Part of the series: Divrei Hashkafa by Rav Mayer Twersky
Transcript
AI-generated transcript. May contain errors.
אסור לאדם להנהיג עצמו בדברי חלקות ופיתוי. ולא יהיה אחד בפה ואחד בלב אלא תוכו כברו והעניין שבלב הוא הדבר שבפה. אסור לגנוב דעת הבריות ואפילו דעת העכו"ם כיצד לא ימכור לעכו"ם בשר נבילה במקום בשר שחוטה ולא מנעל של מתה במקום מנעל של שחוטה ולא יסרהב בחברו שיאכל אצלו והוא יודע שאינו אוכל ולא ירבה לו בתקרובת והוא יודע שאינו מקבל ולא יפתח לו חביות שצריך לפתחן למכור כדי לפתותו שבשביל כבודו פתח וכן כל כיוצא בזה ואפילו מילה אחת של פיתוי ושל גניבת דעת אסור אלא שפת אמת ורוח נכון ולב טהור מכל עמל והוות.
The Rambam's words on the one hand they speak for themselves, they don't really need any elaboration. A person should be totally straight in what he says. It shouldn't be anything insincere, anything with an alternative agenda. A person should be totally straight in whatever he says. The Rambam doesn't explicitly tie this in with the midah habenonit, but yet it's quite clear from the placement of the halachah that it's part of the midah habenonit. So how so? You could say that maiseh here too there's a midah habenonit in terms of the emes and what would seem to be sheker in terms of the gemara we'll learn later in Yevamos that mutar even מצווה לשנות מפני השלום. And Hakadosh Baruch Hu says to Avraham Avinu
למה זה צחקה שרה לאמור האף אמנם אלד ואני זקנתי
and really she said vadoni zakein. So מצווה לשנות מפני השלום. So emes is even in emes there is a wrong extreme. If a person is not meshaneh mipnei hashalom when he should be, so there's also an extreme and in that sense there is a midah beinonis here as well. The Reishis Chochmah lists exceptions to when he says despite the fact that the Gemara in Sotah and Chazal are so so makpid about chanufah and basically the definition of chanufah is again we translate it narrowly as flattery. Flattery is one example, but basically what chanufah means is that it's אחד בפה אחד בלב. It means that there is some kind of posturing. The posturing may be in flattering someone when a person doesn't really mean it, or it can be that a person sort of postures to be a tzaddik or anything that he isn't in reality. But the Reishis Chochmah says that there are there are exceptions. At times it's muttar, basically it's parshas hashavua. It's a different de'as in the medrash whether or not Yaakov Avinu's defense to Eisav, whether Chazal think it was right, whether Chazal think it was right, it's a chiluk de'os in the medrash. So according to some de'as that when you have a rasha and hasha'ah tzochakas lo, that he's being matzliach, so according to some de'as, so then one is muttar to lehachnef. So here too there is a midah benoni-us in the sense that what isn't the hundred percent pure emes on one level, on a literal level, on a literal level, so there is a midah benoni-us here also. Problem is that the Rambam doesn't mention these exceptions here. You would have thought that the Rambam would hint at these exceptions in this halacha, but he doesn't hint to darkei shalom, not only the heter, Chazal call it a mitzvah, it's not only a heter, it's a mitzvah of darkei shalom, or the heter in those different cases of chanifa. I think the Reishis Chochma has four exceptions, three or four exceptions to the rule. The Rambam doesn't even hint at them. Stam is a shayla why not, although this would have been a place to say it, no? So yitachen that even without telling us that balance, that there are again exceptions to the literal application of the rule of emes, it belongs here only because another description of what the first two perakim plus halacha aleph in perek gimmel are about is vehalachta bidrachav, the middos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu, chessed ve-emes. So emes is one of the middos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu. חותמו של הקדוש ברוך הוא אמת. Rabbeinu Yonah is mashma in the peirush on Pirkei Avos, on the mishna of על הדין על האמת ועל השלום that the reason it's assur to tell a lie, to knowingly distort, he seems to give two different reasons. One is he says because a person can't compartmentalize. A person in his middos ve-deios can't compartmentalize. A person who's willing to knowingly say things which are not true, even if it's דברים של מה בכך. Someone asks you what color shirt you wore yesterday. You wore a white shirt, you tell him you wore a blue shirt. You wore a blue shirt, you tell him you wore a white shirt. It's mah be-kach. He was stam making conversation. It doesn't have a thousand dollar wager on what color shirt you wore yesterday. But stam דברים של מה בכך. It says Rabbeinu Yonah, if a person allows himself to begin the habit of not being totally totally emesdik, so then a person's not going to be totally emesdik in דברים העומדים ברומו של עולם either. A person can't compartmentalize his middos. It was one of the that idea was one of the major yesodos in the Mussar movement. The hakpeida on seder and nekius and the like, not only because ultimately a lack of those things inevitably results in bittul zman, which it does, but also because if a person doesn't have again a person is not makpid on details, so ultimately it's going to carry over to important things also. So then... So that's one mahalach that the Rabbeinu Yona has. The other mahalach Rabbeinu Yona says is that emes is one of the middos of של הקדוש ברוך הוא. So because of that, if a person's not dealing with darkei shalom, if a person's not dealing with one of those places where the Torah, where Chazal make an exception, so then just mitzad the vehalachta bidrachav, mitzad the middah של הקדוש ברוך הוא of emes, a person has to be 100% emesdik. Quotes the Gemara where the Gemara tells the story that Rav's wife always used to be metzar him. Whatever, whatever she'd ask him what he'd want for supper, he'd say I want milchigs, she'd make him fleishigs. He'd say I want fleishigs, so she'd, she'd make him falafel. And whatever. So Rav's, Rav's son got, got wind of this. And so one day, so, you know, the message went through the son what he wanted for supper. And then Rav comes and he sees that he got what he asked for. So he says to the son, mai hai? So the son says, no, all you have to do is say the opposite of what you want and then you get it. She always does the opposite. So you said you wanted milchigs, so I told her fleishigs, so you got milchigs. So, so the Gemara says that Rav told him that chochma was a, was a good chochma, but you can't do that. You can't say what's not, you can't say what's not true. And in that context, Rabbeinu Yona has two, two mahalachim. Halacha l'maaseh people discuss that when it comes to, when it comes to shidduchim. So avada it's, it's assur to not be honest about age. Ella mai, if it's unfortunately if the, if the person to whom the information's gonna be relayed is gonna, there's no way to convince the person that the true age is being given. So the person's gonna add three years to the age anyway, so then you can't give the true age because then they're gonna add, they're gonna add three years anyway. So if you mamash can't convince them that you're telling the truth and you're trying to tell them that the person in question is 25. But if you tell them 25, so they're gonna say, oh, so that means really 28, really, really whatever. If, if that's the, the mindset that people are locked into, so then mistama it's not a chesaron in middas ha'emes to say whatever will be inflated to 25. Be'emes the second pshat also, the Rambam doesn't here explicitly refer to the fact that this is one of the middos of Hakadosh Baruch Hu and that's why he's discussing it here. So there's, there's a shtickel taana on that pshat also, but maybe just the context suggests what Rabbeinu Yona says. So I don't know, neither of those two pshatim are, are ideal. But okay. Lichora it's part of middas ha'emes also. The Rambam's not, doesn't, isn't discussing this here either. So lemaaseh you have to try to come up with a definition of what the Rambam is interested in here. But lichora it's part of middas ha'emes also. The Gemara in Shavuos talks about if a person takes a shvua l'she'avar which is, which is not true. A person says that, I khways, hareini nishba says that I walked five miles yesterday and it's not true that he walked five miles yesterday. So the Gemara has a discussion what issur he's over. And according to one view in the Gemara, I think the Rambam quotes this l'halacha that he's over לא תשבעו בשמי לשקר. Okay. What about if it's for the future oriented? What about if he says I will walk five miles tomorrow and then he doesn't walk five miles tomorrow? So there too it's a shaila, is it shvuas sheker or is it bal yeichel? In one view in the Gemara, the Rambam doesn't seem to correspond, doesn't seem to line up exactly with the views in the Gemara, says no, that shvuas shaker. The shvuas shaker is when a person says he's gonna do something and doesn't do it. Obviously it's shvuas shaker only if a person says it belashon shvua. If a person says I'm gonna walk five miles tomorrow, so that's not a shvua. But if a person says that he's nishba that he's gonna walk five miles tomorrow, so then that's a shvua and it's sheker. what's emes about the past and present, but emes, the chiyuv to be emestik also means not just to say what's emes about the past and present, but to be ma'ameis es devarav. That if a person says something about the future, so part of midas ha-emes, part of midas ha-emes is to that a person should stand by his word, שיהא הן שלו הן ולאו שלו לאו. That when a person says he's going to do something, so again, even if it's not the biggest deal and even if it's not necessarily a dvar mitzvah where it's a shaila if he didn't say bli neder that maybe it's binding בתור שבועה או נדר even without a לשון שבועה או נדר, but part of, part of midas ha-emes, you see from the fact that the Gemara says that a shvua le-haba is de-asi shvua lishakra if a person isn't mekayem the shvua is that to be ma'ameis devarav is part of midas ha-emes and to allow what a person says to be proven untrue is a middah of sheker. It's a middah that needs a lot of chizuk in our society. There's a notion which is very, very antithetical to Torah that speech in and of itself doesn't really mean anything. Doesn't really mean anything. If one's speech isn't damaging, isn't maligning someone, so speech is really nothing. It's only words. That's the mindset of the society. And it's besides again the kedusha with which one should invest the koach hadibur, but midas ha-emes is at stake in not only what a person does, but what a person says also. A lack of emes by definition diminishes yiras Shamayim. You can't have yiras Shamayim and sheker in the same breath. There's a tarti de-sasrei between the two. Okay.
לא יהיה אדם בעל שחוק ומהתלות ולא עצב ואונן אלא שמח. כך אמרו חכמים שחוק וקלות ראש מרגילין את האדם לערווה. וציווה שלא יהיה אדם פרוץ בשחוק ולא עצב ומתאבל אלא מקבל כל אדם בסבר פנים יפות. וכן לא יהיה בעל נפש רחבה נבהל להון ולא עצב ובטל ממלאכה אלא בעל עין טובה ממעיט בעסק ועוסק בתורה ואותו המעט שהוא חלקו ישמח בו. ולא בעל קטטה ולא בעל קנאה ולא בעל תאווה ולא רודף אחר הכבוד. כך אמרו חכמים הקנאה והתאווה והכבוד מוציאים את האדם מן העולם. כללו של דבר ילך במידה הבינונית שבכל דעה ודעה עד שיהיו כל דעותיו מכוונות באמצע והוא ששלמה אמר פלס מעגל רגליך וכל דרכיך יכונו.
So the Rambam depicts Simcha as as the mida beinonis. At one end of the spectrum there's shchok, holelut. At the other end of the spectrum there's atzvus. And Simcha is the mida beinonis. There's something Rashi in Brachos interestingly comments on the Gemara. Gemara says the Mishna says in the last perek that חייב אדם לברך על הרעה כשם שמברך על הטובה. So the Gemara says what does it mean keshem? So the Gemara says it doesn't mean the same bracha because it's not the same bracha על הרעה ועל הטובה. So the Gemara says no it means that you say the bracha the same way. Say the bracha besimcha, lekabelinu besimcha that whether rachmana litzlan a person is making a bracha of dayan emes or whether he's making hatov vehameitiv, so a person should make it besimcha. So what does that mean what does it mean a person is supposed to hire a band to to to accompany him? So what does it mean so Rashi says besimcha means beleivov shaleim. The definition of simcha is is beleivov shaleim. So what it means is that simcha Rashi is defining is this profound deeply rooted sense of serenity that a person has. A person has that vis-a-vis external forces and happenings and events because of belief in hashgacha, that כל מה דעביד רחמנא לטב עביד. So there is again it doesn't preclude the the it doesn't preclude in the event of dayan emes it doesn't preclude the the bechi of aveilus, a person is supposed to cry. But at the same time there is a certain underlying a certain underlying serenity which is rooted in the sense of knowing again that things are as they're supposed to be. So it's a certain equilibrium that that a person never loses because of of a sense of bitachon. See there too in Rashi also that leivov shaleim, that sense of of again serenity, the equanimity and and the equilibrium that a person maintains as a result also is very much in in line with simcha as as being an expression of of the mida beinonis. To be genuinely besimcha though, so it requires an attitude of again of bitachon that in terms of external forces factors and events so כל מה דעביד רחמנא לטב עביד. But to be besimcha a person also has to be doing in terms of what's up to him a person is supposed to be doing what he's supposed to be doing. If the sense of simcha results and and a sort of a natural feeling and is naturally exuded because a person knows that things are the way they're supposed to be and that's what it means that things are good, things are the way they're supposed to be. So how things are there are two there are two factors there are two variables. One is how I'm living my life and the other is in terms of what's being done to me what's happening to me. So the second is beyad Hashem. So that's easy that's always going to be right. So it's easy to be besimcha vis-a-vis that because that's always going to be right what Hashem is what he's orchestrating. If a person can do that, so then a person is just gonna naturally be be simcha and that sense of simcha is gonna naturally be exuded. And that's what people point out that in all the pictures of Rav Shlomo Zalman he's always smiling. Always, and in all the pictures he was smiling. He lived the way he's supposed to live and then he had the bitachon that everything around him in terms of what Hashem was
כל מה דעביד רחמנא לטב עביד שמא יאמר אדם הואיל והקנאה והתאוה והכבוד וכיוצא בהן דרך רעה הן ומוציאין את האדם מן העולם אפרש מהן ביותר ואתרחק לצד האחרון עד שלא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין ולא ישא אשה ולא ישב בדירה נאה ולא ילבש מלבוש נאה אלא השק והצמר הקשה וכיוצא בהן כגון עובדי כוכבים גם זה דרך רעה היא ואסור לילך בה והמהלך בדרך זו נקרא חוטא שהרי הוא אומר בנזיר וכפר עליו מאשר חטא על הנפש אמרו חכמים ומה נזיר שלא פירש אלא מן היין צריך כפרה המונע עצמו מכל דבר ודבר על אחת כמה וכמה לפיכך צוו חכמים שלא ימנע אדם עצמו אלא מדברים שמנעה התורה בלבד ולא יהיה אוסר עצמו בנדרים ובשבועות על דברים המותרים כך אמרו חכמים לא דייך מה שאסרה תורה אלא שאתה אוסר עליך דברים אחרים ובכלל הזה אלו שמתענין תמיד אינן בדרך טובה ואסרו חכמים שיהא אדם מסגף עצמו בתענית ועל כל הדברים האלו וכיוצא בהן צוה שלמה ואמר אל תהי צדיק הרבה ואל תתחכם יותר למה תשומם.
So we discussed already. So what's the parsha of nedarim and shvuos therefore? If
לא דייך מה שאסרה תורה אלא שאתה אוסר עליך דברים אחרים,
so the answer is again, that's seyag le'prishus. That nedarim and shvuos are there for a person to uphold the Torah's balance, the Torah's system. A person sees that that lehisgaber on a yetzer hara and that to keep himself on a certain path, so he needs the external pressure of nedarim u'shvuos. So that's why the Torah allowed for nedarim u'shvuos. But to use nedarim u'shvuos to create a different system of issur ve'heter than that which the Torah designs, so that avada is asur. That's not what the Torah has in mind. What the Rambam said etc. about the Chazal, about the Chazal, the Chazal say that David Hamelech was able to kill the yetzer hara through all his taniyos. So again, stama the Rambam would tell us like the Gemara in Nedarim about the nazir, yehi kamocha be'Yisrael, and רבן שמעון בן גמליאל, that there too that David Hamelech felt that that was that was necessary in order to again ultimately be on the mida habeinonis. And the שאסרו חכמים שיהא אדם מסגף עצמו בתענית again means to create a different balance than that which the Torah has. But what do you do with that drasha of Rabbi Elazar ha-Kappar about that the nazir is nikra choteh? Maiseh the Torah the Torah associates the nazir with the kadosh yiyeh. It's hard to say that the whole thing is, again, it's yesh ve-yesh. So it could be, I'm not sure if the Rambam has this in mind, but the context of the וכיפר עליו מאשר חטא על הנפש is by a nazir tamei, a nazir she-nitma. So yitachen that the peshat is that if a person gets an indication al derech aggadah, if a person gets an indication min ha-shamayim that the neziros was not le-ratzon, so then the neziros wasn't accomplishing, again, it wasn't accomplishing the syag li-perishus. So then it's just that, then it's going to be וכיפר עליו מאשר חטא על הנפש. But when it's accomplishing that, the pure neziros taharah, so Chazal don't darshan it by neziros taharah. So maybe it means when when a person misfires with the neziros. And so we'll leave the וכל מעשיך יהיו לשם שמים for next time.