

Hainu Rabbim davka. Right, the Gemara there in Brachot sort of concludes the Sugya by reporting sociologically that many people followed the derech of Rabbi Ishmael and they were matzliach, and many who followed Rashbi's were not matzliach. So first of all, it's a funny, I mean, we don't usually decide psak by based on sociology. We don't don't commission a study to see what works, what doesn't work. So it's clear that what the what Chazal are saying is that that for some people you have the mahalach of Rabbi Ishmael, for some people you have the mahalach of Rashbi. And what's more, it's not some and some, but it's Rabbim versus yichidim. I think a similar a similar idea in a different context, but there too the lashon ha lashon of Chazal invites it. The Gemara in the beginning of the second perek in Succah. Rashi says on זכור את יום השבת לקדשו he quotes שתהא מזמן דבר יפה לשבת. So the Ramban asks on Rashi, but that's Shammai, that the Gemara says that that was what Shammai used to do, but Hillel used to say ברוך ה' יום יום and Hillel if he had a nice piece of meat he ate it today and he said don't worry, Hakadosh Baruch Hu will send me something for Shabbos. So why is Rashi al haTorah following following Shammai? So I think it's the Ksav Sofer, I think the Pardes Yosef quotes from the I think it's I think I think he quotes from the Ksav Sofer, the Ksav Sofer says a very beautiful pshat. He says if you look in the the lashon of Chazal there in the Gemara in Beitzah, it doesn't say Shammai Omer and Hillel Omer. It reports it records what Shammai's hanhaga was, then it says אבל הלל מדה אחרת הייתה בו. Again, which is not the usual way of presenting a machlokes Shammai and Hillel. So that's what he says, no, there's no machlokes Shammai and Hillel. Depending upon if a person all week long what he does is so l'shem shamayim that it's a shtickel mitzvah all week long what he is doing is l'shem shamayim and in addition a person's on a high level of bitachon, so then he takeh should be doing like Hillel. Then he comes across a nice piece of meat, so eat it today because even today it's mamash l'shem shamayim what you're doing and bitachon so you have bitachon the Ribbono Shel Olam will send you something else, if not even better for Shabbos. But if you're not on Hillel's, that's הלל מדה אחרת הייתה בו. But Hillel himself would agree that if you're not on that madreiga, you do you do like Shammai. Again, it's a similar that at least l'halacha the way the two are presented that Chazal are indicating that it's not just pasken like one or the other, it depends upon which which midah is fitting, matches the person. So that's the Nefesh HaChaim is medayek that here also, Hainu Rabbim davka that רבים עשו כרשב"י ולא עלתה בידם. That Rabbim, for the Rabbim this is an inappropriate derech.

כי ודאי שלכל ההמון כמעט בלתי אפשר שישמידו כל ימיהם רק בעסק התורה שלא לפנות נפשם מעט לשום עסק פרנסה ומזונות כלל ועל זה אמרו באבות כל תורה שאין עמה מלאכה וכולו. אבל יחיד לעצמו,

you have רבי שמעון בר יוחאי, you have the Vilna Gaon,

שאפשר לו להיות אך עוסק כל ימיו בתורתו ועבודתו יתברך שמו ודאי שחוב מוטלת עליו שלא לפרוש אף זמן מועט מתורה ועבודה לעסק פרנסה חס ושלום וכדעת רבי שמעון בן יוחאי.

So that's what he says, that for the Rabbim takeh is the derech of Rabbi Ishmael, and there are yechidei segula throughout the generations for whom the who should be following what what Rashbi says. Now, in terms of the kasha of how you can depict Ve'asafta deganecha as בזמן שאין ישראל עושים רצונו של מקום, Nefesh HaChaim has a gvaldigge diyak.

והנה פסוק ואספת דגנך הוא מוצא מכלל פרשת והיה. שכולו נאמר בלשון רבים ופסוק ואספת נאמר בלשון יחיד

Lachein kari leh

אין עושה רצונו של מקום כשמפנה עצמו אף מעט לעסק פרנסה

says a gevaldige pshat. Why does the Torah switch from the lashon rabbim to the lashon yachid? Because for the that switch is why is why Rashbi interprets that this reflects אין עושין רצונו של מקום, meaning והיה אם שמוע תשמעו is describing what the עושי רצונו של מקום is for the rabbim, but for the yachid, for the Vilna Gaon, so for the Vilna Gaon, if it would have said Va'asaftem deganchem, so then you couldn't have said that that's אין עושין רצונו של מקום, but the fact that the Torah is no longer talking about the rabbim but it's talking about the yachid, so that's what the Rashbi says that for the yachid this is not עושי רצונו של מקום. Okay, one of the big questions that he's going to talk about a little bit more, it's very hard to nail down is, so what's left then of the where's the machlokes Rabi Yishmael and Rashbi? When you read the Gemara it's clear that there is a machlokes Rabi Yishmael and Rashbi. Yeah, it's clear from the way it's presented there is a machlokes, but if even Rashbi is sort of acknowledging that what he's saying, what he's advocating is not for the rabbim and it's only because this is belashon yachid that he's saying that it's אין עושין רצונו של מקום, so that's what according to the Nefesh Hachaim you have to try to try to pinpoint exactly where the machlokes is and and what's more the Nefesh Hachaim indicates that Rabi Yishmael would also agree that that the Vilna Gaon and and the Arizal and should have been doing what they did of of learning all the time and not being oseik beparnassa, that Rabi Yishmael would would agree with that also. So that's I don't know you have to as you read on vaiteh you have to try to try to identify exactly where the machlokes exists assuming that each one recognizes the other's derech depending upon who the who the person is. Ulachein following up on this,

ובפרשה ראשונה של קריאת שמע כתיב ובכל מאדך ובפרשת והיה לא כתיב ובכל מאדכם.

Why?

כי פרשת שמע כולה בלשון יחיד נאמרה ויחיד שאפשר לו הוצריך לקיים לא ימוש ספר התורה הזה מפיך דברים ככתבם ממש לכן נאמר ובכל מאדך ובכל ממונך כמו שכתוב במשנה סוף ברכות וציווהו שלא לעסוק בפרנסה כלל אבל פרשת והיה שנאמרה בלשון רבים לרבים כמעט מוכרחים להתעסק על כל פנים מעט גם ברווח ממון לחיי נפש לכן לא כתיב בה ובכל מאדכם.

So he says that explains the the discrepancy why in the second parsha it's בכל לבבכם ובכל נפשכם and you don't have the equivalent of bechol meodecha. Parshas Shema is belashon yachid so it's addressing Rashbi. Rashbi's ahavas Hashem is even bechol mamono that he's not oseik beparnassa because he's כולו מסור לעבודת השם to talmud Torah and avodas Hashem. The parsha shniya that's Rabi Yishmael's derech, again because the two of them acknowledge each other, the next paragraph tries to not tries to but does pinpoint the machlokes and then we have to try and understand it. The second parsha reflects Rabi Yishmael's derech. Rabi Yishmael's derech is not bechol meodechem. A person is not sacrificing his his parnassa as part of avodas Hashem, aderaba he's being oseik he's being oseik bederech eretz. In this paragraph now he comes and and defines it's hard to understand defines the where the machlokes lies between Rashbi and Rabi Yishmael.

והגם שעדיין לא זו הדרך והמדריגה הגבוהה שבגבוהות לפי כשמפנה עצמם מעט גם לעסק פרנסה ובעת עסקם בפרנסה ליבם נוהג בחכמה ומהרהרים בדברי תורה ויראת השם ולרבי ישמעאל זו היא עיקר רצונו יתברך בהנהגת כלל ההמון ופלוגתתם מה היא עיקר רצונו יתברך והמדריגה היותר גבוהה בהנהגת כלל ההמון.

So here he says where the machlokis is that for Rabi Yishmael יפה תלמוד תורה עם דרך ארץ is a thousand percent lechatchila for the rabim. A thousand percent lechatchila for the rabim. That's what Hakadosh Baruch Hu had in mind kavyachol when he created the world, when he designed things, that the rabim should be הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ, that there should be hours when they're making hishtadlus for parnassa. Again, the Nefesh HaChaim reinforces his shittaso, what he said before that בעת עסקם בפרנסה ליבם נוהג בחכמה. And that's totally lechatchila. According to Rashbi, chas veshalom to say that אין עושין רצונו של מקום, but the Nefesh HaChaim seems to say that for Rashbi the emes is that for everyone the ideal is what he's saying. The difference is for a yachid, for the Vilna Gaon who doesn't do it, he's אינו עושה רצונו של מקום. And for the rest of us, you wouldn't say that we're אין עושין רצונו של מקום, but it's not mamish the madrega hagevoha shebegevohos. There's something, something lacking in the highest dargas of lechatchila. Well, that's how the Nefesh HaChaim, that's where he pinpoints the machlokes. So everyone recognizes two types of people, everyone says that the Arizal and the Vilna Gaon have to do what Rashbi says. What about everyone else? So for Rabi Yishmael הנהג בהן מנהג דרך ארץ is a thousand percent lechatchila and for Rashbi it's only 99 percent lechatchila. The 100 percent lechatchila is that everyone should do what he says. What about just coming back, following up for one minute on what we discussed before, assuming that it's correct that the Rishonim don't agree with the Nefesh HaChaim here on this requirement of בעת עסקם בפרנסה ליבם נוהג בחכמה. Assuming that's correct, so the shaila is how does one explain it? I mean, why not? Why not say that if it's possible a person should be mechuyav to do it? What's the hagdara? What's the hagdara? So in a totally different context, I once heard the following, many many years ago, it was almost 30 years ago at this point. One of the rebbeim in the yeshiva was Rav Nissan Alpert zecher tzaddik livracha. He was a very very close talmid of Rav Moshe Feinstein. He was nifter just several weeks after him. Rav Moshe was nifter Taanis Esther, his yartzeit is coming up, and the same year Rav Alpert was nifter, I think it was Lag Ba'omer. So at his levaya, which was held primarily in Tiferes Yerushalayim, so one of the maspidim was Rav Shmuel Berenbaum zecher tzaddik livracha from the Mir in Brooklyn. So he said the following in the course of his hesped. He was talking about Rav Alpert's hasmada. He was a big masmid. He was talking about his hasmada and the way he described it was he said that by Rav Nissan Alpert he said you didn't even have heterdike bittul Torah. That was his phrase, heterdike bittul Torah. And what did he mean by that? So he explained. He said mistama the din is he says mistama you can probably eat lunch in two minutes, no? You can probably gobble down a sandwich within two minutes and again... Even during these two minutes, maybe you can be thinking in learning. He says, but mistama you're not mechuyav to do so. There's no bittul Torah if a person instead of spending two minutes on lunch spends 20 minutes on lunch, 30 minutes on lunch. Again, even if avada he wasn't talking about that a person needs a break. A person needs the break, so then it's a mitzva that he's taking the break. He was saying is hetterdike bittul Torah. A person's allowed to take even if he doesn't mammash mammash absolutely need it, he doesn't think that it's bittul Torah if a person spends 20 minutes eating lunch when he could have eaten lunch in two minutes. So he said it by Rav Alport that wasn't even hetterdike bittul Torah, that he used to eat lunch with a sefer. He used to... So that was the phrase, I don't know if it was his own coinage or it appears elsewhere, but hetterdike bittul Torah. Meaning that when a person is engaged in activities that the Torah sanctions, that the Torah mandates, so then he's relieved of talmud Torah even if eich shehu he could be doing both simultaneously. So the Torah mandates eating lunch. So the Torah mandates derech eretz. The Torah mandates going to work. So there that's a zone of even if a person could do it, if he can do it and he does it, mammash tavoh alav beracha, why not? But is he mechuyav to do it? No. So there mistama the rishonim will say, the Nefesh Hachayim, again, tavoh alecha beracha, the כל המרבה הרי זה משובח, but in terms of whether a person is mammash mechuyav, no, that the same way that a person is not mammash mechuyav to be learning when he's eating lunch, tavoh alav beracha if he does. If it's not going to exhaust him and he has the fortitude to do it, tavoh alav beracha if he does, but he's not mammash mechuyav to do it. That's what he said, that it's hetterdike bittul Torah. So the same thing according to the acharonim would be true for the sha'os hamelacha, that those would be zones of hetterdike bittul Torah.